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The Costs of Cigarettes
I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

A. A Brief History of Cigarette Regulation
Cigarette smoking causes over 420,000 deaths annually in the United
States, roughly twenty percent of all U.S. deaths, 1 making cigarettes the single
greatest preventable cause of death in this country.2 Indeed, tobacco kills more
people every year than alcohol, illicit drugs, automobile accidents, violent
crime, and AIDS combined.3 And not only are cigarettes deadly to smokers;
they kill nonsmokers as well. According to a recent report from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the ..sidestream" or ..passive'" smoke
from cigarettes-so-called environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)-is responsible
annually for approximately 3000 lung cancer deaths, between 1 50.000 and
300,000 lower respiratory ailments in children, and approximately 37,000 heart
disease deaths.4
Considering the staggering social costs imposed by cigarette smoking, an
outside observer might find it odd that cigarette production and consumption
in this country are, to a remarkable extent, unregulated. It is true that selling

See

I.

U.S. DEP' T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. SMOKll'G ASD HEALTI! I� TI!E A'IERICAS 106

(1992) (reporting an annual smoking-death rate of approx1ma1ely -134.000);

Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-United States. 1990. 42

C1garr1te Snwkmg·A1tr1burublr

MORBlOIIT

& MORTALIIT WKLY REP

645, 645-49 (1993) (reporting an annual smoking-death ralc of nppro�1ma1cly -120.000. which "'"lb
approximately 20% of all United States deaths in 1990); see

a/lo

RICHARD

Pero ET AL. MORTAUTI" FRO\t

SMOKING IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1950-2000, at A.7 & tbl.I (I99-1) (discussing lhc: worldwide: hc:ahh
effects of cigarettes and estimating thal smoking kills two m1lhon people: each year in de:, eloping counln.:5
alone).
2.

See

AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES-1997, al 23 (1997). cf Carl E.

Bartecchi et al.,

The Human Casts of Tobacco Use

(pt. I), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED 907. 907-10 ( 199-1)

(noting many adverse heahh con>equences of smoking); Polly A. Newcomb & Paul P. Carbone.

Ca11sequences af Smaki11g: Cancer,

types of cancer caused by cigarene smoking); Nicholas J. Wald & Allan K. Hacbhaw.

An Epidemiological Oven•iew, 52

The Health

76 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 305. 311-24 (1992) (dcta1hng lhc

\"llflOU5

C1garr1te Smoking

BRIT. MED. BULL 3, 3 (1996) (>ummanzmg the: hc:ahh problems cau.scd

by smoking).
3.

See

Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of C1garc:ttc:5 and Smokc:IC5S Tobacco To

Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44.398 (1996) ('Tobacco alone: kills mon: people:
each year in the United States than acquired immunodeficiency >yndrome (AIDS). car accidents. alcohol.
homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and tires. combined."); J. Michael McGanms & Wilham H. Foc:gc:. Ac111a/

Causes of Death i11 the U11ited States.

270 J AMA 2207. 2208 (1993). For a general summary of the 111·

health effects of cigarettes, see Graham E. Kelder. Jr.

Effective Camral of the Sale and Use of Tobacco,

& Richard A. Daynard. Tlte Role af Lmgatwn

111

the

8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63. 6-1-65 ( 1997) For a

detailed summary of all the known or suspected 111-heahh con>equencc. of >mo�ing as of 1989. sec OFACE

ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTil &

HUMAN

SERVS .• REDLCISG ntE HEALTII

CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 37-101 (1989) [hen:inafter SURGEOS GE.... ERAL'S
PROGRESS REPoRT).

4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY. R-.SPIRATORY HEALTII EFFECTS OF PASSIVE S\tOKISG
C' ANCER ANU OTHER DISORDERS 3 (1992) (hen:inaftc:r EPA. PASSIVE S�IOKISG). US E."vn...

LUNG

YRC',....- 'TION AGENCY, SETT ING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: SECOSDHAND SMOKE IS A PREVE.'-"TABLE HEALTII

su also Ehzabc:th T.H . Fontham
Envirarmenral Tobacco Smoke and lung Cancer m No11s111okmg \Vomen, 271 JAMA 1752, 1759

RISK 1, 44 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, SETTING TI!E RECORD STRAIGHT);
et al.,

( 1 994) (confirming the EPA's 1994 conclusions in the large�t case-control study ever conducted on the
subject).
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cigarettes to minors is i llegal in every state.5 It is also true that a number of
states and municipalities have passed laws and ordinances restricting the right
to smoke in various public domains-from government buildings and health
facilities to, in some cases, private workplaces.6 And if one compares these
levels of regulation to the level of regulation imposed on, say, bubble gum
consumption, cigarette smoking seems fairly heavily regulated.7 If, however,
one compares cigarettes with other products that are considered dangerous but
are comparatively less costly to society, such as heroin or cocaine,8 the level
of cigarette regulation seems inadequate. After all, adult smoking is legal in
all fifty states. Likewise, if one compares the hands-off approach to regulating
cigarette companies with the hands-on approach to regulating, say,
pharmaceutical companies (many of whose products treat or even cure, rather
than cause, serious health problems), tobacco companies appear to be
essentially unregulated. Of the tobacco regulations that do exist, many turn out
to be industry-friendly.9 On top of all this, unti l very recently it appeared that
5. See Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Imlttstry: New
Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 727 n.114 (1997).
6. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcemellf,
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 69-70 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen 0. Sugammn
eds., 1993) [hereinafter SMOKING POLICY].
7. But cf Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Burning Questions: Tobacco Pact's Limits-am/ /ts
Loopholes-Presage Fierce Debate, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at A I (arguing that cigarettes receive "less
government oversight of [their] contents and marketing than ice cream").
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. Each of the two most significant prior efforts to regulate cigarette manufacturers-through warning
requirements and advertising bans-turned out to favor the cigarette industry. See Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Tobacco companies fought against the warning requirements
imposed by Congress but ultimately used the warnings as an effective shield against some types of tori
suits. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-31 (1992) (plurality opinion); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986) ("It is ironic that the legislation which the tobacco
company sought so hard to defeat now serves to substantially immunize it from liability . . . . "); Margaret
Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 9 (1997)
(explaining that Cipollone stands for the proposition that federal Jaw preemption provisions may apply to
state tort Jaw claims). When cigarette advertising on television was banned in 1971, see Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act § 6, 84 Stat. at 95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335), manufacturers
quickly shifted their advertising to other media without any significant harm to their business. One of their
strategies was to place their brand imagery in key places for televised sporting events, thus ensuring
continued TV exposure-without the antismoking ads that had previously been coupled with their own TV
spots (pursuant to the "fairness doctrine" promulgated by the FCC in 1967). See Capital Broad. Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 589 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) ('The result of the legislation was
that as both the cigarette advertisements and most anti-smoking messages left the air, the tobacco
companies transferred their advertising budgets to other forms of advertising such as newspapers and
magazines where there was no fairness doctrine to require a response."), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. IOOO (1972).
The ban also had the effect of making entry more difficult for potential competitors. Finally, the ban
"ma(de] it nearly impossible for states and municipalities to restrict or ban the tobacco industry's
promotional activities." Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 68. On net, the advertising ban appears lo have
been to the clear advantage of the industry. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. For a di�cu�sion of the
inefficacy of previous attempts to regulate cigarette advertisements, see RICHARD KLUGER, ASllES TO
ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASllED
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 279-80, 298-99 (1996). Cf Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, al 63 (observing
that "the industry takes an active part in trying to pass weak, industry-friendly, tobacco control legislation
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cigarette companies, unlike most product manufacturers, were effectively
immune from regulation by tort Jaw. 10
How can this be? A good case can be made that the cigarette industry
owes its privileged, lightly regulated status largely to the perseverance and
ingenuity of its lawyers and to an unprecedented level of industry cooperation
and solidarity. By amassing an immense lobbying war chest, 1 1 by developing
a uniquely aggressive public relations and advertising approach, 12 and by
adopting a self-described "General Patton" litigation strategy,11 the cigarette
industry has gained a reputation as unbeatable both in the courtroom and in the
public policy arena.
Consider, for instance, the industry's extraordinary ability for many years
to avoid paying a penny to any tort plaintiff. Until very recently, the vast
majority of decided cases and other legal authorities were hostile to the notion
of c igarette manufacturer liability. Cigarette companies had managed not to
pay damages (or to settle for a substantial payment) in even a single case
brought against them by smoking plaintiffs, notwithstanding two "waves" of
tort suits during the fi fty years that scholars refer to as the "products liability
revolution."14 Until very recently as well, cigarette plaintiffs could find liule
at the scace level 1hroughou1 the count!)' chai would preempt the auc hont)' of local go'emmcnt' to control
the sale and use of tobacco").
IO.

See infra

notes 1 4, 779, and accompanying texl.

1 1 . Senator Edward M. Kennedy said in 1 979 of the tobacco mdu,tl)
probably the most effective lobby on Capitol Hill." Roben Pear.

""Dollar for dollar. thc)°n::

A Neu &af; No.... tire Ard1enem1n N.:ed

Each Other, N.Y.

TIMES, June 22, 1 997 . at D I . Indus!!)' lobbying cffon' were cspcc1ally intcn:>e in 1 997.
including expenditures of over $30 million and the employmenl of 'uch pohucal hcav)' "c1ght5 a5 Howard

See Maureen Do\\d . lntegnt\' Cleara11ce St1le. NY TIMES.
Dec. 20, 1 997, at A l 3. For an excellent summary of the numerou' wap in \\ htch the tobacco industry has

Baker, George Mitchell, and Ann Richards.

historically employed its lobbying prowess to us benefil. sec Kelder & Dayn ard. supm note 3. at

See also supra

66· 7 1

note 9 (summarizing several failed anempts to regulate the c1garc1tc industry J . 111/m note

20 and accompanying text (describing the FDA's reluctance to regulate the crgarctte industry)
1 2.

See PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRl'lll

BEHIND TIIE TOBACCO l�Dl'STRY COVER-UP 17 ·

1 8 ( 1 996) (describing the tobacco industl)''s public rclauons :mad. on studies connccung smoking and
health risks); KLUGER,

supra nole 9, at 23. 7 1 . 292-93, 443 (deta1hng

tobacc o- mdustl)' markcung strategics.

from packaging and labeling techniques to advertisements that appeal to consumer demand for ) outhful
vigor and social and professional success). For a brief sample of the industl)

infra

's ad vcmsi ng strategic,,

sec

notes 58, 69 1 , and accompanying texl.

1 3. An anomey for R.J. Reynolds (RJR) descnbed the strategy (in an internal memo) a5 follo\\ s
The aggressive posture we have taken regarding dcpos1 11ons and d1,,.;o\el)· in general conllnUC">
to make these cases extremely burdensome and expcml \ e for plaintiff,· hm)crs. pamcularly

sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Panon, the way we won these c� Wa5 not by
spending all of [RJR's) money, but by making that other >On of a buch >pend all ht•
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 8 1 4

F. Supp. 4 1 4, 42 1 (D.N.J 1 993) <quoting J � hchacl Jordan) Very

recent evidence suggests 1hat, in anticipation of possible hab1ht) ,uus against their clients. some tobacco
lawyers may have stepped outside of professional ethical boundanc,.

Tobacco Finns, Papers Show, WALL ST.

Su Milo Ge )'c h n . IA>nen Shield

J.. Aug. 7. 1 997. at A3 (reponmg that "law)'crs an: said to have

cunailed research inlo the safety of cigarenes. cleared the rcle� of 1nforrnauon about health •tud1� and
even suggested the destruction of unfavorable poll re'ult' about smoking and health">
1 4. E.g., Kelder & Daynard,

supra note 3.

at 7 1 -72. The first \\a\'e of tobacco la\\>Ull> began in the

s.... Robcn L Rabin .
Tobacco Tort ue1lnlm·. 111 S\tOKl'G POI.ICY. mpra note 6. at
1 1 0, 1 1 0. For the mos! pan, the first wave was decided in negligence reg1m� s.... rd at 1 1 4 There

1 950s, resulted in major decisions throughout the 1 960,. and tapered out in the 1 970.

/nstit111ional and Historical Perspecm·es

011

followed a lull in the 1 970s, when few tobacco suit> \ \Crc brought The �ond "a'e commenced in the
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reason for hope in the more general trends in products liability law. Whereas
the 1 960s and 1 970s were characterized by an extraordinary expansion of
liability, reflecting the then-prominent theory of enterprise liability, that trend
largely ended in the mid- 1 980s. Since then, there has been a substantial retreat
from enterprise liability in the courts. 1 5 In addition, one of tobacco plaintiffs'
most promising legal theories, generic product liability, 16 has lost viability.
Courts that were moving toward generic product liability, condemning outright
particular products as unreasonably dangerous (despite the best possible design,
construction, and warnings) and therefore subjecting them to strict liability,
have been repeatedly overridden by their state legislatures. 17 Moreover, the
reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts 1 8 squarely rejected generic
products liability. 1 9
Similarly, for most of this time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
avoided any challenge to the nonregulatory status quo. That decision was due,
not to a perceived lack of jurisdiction, but to a bureaucratic instinct for self
preservation. In the words of former FDA Commissioner David Kessler:
"There was a sense among many within the agency that you couldn' t pull it
off, and the last thing you wanted was to tackle something you couldn' t pull
off and have the agency get killed."20

1 980s, see id. at 1 1 0, after the passage of legislation mandating warnings on cigarette packaging und
advertising, see Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -222, 84 Stut. 87; Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, and after most jurisdictions had adopted
strict liability, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A ( 1 965) (imposing strict liability for physical
harm caused by defective products that are unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer). At
the same time, however, considerable public outcry and scholarly opinion began to emerge against strict
liability. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform. 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 70 1 , 70 1 -02
( 1 992).
Only a few years ago, cigarette manufacturers fended off another major attack and successfully
maintained their perfect record of products liability victories. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-3 1 (plurality
opinion) (holding that the labeling acts preempted the plaintiff's claims based on a failure to warn, but not
claims based on express warranty. some types of fraudulent misrepresentation, or conspiracy). In Cipollone.
the industry managed to exhaust a plaintiff and a sizeable law firm that had invested large amounts of
money in the futile effort. See Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.B.A. J .. Feb. 1 993, at 30, 30.
1 5. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolmion in Proc/11cts Li11bility:
An Empirical St11dy of Legal Change, 31 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481 ( 1 990) (noting the increasing perccntuge
of decisions favoring defendants); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning 11nd the Possible Encl of the Rise of
Modem American Tort law, 26 GA. L. REV. 60 1 , 647-48 ( 1 992) (observing a recent judicial retreat from
broad liability rules).
1 6. This theory also goes by the terms generic product risk. categorical liability, and product category
liability. See Carl T. Bogus, The Third Revollllion in Products Liability. 72 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 ( 1 996).
1 7. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the Americt1n Products lit1bility
Fro111ier: The Rejection of Lit1bility Witho11t Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1 3 1 5 & n. 1 95 ( 1 99 1 ); Joseph
A. Page, Liability for Unret1s01wbly t1nd Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine f/c1ve
t1 Role To Play?, 72 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 87, 1 08 & n.95 (1996).
1 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
1 9. See id. § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note at 94-97; see also Henderson & Twerski, s11prt1 note 17 at 1 3141 5 ("[P]roduct-category liability is not now the governing law in any jurisdiction."). Biii see Bogus, s11pm
note 1 6, at 1 1 - 1 7 (noting strong academic criticism of the new Restatement). For an i mportant recent series
of articles on generic products liability, see Symposium 011 Generic Products Lillbility, 72 Cltl.- KENT L.
REV. 3 ( 1 996).
20. Freedman & Hwang, supra note 7. The concern was well-founded. as Kessler was later to discover
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Because of the dominant public sentiment regarding smokers and cigarette
manufacturers, the prospect of altering this essentially laissez-faire market has
long seemed remote. Indeed, the inhospitable legal environment reflects-and
is, to some extent, the product of-the traditional American values of self
reliance and individualism, as well as pervasive public hostili1y toward
smokers (the usual plaintiffs).21 For a long time, there has been a strong sense
among many scholars, commentators, and members of the public that smokers
who die prematurely get what they bargained for (and. perhaps. what they
deserve) and should not be heard to complain. much less be compensated.
when smoking causes its predictable results.��
Whatever the explanation, cigarette manufaclurers have enjoyed substantial
immunities from many of the regulatory mechanisms to which almost every
other product manufacturer is subject. Bui, as anyone who reads 1he newspaper
knows, the story does not end there. In the last 1wo or 1hree years. there has
been a partial shift in public sentiment, leading 10 the beginning of a powerful
political backlash against the industry.�' Part of the exp lanai ion for this
backlash l ies in recent revelations regarding the addictiveness of smoking (and
the extent to which tobacco companies not only knew 1hat smoking is
addictive, but also altered the degree of cigarettes' addictiveness by controlling
nicotine levels)24 and regarding the cigarette manufacturers' marketing
strategies (targeting children)25 and public relations stralegies (denying the
when his job and the role of the FDA were threatened b) the Republican bacl.l;i,.h 10 the: FDA'' 1m11al
regulatory steps. See Jeffrey Goldberg. Nexr Targer: N1co1111e. NY Tl�lf:S. Aug -l, 1 996, § 6 1!1-lagazrnc:).
a! 22 (describing the harsh responses of leading Rcpubllcam. including Hou>e Spc:al..c:r Xc:\\t Gmgnch and
presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole. 10 Kc"ler\ aggrc"l\c: pu'h 10 rc:gulale 1oba.:co, among olher
produc!S).
2 I. Cf David M. Engel, The 01·e11 Bird's So11g: !trmlers. 0111s1den. mttl Perw11t1/ ln1ur1e1 111 <111
America11 Communiry, 1 8 L & Soc'y REv. 551. 558-59 1 1 98-11 (finding. rn a '!Ud) of a rural county m
Illinois, strong noons of individuali'm and ,e1f.,uffic1ency running coumc:r 10 nom1' that tend lo promote
litigiousness).
22. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman. Enemies of Tob11<"Co Pou Tlte1r 01rn Rub, ('111 TRI O , Apr 2-l,
1 997, at 1 9; Richard A. Epstein, Big Tob11cco's Btg Mts111ke, NY Tl\!ES, June 25. 1 997, at A l 9, Robert
Samuelson, \Vito \Viii Finance rite Tobacc0 Se11leme1111. Clll. TRIO. Apr. 25. 1 997, a! 3 1 . <1 RCSTATE.\IE.'T
(SECOND) OF TORTS § -l02A cmt i ( 1 965) (noting !ha! "good tobacco " nol unrc..,,onably dangerolb Jnd
therefore producers arc no! liable for the hann' cau,cd b) 1i''l l11c: public', general a1111ude IO\\ ard Jnal
lawyers, and !he unfavorable anention !ha! produc1' llugauon h;i,. rc:cc:1vc:d from conunc:n!alor. and pohu ca l
leaders, especially in Republican campaigning \mcc 1he 1980,, h;i,. con1nbu1c:d 10 the: mho>pllablc: chma!e
for all products liability plaintiffs. See Carl T. Bogu,, \for on rlt.- Cm1111w11 um ni.- Srmi:i:le t11 1lte Ce111er
of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L REV. I ( 1 995 J; Ste\ en P C'rolc) & Jon D Hanwn. n1e Stmp<'< u11wn
Costs of Accide11ts: Pai11-a11d-S11ffer111g Damage> 111 Tort um. 1 08 llAR\' L RH 1787. 1 787-89I 1 995)
23. See Glenn Frankel. Money Is 1ippmg Big Tobacu}s Swl.-1. WASH Po:-1. Apr 27. 1 997 . at Al
(describing a "massive public backlash agam'I the mdu,1ry"). Pnncc:Jon Sune) Re-.:arch A�'>OCJJI�
Telephone Poll, Apr. 1 9-25. 1 996. m·111lable 111 WESTLAW. POLL Da1aba>C, Que,uon ID :-lo
USPSRA.05 1 396 R30E (indicating !ha!, of 1 75 1 re'pondcnb. 75q. de,cnbcd 1hc:i r opinion of tobacco
companies as either "mostly unfavorJblc" or "vcl)' unfavorJble")
24. See infra notes 1 44. 1 6 1 . 2 1 9 .
25. See Kelder & Daynard, supra no1e 3. a! 66 ("(T]he tobacco mdu'll) Jemc:' 1ha1 11 1arge1, nunor.
in its promotional campaigns, but evidence garnered from internal mdu,try Jocumcnh point' 10 1hc
contrary."). For a descnption of the most recent document' 10 come 10 hgh! md1ca11ng 1ha1 at Jc:a.,I one
manufacturer, RJ. Reynolds, aggre,sively 1arge1cd adolc.ccnb. 'cc John Mmlz & Saundra Tol'T). /ltremul
R.J. Reynolds Docume/l/s Derail Cigarelle Marketmg A1111.-d 11t Cl11ldt"r'11, WASH POST. JJn 1 5. 1 998. al
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health effects of smoking despite knowledge of the enormous risks).26
Partially as a cause and partially as a consequence of these revelations, an
immense third wave of tobacco litigation has emerged,27 which, unlike either
of the first two waves, appears to pose a considerable threat to the cigarette
industry.28 In addition, in August 1 995, after more than fifty years of opting
not to regulate,29 the FDA finally asserted its jurisdiction over tobacco
products and announced plans to regulate tobacco as a drug.3° For the first
time ever, cigarette manufacturers now face a substantial threat of regulation.

Al.
26. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 7 7 ("(The evidence] makes clear . . . that the i ndustry was
well aware of the pharmacologically active, addictive, and harmful nature of its products and that it took
active steps to hide this i nformation from its customers as well as the public at large."); illfra notes 144,
1 6 1 , 2 1 9.
27. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 70-88 (describing litigation as an effective alternative to
legislative and administrative regulation of tobacco).
28. Previous suits had been brought primarily by smokers themselves. The plaintiffs in those suits
alleged that cigarettes caused their illnesses and injuries, allegations that rang hollow for many judges and
juries who apparently concluded that smokers had no one to blame but themselves. See Robert L. Rabin
& Stephen D. Sugarman, Overview, ill SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 3, 1 6; Gary T. Schwartz,
Tobacco Liability ill the Courts, ill SMOKING POLICY, supra note 6, at 1 3 1 , 143; illfra note 68 and
accompanying text. The 1 990s approach avoids that pitfall: New plaintiffs, such as secondhand smokers
and public health insurers (representing the general population of premium payers) have brought suit. These
plaintiffs have been injured by cigarettes, but cannot easily be said to have chosen to assume the risk. And
the smokers who sue today have newfound evidence suggesting that cigarette manufacturers concealed the
addictiveness of their products, significantly reducing the extent to which smokers can plausibly be said
to have assumed the risks. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 77; see also illfra notes 144, 1 6 1 , 2 1 9
(discussing evidence that cigarette manufacturers knew o f cigarettes' addictiveness and even manipulated
the levels of nicotine in cigarettes).
Nevertheless, even the most promising third-wave doctrinal theories are, at best, untested, and their
success seems closely tied to the perceived economics of cigarette smoking. See Bob Van Voris, AG Claims
Mere Smoke?, NAT' L LJ., Apr. 28, 1 997, at A l (describing the significance of the economic issues).
Economic theory appears to be gaining in influence in other debates over tobacco policy. See, e.g., Kenneth
E. Warner et al., Criteria for Determillillg all Optimal Cigarette Tax: The Ecollomist's Perspective, 4
TOBACCO CONTROL 380, 380 ( 1 995) (describing a 1 993-1 994 debate regarding whether to i ncrease cigarette
taxes and explaining that "(a]lthough political considerations undoubtedly predominated, the debate was
marked by an unusual emphasis on economic theory and analysis").
29. See Saundra Torry, Duel ill a Country Courthouse, with Tobacco Regulatioll at Stake, WASll.
POST, Aug. 1 8, 1 997, at Fl.
30. Jurisdiction was based on the conclusions that the "nicotine in tobacco products is highly addictive,
causes other psychoactive effects, such as relaxation and stimulation, and affects weight regulation" and
that those "responses to nicotine are effects on the structure or function of the body within the meaning
of the Act." Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Jurisdiction over Nicotine-Containing
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 4 1 ,453, 4 1 ,464 ( 1 995) (referring to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2 1 U.S.C. § 301 ( 1 994)). Based on that jurisdiction, the FDA promulgated
new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products, on tobacco marketing and advertising, and on product
labeling. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To
Protect Children and Adolescents, 6 1 Fed. Reg. 44,396 ( 1 996) (codified at 2 1 C.F.R. pis. 80 1 , 803, 804,
807, 820, 897 ( 1 997)). The new regulations attempt to stop the sale of tobacco products to minors by
requiring manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to comply with a variety of packaging, advertising,
marketing, and sales restrictions. See id. The tobacco industry has challenged these restrictions in federal
court. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1 374 (M.D.N.C. 1 997) (invalidating some of the new
regulations). The Fourth Circuit is currently deciding the case. There now appear to be doubts not only
about the regulations' legality, but also about the FDA's jurisdiction altogether. See Torry, supra note 29;
Bob Van Voris, Tobacco: Alld Now the Appeal, NAT'L L.J., May 1 2, 1 997, at A l .
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Consequently, the tobacco companies perceiYe the threat as real. The once
unified industry and its take-no-prisoners litigation strategy have given way to
defection in the ranks, historic senlement talks, senlements, and a host of
1
unprecedented federal legislative proposals. 1 By far the single most important
development has been the proposed tobacco senlement reached by state
attorneys general and the tobacco industry last June and now being considered
by federal Iawmakers. 32 Although the negotiations giving rise to that proposed
settlement seemed rushed, and earlier anempts to regulate have yielded only
modest gains, those active in the process promise that, this time, the
regulations will have teeth. 33 This Article is motivated in part by our concern
that this promise will not be kept and that the regulations may fail to address
the problems that sparked them in the first place. More specifically, it is
motivated by the sense that the current debates over smoking policy have
omitted from consideration a type of regulation-ex post incentive-based
regulation-that may well be superior to those being considered.
B. An Introduction to Incentive-Based Regulario11 and Emerprise Liability
Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists sometimes distinguish
among three types of regulation: command-and-conrrol rules; performance
based standards; and incenrive-based systems. Loosely defined, command-and
control rules impose specific requirements on regulated firms. For instance, a
polluter might be required to adopt a particular type of technology designed to

3 1 . See. e.g., Placing Re•tra1ms on Tobacco\ Endangcnnent of Cl11Jdren and Teen' A,t. S 1530.
105th Cong. (1997); Healthy and Smokcfree Children Act. S 1-192. J05th Cong
Settlement Act, S. 1415. 105th Cong. (1997);

see

( 19971. L'm\C:l">.11 Tobacco
Plan ,

also Judy Fahy ,. lltz1d1 L'111e1ls folmno Btttrle

SALT LAKE TRIB., NO\. 13, 1997. at A9 (pr0\1dmg a bnc:f O\cn1e\\ and compamon of th� three b1ll>J
One key to the tobacco mdustry's deci•1on to con,1dcr a nauonal .cnlcmcnt '"'' the dcfccuon of

Sa Bob Hohler. :u Ask 711111 fobacw Pact
Spare Liggetr, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14. 1997. at AIO l'ndcr Cl11cf Exccull\C Benne!! S LcBo". Lagge!!
has admitted that cigarenes cause health problc 1m and that the mdu,try'' mari.cung 'tr.ucgy targeted
children. See 1d. Many state anorneys general •cc the L1ggc n ,culcmc:nt a. crucial to the more general \\ar
against tobacco. As Mmnesota Attorney General Hubcn II Humphre) 1 1 1 put 11. ·1111, 1' .i linlc: like bu,ung
a drug dealer to get at the Colombian can c l. " Id
32. See Tobacco Se11/eme111 (v1,11cd June 25. 1997 I <Imp"""" u.atoday (OJn/nc""'mol.c:/
Liggen Group, Inc., which senled separately with 23 •late•

smokeO1.htm>.

33. Massachusetts Anorney General Scon Har..hbargcr. for c:\.tmplc. \\a. lughl) '>Clf<ongratulatory
Twenty months ago, when the,c Jaw,u1b began. nobod) \\ould ha'c dreamed that 20 month,
later we would have big tobacco on II• h•-eb. lx'Conung the mo't regulated mdu,U)' 111 th1>
country. [paying] billion• for children·, health and the public health

This . .. is a hi,tonc breaJ,.through. And I thmJ,. an) body "ho "ant> to que,11011 u

ha. the

burden of proof to •how what ehe could ha\'c Ix-en done to change the \Cl') nature of th1,
industry without banning [c1garenc•] .

Morning Edition (NPR radio broadca.l. June 2-1. 19971. <llm/ablr 111 LEXIS. Sc"' Library. :-IPR File
(Transcript No. 97062402-210): see also 1d. (•tatcment of M1"1"1pp1 Auorne) General �lake �loon:) Some
policymakers who were not 111\'0l\'cd 111 the nego11a11om \\en: appan:ntl) pcr.uaded b) 'u'h ilC(oUnt• For
example, Senator Orrin Hatch. c11111g the prop<hal'> public health effect" urged Congr�' to "'>CllC upon
[the Attorneys' General] i11111ative. to improve 11
and to pass implementing legblation

.

"11hou1 JC:Opard111ng an) of 11, ba." component>.''

quic kly . 143 Co'G R!:r S12.579 lda1l) c:d So' 13, 19971
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limit the quantity of pollution. Perfonnance-based standards tell finns what
they must accomplish but leave them to decide how best to do so. Such a
standard, for example, might specify the maximum quantity of pollution that
a firm may produce without specifying the means by which the firm is
required to comply. Finally, incentive-based systems force firms to internalize
the total costs of their activities, leaving finns to decide what, if anything, to
do about those costs.34
Over the past two decades, the clear trend in regulation has been away
from command-and-control rules and toward incentive-based (or, as they are
sometimes referred to, "market-based") systems.35 That trend is consistent
with, and largely the result of, an emerging scholarly consensus that incentive
based regulatory systems are often the superior approach because they harness
the power of the market to generate efficient outcomes and do not rely on
regulators to attempt to identify and mandate those outcomes. As Susan Rose
Ackerman explains, an incentive-based system attempts to ensure only that all
appropriate costs are i nternalized and then permits the decentralized,
independent choices of individuals and businesses to shape policy outcomes.36
If the institution responsible for administering the incentive-based system can
determine the marginal cost associated with the underlying product (and that
is a big "if'), then it can charge a fee equal to that marginal cost and let the
manufacturers respond.37 This approach arguably avoids the costly and
imperfect process of creating fully specified command-and-control rules or
performance-based standards, yet it ensures that the party with the best
information-the manufacturer-is left with an incentive to self-regulate. Put
differently, command-and-control and performance-based regulations seek to
prohibit or discourage certain market outcomes, while incentive-based

34. For further discussion of the three types of regulation, see infra Part IV.
35. See E. Donald Elliott, Recipe for Industrial Policy: Blending Environmentalism and /111emC1tiom1/
Competitiveness, 1 9 CAN. -U.S. L.J. 305, 3 1 3 ( 1 993) (remarking on the worldwide trend toward "mnrket
based and incentive-based" approaches to regulation). Moreover, there is a growing consensus among
economists and other policy analysts that the movement toward incentive-based regulation is desirable,
especially in the context of dealing with the external costs of pollution. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 27 1 ( 1 982) ("Given the difficulties with standard setting, many economists
have urged the use of taxes or other incentive-based systems to deal with spillover problems."); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmen/Cll Law: The Democratic CClse for Market
/ncenrives. 1 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 7 1 ( 1 988) (making the case for the use of incentive-based
regulations). President Clinton endorsed the trend in a recent executive order on regulatory review: "Each
agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic
incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing
i nformation upon which choices can be made by the public." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639
( 1 994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 ( 1 997). The Supreme Court has also encouraged the use of this sort
of regulatory approach by upholding the constitutionality of user fees charged by the Department of
Transportation. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 2 1 2 ( 1 989). The fees were designed to
internalize the costs of administering federal pipeline safety standards.
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look Cit Reg11/e1tory
NegotiCllion, 43 DUKE L.J. 1 206, 1 2 1 5 ( 1 994).
37. As we detail below, there are a variety of types of incentive-based regulation. See infm Part V.
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regulations seek to eliminate the underlying market failures that give rise to
undesirable outcomes. 38
Enterprise liability, which holds manufacturers liable for all the ha1 ms
caused by their products, is one possible ex post incentive-based regime.19 In
other work,40 we have argued that enterprise liability is, on efficiency
grounds, the most desirable products liability regime. This type of regulation,
we have argued, may be particularly appropriate when a product's
characteristics make consumers undeterrable-that is, where tort law can do
very little directly to give consumers incentives to take efficient precautions
beyond adjusting their activity levels.41 In this Article, we focus on two
general sources of consumer undeterrability. First, consumers may be
undeterrable if they are optim1st1c with respect to-that is. if they
systematically underestimate-the risks posed by products. Second, consumers
may be undeterrable if they are able to externalize product risks to third
parties. With respect to the latter, we distinguish between two types of
38. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oale•. E111·1ronme111t1I Enmu11110 A Sun n . 30 J Eco-.
LITERATURE 675, 699-700 { 1 992) {claiming 1hat mccntl\ e-b� pohc1e' can contnbute to cffecll \ e
regulation); Robert W . Hahn, Eco11omic Prescrrprwns for Ei11·rrm1111mral Probl.-r1u I/oh rlr.- Pt1r1011
Followed rite Docror 's Orders, 3 J. Ecos. PERSP. 95. 95 ( 1 9891 <Je.cnbmg comrnand-Jnd-conlrul
..
regulation as an approach in which the regulator 'pec1fic, 1hc 1echnology a linn rnu•t u..: to comply w11h
regulations").
39. As we explain i11fra Part IV, enterpri'e hab1h1y •• one of >.e\erJI po"1ble fonn. of rncenll \ e·bJ.>.Cd
regulation. Although we conclude in that part thal 'ornc 1ype of ( \·1c11111-1n111a1ed ex PQ'll rncenu•e·ba>.ed
regulation of cigarelles is likely the mosl desm1blc regulatory approach. "e ad.no" ledge lhJt enlerpn..:
liability may not be as effective as other incenuvc-ba.ed regulatory opuon•. Ne, enhcle''- for lhc "'l..e ul
simplicity and ease of exposition, we focu' i11fra Pan' II-Ill on an 1deahzed enterpn..: hab1l11> regune t \Vc
assume, for instance, that enterprise liability I> co,llc" 10 adm1m,ler and tluu cao.auon que,u un' du not
pose a problem for courts. We relax both of tho'e a.'urnpuon• wfm Pan V and compan:: d1lfcrcnt
incentive-based regulatory approaches in more rcali>l1c 1cm1• l Hence. "e orge the reader to remember lhJt
enterprise liability serves only as a simple and convenient placeholder for lhe more general concept ul e'
post incentive-based regulation.
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue. The F1rsr-Pan1 lrrrnrci11c.- £11enwlm An l:t mw1111<
Justificatio11 for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV . I �9 ( 1 990) [hen:rnafter Hanwn & Logue. Tire
First-Parry illsura11ce E.rrernality); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D Logue. Towartl Placing Pruduch L1Jb1lrt)
in Context: The Effect of Non-Tort System• of Dclcrrence and Olher Source' of L' nde1errab1 lrl ) 2 l -t2 10c1
1 996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the fole Lall" Jmmw/) [hereinafter Hanwn & Logue. Pruducl•
Liability in Context); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, Towartl Placing Tort La" r n Cunle\l T.ikmg
Non-Tort Systems of Deterrence Seriously {Oct. 1 996) (unpublr>hed manu'>C npl . on lite \\ 1lh lhe fole Lm
Journal) [hereinafter Hanson & Logue, Tort Law rn Conte\!); ,..,. also Jon D llanwn. Kyle D Logue &
Michael Zamore, Smokers ' Compensariotr: Tuiwrd <l Bluepr1111 for Federal R.-g11l<11wr1 of C1�<1r.-11e
Ma11ufacrurers, 22 S. ILL U. L.J. {forthcoming Spnng 1 998) [here111after H an,on cl al ) . Crole) & llanwn.
supra note 22; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Han>on. Rl.'srnmg rlre Rewlu1w11 111e R.-• " ed Ct11e fur
E11rerprise Liabi/iry, 9 1 MICH. L. REV. 683 ( 1 993) [heremafler Crolc) & Han.on. Emerpme l.J<1b1/m ] .
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Han•on. \Vlwr Lwlnl11.• Crms ' r\11 Alrenwrn e £<plwu11w11 fur Raefll E• ..111,
in Producrs Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. I ( 1 99 1 l [heremafh:r Crole> & Han,o n. ll"/1111 Lwb1lm Cm1s ' ) .
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, A Defen,c of Pam-and-Suffenng Damage- and S ome · 111uugh1 ' on lhc
Empirical Side of Law-and-Economics Scholar.hip (No' I . 1 9961 (unpublr,hed manu">Cnpl. on lile " 11h
the Yale law Journal) [hereinafter Croley & Han>on. A Defcn•e of Parn-and-Suffonng Damage-)
.
4 1 . For a more complele discussion of the concepl of . undeterrnb11rt>."" >.ee H an.on & Logue. Product>
Liability in Context, supra note 40. al 2 1 -42. Ahhough we did not !hen u..: the lenn ··undelerr.ible:· \\e
first discussed the idea in Hanson & Logue. Tire F1rsr·Pt1rl\ /11s11ra11c.- £<rern<1/m . rnpra nolc -10. al 1 59·
68, in which we described how the firsl-party insurance c�temalrl> produce• nonop mna l cJrc Jc, cl' ilnd
activity levels in consumer product market,.
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externalization: insurance externalities, which occur when consumers have
imperfect first-party insurance for at least some portion of the risks posed by
consumer products, and noninsurance externalities, which occur when a
product causes harm to a third-party bystander.
Insofar as consumers are undeterrable, tort law should place
product-accident costs on manufacturers. Because tort law cannot, by
hypothesis, influence consumer decisionmaking, consumers will take too few
precautions, will fail to demand efficiently safe products from manufacturers,
and will consume too many inefficiently unsafe products.42 Shifting all the
costs to manufacturers, however, would internalize the relevant costs to the
manufacturers; they, in turn, would pass these costs along to consumers. This
would lead to optimal manufacturer care levels and optimal activity levels.
To see why that is the case, consider as a stylized example an individual
consumer faced with the choice of buying and smoking a pack of cigarettes or
not. If the consumer decides to smoke the cigarettes, she faces the following
costs: $2.00, equaling the nominal price or the purchase price of the cigarettes
(reflecting the production and marketing costs),43 plus another $2.00, equaling
the present value of the future health-related costs to herself and to others
associated with smoking those cigarettes. Ideally, the consumer would purchase
a pack of cigarettes if and only if she valued a pack at $4.00 or higher.
Assume, however, that she does not internalize the health-related costs of
smoking-that is, the additional $2.00 of costs has no effect on her decision
to smoke. In that case, even if she valued the cigarettes at only $3.00, she
would purchase and smoke the cigarettes. Further suppose that the cigarette
manufacturer could completely eliminate the $2.00 per pack risk by investing
an additional $ 1 .50 per pack in safety measures. Obviously, the efficient
outcome would be for the manufacturer to make the investment, thereby
eliminating the risk associated with the cigarettes.44 Assuming consumer
undeterrability and the absence of manufacturer liability, however, the
manufacturer would not invest the $ 1 .50 in risk reduction because doing so
would cause the manufacturer to lose customers. Consumers would not
perceive the $2.00 reduction in risks associated with the additional cost and
would instead purchase cheaper and less safe brands.
Those results would present at least two deterrence-related problems. First,
too many packs of cigarettes would be purchased; in other words, activity

42. By "efficiently safe products," we mean products for which manufacturers have made ull co�t
justified i nvestments in safety. "Inefficiently unsafe products" are those for which not all such inve5tment�
have been made.
43. We are assuming for purposes of this example that the market for cigarettes is competitive und
that manufacturers enjoy only normal profits.
44. To put this conclusion in terms of Learned Hand's famous formula, see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 1 59 F.2d 1 69, 1 73 (2d Cir. 1 947), because the burden of preventing the accident ($1 .50) is
less than the expected accident cost ($2.00), which amounts to the probability times the magnitude of the
loss, efficiency requires that the accident be prevented.
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levels would be too high. Second, manufacturers would invest too little in
accident prevention; that is, manufacrurer care le1·els would be too low.�� The
economic case for enterprise liability and other forms of ex post incentive
based regulation, therefore, is that they would force manufacturers. and in tum
consumers, to internalize the total costs of cigarettes. As a consequence. both
activity levels and manufacturer care levels would be pushed in the efficient
direction. Because the nominal price would equal the total real price.
consumers would purchase the efficient quantity of cigarettes.�� There would.
in short, be no welfare loss associated with the wedge between consumers·
valuation of cigarettes and the total social cost of cigarenes in the market
Our previous work analyzing these dynamics. like much of the efficiency
oriented products liability scholarship, was written at a considerable distance
from real-world examples and implicitly assumed that all consumer products
are alike.47 One goal of this Article, therefore. is to begin to examine the
breadth of the case for enterprise liability by analyzing a specific consumer
product. For a number of reasons, cigarettes are especially worth studying. In
addition to the fact that cigarette-caused harms have become the most salient
products liability topic of the decade, if not of the century.�� cigarenes present
45. A third problem is that con>umers would lac l. mccntl\C> to tal.c dfic1ent lc\cb or care m u'mg
mfra Part> 11-111. howe"er. there ma) be hnlc that ton kl\\ can or need do .ibou1

products. As we explain

consumer care levels, especially m the c1garene context

46.

Our consumer, who valued the next pacl. at on l) $3 00. \\ ou l d no1 bu) bccau"' lhc pnce " ou ld

b e S3.50.

47. This tendency may reflect the influence of 1he �-cononuc an al ) > ! > of la\\ . \\ luch cnt1c' da1111 100
often bases sweeping policy generalizations on >1mph>t1C model> Or pcrhap> 1 1 " a con"'<jucnce of the fact
that products liability law has expenenced

>C\'er..il dramatic tr..1n,fonnat1on> m

the pa>! lift)

) Cars.

transfonnations that make it difficult for >eholars to do any 1h mg bu1 pa1n1 \\ 1th a broad bru>h :"e' erthcl�'·
it seems to us thal 100 little attention h.u. been paid 10 " hethcr and prcc1..:ly ho\\ ' an.111om aero'' pro<luci
affecl !he analysis. Moreover, the spec ific e\ampl e> U>ed are oflen <jUllc e�cept1on.1I pro<luch
Croley & Hanson,

What Liability Crisis ?. supra note 40. al 84-90 td1>eu»mg

Su

<' �

•

a \ ancl) of produci. and

services, including vaccine>, that pose c.u.e->pec1fic 1»ue»

48. The legal literature 1s by no means lacl.mg m article> on c1garelle manuf.1ctun:r h.1b1ht) �l.1ny
of the law review article> favonng cigarette manufacturer hab1ht) ha\c been doc t n nal 111 n.1turc For
example, there have been numerous articles e\anu m ng the pn:cmpt1 \ e effect of the Federal Ci garette

See. e.g. . Richard C Au>nc». Cigarerr.- ('0111pa111 Lw/11/m Prremp1w11
Public Policy, and Altema1i1·e Compe11sa11011 S1·stems. 39 S' RAC'l Sc L RI:\' 897 ( I 988J [hcrernafter
Ausness, Cigarerre Compa11y Li11bil11y] (arguing !hat the federal cigarette labc:hng l;m ,hould not be: read
to preempt state products liability claim>); Peter F Ril e ) . Nole. 77r.- Prm/110 Lwbrlrn of rlre fobat w
lndusrry: Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group Fma/11 Pran·cl rlre Cig111·..11.- .\lt11111/m ruren · ,\urn of
/nvincibiliry?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1 1 03 ( 1 989) (d1>cu»1ng the po»1b1hty that C1pol/011e \\OUld O\ ercorne the
Labeling and Advertising Act.

industry's theretofore seemingly invincible federal preemption argument) I n add111on. there ha\c been
efforts to fashion new theorie>

for holdrng cigarette compame> hablc

S.-.-. .- � . Bogu,.

mpra

note 2 2 . .11

46-59 (arguing for the application of gencnc producl hab1lny to c1garelle' I . Kelder & Da> nard . mprn no ic
3, at 64 (arguing that, notwithstanding federal labeling la11. >UCCc»ful product> hab1hl) clJ1rt1' .1ga111,t the
cigarette industry are becoming incre;u,ingly h l.el y �-cau,e of >e' crJI factors. r nd udr n g lhc

Jr...: °' Cf) or

internal industry documents detailing 1.nowledge of the dc>truct1 1 e propcmc' of na. o l r nc . mdu'lf) cflort'

to manipulate nicotine, and the unavailability of a>>umpllon-of· ml. dden �, 111 c;1"'' ri led b) \lalc-J. Irene
Scharf,

Brearhe Deeply: Tire Torr of Smokers · Bcmen . 32 Hot s L

RE\· 6 1 5.

660-K7 1 1 995! huggc,u n g

the use of a battery claim against cigarette compame> a' a meam of c1rcum' en ung �'urnpuon-of ·n>k.
defenses); Alex J. Grant, Note, New Theories of Ctgar.-11.- Lw/11/m lltc Rc.1atemcn1 !llurdJ of Ton' 1111d
rlre Viability of a Design Defee/ Cause of Ac1w11, 3 COR�EU. J L & PL B Po1. · , 3-13 ! l <)<).1 1 ! a rgu rn g th.it
the Resratemellt (T/iird)'s reversal of the pre>umed unmumt) for cigarette compame' and the c"'t ence of
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an especially attractive subject of study because of an abundance of relevant
empirical data. And because of a number of important recent developments, we
regard this as an ideal moment to reevaluate the economic case for regulating
cigarettes and for comparing alternative regulatory regimes.49
C. The Absence of Incentive-Based Regulation in the Proposed Settlement
Despite the growing popularity of incentive-based regulation among
scholars and policymakers, the proposed tobacco settlement agreement is
largely devoid of incentive-based regulation. Instead, the proposal relies almost
entirely on command-and-control and performance-based regulations.so This
omission likely has something to do with the composition of the team that
negotiated the settlement. Lawyers for the plaintiffs and defendants and some
public health experts were present,s1 but no economists or academic policy
analysts participated. Public health advocates have long believed that the
market for cigarettes is deeply and dangerously fl awed and that the deceptive
low-tar alternative cigarette designs provide a basis for bringing design defect claims against high·tar
cigarette manufacturers); Bradley M. Soos, Note, Adding Smoke to the Cloud of Tobacco litigCllion-A New
Plaintiff: The Involuntary Smoker. 23 VAL. U. L. REV. I I I ( 1 988) (arguing in favor of allowing passive
smoke victims to bring enterprise liability claims against cigarette companies). And some commentators
have-as we do in this Article-employed the tools of economic analysis to argue in favor of eilhcr some
form of absolute cigarette manufacturer liability or an alternative no-fault regime thal would place costs
on manufacturers. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An
Alternative to Strict liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. ! 085 ( 1 990) [hereinafler Ausness, Compensation)
(proposing a no-fault compensation system on corrective justice grounds); Donald W. Gamer, Cigcm!lles
and Welfare Refonn, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 ( 1 977) (providing a prescient argument in favor of making
manufacturers liable to welfare agencies that bear some of the costs of cigarettes); Frank J. Vandall,
Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Ma111ifc1clllrers, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 405 ( 1 99 1 ) (arguing for absolute cigarette manufacturer liability on co�t-intcrnalizution
grounds).
49. Specifically, there have been three significant developments. First, on a theoretical level, numerous
scholars have begun to employ efficiency analysis to argue in favor of the Matus quo and against holding
cigarette manufacturers liable. See, e.g., WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEAJ.:rtl
HABITS ( 1 99 I ); ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING ( 1 992); W.
KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION ( 1 992); Schwartz, supra note 28; Gregory P. Taxin,
Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigare/le-Related Injuries: "Smokers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS
LIAB. 22 I ( 1 994). More generally, an anti-tort and anti-generic-products-liability sentiment has come to
dominate the products liability literature. See generally Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Liability, supra note
40, at 7 1 3-67 (summarizing the products liability literature). Second, on a practical level, a great deal of
new evidence has come to light regarding the practices of cigarette manufacturers and the effects of
nicotine and cigarette smoke. For some examples of that sort of evidence, sec infra notes 64, I 04, 144, 1 6 1 ,
2 1 9, and accompanying text. Finally, o n a legal level, a third wave o f cigarette litigation has emerged, see
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, and dramatic new federal regulation of the tobacco market is
now under consideration, see infra Part VI. As n result of those three developments. this is an opportune
moment to reconsider whether cigarette manufacturer liability or alternative forms of regulation might be
justified on economic or policy grounds.
50. See infra Part VI (reviewing and criticizing relevant aspects of the proposal). Given the propo�al's
exclusive reliance on command-and-control and performance-based regulation, it is no surprise that the
debates over the proposal have centered on whether the performance-based standards arc properly calibrated
and whether the mandatory command-and-control prohibitions and requirements arc too draconian or
whether, instead, they contain too many loopholes to be effective.
5 1 . See Saundra Torry, Anny of Capital Lobbyists Has Drawn $8 Million on Tobacco Fight, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1 1 , 1 997, at A4.

1 998]

1 1 79

The Costs of Cigarettes

practices of manufacturers, coupled with the devastating health effects of
smoking, are evidence enough that the underlying market ii. in need of
substantial regulation.52 Perhaps because most public health advocates arc not
economists, however, these specialists have overlooked the potential market
correcting role of incentive-based regulation. They recognize that there is a
disease but seek to treat only its symptoms.53
In contrast to public health advocates, most of the economists or
efficiency-minded legal scholars who have considered the issue have concluded
that the cigarette market functions well and is in no need of regulatory
oversight.54 These scholars have therefore not reached the next question,
which no doubt would have been pertinent to the settlement talks: Assuming
that there are problems with the cigarette market, what regulatory mechanisms
should be implemented?55 Thus, economists have provided little in the way
of relevant guidance.
In this Article, we hope to bridge the void that separates economics and
public health with respect to tobacco regulation and, by doing so, to suggest
a means of improving the imminent resolution of the long-term struggle
between the cigarette industry and those who would regulate it. We offer a
substantially refined version of the public health diagnosis: The unregulated
market cannot be relied upon to produce the efficient level of safety in
cigarette design and manufacturing or the efficient amount of smoking and is
in need of significant regulation. Our prescription, however, ii. informed by
economics: Some form of incentive-based regulation is the best cure for the
underlying disease.
D. Overview
In the most general terms, this Article attempts to answer two questions:
Should the cigarette market be regulated? If so, how?56 Parts II-III arc
52.

Interview with Richard Daynard. Chair of the Tobacco Product> L1 ab1ht) Project. :\orthc.,,, tcm

University School of Law, in Boston. Ma>>. (Dec. 19. 1 997);

cf

Bnon J. Fox & Stanton A Glantl. TI1c

National Tobacco Deal Compared with Pubhc Health 2-6 ( 1 997) (unpubh>hcd manu..:npt, on lilc " uh the

Yale law Journal)

(outlining various public health benchmark> that \\ ere c>tabh,hc<l before the pro�<l

tobacco settlement was announced).

53. There

are, of course, "public health" economt>I> " ho behe\ e that the .:1garenc marl.ct ., llJ\\C<l

and in need of regulatory intervention. See.

e.g .. J e ffrey E. Ham>. 7iu111g T11r m11/ N1w1111r. 70 A\t Eco'

REv. 300, 300 ( 1 980).

ET AL., Sllf'rll note 49; TOLLISO' & WAG,ER. lllJ'Tcl note .jl). \'l!>Cl \I, "'I'"'
Sllf'T<l note 28; Taxin. Sllf'ra note 49 For an o\ ef\ te\\ of that htcrJturc. � 111/r11

54. See. e.g.. MANNING
note 49; Schwanz.
Subsection III.C. I .

55. Arguably, an answer to that que>tion t> nnphcu 111 much of the econom1c " orl. .t" unu ng th.it "

Pigouvian tax--<Jne of several po>sible type> of mcentm:·b:bcd 'Y 'te m '-" oul<l be the JppropnJtc
regulatory approach.

See infra notes 436-439 and accompan)·111g text
a number of 1,sue> for U> to addre" m fu t ure

56. This Article leaves

\\Ori. For c�ample. "e <lo not

discuss in detail the distributional effects of our propo,e<l e� po't mcenu,c-� rcgunc :\or <lo \\C
addre>s the international ramificauons of our propo.al l n >tcad. tht> Amde

t> l mu tcd

to the cltic1cnc)

concerns that are relevant to the que,tion> of whether and ho" to regulate the .:1garene marl.ct m the
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devoted to the first question, and Parts IV-VI are devoted to the second. For
the reader who needs to be convinced that the cigarette market requires
government intervention of any kind, Parts II-III will be essential. For the
reader who already holds the view that government intervention is warranted,
those parts could be skimmed or even skipped, and attention focused on Parts
V-VII.57
In Part II, we respond to the argument that consumers are adequately
informed of the risks of smoking. We conclude that when consumers are
making the decision whether and how much to smoke they do not (and perhaps
cannot) fully take into account the risks that cigarettes pose. We also point out
how an ideal enterprise liability system could respond to that problem. Part III
then observes that, even if smokers were well-informed of the risks of
smoking, they would still ignore many of those risks because they could
externalize those risks onto third parties either through imperfectly risk
classified first-party insurance arrangements or through the effects of passive
smoke.
It is worth highlighting one of the most interesting challenges we face in
Part III: providing a response to the economists' arguments that cigarettes do
not, on balance, impose negative external costs on society but instead produce
a windfall social gain because of the savings resulting from cigarette-induced
premature deaths-savings mostly in the form of smokers' unclaimed pension
and nursing home entitlements. Thus, the economists' argument goes, cigarette
consumption should not be deterred, but should be subsidized. In Part Ill, we
offer both an economic and a noneconomic critique of that position. Whereas
some economists have concluded that cigarettes create a net social benefit of
$0.32 per pack, we conclude-using those economists' data but changing a few
key assumptions-that cigarettes (at the current level of production) produce
almost $7.00 per pack of net social cost. After doing so, we demonstrate how
ex post incentive-based regulation can respond to that problem of negative
externalities.
Part IV looks more generally at potential regulatory responses to the
market failures detailed in Parts II-III. Borrowing from and building upon the
l iterature in the economics of regulation, Part IV describes the advantages of
incentive-based regulation over command-and-control and performance-based
regulation in dealing with the deterrence problems associated with cigarettes.
Specifically, we explain why one type of incentive-based regulation-victim-

United States.
57. A word of caution is in order here, however. In our experience, many people believe that markers
fail and that regulation is therefore necessary, but do not idenrify the precise ways in which markets fail.
Thus they do not provide any useful basis for comparing regulatory responses. See Croley & Hanson,
Enterprise Liability, supra note 40, at 736-67 (making this point with respect to several prominent products
liability scholars). We offer an extended treatment of market failures because doing so is, in our view, u
necessary condition for offering worthwhile regulatory proposals.
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initiated ex post incentive-based regulation-is generally superior to its
alternatives, including ex ante incentive-based approaches such as Pigouvian
taxes.
Part V then turns to several potential ex post incentive-based regimes and
suggests their strengths and weaknesses. We then provide a very rough outl ine
of a p articular type of ex post incentive-based regime. which we call smokers ·
compensation. We also introduce the idea of the cigarerre card. a technological
innovation that would improve the effectiveness of any regime for regulating
cigarettes, including enterprise liability and smokers' compensation. Part V also
provides a brief discussion of some of the difficult issues that would arise
when planning a system of ex post incentive-based regulation. In particular. we
seek to address two potential transition problems. first by limiting liabil ity for
manufacturers to the particular amount of harm they caused (including. to the
extent it is politically possible, the harm they caused already), and second by
suggesting solutions to the problem of judgment-proof defendants. We also
briefly discuss the problems of widely dispersed harm and poorly informed
defendants as challenges to an ex post incentive-based regime.
Finally, Part VI applies the analysis of this Article to the proposed tobacco
settlement agreement. We conclude that the proposed agreement is almost
exactly the opposite of what should be implemented. If comprehensive and
preemptive federal legislation is truly on the horizon, we recommend that
Congress reject the current proposal in favor of a strong form of ex po�t
incentive-based regulation. At the very least, we recommend that Congress not
eliminate products liability Jaw, as it is the only existing serious deterrent that
cigarette manufacturers face. If forced to choose. we would favor the status
quo over the proposed settlement.
IL THE FIRST SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY :
IMPERFECT INFORJ\IATION

A. Current Views of Consumer Risk Perceptions
Most of the debate over how. if at all, cigarette manufacturer� �hould be
regulated has boiled down to a debate over who knew what when about the
risks of smoking. The widely held view today, among both the public generally
and legal economists specifically, is that the vast majority of consumers are
well aware of those risks. It follows (at least for the legal economists ) that
regulation of the cigarette market is unwarranted. except perhaps on
paternalistic grounds.
From the early years of this century through the 1 950s, cigarette
manufacturers frequently made advertising claims that would seem astonishing
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today, claims that their products were innocuous or even beneficial.58
Although literature on the ill-health effects of smoking began to appear in the
1 950s,59 it was not until the 1 960s that such research came into public focus
with prominent government reports.60 Those reports established the basic
links between smoking and disease that have been reinforced and elaborated
ever since, giving rise to the first efforts to regulate the market for
cigarettes.6 1 Unfortunately, those regulatory efforts did little to reduce the
popular incidence or acceptance of smoking.62 They did serve, however, to
create a widespread perception that consumers were informed of the risks
associated with smoking. Indeed, it was that perception that made it difficult
for smokers to win lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers: Despite the advent

58. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 37. Not all of the claims could be explained by honest naivete
about the dangers of smoking. Professor Schwartz notes that, as early as the 1 930s, the hazards of cigarettes
were referred to in popular discourse, suspected by many physicians, and at least tentatively indicalcd by
medical research. See id.; see also Marc Z. Edell, Cigarel/e Lirigation: The Second lVcive, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 90, 97 ( 1 986). In that 20-ycar interim, tobacco companies also did little or no research on the possible
causal connection between their products and cancer. See Edell, supra, at 97-98.
Tobacco industry advertising may have contributed to consumer confusion. According to Richard
Kluger, for example, even after the 1 955 Federal Trade Commission (FfC} promulgation of advertising
guidelines, cigarette companies could advertise with language that suggested that their brands were heulthy
and safe while explicitly lauding their products' taste and Havor. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 1 85.
59. See, e.g., ALTON OCHSNER, SMOKING AND HEALTI! ( 1 959) (discussing early evidence ugninst
smoking); see also Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 37 (surveying the early literalure on the heulth effecls of
smoking).
60. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ED UC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE 5-7 ( 1 964) (hereinafter 1 964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]; ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS
OF LONDON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON ON
SMOKING IN RELATION TO CANCER OF THE LUNG AND OTHER DISEASES I ( 1 962). The history of medical
and public health reports has been reviewed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, No
SMOKING 1 -5 ( 1 989); SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5- 1 0; see a/so ALBERTA
0. BERTON, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ( 1 980) (providing a bibliography
of sources).
6 1 . The Surgeon General's watershed 1 964 report, for example, contributed directly to changes in U.S.
advertising regulations and to federally mandated package and advertising warnings. See Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1 969, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended al 15 U.S.C. §§
1 33 1 - 1 340 ( 1 994)); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 ( 1 965)
(codified as amended at 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 3 3 1 - 1 340). Ironically, it was these very warnings that the induwy
later used to fend off tort liability. See supra note 9; see also KLUGER, supra note 9, at 290 ("(W]hile the
labeling law did not explicitly preclude state liability suits from being filed, it came close to providing the
industry with an ironclad defense . . . . ").
62. Per capita sales of cigarettes to Americans over 1 8 actually rose for the first three years after lhe
1 969 Act. See KLUGER, supra note 9, at 377. There are severnl plausible explanations for the apparent
failure of lhe warning requirements and advertbing restrictions. Some argue that tobacco companies met
the new restrictions on advertising with great creativity, devising new marketing campaigns. such as the
"lifestyle" campaigns featuring the rugged, individualistic "Marlboro Man." See id. at 377, 444. Moreover,
the restrictions freed the industry of antismoking advertisements that had been required by lhe fairness
doctrine, which was then in effect under the rules of the Federal Communications Act. See id. at 332-35;
supra note 9. Another hypothesis is that consumers were already well-informed of the risks, und the
additional warnings were redundant. Yet another hypothesis is that the advertisement warnings and
information did not inHuence even uninformed consumers because of the nature of their information
problems. See infra Section Il.B.
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of strict liability, juries almost invariably treated smoker-plaintiffs as wholly
responsible for their actions in starting to smoke and maintaining the habit.63
As a general matter, the risks of smoking are not seriously contested
within the medical and scientific communities. The weiglzr of evidence about
adverse health effects of cigarettes continues to increase. and confidence in the
conclusion that smoking poses numerous particular health risks-including
various risks of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and chronic obstructive Jung
disease-is greater now than ever.64
The general public appears to be getting the message. In 1 986, for
example, more than 70% of all adults agreed that '"any amount" of smoking
is hazardous to health; most of the other 30% acknowledged that '"heavy
smoking" is hazardous.65 Smokers. too, are apparently aware of the hazards.
In a 1 985 Gallup poll, 90% of current smokers and 96% of former smokers
reported believing that "[c]igareue smoking is harmful" to health.61' Although
terms such as "hazardous" and "harmful'" are somewhat imprecise,67 it is
quite clear that the vast majority of consumers have not assumed that smoking
is riskless (at least not in the recent past). Moreover. most lawmakers, courts,
and j uries apparently perceive consumers to be well-informed of the risks.M
63. See, e.g., Rabin & Sugarman, mpra note 28. at 3, 1 6; Sdm a nL, s11pm note: 28, at 1 3 1 , 1 4 3 . Glc:nn
Collins, Cigarerre Makers \V111 Verdier 111 S1111 b.1 " Smoker s Fam1ll . N Y. Tl\ll:S, Aug 24. 1 996. al 8
(describing the response of the JUry i n one 'uch ca,e); cf mfrtl note: 6!1 tde,,.;nbing phu n urr,· 'tratc:g1� to
avoid juries' blame).

64. See supra notes 1 -4 and accompanying teAt. A rc:cent international 'tUd) by the: Jmpc:nal Caru:c:r
Research Fund goes beyond the earher one-count!) . hmuc:d-pc:nod report:. S<'<' Pt:.TO l::r At. , mpru note:
I . This study compiles data on smoking mona ht y ''"cc 1 950 m de1 clopc:d countnc:• around the: "' orld.
seeking the total picture of the worldwide health effects of 'moking and e't1111atmg the: 1111pac1 of •mol..m g
on developing countnes. Peto and his colleague' e,u mat c that, m developed countne• alone:, 'mol.. i ng l..1 lh

.

two million people each year, see 1d. at A.7 & t bl . I and that tobacco 11 111 have: figured in the: death' of
approximately 60 million people bem een the years o f 1 950 and 2000 . see 1d. at A 8 10 9 & tbl 2
Estimating total monality. the authors compute that half a b1lhon o f the \\orld"• 5 5 b1lhon people: "' 'II die
of smoking-related illness. See id. at A. I 03.

65.
66.
67.
68.

SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. s11pm note 3. at 1 82 tbl 4

Id. at 203 t bl . 1 4 .
See VJSCUSI, supra note 49, at 48.
See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Hear Is On.

A . B . A . J . Sept . 1 994, at 60 (quoting a Ph1hp �lorn'
defense counsel's opinion that the fundamental flaw 11 1th plamuff>" c�> I> that ei c:r)onc: undc:r>tand.. that

tobacco is risky, and thus cigarettes arc not dangcrou' bc) ond c:xpc:c1at1on,) lndc:c:d, the: dc:timng •lrateg)

.

of third-wave cases is to escape the consequence> of th" pc:rcc:puon F1 r>t •U•h ha1c: bcc:n brought on
behalf of panies who did not choose to smoke cigarette> 111 an) 'en><:, but \\ho \\ere ne1 c:nhdc:" miurcd

See, e.g., Butler v. R.J. Reynold' Tobacco Co ..

8 . 1 Tobacco Prod• L111g. Rep.

3 I 1 �"'' Cir Ct 1 99 3 >

(complaint) (involving a suit over secondhand >moke ); Brom 1 Ph1 hp �lorn' nie Clt1SJ A.-11011 011 8<'ht1/f

of Currenr and Former F/ig/11 Aue11da111s /np1red !JI £ipos11rt' w Second l/a11d Smoke 111 A trlme
Cabins-Se11/e111enr Agreemem (vi,ued Dec. 1 1 . 1 997) <http.//" ww.km>c:lla.corn/brorn/>c:ttagrcc: ht ml >
(same). These suits may blaze traib for other plainti ff, 11ho": health ha> hkcl) bcc:n affected by pro"nlll)
to smokers, either in the workplace or m the home.

Another group of panics that bears the co't ' of 'mok mg 11 ithout any cho1c-c: " 'talc: go,c:rnmc:nt• and
health care providers that pay for medical care for chrome inJ un e:, . man) of " h1d1 arc hnl..c:d to •mol.. mg

Suits by state attorneys general were led by Moore

1

Amenrn11 Tobtlcco Cu . 9 2

Tobacco Pnxh L111g

Rep. 3.35 (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23. 1 994) . m which the Attorney General of �!""'"PP' .c:c:b to n:co,c:r
Medicaid expenses. The ca'e wa> ba>ed on theone> of unJu't c:nnchmc:nt and kno\\ rng .:on•p•r.u:) to
merchandise an unreasonably dangerou> and addictive product to adult' and minor;,

1a

rd . an d

" "-' >c:ttlc:d

for $3.366 billion over the next 25 years. set• Miss. Eip<'rts Etpnr Tobacco F11m/s flus ,\/o111h S / 7-1
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Just as the public has come to perceive tobacco consumers as well
informed, so too have efficiency-minded legal scholars. As a consequence,
these scholars argue, cigarette manufacturers' virtual immunity from tort
liability should continue.69 Of those scholars, however, W. Kip Viscusi is
perhaps the only one to have studied carefully the nature of consumer
information regarding cigarettes' risks.70 Drawing on "detailed analysis of
large bodies of empirical evidence, not . . . conjecture or anecdotal
evidence,"71 Viscusi rejects the conclusion that "individuals are . . . ignorant
of the hazards they face . . . [or,] if they are aware of the risks, [that] they
ignore them when making their smoking decisions."72 He refers to the
conception of uninformed consumers as the "stylized smoker" model.73
Contrary to that model, Viscusi argues, the evidence suggests that "smoking
rates [do not] greatly exceed what would prevail in a fully informed market
context."74 In other words, the evidence is more consistent with what he calls
the "fully rational" smoker model than with the stylized smoker model.75

Million in Settlement Coming, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 2, 1 998, at A l 2.
A second general strategy is to stage a frontal attack on the premises of the assumption-of-risk
defense while continuing to represent traditional, firsthand, "elective" smokers. Under this strategy,
plaintiffs attempt, first, to challenge tobacco manufacturers' professed naivete about the health effects of
smoking, both currently and in the past. This requires unearthing evidence that manufacturers know, und
knew, that cigarettes can be lethal, and perhaps concealed the information, or even sponsored studies geared
to show the opposite. The second prong of the attack, already tried during the second wave, see Rabin,
supra note 14, at 1 23- 1 25; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 28, at 1 6, is to highlight the youth of beginning
smokers and the role of addiction to illustrate the lack of free choice involved i n starting and maintaining
the smoking habit. The two prongs can even be combined by showing that cigarette manufacturers were
aware of the addictive properties of nicotine and quietly developed the technology to manipulate nicotine
levels, at least partly to encourage addiction. It was one of these third-wave cases, based on a novel cause
of action alleging a willful tort, that helped lead to the unprecedented March 1 3 , 1 996, Liggett settlement.
See Castano Settlemem with Brooke Group Ltd. and Liggett Group Inc., 1 1 .2 Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep.
3. 1 47 (E.D. La. Mar. 1 2, 1 996). Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1 044 Section "B," 1 994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7426 (E.D. La. 1 994), was filed on March 29, 1 994, on behalf of all nicotine-dependent
persons against the five largest tobacco companies. See also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 941 044 Section "B," 1 994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 3438 (E.D. La. 1 994) (denying a motion to dismiss); cf. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 996) (defining a class of all Florida
citizens, and their survivors, who have or had a medical condition or disease caused by addiction to
smoking).
69. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 56-57 (concluding that strict liability doctrines "turn out
to have no obvious application to cigarettes-products whose hazards (however extreme) are both inherent
and reasonably well known by consumers"); Epstein, supra note 22 (arguing that because consumers arc
well-informed of the risks of smoking, "individual smokers should own up to the consequences of their
actions" and "the tobacco industry's liability for smoking-related illnesses should be zero"),
70. See V1scus1, supra note 49.
7 1 . Id. at 1 39.
72. Id. at 144.
73. Id. at 1 39.
74. Id. at 144.
75. Id. Viscusi imagines a third possible model: the "smoker with cognitive limitations," who is subject
to certain well-recognized cognitive biases. Id. at 1 39. In his view, the fact that consumers overestimate
risks is consistent with that model. Thus, the evidence does not adequately distinguish between the fully
rational smoker model and the smoker-with-cognitive-limitations model. Either way, according to Viscusi,
there is not too much smoking. See id. at 144.
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Viscusi bases his conclusions about consumers' risk estimation primarily
on the results of a study "commissioned by the defense Jaw firms in support
of tobacco litigation efforts."76 As part of that study. over 3000 subjects in
a nationally representative telephone sample were asked a number of questions.
including the following: "Among 1 00 cigarette smokers. how many of them
do you think will get Jung cancer because they smoke?"n The average
response was that forty-three of the smokers would get lung cancer. leading
Viscusi to conclude that consumers consider smoking to have a 43% chance
of causing lung cancer.78 He observes that this perception substantially
exceeds what he estimates to be the actual lung cancer risk of between 5% and
1 0%,79 as well as his estimates of total mortality risk to the smoker
(excluding danger to others from smoking-related fires. etc.) of 16% to
3 6 %.80 In short, "[t]he potential hazards of smoking are not a closely guarded
secret, and if anything risk perceptions for some smoking risks. such as lung
cancer, may be too high."81
If one takes Viscusi 's figures as to the actual lung cancer mortality risk of
smoking as accurate, the survey respondents do appear on average to be
pessimistic with respect to the risks of cigarettes. A tentative inference that
consumers judge smoking to carry with it a 35% to 45% risk of fatal lung
cancer seems, in the abstract, plausible.82 Based on such an inference. Viscusi
implies that there is no useful role to be served by tort liability.8J
Just because consumers are aware that smoking has some risk. however,
does not imply that consumers are fully informed of those risks. In the
remainder of this part, we use Viscusi's thoroughgoing empirical research as
our foil as we challenge the conventional wisdom that consumers are
adequately informed. Among other things. we argue that the issue of consumer
information is far more complex than is commonly understood. For

76. Id. at 84 n.6. Viscus1 emphasizes that the underly mg ">ur. ey design wa.> quue wund" and lhat.
in any event, he ''undenook a variety of sensit1v1ty te,t>."" mcludmg rephcatmg lhe enlln: >Ur.ey on a
.
sample of North Carolina residents. Id. at vi. "All these effon> corroborated the >urvey rouhs
. Id.
Although Viscusi explains that ''[r]eaders wishing to validate the >Ur. ey can readily do >O \\ Uh the aid of
a telephone," id we have opted in this Article to accept V1>eu>1°> e\·1dence at face ' alue llta1 1>. \\ C
assume that the questions on the survey were asked of a rJndom1z.cd national sample and 1hat the responses
that Viscusi reports are accurate. A> we bncfly indicate below. howe\ er. there appear to ha\ c: been several
significant defects in the design of the sur.·ey 11>elf. See mfra nolc> 795. 82-1.
77. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 55.
78. See id. at 68.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 70.
8 1 . Id. at 145.
82. Cf. id. at 7 (stating that, from the survey respon>cs. "the: c:nure populauon a.>!>C>!>C> tht> ml. at -13.
and even current smokers have a substanual nsk pcrccpuon of .37"').
83. Jn his discussion of possible policy responses. Vi>CU>I doc> not e'en con>1der a role: for Ion law
That is consistent with his view that ton law should be employed only m circumstances where consumer.>
underestimate risks. See \V. KIP VJSCUSI, REFORMll'G PRODL'CT'S LIABILITY 6-1-65 ( 1 99 1 ) . su alw Croley
& Hanson, E111erpr1se Liability. supra note -10. at 7-13-5 1 (>ummanzmg a sub>tanual pomon of Vi>eus1"s
products liability scholarship).
.•
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unregulated markets to work well, we conclude, consumers must be much
better informed than they now appear to be. 84
B. A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom
As the previous section indicates, there are two sorts of informational
arguments to which we need to respond: Viscusi's somewhat technical and
survey-specific arguments and the loose common-sense notion that everyone
knows smoking is dangerous. We therefore offer two types of responses. The
first type is directed solely at the surveys on which Viscusi relies and the logic
that he employs in drawing policy conclusions. Because the responses of the
first type are survey-specific, we have opted to place them in an appendix. The
thrust of the arguments in the appendix is that the survey and survey data on
which Viscusi relies are misleading and that, in any case, Viscusi's
interpretations of that data are, at best, dubious. In this section, we provide a
second type of response, which is of more general significance. That is, we
seek to rebut the view that cigarette smokers are adequately informed. We do
so by exploring a number of different ways in which consumers may lack full
information relevant to their individual decisions about whether to smoke. In
particular, we focus on four areas of potential distortion: first, the "third-person
effect" whereby consumers may fail to apply generalized perceptions of risk
to themselves; second, the absence of brand- or type-specific risk information;
third, the underestimation of cigarettes' riskiness relative to other products and
choices; and fourth, information problems related to cigarettes' addictiveness.
1.

The Third-Person Effect

Although consumers appear to overestimate the health risks of smoking
when responding to survey questionnaires, it is not at all clear that these same
consumers apply their overinflated risk perceptions to themselves. Indeed,
social psychologist Martin Fishbein has criticized the use of general questions
in smoking surveys (like those in Viscusi's work) on just those grounds.85
Distinguishing between personal beliefs and general beliefs, Fishbein notes that
it is beliefs about the risks to oneself, not generalized notions of risk, that
affect people's behavior: "Although a person may believe that 'Smoking
increases the chances of lung cancer,' this will have little influence on his or
her smoking decision if he or she also believes that 'My smoking is not

84. Moreover, as we argue infra Part III, consumer information levels are by no means the only
relevant factor in deciding whether manufacturers should be liable for cigarette-caused harms.
85. See Martin Fishbein, Social Psychological Analysis of Smoking Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCllOLOOY
AND BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 1 79, 1 83-84 (J. Richard Eiser ed., 1 982).
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increasing my chance of getting lung cancer. "'s6 We refer to this
phenomenon, well-known in survey research,87 as the "third-person effect."
Viscusi concedes that there may be "a discrepancy between the perceived
risk to others and the perceived risk to oneself,''88 bur he ultimately dismisses
the possible influence of such a third-person effect by pointing to evidence that
·'risk assessments influence smoking behavior."89 His point is that because
smokers overestimate smoking's risks by less than nonsmokers do, smokers'
risk perceptions partially explain their decision to smoke.90 The third-person
effect, however. refers to how people calculate personal risks and nor to
whether or not they respond to those risks they perceive.
Viscusi seems to assume that, if the third-party effect were present,
consumers' personalized beliefs would be that smoking is risk-free, but this is
not a necessary implication.91 Suppose, for example, that personalized risk
assessments tend to be, on average, one-twentieth of consumers' generalized
risk assessments. Under that assumption, Yiscusi's survey evidence would
imply that consumers significantly underestimate the personal risks of smoking
at the same time that his evidence regarding risk perceptions could still be said
to influence smoking behavior. Because Yiscusi does not disentangle the
influence of the third-person effect from other factors. he may well be
overstating dramatically consumers· personalized assessments of smoking'!>
risks.
Recently published survey results by Michael Schoenbaum strongly
suggest that at least some smokers believe the personalized risks of smoking
are significantly lower than the general risks of smoking.9� In Schoenbaum's
study, adults ranging from fifty to sixty-two years old were asked to assess
their chances of reaching the age of seventy-five.9' Schocnbaum compared
86. Id. at 1 84.
87. See, e.g., Ralf Schwarzer. Op111111sm. 1'11/11aabill/\. mu/ Sdf-Bdt<""fs cu ll<""alrb-Rdau.J Cm:1111w11•
A Sysremaric Oi·en•iew. 9 PSYCHOL. & HEALTII 1 6 1 . 1 62-63 ( 1 99- H 1de..: nb10g P•)Cholog1cal phen onu:n.i
of ''defensive optimbm"' and 1he .. ,oc1al compamon b13':· \\h1ch g1'e n-.: 10 belief, •uch '" · ··�t) fcllo"
smokers might gel lung cancer one day. but n ., le" hl.cly 1ha1 1h1' " ould happen 10 me·· J. Joop \'an Der

P l igt. Risk Perceprion and Self-Prorecm·e Belwiwr. I Et R PsH-llOLOGlST J.I, 36 1 1 9961 l ""(A)hhough
people seem quite aware of the

relam·e

ml. of 'pcc11ic acll\ ll1c' or beha\1on., 1h10p len d 10 change \\hen

this knowledge is applied 10 their own behavior. For 10'1ance. man) •mol.en. accept the a'.-<x:1a11on bet\\ccn
smoking cigareues and dbe3'e, bul do not behc' e 1 hcm,ch c' 10 be pcn.onall) al ml · · 1

88. V1scus1, srcpra note 49. al 64.
89. Id. al 64; see also id. al 1 1 0 (expla1010g 1ha1 ml. pcrcepuon' do appear 10 pla) a 'hgh1 role 1 0
people's propensity to smoke).

90. See id. at 1 1 0. ll is worth noung lhal V1'c u'1 · , C\ 1dencc 'ugge'l> 1ha1 ' af) 10g ml pcrcep110n, pla)
See id. (reporting that 'mol.c n. pcrcc1'e a lung cancer ml. o f 37� . \\hKh ., onl) 6�
less than the average perception of the full 'ample. and charac1c:nz 10g the: d1..:rc:panc) "" ··nol •larl.. " l. ct!
al 1 1 4 (calling lhe discrepancy a ··mmor d1 sp amy" )
9 1 . Cf infra notes 252-253 and accompanymg le\l 1c:xpla1mng ho\\ the . .,,t ) l lL<:d •mold" model.
which Viscusi concludes i' incon'i'lenl w11h the C\ 1dc:ncc. ma) be a ,1r.1" man bccau.c of the e'trem e
assumptions underlying 11).
92. See Michael Schoenbaum. Do Smokers U11denraml rii<"" .\forra/11\ Eff<""< t• of S1110J.11u: ' f.> tdou r
from rlze Health and Rerireme111 Sun-e\. 87 A\t. J. Pl B HEAi.TI! 755 1 1 997 1
93. See id. al 756.
a de minimis role.
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those assessments of perceived survival chances with epidemiological
predictions for such individuals, controlling for smoking status. In doing so,
he found that survival expectations of "never," "former," and "current light"
smokers were quite close to actuarial predictions.94 In contrast, among
"current heavy smokers"-those who smoked twenty-five cigarettes (that is,
1 .25 packs) or more per day-expectations of reaching the age of seventy-five
were approximately twice as high as actuarial predictions.95 Specifically,
heavy-smoking men predicted a 50. 1 % chance of reaching seventy-five, despite
actuarial chances of just 26.3%, while heavy-smoking women predicted a
60. l % chance of surviving to seventy-five, despite actuarial chances of only
30.8%.96 Contrary to Viscusi's suggestion, Schoenbaum's evidence
demonstrates that heavy smokers underestimate, without discounting entirely,
the risks to themselves.97 Moreover, Schoenbaum notes, younger smokers
may be even more optimistic. Schoenbaum's sample was aged fifty and over,
an age group in which most smokers have been smoking for more
than 3 decades and have presumably begun suffering adverse health
effects of smoking . . . . That respondents in this sample apparently
underestimated their risk of premature mortality, possibly to a large
extent, suggests that typical new smokers may be making even less
well informed decisions.98
Schoenbaum's study, therefore, raises significant doubts about Viscusi's
data and the conclusions that he draws from it. In upcoming sections, we
elaborate on Schoenbaum's findings by providing further evidence that all
smokers (and, perhaps, especially younger smokers) are ill-informed.
2.

The Problems of Impeifect Brand-Specific Information

Even if consumers did know the generic health risks associated with
smoking, they would need considerably more information in order to ensure
that market outcomes would yield optimal deterrence. In particular, they would
also need to know the risks of individual brands and types of cigarettes. In the
absence of this information, the market for cigarettes would fail in a number
of ways. First, smokers would assume that all cigarettes are equally risky,
which would remove any incentive that manufacturers otherwise had to make
their particular brands less dangerous.99 Investments in safety could not be

94. See id. at 757 tbl.2.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 758. Also in contrast to Viscusi"s findings, Schoenbaum found that "no smoking group
appeared to overestimate the likely mortality effect of smoking." Id.
98. Id.
99. This may help explain the failure of the Premier cigarette. See infra Subsection 11.B.4.e.i.
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recovered on the market because. by hypothesis. consumers would not
appreciate them. Manufacturers, in fact, would have an incentive to cut their
safety investments because, by doing so. they could lower their costs of
production without lowering consumers' willingness to pay for their product.
An "unraveling" of cigarette safety might then occur. as each manufacturer
chose to make the smallest possible safety investment. '00
In addition to this lowering of manufacturer care levels, the inability of
consumers to identify the risks of specific cigarette brands would also have
deleterious activity level effects. That is, even if product safety unraveling did
not occur, consumers would nevertheless underestimate the risks of some
relatively risky brands of cigarettes and overestimate the risks of relatively safe
brands. As a consequence, they would consume too many or too few
cigarettes. 101
Viscusi emphasizes that low-tar cigarettes are safer than standard
cigarettes102 and indicates that consumers correctly perceive them as
such.103 It is not clear, however, that so-called "light" cigarettes arc any safer
than their "regular" counterparts. I0-1 Indeed. the mistake that Viscusi and
1 00. For more thorough accounts of thi> unra, ehng problem and of how enlerpme hab1ht) would
eliminate it, see Croley & Hanson. E111erprise Lwbi/m., supra note 40. al 776-78. 791 -92. and Hanwn &
Logue, The First-Porty Insurance Exremo/1 1y. supra note 40. al 1 77-79. I S I . The unraveling phenomenon
is well-recognized in the products liab1hty literature. s,.,., ,. g . I AMERICA" L.\W h�-r . E.'IF.RPRISE
REsPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 227 ( 1 991 ): Howard A Laun. Problt'm· Soh 1111: 8t'htn wr 11nd
Theories of Tort Uabiliry, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677, 695 ( 1 985). Ste,en Sha,ell. Srn.-1 L111b1/IT\ VasuJ
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. I ( 1 980): see also Duncan Kenned). Drsmb11111 t' 11111/ Pt11t'n111/uru· .\10111·t'1
in Contract and Torr loH; with Speciai Reference ro Co111p11/son frm1s and Unt'qtwf 811ry:11111111g Po .. a.
4 1 M D . L. REV. 563 ( 1 982) (noting that con>umcr.. tend to "gcnerJlc fan1a... 1c. of .afct) ." w h1d1 lca1h lo
the systematic underpricing of goods). The >emmal amclc dc>enbmg the unrJ\ ehng phenomenon " George
A. Akerlof, The Markerfor "Lemo11s": Q110/m· U11ar1t11111\ mu/ rhr M11rl.t'1 Mnl11111u111. 84 QJ Eco' 48!1
( 1 970). As we indicate below. however. the phenomenon ha> often been O\ erlookcd m d1.cu-.>1on> of how
best to regulate the market for cigarette>. See. r.g .. 111/ra Sub>ecuon IV C 2 (dc>enb111g the unraveling
problem created by ex ante exc1>e taxe>); mfra note 602 (dc>enbmg how cla...> acuon >Ull> may create the
same problem); infra text accompanying note 64 1 (c:.plaimng how the propo>Cd >Cttlcmcm ought lead to
unraveling).
I 0 I . For a discussion of a closely related ac11v11y le' cl mcffic1cn9 and of ho\\ an enlcrpn>C hab1lll)
regime would eliminate it. see Hanson & Logue. The F1n1·P11rl\ ltis11rt111a £11t'n111lm. mpra note 40, at
1 77-79, 1 8 1 ; and Croley & Hanson, Enterprise Lwb1lm . s11pro note 40, at 778. 79 1 ·92
1 02. See. e.g., \V. Kip Viscusi. Cigareue Tiuo/1<111 011J lht' Socrol Co11Jt't/llt'11ct'J of Smokmi.:. 111 To\\
POLICY AND lllE EcONOMY 5 1 , 69 (Jame> M. Poncrba ed . 1 995)
1 03. See, e.g., V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 37-4 1 (dc•cnbmg the heahh-rcl:uc:d comparall\C ad,crtmng
that has been fairly common in the cigarcne mdu>tr)'. c'JX'Clally \\ llh re>pcct to tar lc\chl. V1>eu>1. rnpm
note 1 02, at 67 ("Individuals who exprc•> concern• about the health con>Cqucnce> of 'mokmg arc much
more likely to smoke low-tar cigarcnes . . . " ) .
I 04. See Mirjana V. Djordjevic cl al.. Self-R1•g11/111um of Smokmg /111r11s1t\ Smolt' Yir/J1 of lht' Lo" ·
Nicotine. Low- 'Tar ' Cigare/les, 1 6 CARCINOGENESIS :!0 1 5. 20 1 8· I 9 ( 1 993). Lynn T KoLlow >kl cl al .
Blocking Cigarelle Filter Ve111s ll'ilh Ups More Thon Do11bles C11rbo11 Mo11ottdt' /111t1!t' from U/1r11 ·Lo"
Tar Cigarelles, 4 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCllOPllARMACOl.OGY -104. 406-07 ( 1996). Lynn T
Kozlowski et al., Smokers A re Unoll'are of the Ftfrer \'.-111s No11· cm Most CtgoTt'llt'J Rt'rnlts of 11 N111w1111/
Survey, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 265, 267-68 ( 1 996); Richard Sahu>. M11las To Rt'l <"tzf CtgtzTt'llt' Add1111·e1
Massachusells Order ls First i11 the Norum , BOSTON Gl.0111:. A ug 20. 1 997. at B I (paraphr.1.>mg Grego!)
Connolly, head of the Ma...sachuselb Tobacco Control Program of the >late Department of Pubhc Health.
in stating that "most cigarene' advcnised a> being VCI)' lo\\ m mcoune actuall) deh\er about "-' much of
the substance as a regular cigarette bccau,e they arc >mokcd more 1nten>el) ··1
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many smokers appear to be making is evidence of our basic point: Smokers
(and, at least to date, administrative regulators and scholars) cannot recognize
the riskiness of individual brands of cigarettes. 105 Moreover, the mistake is
a consequence of a third problem of imperfect brand-specific information: The
incentive of manufacturers is not to make their cigarettes safer-as Viscusi has
claimed and as it would be were consumers truly well-informed-but to make
their cigarettes seem safer. 106 To the extent that manufacturers have
succeeded in creating such an impression, it seems likely that many smokers
have been lulled into underestimating the risks to themselves of smoking and,
thus, into smoking too much. 107
3.

The Problem of lmpeifect Relative-Risk Information

Even if smokers overestimate the absolute risks to themselves of smoking
their particular brand of cigarettes, it does not follow that they will be well
informed. To know whether consumers are making truly well-informed
decisions, it is necessary to know their assessments of the relative risks of
smoking. 108 If, in fact, consumers tend to overestimate some or all of the

1 05. The Surgeon General's 1 989 progress report summarizes an "Adult Use of Tobacco Survey,"
conducted in 1 986. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT, s11pra note 3, at 1 8 1 , 247. According to
that survey, 50% of then-current smokers believed that "[a]ll cigarettes are probably about equally
hazardous," and 45% believed that "[s]ome kinds of cigarettes are probably more hazardous to health than
others." Id. at 1 8 1 tbl.3. There were four subcategories of responses among those in the latter category. Of
all smokers, 21 % believed that their brand was "less hazardous than others," and 13% believed that their
brand was "about the same" as other brands. Only 8% believed that their brand was "more hazardous than
others." The remaining 2% did not know. Even that small percentage of smokers (29%) who believed that
their cigarettes were more or less dangerous than other cigarettes may well have been wrong. See infra note
I 06 and accompanying text. Viscusi does briefly acknowledge this evidence and its potential significance.
See V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 49-50.
I 06. This was a distinction that the industry apparently understood and may have exploited with
respect to tar and nicotine levels. Recently released documents regarding a conference of tobacco company
scientists in 1 968 demonstrates that several of the scientists at the conference emphasized the di5tinction
between a "(h]ealth image" or "health reassurance cigarette," such as "a low tar-low nicotine cigarette
which the public accepts as a healthier cigarette," and a "[h]ealth-oriented" cigarette, which is intended to
be truly safer. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 1 29 ( 1 996) (emphasis omitted).
A very similar story can be told with respect to the introduction and eventual dominance of lilter
tipped cigarettes in the 1 950s. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging Market for long-Term Nicotine
Maintenance, 278 JAMA 1 087, 1 088 ( 1 997) (explaining that filters were introduced primarily as a "public
relations gambit" in reaction to newly emerging evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer and
that their introduction reversed what had been a decline in per capita cigarette consumption). Cigarette
manufacturers continue to market seemingly safer cigarettes that, in fact, may not be safer. The most recent
example is the current campaign for Winston cigarettes, which are controversially being marketed as free
of additives. See Rajiv M. Rao, All Nat11ral Killers: RJR's Co111roversial Additive-Free Cigarelles,
FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1 997. at 40; cf infra notes 2 1 0-2 1 8 and accompanying text (raising doubts about the
health benefits of RJR's "cleaner" cigarette, the Premier).
1 07. This source of optimism would enhance the third-party effect described above. See s11prc1
Subsection II.B. I .
I 08. Indeed, for the reasons that we provide i n this subsection, so long as consumers properly assess
relative risks, consumers may act as if well-informed even when they grossly underestimate the absolute
risk levels. Put differently, consumer estimates of absolute risk levels may be irrelevant to the policy
analysis.
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other risks to which they are exposed, they may well behave as if they
underestimate the risks of smoking. That is, insofar as individuals perceive
nonsmoking activities as substantial threats to their health or life, they will
give less significance, other things being equal, to the risks of smoking.109
The problem of imperfect relative-risk information is particularly important
where smokers significantly overestimate the risks of not smoking relative to
the risks of smoking. For example, smokers commonly claim that smoking
helps them to keep weight off or reduces their stress levels.'10 If those
smokers believe the risks of obesity or stress are greater than or comparable
to the risks of smoking, then those smokers' decisions are dangerously
misinformed.
As it turns out, there is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that
smokers misestimate the relative risks of cigarettes. In 1 989, the Surgeon
General summarized numerous studies indicating as much.' 1 1 Between 1 970
and 1978, for example, Roper conducted five surveys in which it asked
respondents whether they agreed that certain risks ..make a great deal of
difference in longevity."112 In each one of those surveys, roughly 30'7c more
of the respondents answered "yes" when the risk was .. a lot of tension and
stress" than answered "yes" when the risk was ··smokes a pack of cigarettes
a day."1 1 3 In 1 983, Louis Harris & Associates conducted a national telephone
survey of 1 254 randomly selected adults . 1 1 � Respondents were asked: .. In
helping people in general to live a Jong and healthy life, how would you rate
the importance of' each of twenty-four health and safety factors on a scale of
one to ten?115 The low end of the scale represented the response, "of low
importance," and the high end represented "of utmost importance.''1 16 The
study yielded several interesting results. For instance, the lowest mean health
ranking for all the safety factors among respondents was 6.42 ( for "drinking
no alcohol"), well above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that virtually all
health factors were viewed as substantial, including "[g]etting 7-8 hours [of]
sleep" (8.04) and "[e]ating breakfast daily" (7. 6 1 ). 1 1 1 More important, the
perceived mean health ranking of .. [n]ot smoking" (8.32) indicated that
consumers had imperfect relative-risk information. Of the twenty-four health
factors, "not smoking" had the tenth highest ranking, placing it somewhere
I 09. See infra notes 249-250 and accompanying 1c:x1.
1 1 0. See, e.g Scharf. supra no1e 48, al 64 1 (noting thal 1hc: tobacco andu•tl)' ha, cap11ahLcd on ,uch
.•

factors and that one manufac1urer encouraged •mokmg

a,,

a " c:1ght·lo" me1hod " uh the ,Jogan ··Rc:-.ich for

a Lucky instead of a Sweet'"); McCullough. supra note 5. al T:!. I (noting 1hat •ome people 'mol..c to rchc' c

stress).

See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpm nolc 3. al :!07. J :!
1 1 2. Id. at 207; see also id. at 208 tbl . 1 6 (•ummanLmg lhc Roper 'un c) ' I
1 1 3. Id. a t 208 tbl . 1 6 (emphasis added).
1 14. See id. at 207: see also 1d. al 209 fig. I . 2 1 0 fig :! bUllllllJrlllng the Ham' 'unc� I
1 1 5. Id. at 209 fig. I .
1 1 6. Id.
1 1 7. Id.
111.
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near the middle, i mmediately above "[h]aving friends, relatives, neighbors"
(8. 1 8) and below "[n]ever driving after drinking" (9.25), "[k]eeping air quality
acceptable" (9. 1 1 ), "[k]eeping water quality acceptable" (8.95), "[h]aving
smoke detectors in home" (8.89), "[k]eeping close to recommended weight"
(8.54), "[h]aving blood pressure reading annually" (8.5 1 ), "[t]aking steps to
control stress" (8.36), "[g]etting enough vitamins, minerals" (8.37), and
"[ e ]xercising regularly" (8.32).118
Those studies, and many others since, 1 19 indicate that consumers'
relative-risk information is quite i mperfect.120 The most recent relevant study
that we came across was completed in 1 993 by the American Cancer
Society. 121 That study found that "[a]lthough Americans are generally aware
of the personal health risks associated with tobacco use, the public seriously
underestimates the magnitude of the impact cigarette smoking has on the health
of the country as a whole" as compared to other health risks. 122 When asked
what they consider to be the country's most serious health risk, for example,
36% of respondents mentioned the AIDS virus, whereas only 9% answered
smoking. 123 When asked to select from a list of various health risks the
single risk that they believe is responsible for the greatest number of deaths,
28% of respondents identified car accidents, 1 6% named illicit drugs, 12%
named AIDS, another 1 2% answered alcohol abuse, and 7% said murders. 124
Only 2 1 % identified cigarettes as the number one killer. 125 Cigarettes,
however, kill significantly more than all the other causes of death put
together. 1 26
When consumers make poor relative risk estimates, even accurate
cigarette-specific risk estimates may not prevent them from smoking too much.
Thus, studies that examine only cigarette risk estimates may substantially
overstate the rationality of smokers' decisions. Unless smokers understand that
gaining, say, ten pounds from quitting smoking is healthier than continuing to
smoke, they will not make appropriate risk calculations.

I I 8. Id. (emphasis added). As part of the project, Louis Harris & Associates also sampled 1 03 health
experts and asked them to rank the same 24 health factors with respect to the "overall health of the general
population." Id. at 207, 2 1 0 fig.2. Unsurprisingly, they ranked "(n]ot smoking" as by far the most important
factor (with a mean ranking of 9.78). See id. at 2 1 0 fig.2.
I 19. The Surgeon General's report, for example, summarizes five more recent studies, all of which
confirm the conclusions of the Roper and Louis Harris & Associates studies. See id. at 207- 12.
I 20. Unsurprisingly, there is also evidence that the problem is particularly acute among smokers,
which may help explain why they are smokers. See id. at 207, 2 1 I tbl . 1 7.
1 2 1 . See Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Highlights from an American Cancer Society Survey of U.S. Voter
Attitudes Toward Cigarette Smoking (Sept. 9, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yelle law

Journal).
1 22.
1 23.
1 24.
1 25.
I 26.

/d. at 2 1 .
id.
id.
id.
id. at 2 1 -23; see also supra notes 1 -4 and accompanying text.

See
See
See
See
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The Potential Significance of Addicrion and Orher Relared Sources of
Imperfect Informarion

In addition to the third-person effect, the absence of brand-specific
information, and the presence of imperfect relative-risk information. cigarettes'
addictiveness has major implications for consumer awareness and
deterrability. 127 Before examining these implications, it is worth highlighting
the increasingly abundant evidence that cigarettes are addictive, evidence that
has accumulated despite industry claims to the contrary. At the end of 1 994,
for example, the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention reported the results of a survey conducted on a sample
of some 20,000 adults.128 The survey found that, of the American adults who
currently smoke, 70% "said they would like to quit completely," and 34% try
to quit in any given year.129 Of the 34% who try to quit in any given year,
the study revealed, only 8% are successful. 1 30 Similar statistics were reported
in 1 993 following the Massachusetts Tobacco Survey. which found that 88%
of current Massachusetts smokers were at least thinking about quilling. and
75% had attempted to quit at some time in their lives. 1 3 1 The Massachusetts
survey also found that 43% of smokers had "quit" for at least one day in the
past year only to resume smoking subsequently, while 2.8<7£- of smokers claimed
(optimistically, in light of the survey's findings) that they were planning to quit
smoking within thirty days.132
That evidence-and a great deal more evidence like itm-poscs a sticky
challenge for economists, who for the most part have failed to provide a
plausible account of the apparent conflict between smokers' revealed
1 27. Addiction can be understood � a 1ype of mfonna11on deficn bc:cau..: II le.uh •mok.er. 10
underestimate the hanns of the marginal c i gare nc .
1 28. See Spencer Rich, Smdy Says Adulr S111ol.u1g Dropp<'d /CJ 25"< 111 1993. R..u11rd1c-r o..sa1b.-,
Resulrs as Encouraging, WASH. POST, Dec. 23. 1 994. at A6
1 29. Id.
1 30. See 8% of Smokers \Vho Try To Quir Succud. Sun<'\ S111·s. LA. Tl\ll:S. Dec 23. 11)<).1. at A4
1 3 1 . See LOIS BIENER ET AL., 1993 MASSACl!l'SE'JTS TOBACCO SL'R\'EY 6 ( 1 99-1 l
1 32. See LOIS BIENER ET AL.. 1 993 MASSACHL'SE'JTS TOBACCO Sl'RVE) APl'E.'DI\ TAB� 10 !bl A3·
A ( 1 994).
1 33. See, e.g .• AM ERI CA N PSYCHIATRIC Ass·N. DIAGNOSTIC A"D STATISTICAL MA"l AL Of· )',(E,-.TAL
DISORDERS 1 8 1 -82 (3d ed. rev. 1 987) (descnbing "mcolme dependence" and the facl 1ha1 " ( p )eople \\ llh
this disorder are often distressed because of their mab1 l 11 y to 'lOP mcoune u"'"): Cig11rr11.- S11wk1111: Amoni:
Adu/rs-United Srates, 1 993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALm' WKLY REP 925 ( 1 993> (IC\ lewing r�uh, ot
the "National Health Interview Survey,'' which md1ca1ed 1h a1 roughly 70,._ of 'mol..er. wanl lo qu11 'mol.. ing
completely and roughly 34% anempt 10 qun each yearl
Viscusi finds remarkable some rela1cd survey evidence. s.... VISCl SI, mpnz nole 49. at 90 < "One
would have expected almost all individuab who curremly purcha..: a product 10 be en1hu>1a..11c about II
What we find i nstead is that there are a large number of negau,·e menuon' of c1gan:uo from 111<: •mokmg
population."); id. at 88 ("What is most stunning " 1 he over\\ helmmgly ather.c ..:n11111cn1 again.I the
product, even among current product users. . . . The d1wr.11y of Ihe adver.c reacuon' 10 c1garc110 " qu11c
striking and is possibly unequaled by any 01her widely u.cd con,umer product ") 1'e,enhcle". Vi.cu"
gives this type of evidence shon �hrift when he argue' tha1 1he con,umpuon of c1gare11� " ba..1call)
indistinguishable from the consumption of ordmaf)' con,umer producl>. s.... 111/nz not� 233-237 and
accompanying text.
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preferences and their stated preferences. 1 34 The possible explanations for this
conflict, it turns out, undermine the conclusion that consumers overestimate the
risks of smoking. To the contrary, those explanations suggest that consumers
underestimate those risks considerably. We explore several of those
explanations in the subsections that follow. But first we respond to the claim
made by tobacco industry officials that cigarettes are not actually
addictive. 1 35
a.

The Industry's Claims

Most cigarette manufacturers have consistently challenged the proposition
that cigarettes are addictive. 136 For instance, in response to a question about
the addictiveness of cigarettes, William Campbell, CEO of Philip Morris,
answered that "Smoking is not intoxicating. No one gets drunk from
cigarettes."137 The problem with that response is that there is no reason that
a substance's ability to addict users should necessarily be linked to the
substance's ability to intoxicate users. As Dr. Jack Henningfield, a scientist at
the Addiction Research Center, observes, the full spectrum of characteristics
of nicotine that relate to addiction put it "right in the top tier with cocaine,
heroin and alcohol." 138 Cigarette manufacturers also defend their position
with the following interesting statistic: Approximately 50% of smokers manage
to quit. 1 39 This figure derives from evidence that there are about as many
living ex-smokers as current smokers. Even discounting the inherent inflation

1 34. There is disagreement regarding whether to measure people's preferences according only to whal
they do or according also to what they say they want to do. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 3 - 1 4 (4th ed. 1 992) (explaining that evidence of "willingness to pay can be determined
with great confidence only by actually observing a voluntary transaction"), with ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS 200-03 ( 1 993) (criticizing the assumptions underlying the use of
cost-benefit analysis for policymaking and arguing that what matters normatively are people's "attitudes,"
not their "revealed" preferences), Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & Puo.
AFF. 54, 59 ( 1 988) ("[R)evealed preference theory can make claims only about what people choose, not
about how they view their choices."), and Amartya Sen, Behavio11r and the Concept of Preference, 40
ECONOMICA 24 1 , 258 ( 1 973) (arguing that "there remains a fundamental question of the relation between
preference and behavior"). The fact that smokers trying to quit have spent a lot of money on only
somewhat effective smoking cessation programs and products, see infra notes J 60, 375, and accompanying
text, indicates that even if one looks solely at revealed preferences, smokers' conduct is not easily
reconciled with the rational actor model.
1 35. In Subsection 11.B.4.e.ii infra, we respond to specific claims made by Viscusi that cigarettes arc
no more addictive than other products or activities.
1 36. See infra note 1 6 1 .
1 37. Frontline: The Nicotine War (WGBH radio broadcast. Jan. 3 , 1 995) (transcript o n file with the

Yale law Jo11rnal).
1 38. Id.; see also U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TllE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL at
iv-v ( 1 988) (reporting that "the processes that determine tobacco addiction arc similar to those that
determine addiction to other drugs" such as cocaine and heroin).
1 39. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853,
87 1 & n. 1 1 4 ( 1 992); cf Epstein, s11pra note 22 (suggesting that "claims of addiction failed [in tobacco
lawsuits] because too many smokers had already quit").
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caused by the greater mortality of smokers compared to ex-smokers. the 50%
figure remains i mpressive. 140 But it also appears inconsistent with the
emerging body of evidence indicating that only a small percentage of people
who attempt to quit succeed.141
Actually, however, the two bodies of evidence are not necessarily
inconsistent. The industry's 50% figure is cumulative, presenting the number
of smokers who manage to quit, before dying, over all of their years of
smoking, and often after many unsuccessful attempts. That is, if 34% of
current smokers attempt to quit each year, but only 8% of those attempts arc
successful, 142 then about 2. 7% of smokers will quit each year. leading to a
cumulative 50% quitting rate over about twenty-five years.143 In twenty-five
years, that is, fifty of 1 00 smokers will have quit smoking, but those 1 00
smokers will have made a total of 575 attempts to quit- 1 1 .5 failed attempts
for each success. This average figure, of course, represents a more complicated
reality: A few smokers are able to quit successfully the first time they try.
others require several attempts, and the majority are unable to quit even though
they try time after time. Properly understood as cumulative, then, the industry's
50% figure may dramatize the difficulty. not the ease, of quitting smoking. ' .w
1 40. The evidence may be mbleading inasmuch as people who smol..e cigarette' -cem Jes> hi.e l ) 10
call themselves "smokers" i n survey settings (or othen, 1>e) than people " ho stop ,11101.. i ng arc 10 �-all

See Edwin T. Fujii, The Demarrd for Ctgal'l.'ll<'s · Funlia Empinrnl Eudma mrd
Its Implications for Public Policy, 1 2 APPLIED Ecos. 479. 480 ( 1 980) ("The understatement of the e\lcnl
themselves "ex-smokers."

of cigarette smoking i n surveys is exactly what we mrght expect. Long expenence " uh >UTYe) e' 1dence
suggests that respondents tend to provide inten·ie\\ers wrth a fo, orable picture of them-che> and hence.
in this case, to understate their extent of cigarette smoking."); Kenneth E. Warner .

the Underreponing of Cigarette Consumption,

73 J.

A�I.

STAT.

ASS' '\

Pombl<' /rrcl'l.'aso rn

3 1 4. 3 1 ·H 5 1 1 97 8 ) buggesung that

evidence of underreporting of cigarette consumptron might be explained by

the incrca.>ing soc1.il

undesirability of smoking).

See Tara Parker-Pope, Facts Abo111 tire Global Tobacco B11s111t'ss. WA.LL ST J . June 23. 1 997.
supra notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying text.
1 42. See supra text accompanying notes 1 29- 1 30.
143. We arrived at this estimate by raising .973 (because 97.3"< of >mol..ers remain each ) earl 10 the
141.

at B I ;

25th power (based on the number of years)-a cakulauon 1ha1 ) reld>

.SQ.I

Thi> rough calculauon pro' 11!c,

some explanation for how the 50% cumulative quitting figure and the 8"< hkehhooJ of quuung succc"
are consistent. This calculation assumes that the same percentage of >mol.. ers tncs 10 quit each ) car. C\ en

though some have already succeeded and thu> have left the pool \rcqurnng that. each ) car. •u lea>! an

additional 1 .9% of smokers attempt 10 quit, having never med before ). It al>o a.>sumc' no d1rfcrcncc

m

mortality rates between smokers and former smokers. Morco' er. 25 ) cars may understate the number of
years that some smokers smoke before succes>fully quuung. Su mate> of attempts and >UCCC>� at qu111rng
are from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention >ludy

Succeed, Sun•ey Says, supra

SC'<' S'.'< of Smo!a1

11'/ro Tn

fo

{!1111

note 1 30.

144. Their public denials notwith>tanding. manufacturers >eem 10 understand th" perfect!) \\ell The
consensus view of the industry's own re>earcher> appears 10 be that mcounc I> adJr cm c Sa K �lrchacl
Cummings et al., \Vhat Scientists Funded b\· the Tobacco /11d11stn Bdr<'•·<' Abo11t th<' lla:ard1 o/ Cu;arelle
Smoking, 8 1 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 894. 894-96 ( 1 99 1 ). Indeed. the recent relca.>c of docu menl> frum Bro\\ n
& Williamson and other cigarette manufacturers >trongl) >uggc>I> that manufacturers hJ\ c l ong �no" n or
the addictive propertie> of nicotine. See Phrhp J. Hrh>. Tobacc a Compmn llCu S1/e11T 011 l/tl:ard> . S Y
TIMES, May 7 , 1 994, al A I ; see also Sheryl Stolberg. Defecton Hdpmg To Crack \foll .-\rmmd Tob,1< w
Firms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3. 1 996. at Al (dr>CU»tng the affida\ U s of fonncr Phr hp �lorn> cmplo)cc' lo the

hed 10
& Wrllram>on document> are >Uf\ C)ed c\11au>U\ cl) rn -c\ e ral
articles in the July 1 9. 1 995. issue of the Joumal of the Ama1w11 Mecl1wl .-\ 1wna1w11. "'" �7-1 JA�IA 2 l 'J

FDA.

which state that company execuuve, rntcrfcrcd \\ 1th rc-carch on cigarettes" hc:ihh ham" Jnd

Congress about addiction). The Brown
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The question to which we now turn is the economists' response to the
issue of nicotine addiction. Economists have not offered a convincing
explanation of the disparity between smokers' revealed preferences (the fact
that they smoke) and their stated preferences (that they want to quit). 145 In
the next three subsections, we explore several explanations for this conflict,
explanations suggesting that consumers underestimate rather than overestimate
the risks of smoking. Then, in Subsection II.B.4.e, we respond specifically to
evidence offered by Viscusi that cigarettes are not in fact addictive.
b.

Identifying the Relevant Margin:
Dependence

The Problem

of Path

Typically, economists describe consumption choices of rational actors as
taking place on an incremental or marginal basis. 146 The question facing the
consumer is typically said to be of the following sort: Should she purchase one
(more) widget? If the answer is yes, that does not imply that the consumer
should continue to purchase widgets on a regular basis in perpetuity. Indeed,
it does not even imply that the consumer should purchase a second widget.
Owing to, among other things, budget constraints and the law of diminishing
marginal returns, the decision whether to purchase each new widget requires
its own i ndependent analysis.
In contrast, Viscusi seems to imagine that consumers conduct a different
sort of marginal calculus. He suggests that consumers compare all of the
benefits that they will receive from the "marginal" decision to become a
"smoker" with "the incremental lifetime death risk from lung cancer to a
smoker."147 The question of how consumers frame the smoking decision is

( 1 995), and are also available on the World Wide Web, see Tobacco Control Archives: Brown cmc/
Williamson Collection (visited Nov. J 3, 1 997) <http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/index.html>. Then-FDA
Commissioner David Kessler testified to Congress that Brown & Williamson had spent several years
growing a genetically altered variety of tobacco that contains very high doses of nicotine nnd had used
ammonia as a cigarette additive to i ncrease the amount of nicotine delivered to smokers. According to
Kessler, this new information Jays to rest "any notion that there is no manipulation and control of nicotine
undertaken in the tobacco industry." Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Chief Denies Nicotine Scheme i11
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1 994, at A l . Commissioner Kessler also pointed to numerous patents
illustrating that the industry has been working to sustain addictive nicotine levels in tobacco products. These
include patents to increase nicotine content by adding nicotine to the tobacco rod, filters, and wrappers;
patents on the extraction of nicotine from tobacco; and patents to develop new chemical variants of
nicotine. See Compa11ies' Alleged Nicotine Manipulation Is Issue for FDA, Kessler Tells House Pe111el,
Products Liability Daily (BNA), Apr. 8, 1 994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, PLO File (discussing
patents that illustrate the industry's intent to i ncrease the nicotine content of cigarettes); see also Kelder
& Daynard, supra note 3, at 77 ("[The] evidence [from the FDA, whistleblowers, and internal tobacco
company documents] . . . indicates that the tobacco industry manipulates nicotine levels in their products
with the intent of addicting or maintaining the addiction of consumers.").
1 45. See supra notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying text.
1 46. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-26 ( 1 988); RICHARD G.
LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 1 3 1 -37 (6th ed. 1 98 1 ); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 0.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 447-48 ( 1 3th ed. 1989).
1 47. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 34 (emphasis added). Perhaps Viscusi frames the consumer decision
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critical. As Viscusi briefly acknowledges. perceptions of per cigareuc risks
may d iffer from perceptions of long-term smoking risks. He writes:
Lifetime risks are substantial, but the risks from a pack of cigarettes
or a single cigarette are relatively small. producing a tendency to
overestimate the risk level. An open issue that will affect the direction
bias for smoking behavior is the extent to which individuals arc
thinking of the lifetime risk or the individual cigarette risk when
making smoking decisions. 148
Thus, Viscusi apparently justifies framing the consumer decision in the unusual
way that he does by claiming that if. indeed, consumers do make their
decisions to smoke on a per cigarette basis, then, for that very reason.
consumers likely overestimate the risks. We disagree.
Even assuming Viscusi is correct that consumers would overestimate
smaller risks, the actual risk of one cigarette or one pack is probably
infinitesimal.149 Even a consumer who egregiously overestimates this risk is
likely to find it insignificant. In the cigarette-at-a-time decision model, the
health risk from the marginal cigarette is not Viscusi's 439c perceived risk of
lung cancer from being a smoker; it is more likely to be that figure divided by
the number of cigarettes smoked over a "smoker's" lifetime, something on the
order of .000 1 % or .0002%. 150 Even if the smoker were to overestimate this
risk by a factor of two, five, or ten, it would appear trivial. Contrary to
Viscusi's suggestion, however, there is conflicting evidence and theory on
whether people exaggerate such small risks. Some scholars argue that. below
a certain threshold, consumers discount risks altogether. treating them as if
they were zero.151 Other scholars argue that. because of certain biases and
i n the unusual way that he does because the >urvey upon which he rcho " "" 11..:lf unphcnl) .:onductcd
from the standpoint of a one-shot, long-term dec1>1on model of "nol.mg Sur.C) rc>pondcnl• \\ ere ..,l,.cd
about the health risks to a '"smoker.'" To most respondent>. tlm hi.c l) connoted long·lenn Jnd frequent

See infra notes 789-791 and accompanying tc\l
1 48. V1scus1, supra note 49. at 25.
149. A s far as we know. no one has a11emptcd 10 mea>urc the ml. po..:d b) •mol.111g one c1garellc
1 50. This figure is derived by dividing the 43'k h fet 1 1ne percel\ ed ml. by one :?O-c1garclle pacl. per
day for 60 years (.0001 %) and 30 year> (.00024). It :l!>>Ume>. of cour,..; . that the >mol.er percel\e• the total
consumers of cigarelles.

lung cancer risk as a strictly linear function of the amount >mokcd. >O that the marginal ml from e.ich
cigarelle is invariant. That assumption. though que>llonablc. 1> comm on (and often unphcitJ m the lncrnturc

See W. Kip Viscusi, Seco11dha11d Smoke: F<Icll <Ind Fm11t1sl'. 18

RcGl LATIO' 42. 43

that government agencie> such "" the EPA and OSHA ha\e

1 1 995 1 t c\p!Jtning

focu.cd ··on hne.u do.c-rc,pon..:

relationships"). The assumption i> implicit m the recent effort> to e>lllnate the per pacl. co.h Jnd benefit,

See, e.g., MANNING ET AL. . supra note 49. at 82-85. V1 .cu>1 . SU/lr<I note 1 02. at 67-9-1
1 5 1 . See. e.g., HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL. DISASTER ''Sl RA 'CE PROTECTIO' Pl Bl.IC"" Poun
LESSONS 248-49 ( 1 978) (indicating that indiv1duab often underc>llmate l o\\ · probab 1 ht) mk>. •Uch '" tho..:

of cigare11es.

presented by earthquakes and floods, and often do not \\OIT)' about ml> that arc bclo\\ a certain thrc.hold).

The Economics of Prorec11011 Agwnsr Lo11 Prulx1btlm El't:ms. 111 DEC"" ISIO' !\IAKl'G
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY 1 95. 209 (Gerardo R. Ung>on & Daniel N Braun>tern cJ, . 1 9821 tnoung
Howard Kunreuther.

that consumers may actually ignore low-probabrhty event> and thetr con,i;:quence> unul t he) percel\ e that

Sr<Il.-d
Expectations as Fu11crio11s ofProbab1/iry and Des1rab1/I/\ of Omwmes. 2 1 J PER.so,ALm 329. 3 33 t 1 953 I
the probability of such an event's occumng ha. men abo\ e a thrc>hold )e\elJ. </ Frnnci. W )l"\\ rn.
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heuristics, 152 consumers are likely to underestimate risks associated with
products with which they previously had uneventful experiences; thus,
consumers may not associate the overall harms of "smoking" with the
individual harmless cigarette. 1 53
The question of how a smoker frames his or her smoking decision is, at
bottom, a question of how well consumers are informed. Market outcomes will
not be efficient, of course, if consumers underestimate a product's risks. B ut
even if consumers accurately estimate, or overestimate, those risks when
framed as a durable decision, the market will still lead to an inefficient
outcome if consumers rarely or only partially apply those estimates to their
own consumption choices. The frame, we submit, will turn in part on a
consumer's perceptions of cigarettes' addictiveness. A rational actor who
believes that cigarettes are addictive-such that any smoking today will very
likely be replicated, if not amplified in the future-will frame the decision as
Viscusi does.154 In contrast, a rational actor who believes cigarettes to be
nonaddictive will likely frame the decision as a comparison between the
marginal benefit of one cigarette (or pack of cigarettes) and its marginal cost.

(providing evidence that people are more likely to state higher expectalions of drawing a "favorable"
outcome and significantly underestimate expectations of drawing a "negative" outcome when asked to give
probability ratings in a card-drawing psychology study).
I 52. For a compendious and influential collection of essays describing the various biases und
heuristics, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman ct al. eds.,
1 982).
1 53. Howard Latin, for instance, argues that, because of the "representativeness heuristic," "[w)hcn
consumers use particular products without injury, the 'input' in their assessment of product safety-these
safe experiences-will lead to an expected 'outcome' of continued safety." Howard A. Latin, "Good"
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 4 1 UCLA L. REV. 1 1 93, 1 230, 1 232 ( 1 994). As a
result of such biases, according to Latin, "people often ignore low-probability risks." lei. at 1 245. From a
cognitive capacity perspective, ignoring small risks makes sense. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic,
Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, AM. ECON. REV., May 1 978, at 64, 67 ("Unless we
ignored many low-probability threats, we would become so burdened that any sort of productive life would
become impossible."); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 146, at 4 1 6 (describing how the "availability
heuristic" may have a similar effect).
Viscusi briefly acknowledges the evidence suggesting that individuals will sometimes underestimate
low-probability events such as earthquakes. See VISCUSI, s11pra note 49, at 25. He downplays the
significance of the evidence, however, by describing the underestimated events as "hidden" and pointing
to other studies in which respondents overestimated these risks once the risks were called to their attention.
See id. Therefore, Viscusi concludes, "[t]o the extent that cigarettes are among the most-discussed risks in
our society, one would expect there to be an overestimation of these hazards." lcl. We huve doubts about
Viscusi's attempted reconciliation of the studies. II is not clear that the risks of earthquakes are any more
"hidden" than are the risks of individual cigarettes. Moreover, evidence that survey respondents
overestimate risks that are made salient to them by survey takers simply highlights a weukne�� in the
survey data on which Viscusi relies. The fact that consumers ignore the same small risks when making
consumption choices that they overestimate when responding to survey questions should make one
suspicious of survey results of the sort on which Viscusi relies. Cf. Latin, s11pra, at 1 246 ("One explanation
for the disparity between experimental evidence that low-probability risks arc overweighted and
observations Ihat people often ignore these risks is that experimental methodology forces high salience for
the risks under study while 'real life' experiences seldom make low-probability risks available.").
I 54. Note that by assuming the frame that he does, Viscusi is implicitly assuming that cigarettes arc
addictive, an assumption that he rejects elsewhere in his analysis. See infra Subsection 11.B.4.e.
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The latter is true because the decision to purchase a pack of cigarettes by
a person who believes cigarettes are nonaddictive does not implicate the
long-term calculations that might go with a decision to become a long-term
smoker. If the tobacco consumption decision is made strictly one cigarette at
a time, only the marginal risks and benefits of that cigarette are relevant. The
marginal benefit of the next cigarette is likely substantial. The enjoyment of
the next cigarette is not much, if at all, diminished by the number that one has
consumed in the past or expects to consume in the future. It may not be too
much to say that. when a cigarette is consumed, the marginal benefit of that
cigarette equals the total benefit, at that moment, of being a smoker. • �� The
marginal cost of the next cigarette, on the other hand, is tiny. It is quite
artificial and most likely not reflective of medical reality to compute the
marginal risk for a single cigarette or pack, given that the harmful
consequences of smoking seem to be caused by regular smoking over a period
of years, not by any single cigarette. 156 Consumers may therefore. correctly.
view a single cigarette or pack of cigarettes as posing virtually no health risk.
A smoker could smoke one cigarette at a time over the course of a lifetime
without ever making a conscious decision to encounter a health risk perceived
as significant. 157
Consumers may be capable of producing lifetime mortality rate estimates
when someone surveys them, but our argument is that the conditions of their
everyday lives-in particular, the incremental, recurring nature of decision
points-will not produce such estimates. At the margin, the benefit of the next

1 55. Cf OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTt RE OF DORIA!'> GRA) 87 ( l\lodem Libr.tr)

1 93 1 J ! 1 891 J l ""r\

cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It I> e Aqu 1 >1 te. and II lc:a\O one un "1t 1 , fi ed ··1

1 56. See, e.g., 0FACE Ol\ SMOKING Al\D HEALTII. U.S. DEP0T OF HEALTII & Hl \IA' SERV � . T11i,
HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATIO!'>: A REPORT OF TIIE Sl RGEO!'> GE.,ERAL 92 ( 1 990 ) ldl'ICU�'rng
the hanns of regular smoking and the benefits of qm tu n g at any po111t rn hfcl. RG Roger.. & E Powell·
Griner,

Life Expec1a11cies of Cigare11e Smokers and Nm1s11wAas 111 th<" l'mt<"d S1t1t<">. 32 Soc Sn !'.IED

1 1 5 1 , 1 1 54 ( 1 99 1 ) (same).
1 57. Professors Rabin and Sugannan make a related point
Unlike the sky-diver. skier, or even the al cohol ic . the typu:al >mol..e r ha> no fc:cdbacl..
mechanism in the course of her daily routmc to tngger a •eri.e of unmment Jeopardy to ph) '1<:al
condition. Indeed, given the long-tcnn nature of the hann from >11101.. mg. and the potential for
avoiding serious physical consequence. by qu1tt111g ··,oon."" tobacco u..: take> on an e>pcc1all)
sinister character: cumulative phy>rcal dcb1lna11on goc> largely unnoticed. and. \\hene\er

extrinsic risk infonnauon i> a>>rmr latcd. a rauonalc 1> at hand for d1 "1Coun 1 1 n g one">
concern-the risk can be addre>sed at a later pom t 111 lime

Rabin & Sugannan,

supra note 28. at 1 1 - 1 2.

Unfonunately, one of the federally mandated ci garette \\ammg>-"'Qumrng S mol.. m g Sow Great l y
Reduces Serious Risk> to Your Health,"" 15 U.S.C

§ 1 333(a) ( 1 994)-may exacerbate the effect> of the�

phenomena. Viewed from the perspective of Vi>cu>r'> 1deahzcd >m ol..e r. \\ ho 1> mal.. m g a dcc 1 >1 on \\ hether
or not to continue smoking cigarette> for 1he 111defin11e future. the " ammg .ounds hl..e an mducement to
quit. The smoker can eliminate many of the i ll-health cffccl> of pre' 1ou> >m ol.. mg >1mpl) by qunung

Viewed from the perspective of the one-c1garette-at-a-t1me >mol..er. ho\\ e\ er. the \\ammg .ou nd> more hke
an i nducement to smoke another. The me»age >CCm> to be lhat 1f 1he ne�t cigarette I> 1he lout crgarene.
then there i; vinually no health-related rea>on not to ha\ e II. Not onl) '"" one cigarette po>e onl) de
minimis potential health ri;ks. but by not havmg another cigarette .1f1er thal one. e\ en th.it much
be substantially reduced. i f not eliminated.

mk. \\ Ill
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cigarette may easily outweigh the harm, resulting in a consumption decision
that might be irrational from the perspective of the one-shot de�ision that
Viscusi posits. Any new smoker, therefore, who assumes that smoking is
nonaddictive (or who, more likely, underestimates its addictiveness) may well
make an inefficient choice to smoke.158 For such smokers, the costs of
deciding to smoke will likely be underestimated given the unanticipated costs
of quitting. 1 59 Since addiction seriously raises such costs, a person might
decide to forego the health benefits of quitting in order to avoid the costs of
quitting (even if the person would never have smoked the first cigarette if he
or she had understood the addictiveness of smoking). 160 In sum, because of
the potentially substantial unanticipated costs of quitting (created by the
addictiveness of cigarettes), individuals may well choose to endure costs (of
continued smoking or of quitting) that greatly exceed any benefits that they
might have anticipated when initially deciding to smoke.1 61 The initial choice
1 58. Arguably, consumers who accurately estimate (or overestimate) the addictiveness of cigarettes
could make an "efficient" choice when they decide to begin smoking. That also assumes, of course, that
those consumers do not underestimate health risks and that there are no other information problems,
including those described in this Article. If consumers, fully i nformed of cigarettes' health risks and
addictiveness, decide to start smoking, presumably they have done so because the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 8 , 1 1 9-20.
It is not clear to us, however, how consumers could, ex ante, accurately estimate the strength of their
addiction to smoking. And even if consumers are fully informed of the strength of cigarettes' addictiveness,
if manufacturers could have made nonaddictive or less addictive cigarettes but chose not to, then the
choices made by some consumers to smoke may well be i nefficient. Under a rational choice model,
consumers must be presumed to take whatever costs are associated with becoming addicted to cigarettes
into account when they commence smoking. If they assumed that addiction was an inevitable property of
cigarettes, however, consumers volunteered to become addicted only because they wrongly assumed that
smoking entailed becoming addicted. If they were aware that the pleasures of smoking were nvailable
without addiction, it is doubtful that they would have chosen to smoke addictive cigarettes. Therefore, it
is not clear that consumers' decisions should be treated as informed, even if consumers accurately estimate
the addictiveness of the cigarettes they were smoking.
1 59. Viscusi briefly acknowledges this potential source of i nefficiency. See id. at 1 1 9-20.
1 60. To be sure, there may be times when continuing to smoke becomes so costly that a person will
quit, but that does not imply that the person will not have to endure the substantial costs of quitting.
The unanticipated costs of quitting may help explain the survey evidence that most smokers regret
having started smoking but cannot manage to quit, see supra notes 128- 1 33 and accompanying text, and
why smokers spend $4 1 7.7 million annually in the United States on products to help them quit, see Parkcr
Pope, supra note 1 4 1 .
1 6 1 . This model o f the choice t o smoke can b e understood a s a form o f "path dependence." Path
dependence occurs when actors continue to use an inefficient path long after the circumstances warranting
its use have disappeared. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolmion in Law and Economics, 1 09 HARV. L.
REV . 64 1 , 643-44 ( 1 996); cf HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 25-27 ( 1 996) (describing
the problem of "lock in"). The path dependency model of cigarette consumption may be well
understood-and perhaps exploited-by the cigarette industry. In a 1 973 memorandum, Claude E. Teague,
Jr., the assistant director of research and development for R.J. Reynolds, noted the need to get young
smokers past the initial discomfort of smoking so that they would become habituated:
For the pre-smoker and "learner" the physical effects of smoking arc largely unknown,
unneeded, or actually quite unpleasant or awkward. The expected or derived psychological
effects are largely responsible for influencing the pre-smoker to try smoking, and . . . [to) keep
the "learner" going, despite the physical unpleasantness and awkwardness of the period.
In contrast, once the "learning" period is over, the physical effects become of overriding
i mportance and desirability to the confirmed smoker . . . .

RJR Confidential Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands ofCigarel/esfor
the Youth Market (visited Dec. 9, 1 997) <http://www.gate.net/-jcannon/documentsf730202rl.txt> [hereinafter
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to smoke, therefore, may often be inefficient when consumers underestimate
the addictiveness of smoking.16�
On the important question of whether consumers know about cigarettes'
addictiveness, consider survey evidence from the Monitoring the Future
Project, 163 regarding the extent to which young smokers see their decision
to smoke as a lifelong decision. In that study, high school seniors were
RJR Memorandum].
In light of this path dependency model of add1c1ion. consumer informauon Je,·eb in n:cent yean lose
some of their significance. Whatever consumers knew about >mol.ing in 1 985. " hen the >tudy on which
Viscusi primarily relies was conducted. may provide hnle in>1ght into the dec1>1on> of many indl\ 1duals
to start smoking sometime in the past and to keep smoking today After all. man) of the smokers sune)ed
likely began smoking well before that date. at a lime when the average con>umer might " ell ha' e perceived
a significantly lower risk of smoking. Cf Rabin & Sugamian. supra note 2S. at

-I

(d1>el&Sing the steady

increase in public perceptions of the danger of smoking). V1>cu>1 points out that then: ha. long been a fairly
widespread perception that smoking po>es health mk>. Su VtSCL'SI, supra note -19, at -18-53 As he
concedes, however, the opinion poll qucsuons on which he b;i,,es has empmcal concl11>mn "cannot n:soh·e
the issue of whether the absolute level of nsk perccptmns 1> sufficient." Id. at -18.
In addition, courts as late as the 1 960s found manufactun:r> not hablc: bccaU>C plrunt1ffs could not
prove cigarettes caused their health problems. See, e.g. . Lamgue ,. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co . 3 1 7 F 2d
1 9 (5th Cir. 1 963) (holding for manufactun:rs pamally on causauon ground>). The first maior studies
indicating the potentially harmful effects of smoking did not appear unul the 1 960s. Sa supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text. Information about addiction has been e\en mon: n:cent, much of 11 coming to hght
in the last several years (after Viscusi's book was published). Sa supm notes 1 28- 1 33 and accompanying
text. Moreover, any information that has been made available to the pubhc has arguabl) been contradicted
through the marketing and public relations efforts of c1gan:ne manufactun:rs, su supra note 1 2 . not to
mention in the congressional testimony of their CEOs. see Ahx Ill . Freedman, Tit<' Deposma11. Ctgarme
Defector Says CEO Lied to Co11gress Abow View of N1co1111e. WALL Sr. J . . Jan. 26. 1 9%. al A l . John
Schwartz, Tobacco Finn Chief Denies FDA Charges: House Subcommwu Told Ctg1mmes \Vae Nei,·a
Spiked, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1 994, at A I .
1 62. Viscusi would likely respond to all of th1> by arguing that the 1-.ue of addacuon 1 > irrelevant tb
we detail below, Viscusi argues that cigarettes an: not in fact any more ··add1cll\ e" than most other
consumer products. See infra Subsection 11.8.4.e. That conclu>1on. ho\\ ever. 1s incon>1>tent " uh a growing
body of medical research indicating that cigarette >moking 1> quue add1ct1ve Sa supra notes 1 38. l -14
Even putting that evidence to one side, Viscusi has a problem inasmuch

as

he himself 1mphc1tly �umcs

that cigarettes are addictive in some meaningful sense when he treats the marginal dec1S1on as the

"incremental lifetime death risk" of smoking. VISCUS!, supra note -19. at 3-1; St.'<' t1lso supm notes l -19- 1 5-1
and accompanying text (describing how Viscusi's model of con>umer dec1S1onmaking differs from the
standard economic model).
Furthermore, the possibility that consumers may

mn·

in their csumates of the add1c11veno.s of

smoking might explain one of Viscusi's mon: stnking finding>. According to V1>eu>1. smokers and
nonsmokers have roughly similar estimates of the nskincss of smoking. Su Vtsct SI, supm note -19. at 1 10;
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67. Viscusi conclude> that the dec1>1on whether to smoke, therefore. turns
significantly on consumers' varied preferences for risk. Su VtSCL'SI. supra note -19, at 1 1 O. Viscus1. s11pr11
note 1 02, at 67. The difference in consumption pattern>. however. could

as

east!)' be explained by \ anauons

in estimates of addictiveness: Consumers who believe that c1gan:nes an: n:lat1vely nonadd1c11' e an: more
likely to begin smoking, other things being equal.
1 63 . The project is being conducted by the l n>lltute for Social Re>earch at the Um , er.. u y of M1ch1gan
The study results referred to in the text are unpublished. but an: summanzcd in U S DEP'T OF HEALTII &

HUMAN SERVS., PREVE.,'TING TOBACCO USE AMOl"G YOt.,1'G PEOPLE A REPoRT OF TIIE Sl RGEO"
GENERAL 84-87 ( 1 994) (hereinafter PREVENTING TOBACCO USE] The only potent1all)' n:le\'ant suney
evidence that Viscusi discusses comes from a 1 97-1 study that n:ported that approximately 75% of children
between the ages of 7 and 1 4 agreed with the statement that "(1]1 1> \'ery hard to stop smol.ing " VtsctSI,

supra note 49, at 1 2 1 tbl.6-1 (citing F.W. Schneider & L.A. Vanma.tng. Adolescem Prradolesalll
Differences in Beliefs a11d A11i1udes Abo111 Ctgarel/e S111ok111g, 87 J PsYCllOL 7 1 ( 1 97-l)J Of course. that
figure implies that 25% of those children did not agree that II 1> hard to >top smolang. >1gmficantly more
than the current national teenage smoking rate of 16%. See Andrea Adelson, Is Ambcx/\ Gm111g rhi:

Picture? Despire Ads, Teen-Age Smoking Is Unabwed, N.Y. TIMES. July 1 7 . 1 997, at D I
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surveyed each year for one decade-from 1 976 to 1 986-and then again five
years later after graduating. In the first stage of the survey, seniors were asked
"Do you think you will be smoking cigarettes in five years from now?" 164
At the second stage of the survey, respondents were again asked about their
current smoking status. Of those respondents who smoked at least one pack per
day as high school seniors, 32% of them predicted at the first stage that they
would "probably" or "definitely" stop smoking within five years.165 At the
second stage of the survey, however, only 13% of those graduates had quit,
while nearly 70% continued to smoke more than one pack per day.1 66 Of
those high school seniors who smoked about one half pack per day, 42%
predicted that they would probably or definitely quit within five years; only
1 9% actually did.1 67 Moreover, nearly half of those seniors had increased
their habit to more than one pack per day five years out. 1 68 Finally, of the
seniors who smoked only one to five cigarettes per day, 6 1 % believed that
they would probably or definitely quit within five years. 1 69 As it turned out,
only 30% managed to quit, while nearly half at least doubled their smoking
rates. 1 70
As the Surgeon General's Report summarized: "When earlier smoking
behavior is controlled, seniors' expectations to smoke had very limited power
to predict subsequent smoking behavior." 1 7 1 "[T]he expectation to abstain
from smoking in the future seemed overwhelmed by the strong forces that tend
to maintain or advance smoking behavior once it is established."172 This
evidence suggests that Viscusi's view that beginning smokers base their
decision on their perceptions of the "incremental lifetime risks" of smoking is
fundamentally flawed. Of all the respondents who smoked as seniors, only
around 8% believed that they would "definitely" be smoking five years
later, 173 and thus only that many might have considered the risks of smoking
even for five years.

1 64. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 1 63, at 84.
1 65. Id. at 84 tbl . 1 9.
1 66. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
1 67. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9, 85 tbl.20.
1 68. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
1 69. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9.
1 70. See id. at 85 tbl.20.
1 7 1 . /d. at 84.
1 72. Id. at 87.
1 73. See id. at 84 tbl . 1 9; cf 1Y Spots Hit Smoking with Graphic Visuals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28,
1 997, at A22 ("When I speak to smokers, almost all of them say they will quit within two years . . . .
When I ask i f they expect to quit within the next two weeks, the answer is i nvariably no." (quoting Howard
K. Koh, Massachusetts Public Health Commissioner)).
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Temporal Separation of Benefits and Costs:
The Problem of Myopia

Even if Viscusi were correct that smoking is viewed by smokers as a long
term decision (in other words, that consumers do somehow understand the
extent of cigarettes' addictiveness even before they are addicted), there are
additional attributes of the cigarette consumption context that may lead
consumers to underestimate smoking's risks. Again, the challenge is to explain
how a person's revealed preferences (e.g., smoking a cigare!lc) can conflict so
dramatically with that person's stated preferences (e.g., "I want to quit
smoking"). Economists have offered several plausible explanations for the
seemingly contradictory behavior, all of which relate to the context or structure
of the smoking decision. In the next two subsections. we discuss two such
explanations.174
FIGURE 1

B

REWARD
EFFECTIVENESS

TIME

The most common explanation relies on the fact that the health effects of
smoking are temporally distant from the pleasures of smoking individual
cigarettes. The intertemporal choice literature suggests that the discount rate

1 74.

In addition to the features of cigarette• dc•cnbcd in the next '" o •ub..:cuon' thal n11gh1 con1nbu1c

to their addictiveness. there is a growing body of C\' 1dcnce ind1ca1ing thal c1garc11e, are add11:l1\e bccall-'C
of their physiological and pharmacolog1cal effccl•. The Surgeon General tir.. 1 add�!>Cd lhe 1,suc of
addiction in 1 988, drawing the following lhrec conclu.,on• ·· 1 Cigarette. an d
addicting.

2. Nicotine b the drug in tobacco thal cau-.:• add1cu on

other fonn' of lobacco arc

3 The pham1acolog1c and bcha' 1oral

processes that detennine tobacco addiction are •nmlar lo lho•c !hat detenmnc add1ct1on lo drugs 'uch

a.

heroin and cocaine." U.S. OFFICE ON SMOKl1'G & HEALTH. s11pm nolc 1 38. al 9 In 1 96-1. lhc Su rgeon
General had stated that ''[t]he tobacco habit 'hould be char.1c1en1cd
addiction."' 1 964 SURGE01' GENERAL'S REPORT. Sltflr<l note 60 . .it :w

a. an

habnuat1on ralhcr 1han an

1 204

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63

that some consumers use to measure the long-term health effects of smoking
(or the costs of quitting) is greater than the discount rate used to measure the
short-term benefits of satisfying a craving to smoke. 175 George Ainslie, a
psychologist, illustrates the point graphically, as depicted in Figure 1 . 176
Suppose that the individual is choosing between two rewards: a smaller,
earlier reward S, which occurs at t1, and a bigger, later reward B, which occurs
at t2• More concretely, imagine that S is the satisfaction that a consumer would
receive if she were to smoke a pack of cigarettes today and that B is the
i ncremental increase in long-term health that the smoker would enjoy if she did
not smoke that pack. The lines depict the present utility of the rewards that the
consumer enjoys over time. As George Loewenstein and Richard Thaler
explain:
If the individual discounts the future at a constant rate, that is, if
discounting is constant for different time delays, then the curves will
never cross. However, if discounting decreases as a function of time
delay, as the empirical research suggests, then the curves may cross,
leading to a reversal of preference. When both rewards are sufficiently
distant, the individual prefers B, but as S becomes more proximate, its
relative value increases until at t*, S abruptly comes to dominate B in
terms of present utility. The significance of the crossing curves is that
behavior will not generally be consistent over time.177
There is considerable evidence to suggest that this sort of dynamic
inconsistency is common. 178 Loewenstein and Thaler, for example, highlight
the following anecdote: In West Virginia, the passage of a law mandating that
students under the age of eighteen who drop out of school lose their driving
permits led, in only one year, to a reduction in the dropout rate of one
third.179 It seems unlikely that the expected costs of losing drivers' permits
for a few years could tip so many potential dropouts' rational human capital
investment decisions toward completing high school. Instead, the results
suggest "extremely myopic preferences."180 Similarly, many more people

J 75. Note that this phenomenon, if true, violates the predictions of economic theory. See George
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Interremporal Choice, J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 1 989, at 1 8 1 ,
1 83. Nevertheless, there i s considerable evidence that the phenomenon i s real. See id.
1 76. See George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse
Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 47 1 fig. I ( 1 975). The diagram provided is a slightly modified version
of the Ainslie original.
1 77. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75, at 1 85.
1 78. See Ainslie, supra note 1 76.
1 79. See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75, at 1 82.
J 80. Id. Commentators often suggest-as do the examples offered by Loewenstein and Th11lcr-th111
this tendency for myopic behavior is especially acute during adolescence. In that light, it bears noting that
"[e]ighty-two percent of adults who ever smoked had their first cigarette before the age of I 8, and more
than half of them had already become regular smokers by that age." Regulations Restricting the Sulc and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,396, 44,398 ( 1 996) (citing PREVENTING TOBACCO USE, supra note 163, al 65).

The Costs of Cigareues

1 998]

1 205

avoid sun exposure to prevent large pores and blackheads in the short term
than will act to minimize the long-term, much more significant risk of skin
cancer.181 B ecause of this sort of intertemporal myopia, even smokers who
fully anticipate the addictiveness and health effects of smoking may be making
irrational decisions. 182
d.

Disaggregated Benefits and Pooled Costs:
The Problem of Multiple Selves

Some scholars prefer an alternative to the discount rate explanation for the
confl ict between what smokers say and what they do. 183 For example.
Thomas Schell ing, one of the first economists to focus on the issue.
demonstrates that "[p]eople behave sometimes as if they had two selves, one
who wants clean lungs and long life and another who adores tobacco."1s.i To
understand smoking behavior, Schelling argues, it is useful to view individuals
as comprising at least two selves who "are in continual contest for
control." 1 85 With respect to most consumption choices, there is a "dynamic
programming self'-a sort of referee-that manages continually changing
wants and desires, harmonizing them over time in an evenhanded manner. l ll6
But with respect to some consumption choices, that referee does not exist.
Instead, there is a series of impermanent selves. Each has its own needs and
desires, and some have preferences about what should be done when other
selves are i n command. Thus, the nicotine addict wants to smoke when he is
i n charge, but another self is concerned about health and wants not to smoke
even when the addict is in command. 187
In the wake of Schelling's path-breaking work.188 numerous scholars
have offered similar multiple selves models.189 It is critical to recognize that
1 8I .

See Loewenstein & Thaler, supra

note 1 75, at I 82.

1 82. Viscusi describes an extreme ver..ion of myop1a---0 ne in which '"[t]he >moker >amply ignores the

risk component since these risks are remote." V sc us . supra note .i9. at 2 1

1

1

According to

'"[o]nly the immediate gratification provided by c1garc:1te> dme> con>umer behavior "

(J.

Im

' er>1on.

Conlral')· to

Viscusi's suggestion, however, the fact that consumer.. ma) apply a larger discount rate to more: remote
risks does no! imply that consumers ignore those mks or 1h at only the 11nmed1ate grat1ficat1on of smoking
matters to consumers. See infra notes 25 1 -256 and accompanying text (arguing that V1i.c�1 has provided
an extreme, straw man version of '"addiction").
1 83. One perceived problem with the discount rate explanauon 1> that tt 11n p hes that people have an

astronomically (and, perhaps. implausibly) high d1scoun1 rate in >Ome c1rcum>tanco. e\en \\hen the future:.

t,. is only a few hours away. See THOMAS c. SCUELLl �G. CHOICE A '\D COSSEQUo-'Cc 62-63 ( 1 98.i)
1 84. Id. at 58.
1 85. Id.
1 86. Id. at 86.
1 87. See id. at 86-87. Schelling as unwilling 10 comm11 regarding the extent to which has muluple
selves model is merely metaphorical. See id. at 96.
1 88. See also T.C. Schelling, Egonomics. or the An of Self-Marwgeme111, AM Eco' Rlo>' May 1 978,
at 290; Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Co111111a11d 111 Practice. 111 Polin. t111d m t1 T/1et1n of R<11wm1/ Clw1cr,
AM. EcON. REV., May 1 984, at I .
1 89. See. e.g., ]ON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND TIIE SIRf..'\S 1 03- 1 1 (rev ed. 1 98.i), George Aanshe. Bewnd
Microeconomics, Conflict Among Interests 111 t1 Mu/11ple Self t1s ti Derem1111t111t of \'<zlue. 111 TllE Mt.:LTIPLE
•
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these models do not assume that consumers are ignorant of the fact that
cigarettes are risky or that consumers completely ignore their risk perceptions
in making consumption choices. Indeed, the models acknowledge that smokers
are reflective creatures who do, at least partially, take into consideration the
long-term risks and benefits of smoking. Moreover, they acknowledge that
other variables, including price, can affect consumption decisions in predictable
ways. A major advantage of multiple selves models, however, is that they help
to make sense of common behavior that, at least on its face, does not comport
with the basic rational actor model. As Schelling puts it:
Many of the skills and maxims and stratagems for coping with one's
own behavior become less mystifying and more familiar if we can
recognize them as the same principles and stratagems that apply to
managing someone else-someone in a close relation, with a
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child,
teacher and pupil, missionary and convert, master and apprentice, or
guide and follower. 190
Individuals "struggle for self-command" through the application of tactics that
are essentially variations on the Homeric episode in which Odysseus ordered
that his hands be tied to the ship's mast so that he could not be seduced by the
song of the Sirens. 191
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such tactics are routinely employed by
smokers. Some smokers, for example, limit themselves to smoking only
cigarettes that are given to them; they have a "rule" against buying cigarettes,
a practice that many admit is not easily sustained. Similarly, closet smokers
conceal their habits from some or all of their friends and loved ones, a strategy
that can reduce the number of cigarettes smoked but can also have the
unintended effect of reducing the smoker's social encounters. Other tactics
include enlisting the aid of a trusted friend to allocate cigarettes in limited
quantities or smoking only in a limited number of predefined circumstances.
Thomas Schelling, for instance, reports his own rule of smoking only after an
"evening meal," a strategy that ultimately failed.192 Many heavier smokers
also apparently attempt to "tie their hands." As Loewenstein and Thaler have

Weakness of Will and the Free·Rider Problem, I ECON. &
Goethe's Faust, Arrows Possibility Theorem and the
Individual Decision-Taker, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 1 97; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 ( 1 980); Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M.
Shefrin, An Economic Theory ofSe/f-Co111rol, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 ( 1 9 8 1 ); Gordon C. Winston, Addiction
and Backsliding: A Theory of Compulsive Consumption, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 295 ( 1 980).
I 90. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 63.
I 9 1 . Id. at 76-82 (describing ways in which individuals manage or discipline their many selves).
1 92. See id. at 77.
SELF 1 33 (Jon Elster ed., 1 986); Jon Elster,

PHIL. 2 31 ( 1 985); Ian Steedman & Ulrich Krause,
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observed, many "smokers buy cigareues by the pack (rather than by the carton
which is cheaper)."193
For many, these sorts of efforts to smoke in moderation fail. driving
smokers to attempt quitting entirely. As Schelling explains, "Just as it may be
easier to ban nuclear weapons from the baulefield in roro than through
carefully graduated specifications on their use, zero is a more enforceable limit
on cigarettes . . . than some flexible quantitative ration."1� Efforts to quit,
too, are often fashioned in a self-binding way such that the common self can
justify singling out the current self to bear the initial burden of the decision to
quit. Resolutions to quit smoking are an example. The common self does not
fully control the current self's decision to smoke, but it can raise the costs to
a future self by publicly resolving to stop smoking on a date certain sometime
in the future, invoking shame as an aid to sel f-govemment. 19s Another
feature common to many smokers' attempts to quit is that they occur at special
moments, such as on smokers' birthdays or on New Year's Day!96 The
multiple selves model may also explain some of the logic behind the annual
"Great American S mokeout," in which smokers are urged to stop smoking
even for j ust the day. 197
With those tactics in mind, it seems plausible that the desire to quit
smoking (or not to start smoking) might itself raise consumers' estimates of
the risks of smoking. Survey data showing that respondents overestimate the
risks of smoking, therefore, might reflect merely a desire on the part of many
consumers to trick themselves into overestimating those risks. The problem
with any instrumental attempt to inflate the underlying risks in that way is that
the current self is not easily fooled. The person whose watch is set ahead of
the true time, for instance, will often adjust for that fact. As Schelling puts the
point, "There is one family of tactics common in interpersonal relations that

1 93. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 1 75. al 1 86.
1 94. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83. at 77.
1 95 . See id. at 76.
1 96. See id. The American Cancer Society ( ACS ) la>l )'Car >pon>on:d a '" eep>l.il.e> for >moler. \\ ho
purchased Nicorette Gum or Nicoderm patch�. The tear-off >helf tl) er read m large and bold pnnl '"For
Mother's & Father's Day, Commit to Qmt1" AMERICA' CA�C'ER SOCltTY

CO\l\llT To Ql IT '

(advertisement, on fi l e with the Yale law Jounw/).
1 97. The ACS has been sponsoring the Great A mencan Smol.eout. on the third 111ur'>il.i) of .,-.,ch
November, since 1 977. As part of their "Commit lo Qun plan." the ACS encourage> >moker> lo d100>e
a date for quitting and lo mark that date on their calendar Amen can Cancer Soc1el). Grw1 A111eriw11

Smokeo111, Commi1 To Quit (visited Dec. 9. 1 997)

<lmp://www.cancer.org!ga>plcomracl html> S1mil.irl).

the ACS encourages smokers seeking lo quit lo put their tnlenuon "m w n ung-and >ign 11'' and m.ike>

available a "Contract to Quit." Id. In their "Quit Smol.mg Tip>." the ACS e \p l atn> th.it '' (c lol d turkey 1'

the most successful" method of quitting and then advt>e> quilter> to "(t)hro" a\\a) all c1gan:tt� and
matches" and "[h]ide lighters and ashtrays." Amencan Cancer Society.

Q111r S11wJ.111g n,,,

( \ l>l lcd Dec 9.

1 997) <http://www.cancer.org!tobacco/tr8.html>. The ACS then encourage> tho>e \\ ho prder .i more
gradual approach to make it harder for themselve> to >mol.e c1gareth:>-for 1mtance. b) bu) mg one p.ick
at a time and by wrapping up that pack and puumg ela>uc band> around

n

Sec- ''' Another up for the

smoker is to "[s]moke with your left hand if you usuall) >mol,.e " nh )'OUr nght"-.i near!) lateral an.ilogue
of tying one's hands to the mast. Id.
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is peculiarly unavailable, or nearly so, in dealing with oneself. That is
deceit."198 Even so, we think it common that individuals attempt to deceive
themselves, even if they are only partially successful.
For a variety of reasons, these strategies for binding the current self are
likely to be especially ineffective in the cigarette context. 199 Cigarettes are
widely available and relatively inexpensive. Moreover, a smoker can often
conceal the fact that he or she has smoked cigarettes. Therefore, the multiple
selves model of smoking behavior leads to a prediction that is extremely
difficult to square with the basic rational actor model. Specifically, some
smokers favor policies that help smokers precommit to quit or curtail smoking.
Indeed, as Schelling observes, "[i]f there were some way that cigarettes could
be reliably put beyond reach, and people could vote on whether they would
like that done, my guess is that a majority of smokers would elect to deny
themselves the possibility of lighting another cigarette."200 In contrast, if
smokers were rational actors of the sort imagined by most economists, they
would be squarely against policies that made smoking more difficult.
As far as we know, there has not been an extensive empirical test of
Schelling's prediction. That 70% of smokers say they want to quit and many
try to quit but fail,201 however, should give pause to those who assume that
smokers are making decisions based on a single, stable set of preferences. The
multiple selves conception of consumers may also help explain a result that
Viscusi finds remarkable: Even smokers in the surveys he reports had
predominantly negative things to say about smoking and very few positive
things to say.202 The artificiality of the survey context, where the respondent
is not making an immediate consumption decision but is invited to consider his
or her habit abstractly and in the long term, generates an emphasis on the
negative side of the equation. It may be that in the real world (e.g., at the
convenience store counter), exactly the opposite side of the equation is
implicated.203
1 98. SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 78.
1 99. Cf id. at 69-73 (describing various relevant product dimensions that may affect how difficult
self-command is likely to be).
200. Id. at 74; see also id. at 78 ("Doctors report that when patients are flatly told that their condition
makes it i mperative they cease smoking at once, the patients quit not only more reliably than when they
are left any choice, but far more comfortably. Continual indecision . . . aggravates both the discomfort und
the temptation . . . . ").
20 1 . See Parker-Pope, supra note 1 4 1 .
202. See V1scus1, supra note 49, a t 88-95; supra note 1 33.
203. On the day that the tobacco settlement was announced, some newspapers included among the
stories on the settlement a public reaction section. The samplings of public opinion were by no means
scientific; nor were they intended as a test of the multiple selves model. Still, the responses of smokers to
the news seem to suggest that, indeed, some smokers would support a settlement that made quitting easier.
In the Boston Globe, for example, three of the six interviewees were regular smokers, and only they seemed
clearly to favor the settlement. They did so, it appears, because they believed the settlement might help
them quit. See "How Do You Feel About the Settlement with the Tobacco Industry?", BOSTON GLOBE, June
2 1 . 1 997, at A I O; see also Lynda Richardson, The Smokers: Reacting with Skepticism bm Also with Some
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, June 2 1 , 1 997, at 8.
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In sum, the multiple selves model is important in two ways to
understanding the results of Viscusi's survey evidence. First, it makes Jess
relevant the underlying estimate of smoking's costs (because the current self
does not take into account the full costs to future selves), and second, it helps
to explain why respondents might artificially inflate those estimates.
e.

The Economists ' Response

The issues discussed in this section might be characterized as ..addiction"
problems inasmuch as they create a conflict between what a consumer wants
to do and what the consumer actually does. Once one takes seriously the
evidence that cigarette smoking is addictive, the claim that a smoker's decision
to keep smoking is efficient is less easily maintained. In this subsection, we
discuss specific evidence put forward by Professor Viscusi in support of his
claim that cigarettes are not addictive in any meaningful sense. In our view,
the evidence he presents is either unconvincing or, in some instances, actually
supports our contention that cigarettes are addictive. 2<>l
1.

The Premier Experiment

Viscusi draws his first evidence from the market for cigarette substitutes,
which he sees as inconsistent with the predictions made by the sorts of models
of c igarette addiction discussed above. Responding to Schelling in
particular,205 he points out that such substitutes have been offered but have
failed, suggesting that consumption choices are not driven by any sort of
addiction:
[I]t appears that most consumers enjoy smoking as a consumption
decision. In 1988 R.J. Reynolds introduced the Premier cigarette . . .
204. Of course, if cigarettes are not addicuve. then the fact that mo't cum:nt •mol..ers began smoking
as minors loses some of its significance. Viscus1 dedicate> a chapter to rcv1e\loing 'ur.ey rc.ull'I and arguing
that the smoking decisions of teenagers arc just

"'
as ..sen.i ble as tho!><! of adults.

Sa

VISC1.'SI.

111pra note

49, at 1 0- 1 1 , 1 1 9-37.
The observations that we make above and below regarding Vi,..;u ,1\ e\'tdence arguments. •md policy
.
conclusions regarding the smoking deci•ion of adult' apply equally to hi. e\'tdence. nrgumenl'I. and policy
conclusions regarding that of children. We would add abo that the evidence with regard to children»
assessment of risk seems especially inappo,ite. Vi-cu.i at one point ackno" ledges the J>O>'>tbthty that the
young smoker may not "fully recognize how ht• or her future ,elf will \ alue health

as comp•m:d \lo 1th

smoking," though he concludes that young people mal..e ml.. - !>Cn.ill\'e •mokmg deci.1ons Id at
205. See \V. Kip Viscusi, Strategic and Etlucal /ss11t's

111

1/zt' \'ulita11011 of Ll/.-.

1 19

111 STRATI:GY A'D

CHOICE 359, 372 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1 993). Schelling coniecturcs that .rnol..ers \\Ould be willing
to pay a great deal, on the order of SI 00 bi ll io n . for ..a reliable way to qun c1garctte>-10 qun e\ en "'anung

them-without torment or suspense or loss of pnvacy or any rc,1nc11on' on mob1lit) or any ph) sical side
effects." SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 74. The path dependence model 1111plie' the "1Ille pn:d1cuon If an
inexpensive way to leave the current path were d1sco\'ercd. dcc1.ionmal.ers \loOUld be much more likely to
take the new path. Cf Parker-Pole, supra note
aids).

141

(de-cnbmg cum:nt expendnurc' on 'mokmg cessation
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[which was] [e]xternally indistinguishable from a traditional
cigarette . . . . Smokers of the Premier could enjoy the physical
movements of holding a cigarette and the oral gratification achieved
through cigarette smoking as well as the nicotine that smokers
presumably desire. . . . Perhaps the only attribute on which the
Premier fell short was its taste. The result was a marketing disaster,
and the new product was withdrawn from the market.
The Premier provided an almost perfectly controlled
experiment. . . . Surely i f cigarette purchases were driven by
"addiction" alone, this product would have dominated the market. It
seems clear that some fundamental taste on the part of consumers for
the smoking experience is at play.206
At first blush, the evidence from the "perfectly controlled experiment"
seems compelling. The failure of the Premier seems to prove that the taste of
cigarettes, and not addiction, is the primary reason for smoking. Under closer
scrutiny, however, the experiment appears less than perfect. Even assuming
that the Premier experiment unfolded exactly as Viscusi describes, it would
prove little with respect to the addiction models we discussed above. Those
models, recall, depend not so much on nicotine-based addiction, but on, among
other things, the fact that the good taste is delivered with each cigarette while
the ill-health effects are incurred much later-or, if the smoker quits in time,
possibly never.207 To treat the Premier as a test of, for example, Schelling's
model is to misunderstand that model.208 If the Premier tasted bad, then it
would not be a viable cigarette "substitute" within Schelling's conception. If
each puff is unpleasant, none of a person's "selves" would have any interest.
The Premier experiment nevertheless may indicate that consumers do not
smoke solely because of chemical addiction.209 In numerous ways, however,
the experiment was far from "perfectly controlled"; it was badly flawed. First,
it is questionable whether the Premier's purported health advances were

206. Viscusi,
207.

supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 1 55 - 1 57 and accompanying text. The path dependence model does depend in part

on nicotine-based addiction. Specifically, because consumers underestimate the costs of quitting (that b,
the addictiveness of nicotine) when initiating their smoking habits, their choice to begin or continue
smoking may not be a welfare-enhancing choice.
208. In a 1 993 article, Viscusi described the Premier experiment to help sort out questions Schelling
raised about smoking behavior. Viscusi's framing of questions, however, suggests that he mistakenly take�
Schelling as explaining smoking as the consequence of chemical addiction to nicotine: "Is the authentic self
the smoker or the person who claims to want to be a nonsmoker? What does it mean when individuals
express a desire to quit smoking? Are they physically dependem 011 nicotine, or is it the act of smoking
that they cannot quit?"' Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372 (emphasis added). Limiting himself to those
dichotomous alternatives, Viscusi ultimately concludes that, for reasons we examine and criticize in this
subsection, "there is at least some evidence that cigareue smoking is an action of one's authentic self." It/.
at 373-74.
209. This assumes, contrary to our arguments above, that smokers are in fact well informed of the
health risks that they face and would have been willing to trade seemingly trivial taste concerns to reduce
health risks while still getting their nicotine fixes.
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substantial210 or whether the new cigarettes were percei1·ed by consumers as
substantially safer.21 1 In addition . a host of nonhealth differences between the
2 1 0. As compared 10 traditional cigarenes. the Premier contam c:d fe"er of " hat RJR .:ailed
"controversial compounds" like tar. John

Breakthrough with Hefty Price Tag.

Helyar. RJR Pla11s

Ta Markt't SmoAdt'n Ct>:<lf<'ll<' '"
25 [heremafler Hcl) ar. RJR Plt11u )

WALL ST. J . Aug. 30. 1 988. al

It was 1 0 produce no ash, less s1des1ream >mokc. and l e " mcoune than 97"< o f the brand, o n the 111.irlet

See id.

The number of chemical compound> w� not chmma!ed. but reduced b)

See John

low-tar cigarenes.

Helyar,

Scie1111s1s G11·e

82"< to %"< .:ompan:d lo
111 Prr/<1< <" to

the SmokdeSJ Ctgcueue Goud Rn l<"h '

RJR Repon, WALL ST. J., Sep!. 8. 1 988, a! 36. More spec1ticall). RJR" 7-M-page ..:1enu11.: .:ompend1um
stated !hat there were 6.0 mg of tar per c1garcuc compared 10 S 2 lo

See Finn Introduces the 'Clean ' Cigarel/e.

ST

1 2 0 mg for leading Jo\\ -1.ir hr.ind..
26. 1 988, al 03 A• .i

PETERSlll RG Tl\IE.S. Sepl

consequence of these sorts of changes, lhe Premier '' � e�pecled lo be Jc,, oifen>I\ e lo non•moler.. su

& Alix M. Freedman, 'Smokeless · Ctgarelle ls fapu ted To Pou 81g .\forJ.e11111: Clra//em:e.
Tir e De111lr of Pri:1111a. W .\LI. ST J .
Mar. 1 0, 1 989, at B l ; Peter Waldman & Betsy Mom>. RJR .\'alusco AbcmJ01u ·smoJ.den ' C11:<1rrll<",
WALL ST. J., Mar. I , 1 989, at B I , to ease "the social pre»ure and gu1h man) •moler. •uffer." �lorm &
Freedman, supra, and to appeal particularly lo \\Omen. see Mom> & Waldman. rnpra
The continued presence of nicotine sugge>l> thal the Prenuer w� not >Ub>lanuall) .afcr Ahhough
tar is believed to elevate the risk of cancer m >mokcr>. mcoune 1> be he' c:d lo create lugher ml ol heart
Betsy Morris

WA LL ST. J., Sept. 1 8, 1 988, at 39; Betsy Mom> & Peter Waldman.

disease and is suspected to play a role in the mel�lal1c >pread of cancer

Pseudo-Cigare11es Still Han' Toxms.

CHI. St1-.-T1\IES. Sept

20. 1987.

at 1 -1

Su

l lo\\ard Wohn,l}.

Further. reduced mcoune

levels, researchers suggested. would not nece»anly reduce the Je,el of mcolme-b.bed

ml. � .:omp.m::d to
lo
Su F1m1 ltrtrodun-1

conventional cigarenes. In RJR's studies, test rat> exposed 10 >mol.e from the Prenuer \\ere reported
have twice the level of nicotine in their blood a> lest rat> expo>ed lO regular c1garem:•

the 'Clean ' Cigarelle, supra.

Moreover. RJR» claim that ll reduced the mcoune )e\ cl m Prc1111er belo\\

that of 97% of the brands on the market casts doubt on the •lalu• oi the Prenuer a.> .in .idequate

"substimte."

See

Helyar. RJR

Plans. supra.

2 1 1 . RJR did not promote the Premier a> a "heahh1cr" c1gareue becau..: oi the uncertamt) rei,:;irdrng
its health effects and because such adverti>ement> nught h.t\ e unphculy md1c1ed other !ob.i.:co product.

and invited FDA regulation. See Don Colburn. 'Cleaner. · Bur ls Ir S<tfer ' R J Re1 1w/Js Tout> " .v.. ,,
High-Tech Cigarelle-Very Carefully. \VASIL POST. Sep! 6, 1 988. at Z6 ln•!ead. RJR •ugge•led onl) that
!he Premier was "cleaner," hoping that the con>umcr \\ Ould read bet\\een the lmC> See Fm11 /111rod11t<">
the 'Clean ' Cigarette, supra note 2 1 0. Heahh claim> made b) RJR \\ ould al•o ha\e done hnle to
distinguish !he Premier from conventional c1gare1te>. gl\ en thal c1gare1te manufacturer. had long demed
that conventional cigarenes have any significant 111-heal!h con>c:quence>

S.:-e supra

nole

26. cf mprct nole'

99- 1 0 1 and accompanying text (arguing that 1f con>umer> do nol ha\C br.ind ..pc:.:1lic mfom1.iuon .
manufacmrers will have reduced incenuves 10 marle l relatl\cl) >afe c1gare1te•I
In addition, regulators, heahh groups. and comumcr group> did nol treat Prenuer .:igarenc. '" n,1.Jc"

Potential FDA regulation of the Premier � a drug. see FDA \\\mis R J

Cigarelles Could B e Classified a Dnig. 0RA1'GE Cot �TY

R.-vwld> Tlrcll SmoJ.t'/.- , ,

l . Sep! 3. 1 9SS . a l A8 . .ind 1 1 > ongoing
Februaf) 1989 could h;I\ e hrnden:d the ne"

REG <Cal

review until the Premier was withdrawn from the marl.et rn

cigarene's acceptance by cus!Omers. The ho>ule re>pon>e of heahh group• and anti.mol.ing 1;:rouP' .imilarl)
doused the chances that consumer> m1gh1 con'1der 11 •afcr

supra

Sa F1m1

l11tn><l11ro

tire

C/<"<111

Cu:m.-tk.

note 2 1 0. These groups joined the Surgeon Ge ner.ti 111 labehng the Prenuer .i "drug-deh, er) ') 'lem"

and in raising a range of cri11ci>m>. Ne"' ·c1gcrre11<" Recr/11

e1 Om�.

Kool' Cle1111u . L A Tl\ll-'>. 0.:1

21.

1 988, at 2 ; see also Smokeless Cigarcue Amro1111ccme111 Ref1<1rtedh Ser for .\fmtc/d\ . AP. Sep! I 3. 1 987.

al'ailable in 1 987

WL 3 1 7-1997 ("\Ve don't kno\\ what e b e 1> going 1 0 be g 1 , e n oil Once ) OU p u t pl.t•llo
..
1quo1111g a re>e.in:h ..:1enu,1 .it the

in there you have to be concerned about the compound, m the pl�llc•
Georgia Ins1im1e of Technology)); Scon Ticer

What?,

& Rcg111ald Rhem Jr . 171.:- 8cm1111g Qu<">lw11 "' RJR

,V,,,.

Bus. WK., Sept. 28, 1 987. a! 28 ( " ( 1 ] 1'> mcrel) a ne\\ fanglcd drug-deh\ Cf) •) 'tem ror mcoune " 1 .

Michael Waldholz

& John Helyar. FDA Feels Ht•tll

011 SmoJ.den C1g<1rt'll<". \\' .\ LI.

Sl J

. Oc t

2 1 . 1988.
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of ri;k, which are what count in con>umer dec 1>1on >
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effect of these risk percepuons on their dec1>1on> .

SUf1rct note -19. al 5 t C \ p l.i 111111 g tl1'1l "the

1> lhe mam maner of 1111ere,1" • . Jom ller..:h

Cigarelle Smokmg. Seatbelt Use. crnd D1ft'a.-m e> 111 \foge-RuJ. fre1ifr· Of/> . 25
202, 226 ( 1 990) (explaining that "md l \' J duab ' >UbJ�-Cl1vc percepuon' of the mk111c:" ol 1hc:1r
Kip Viscusi,

J Ill \I

& W
Rt�
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Premier and traditional cigarettes undermines the view that the experimental
c igarettes were a viable substitute. The Premier's taste was not merely a
"drawback," as Viscusi would have it, but a fundamental flaw. According to
test marketers, the Premier "smell[ed] like burning garbage,"212 and "taste[d]
like shit."213 Furthermore, contrary to Viscusi's reckoning, the Premier did
not retain the "look and feel" of conventional cigarettes. "Smoking is a
complex psychological, emotional and mechanical process, 'a total
activity' . . . . 'Smokers like taking out the cigarette, tapping it, playing with
it, blowing smoke.'"214 With the Premier, there was no ash and therefore no
flicking.215 For many smokers, '" [t]he smoke itself is part of the
satisfaction,"' and many were not eager to become mere "puffers."21 6 More
generally, smokers found the Premier cigarettes to be difficult and unpleasant
to consume.217 Finally, beyond these issues of "look and feel," Premier

suggests that the government's regulatory interference with the marketing of Premier cigarenes was largely,
if not entirely, to blame for the failure of that and other potentially safer cigarene substitutes. See VtSCUSI,
supra note 49, at 1 47-48 (concluding that "government policies now in place actively discourage safety
innovations in cigarenes.").
2 1 2. Melissa Turner, The 'Cleaner' Cigarelle Will Make Its Premiere, ATLANTA ].-CONST., Aug. 3 1 ,
1 988, a t C I .
2 1 3. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO
1 1 2 ( 1 990); see also Bradley Johnson, Cigarelle May Fuel Heated Debate, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC.
(N.C.), Sept. 5, 1 988, at CS (reporting that the Premier tasted like "singed hair"); Douglas C. McGill,
Consumers Give 'Smokeless' Cigarette Unfavorable Reviews, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 1 9, 1 988, al
A4 ("It tastes like burning plastic."); John Riley, Smoker Carries a Torch; Aficionado Reflects on 'Weird, '
New Smokeless Cigarelles, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 7, 1 988, al 2 (stating that Premier cigarettes were at
first fine, but then "harsh in the mouth and sickening in the nose" and "gave me headaches."); Smokeless
Cigareue Gets Varied Marks in Informal Taste Test, AP, Sept. 4, 1988, available in 1988 WL 3808039
(stating that the Premier smelled "like a tennis shoe burning"). RJR was not entirely surprised by the
reviews. Indeed, its own ambition was apparently not to attract currently satisfied smokers to switch to
Premier cigarettes. According to an RJR executive responsible for the Premier's initial development, the
firm "hoped [the cigarene] would keep smokers from quilling and draw ex-smokers back to Reynolds."
BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra, at 74. That RJR did not target Premier for consumption by currently
satisfied smokers may further impeach the claim that it was a "substitute" for other cigareltes.
2 1 4. Morris & Freedman, supra note 2 1 0 (quoting Leo Shapiro, a Chicago-based marketing
consultant).
2 1 5. See Johnson, supra note 2 1 3.
2 1 6. Smokeless Cigarelle Announcement Reportedly Set for Monday, supra note 2 1 1 (quoting Dave
Brenton, head of the Smoker's Rights Alliance).
2 1 7. A host of practical complications made the Premier potentially unappealing. To begin with,
Premier did not mix well with matches or even cheap lighters, which only exacerbated the cigarene's bad
taste and smell. See BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 2 1 3, at 1 1 2. RJR's own CEO at the time, Ross
Johnson, was quoted as saying that when lit with a match, the Premier smelled "like a fart." Id. Even with
a quality l ighter, Premier cigarettes took longer than normal to light, and an inadequate lighting caused the
smoker to experience what became known as the "hernia effect," the need to overexert on the inhale
because the cigarette was not lit properly. See Morris & Waldman, supra note 2 1 0. To overcome those
problems, RJR provided consumers with four pages of directions on how to smoke the Premier. Each
cigarette was good for around I 0 to 1 2 solid drags before the heat source ran out, but who was counting?
Disposal of spent cigarettes also proved a problem, which RJR endeavored to solve by including with each
pack a plastic case to carry unpleasant cigarene carcasses, but that solution, according to one investigator,
had a negative psychological effect because it reminded the smoker of a junkie's discarded hypodermic
needles. See Riley, supra note 2 1 3.
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cigarettes were priced 15% to 20% higher than conventional cigarettes-··at a
time when discount brands [were] taking off."218
In light of this history, it seems doubtful that the ..marketing disaster"
provides any evidence that cigarettes are not addictive. If anything, the Premier
experiment and other efforts to provide a viable cigarette substitute provide
some evidence of the addictiveness of nicotine. In each of these cases. the
manufacturer has chosen to leave nicotine in its product, despite an ability to
remove the substance and despite knowledge of the hazards it poses.21�
11.

Evidence of Rational Decisionmaking

Viscusi offers a second type of argument to suggest that ··smoking
behavior follows patterns similar to that of other types of consumption
goods,"220 or, in other words, that cigarettes are not addictive. For instance.
Viscusi emphasizes that the elasticity of consumer demand with respect to both
cigarette price and consumer income is "not entirely dissimilar" to those of
other products.221 Specifically, Viscusi summarizes forty-one studies that
were "able to generate estimates that indicated a negative elasticity of demand

2 1 8. Ticer & Rhein, supra note 2 1 1 . It is wonh noting finally that, although comumcl'> h.ul plcnt) ol
good reasons not to switch 10 Premier c1garc11e,, II wa' ultnnatcly RJR'' dcc"ion to pull the product from
the market after only a very brief tnal. A number of internal corporJtc 1�u� ma) help to e�plJin the
"marketing disaster," including uncenainty. d"agrcc mcnt � to RJR'' true mou'e' and the Premier·,
chances of success. concerns over the rcadine" of the product for market. and corporate mJncU\enng
relating to the leveraged buyout of RJR. See Bt'RROl'GI! & HEl.YAR. suprn note 2 1 3. at 1 1 1 - 1 2. 1 1 9-22.
Bradley Johnson, Up in Smoke, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC' (:"< C ) , Mar 1 3. 1 989. JI 8. �lorn' &
Waldman, supra note 2 1 0.
2 1 9. A sworn statement given to the FDA in March of 1 996 b) Dr Ian L°) dc"· a fonncr .i.-'>OC1Jte
scientist for Philip Morris, is enlightening on th" point·
Tobacco companies like Phihp Morri' learned a Jong tune ago that 11 " "' hJrd to get people
to stay with a good tasting product if the nicotine lc:vcl wa' too low It " fairl) \Jfc to -ay that

while taste is a very imponant component of a 'mol.cr\ cxpcncncc (""-at"l a.:11011·· 1 \\tth a
cigarene, that good taste alone does not ,u,tain a marl.ct Pl11hp Mom' clcarl) undcr,too<l 1111,
relationship between nicotine level and product acceptab1hty (c.g . that the) could dc,clop

a

market for a medium to high nicotine product that had marginal t�te. but that the) \\ ould lta' e
trouble sustaining the sales of a good-t�ung product that w� too Jo" in mcotincl
Declaration of Ian L Uydess. Ph.D. to the Food and Dmg Ad1111111s1rnt1em. 1 1 2 Toba.:co Pro<l, Lmg Rep
(TPLR) 8. 1 , 8.6 ( 1 996); see also lmemal Memos Sho ll RJ Remolcls TolH1cco Comp<m\ for;:eted U11dam:e
Smokers and Viewed Nicotine as a Dmg. 1 0.6 Tobacco Prod' Ltt1g Rep I 1 57. I 1 57 f 1 995! ( hcreuwller
lmemal Memos] (''"Happily for the tobacco indu,try. mcounc " both habttuaung and umquc 1n tt' ' anct)
'

of physiological actions."' (quoting an internal RJR memo)) Smoke� choo.c brand' according to their
"individual nicotine dosage requirement' and 'econdanly by a vanety of other con\ldcrJllon,. i ndudmg

flavor." Internal Memos, supra. at 1 . 1 57 ; see also suprn note 144 (de><:nbing " hat the tobacco indu>tf)

has known about the addictiveness of c1garc11e, and ho" the indu•tf) may ha' c mampulatc<l that
addictiveness). In shon, the fact that ta,te may play a role m people·, choice' among c1gan:11e bramh doc'
not--even the industry seem' to rccognize-md1catc that c1garc11c' arc not addict I\ e Th" wn of e\ IJcn.:c
led FDA regulators to suspect that nicotine had been mampulatc<l for 11, addict I\ c effect, prompting the
FDA to enter the "tobacco wars."

See HILTS. suprn note 1 2. at 1 02- 1 2

220. Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 66.
22 I . VISCUS!, supra note 49, at I 0 I : see also Vi'CU \ I. su11rn note I 02. al 52. 66 bub>tttullng the
phrase "�imilar to").
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for cigarettes" ranging from -0.4 to - 1 .4.222 The latter extreme was an
estimate of the price elasticity for teenagers, "who appear to be most sensitive
to the price."223 Viscusi finds "striking[]" that all the studies would provide
evidence that "as the price of cigarettes declines, consumers increase their
demand for the product" and that "price increases for cigarettes will reduce
consumer demand."224 He concludes that such evidence "implies that
smoking decisions satisfy a basic but fairly undemanding test of
rationality."225
Viscusi also makes a closely related observation that "the character of
individual risk perceptions" also affects a consumer's smoking propensity.226
"Higher assessed smoking risk probabilities decrease the probability that an
individual will smoke."227 For i nstance, "smokers assess the lung cancer risk
as being .37, which is .06 lower than the societal perception of .43."228 This
finding is "also consistent with rational decision making."229 This is true
because rational actors would treat perceived i ncreases in risk as tantamount
to price increases.230
Still more evidence of rational decisionmaking can be found in smokers'
selection of cigarettes. Although a majority of all smokers in the survey
expressed concern about the health risks of smoking, a disproportionate
percentage of those who expressed such concern smoke putatively healthier
"low-tar" cigarettes.231 Thus, risk perceptions seem to have a predictable
effect on decisionmaking among smokers, j ust as they do between smokers and
nonsmokers.232
According to Viscusi, "The character of the tradeoffs that smokers make
in other contexts," such as in the workplace, is "consistent with risk-taking
decisions in the smoking domain."233 Nonsmokers require more
compensation to bear job-related risks of serious injury.234 This is probably

222. V1scus1. supra note 49, at 1 06-07.
223. Id. at 1 06.
224. Id.
225. Id. He also points out that the evidence "highlights the potential role of taxes as a policy

instrument for influencing cigarette smoking behavior." Id.
226. Id. at 1 1 0; see also Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67.
227. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67; see also V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0.
228. V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0.
229. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67.
230. It is noteworthy that Viscusi's own findings suggest that risk perceptions arc not especially
influential i n a person's decision to smoke. See, e.g., V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0 (explaining thut
differences in risk assessments should help explain consumption choices and then conceding that difference�
in smoker and nonsmoker risk perceptions were "not stark"); id. at 1 14 (describing the "disparity in the
perceptions of smokers and nonsmokers" as "minor").
23 1 . See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 67.
232. But cf. supra notes 1 04-105 and accompanying text (describing how "light" cigarettes may be
deceptively dangerous).
233. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66.
234. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 1 0- 1 1 5, 143; Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-67: Viscusi, supra
note 205, at 373.
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the most i mportant evidence, in his view, because it indicates "that smokers
differ systematically from non-smokers in terms of their valuation of the health
effects of smoking."235
Based on this evidence that the decision to smoke is responsive to price
and risk perceptions and that smokers appear more willing to take risks than
nonsmokers, Viscusi suggests that the purchase of cigarettes is
i ndistinguishable from the purchase of ..automobiles . . . or books.''2� Put
differently, "there is at least some evidence that cigarette smoking is an action
of one's authentic self."237 This evidence. however, is perfectly consistent
with the addictive models that we described above.23K The general message
of those models is that some consumers who now smoke might not if the risks
and benefits were presented to them simultaneously in an aggregated fashion
at the moment of decision. Indeed, those models would predict that price
i ncreases and risk perceptions would influence aggregate smoking patterns.
To be clear, it may be helpful to describe in slightly more detail Thomas
Schell i ng's multiple selves model, which Yiscusi's arguments seem specifically
intended to refute.239 In Schelling's view, self-management is equivalent to
the management of someone else-"someone in a close relation, with a
paternalist or senior-junior quality like that between parent and child."240
Sticking with Schelling's parent-and-child analogy. one would predict that.
other things being equal, the greater the perceived price or risk facing a child's
decision, the more control a parent would seek to exert. Moreover, a great deal
of Schell ing's discussion of how individuals manage the contest for
self-control, as well as how the Jaw might assist them, involves altering the
"prices" and the perceived risks associated with smoking.2�1 Indeed, that
effect is what leads some consumers 10 cry 10 crick chemselves into
overestimating the risks of their choice-noc unlike che common and more
observable habit of setting one's watch a few minuces fasc.242 The same poinc
235. VISCUS!, supra note 49, a t 1 1 2.
236. Id. at 1 09.
237. Viscusi, supra note 205. at 373- 74. Vi,cu,1 concede' 1ha1 man) 'mol.c:n 'ur"c:) cd c\prc:� a
desire to quit, but states that ..the full implicauon' of the 'ur.cy rc:'pon�'
238. See supra Subsections 11.B.4.b-d.

lire:

not cl ear .. Id at 37-l

239. See supra note 205 and accompanying tcx1
240. SCHELLING, supra nole l 83. al 63.
24 1 . Thus, Schelling is unsurprised by 1hc fac1 1ha1 n hcn 1hc Surgeon General nc:nl publu; \\llh
findings about 1he risks of cigareues, smoking decreased. 5,.,. 1d. at 82
242. See id. at 78-80. One might explain Vi'cu>t \ finding> in JU'! lhc>c lc:nm llia1 I>. con> um c:n ma)
attempt to trick themselves into believing that cigareuc' arc cx1rc:mcfy dangcrou> as a mean> of mamlmnmg
some self-control. If that were true. then Vi�u,i\ cv1dcnce could be undcn.tood as the: >)'mptom. no1 1hc:
absence, of a problem.
Schelling does, from lime to 11me. empha!>1ze 1ha1 h" conccp11on of the: md1\ 1dual 1> d1ffcrc:n1 from
the rational ac1or conception. He wri le>. for m'tancc. thal "'lhc ordinary human being t> wmcumc'
nol
a single rational individual . . . [bu1] more lil.c a 'mall co l lccl f \ 1 1) ·· Id al 93 Con � uc:n ll ) ··mdn1dual>

.

may nol make decisions in accordance w11h the po,1ula1c> of r.111onal11y " /ti. A pc:non ·, choice:> may foil
to "display the qualities 1ypically imputed 10 rauonal dcc1Mon. ltkc: lr.Jn>lll\ lly. 1 rrdc, a ncc: of "1rrc:fc:,an1'
alternatives, and short-run stability over ume ... Id. at 94. But. again. Schc:lhng doc:> not mean IO >Ugg�I
tha1 price or ri>k perceptions will not influence con>umcr.· conduct tn prc:d1c1ablc: \\3)> Tho-.: \ anablc>
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can be made with respect to George Ainslie's time-discounting model.243
That model also predicts that price increases and perceived risk increases
would lead to decreases in consumption levels. To be sure, the more immediate
the increase, the more dramatic will be the response, but at the margin, average
consumption levels will always be inversely related to price and risk
perceptions: When consumers face a higher price or perceive an increase in the
risks of cigarettes, they will, other things being equal, smoke less (or switch
to a brand that they perceive to be less risky).
Viscusi's evidence is also consistent with the path dependence model of
addiction. In terms of the decision to smoke, the point of the metaphor was not
that smokers would fail to alter their smoking behavior in the face of new
costs. Instead, it was that some smokers would continue to smoke only because
earlier decisions raised the costs of quitting. In the aggregate, however, if price
or perceived risk levels of smoking were to increase, the model would predict
that more smokers would quit.
In addition to the evidence that smokers respond to price variations in
cigarettes, Viscusi presents findings that smokers are, other things being equal,
less likely to wear seat belts and more willing to accept job risks than
nonsmokers.244 These findings, he suggests, support the conclusion that
smokers are less risk averse than nonsmokers, a conclusion that is consistent
with the rational smoker model. These findings, however, are also consistent
with the addiction models that we have considered. The possibility of varying
tastes across consumers is not unique to Viscusi's rational actor model. Tastes
could just as easily vary across consumers under our addiction models, with
similar effect. Consumers who are especially sensitive or insensitive to risk in
one context will likely be the same in other contexts.245 For example,
returning to Schelling's parent-child metaphor, if the parent self is especially

will influence which of the multiple selves wins the contest. The self who wants to stop smoking gains
some advantage in the contest for control, other things being equal, when cigarette prices increase. The type
of "irrational" behavior that Schelling has in mind is that of the individual who in one moment is cursing
and forswearing cigarettes as he crumbles a pack in his hand and, in the next moment, is lighting the bent
and busted remains of one of those cigarettes. See id.
243. See Ainslie, s11pra note 1 76, at 47 1 , 492-93. Schelling also describes the person whose multiple
selves differ along "the dimension of time preference-of the discount rate to compare present with future,
near future with far future, imminent with remote, or permanent with transient. The idea is that the person
who . . . lights that cigarette . . . is merely discounting the future with a high interest rate." SCllELLINO,
s11pra note 1 83, at 62.
244.

See Vtscus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 1 3-14.

245. It may be worth emphasizing i n this regard that social scientists have long recognized thut

personal or behavioral characteristics likely play a significant role in the smoking habits of individuals. The
Surgeon General's 1 989 report summarized that evidence as follows: "Studies have linked initiation of
smoking with rule breaking in school, general delinquency, age at first intercourse, inadequate contraceptive
use, low levels of child compliance within the family, low levels of responsibility, nonconvcntionulity,
impulsivity, rebelliousness, and previous use of alcohol and other substances." SURGEON GENERAL'S
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 3, at 336 (citations omitted). Such correlations are analogous lo those
observed "with other drug addictions," id., and as such do not imply that cigarettes are not addictive.
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lax i n controlling the child self with respect to one type of risk, then it seems
l ikely that the parent self would be lax with regard to all types of risk.
There may be another problem with Viscusi's evidence-a problem of
i nterpretation. In his view, the evidence "is consistent with differences in
individual tastes driving choices in a rational economic manner. "246 In an
earlier article (with Joni Hersch), however, Viscusi seems to identify two other
viable explanations for the evidence, neither of which suggests that smokers
smoke simply because they value their lives less than nonsmokers, as measured
by job-risk premiums. One "hypothesis that generates similar patterns of
influences is that cigarette smoking and seatbelt use serve[] as proxies for the
production of safety."247 Alternatively, Hersch and Viscusi concede, the
evidence is consistent with systematic differences across individuals in
estimations of the magnitude of the health loss: "If individuals underestimate
the severity of all adverse health risks from jobs, cigarettes. or automobiles,
they will be more l ikely to engage in all of these forms of risky behavior.''248
Though Viscusi once recognized these other potential explanations for his
evidence, he does not, so far as we can determine, consider them in his work
on smoking policy.
Moreover, there is another viable interpretation of the evidence that
Viscusi seems nowhere to consider. Contrary to Viscusi 's implicit assumption,
for instance, tastes may not be completely exogenous-that is, fixed and
uninfluenced by consumer's smoking decisions and other risky decisions.
Instead, a consumer's decision to encounter one risk may well influence the
consumer's willingness to encounter another. Accepting for the sake of
argument that smokers believe they face a substantial risk of illness, disability,
or premature death from smoking, it seems plausible that smokers will have
less distaste for other types of health risks than will nonsmokers. The greater
the chance that a person will grow ill or die prematurely from one type of risk,
the less willing that person should be to invest in avoiding illness or death

246. VJSCUSI, supra note 49, at 1 1 3.
247. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2 1 1 , at 225; see also 1d. at 205 (explaining the intuition behind the
hypothesis). A similar panial explanation that Hersch and ViM:u>1 do not con>1der " that smol..crs may be:
less productive or more costly (or perceived as less producll \ e or more costly) on the JOb, oth<:r things
being equal, than nonsmokers. For instance, smokers probably take more break> than do their nonsmolang
counterparts, for obvious reasons. For summanes of a number of studies that have purponed to find that

smokers are less productive or more costly to employ. sec: David B Ezra. ··G,.r Off Your Burrs·· Th..
Employer 's Righr To Regulate Employee Smoking. 60 l°Er-N. L. REV. 905. 9 1 0- 1 6 ( 1 993). and Jimmy Goh.
"Smokers Need Not Apply ": Challe11gi11g Employmem D1scnmmarw11 Agauut Smokt'rs Unda th<'
Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 8 1 7. 823 ( 1 99 1 ). Su also mfra note 278 (dc:scnbing
the potential savings in health insurance costs to employers who institute smol-ing bans in the "' orkplaceJ.
Some scholars, however, have challenged the evidence that smokers are le>> producU\e than nonsmokers.

See, e.g.,

Alfred Vogel,

Are Smokers Really Less Productm� Than Nonsmokas'. LEGts. POL'Y.

1 985, at 6.
248. Hersch & Viscusi. supra note 2 1 1 . at 205. The evidence
hypothesis that "health-related activities capture difference> in

Summer

u incon>1stent. ho" ever. with the

nsk p<'rr:t'ptw1u." Id.

(emphasis added)
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from another type of risk, other things being equal.249 To the extent that
consumers' risky decisions affect their other risky decisions as we have
described, it no longer follows that "it is largely . . . differences in taste that
drive the differences in smoking decisions."250
In sum, it seems that none of the evidence Viscusi highlights rules out the
possibility that consumers are addicted to cigarettes, at least as we have
defined "addiction." Perhaps the only model of addiction that Viscusi's
evidence contradicts is the model that assumes that "addicted" smokers are
simply incapable of not smoking at some fixed rate, no matter the price and
no matter the risk. Indeed, it appears that Viscusi has that model in mind. For
example, in a very recent article, he explains that he is responding to those
"observers [who] have hypothesized that even if people understand the risk of
smoking, they may . . . be addicted to smoking and unable to alter their
behavior."25 1 His definition of the stylized smoker model-which he
describes as the "main characterization of smokers underlying the smoking
debate"-also seems to include that extreme notion of addiction.252 We are
doubtful that such an extreme position is as common as he suggests.253
Similarly, we have nowhere encountered a claim that smokers, in the
aggregate, will not lower their smoking rates in response to price increases and
we do not believe that anyone holds such a view.254

249. The basic intuition underlying our point here has an analogue in the cynical bumper sticker that
reads, "Eat Well, Exercise, and Get Hit by a Truck," and is related to the argument above regarding
imperfect relative-risk information. See supra Subsection Il.B.3.
250. V 1scus 1, supra note 49, at 1 1 4. Finally, we are suspicious about the study results in light of the
absolute wage-compensation amounts that Hersch and Viscusi found. It seems to us implausible that a
sample of blue collar employees of three manufacturing firms (a wholesale warehouse, a laundry, and a
gardening firm), would implicitly value an injury that caused a worker to miss one workday at
$83,2 1 7 .39-even if the worker is a nonsmoker and a non-seatbelt-user. The point is even more clear when
one takes into account that the "compensating differentials may be biased downward" by at least
$ 1 2,608.70. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 2 1 1 , at 22 1 . Again, it seems odd that workers would demand
what is likely to be well over one year's salary as implicit compensation for the risk of an injury leading
to the loss of one day of work. These results suggest that something is wrong with the methodology of the
study or with the rationality of the subjects studied. Hersch and Viscusi do not, as far as we can tell,
address this issue.
25 1 . Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66 (emphasis added); see also VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 5, 1 8, I O I .
252. V1scus1, supra note 49, a t 5; see also id. at 1 8 (stating that "if they are cognizant o f the hazards,
they ignore these risks in making their decisions"); id. at 2 1 ("Only the immediate gratification provided
by cigarettes drives consumer behavior.").
253. Indeed, Schelling, the only scholar whom Viscusi mentions by name. devotes considerable
attention to understanding the mechanisms that individuals commonly employ to help with the battle of
self-control. Implicit in Schelling's discussion is the notion that different consumers will have different
amounts of self-control. See T.C. Schelling, Self-Command: A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIME 1 67
(George Loewenstein & Jon Eisler eds., 1 992) (noting that people vary in their ability to stop using cocaine
or cigarettes, to get out of bed at a chosen time. and to do many other things that they know they should
do).
254. After cursorily surveying 4 1 studies of price elasticity, Viscusi concludes that "most of the
demand elasticities are clustered in the range from [-0.4 to - I .OJ," implying that a 1 0% increase in price
would reduce consumption by 4% to 1 0%. Vtscusr, supra note 49, at 1 05. His argument seems to be that
if cigarettes were truly addictive then price increases would have little or no effect on overall con�umption
rates.
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We have a variety of re,ponse,. First. It 1' not clear that an) plausible model of add1c11on could lead
to the conclusion that addicted consumers \\ I l l be \\holly pnce 1n�n'111 ' e

A- Gar)

Bccl..c r dcmon,trated

in a cla5sic anicle, "[N]egatively inclined marl..et demand cune' re'uh not so much from rational beha\lor

per se as from a general principle which includes a " 1de clas' of 1rrat1onal beha\ 1or as " el l
Becker,

Irrational Beha1·ior and Eco11on11c Tlzeon.

�

Gary S

70 J POL Eco". 1 . 4 ( 1 962 ) It 1' thus unclear " h)

Viscus1 stresses that the "most striking[]" insight from h1' 'un e) of 'tud1e' ma) be that all the studies
indicate downward-sloping demand or why he a"en' that '"(t]he pnce re'pon,1, enes' of c1gan:t1c demand
implies that smoking decisions satisfy a b;1'ic but fairl y undemanding test of rauonaht) " V1sn SI.

rnpm

note 49, at 1 06.
Still, Vi'cusi'' bigger point may be s1mpl) that addicuon unphes that demand cune' \\ ould be
extraordinarily steep.

See id.

at 1 0 1 . The claim that cigarette> are add1ct1\ e , ho\\e\ er, doc, not ncce,.anly

lead to such a prediction. Instead it may sugge>t onl) that de mand for c1garet1e' \\ i l l be le" pnce d.i.st1c
among current smokers than it would be were cigarette' stnpped of their add1cll\ e features l e g . nicotine l
But even if Viscusi were correct, we bel ieve the evidence 1' quite con>1stent \\ uh V1,,.;u,1·, notion of
··addiction."
To see why. it is necessary inmally to point out that. as far as \\ e can tell. V1,,.;u,1 mappropnatcl)
truncates the lower end of the price -e last i city estunate' that he 'un e)'' From \\hat "e can o1™:ne, It 1s
more accurate to state that the estimates cluster between a r.mge of -0 2 and - 1 0

Su td

at 1 02-05 tbl 5-6

(summarizing the studies). Indeed. 11 appears to u' that rough!) one-third of the ,1ud1cs that V1,,.;u,1
summarizes include estimates of less than -0.4.

See td

Another problem with Viscus1 's inte rp retauon 1s that u see m' to assume that all 'mol..er. arc c:quall)
addicted to cigarettes. Elasticity studies. however. typ1cj l ly measure a\ erage n:spon�' to pncc changes
It may well be that for a sizable percentage of 'mol..ers. pncc: pla) ' little role in the dc:c1,1om of "' hc:thcr
and how much to smoke. If enough smol..ers are highly pncc: �n>lll\e, ho\\ e\ c:r, their pnce reacuons "' I l l
dilute some of the price insens1t1vity o f other smokers. when the quanut) reaction' to pncc incrca� arc:
averaged. In other words, averaging may understate the s1gmlicant problem that man) people ha\ c 111
quitting. To get some sense of the vanance of pncc clast1c1111:s. It nnght be 1 l lun11na11ng to d1\ 1dc: the
market into different groups. Long-tenn smokers, one 111 1gh1 predict, are hl.. c l) to be more addicted and thus
to evince much less responsiveness to price than the average:

'11101..c:r

and, c:spcc1 all). the: ,hon-tc:nn smoker

Evidence that young people have the most elastic demand scems to confim1 th1' claun

Su. <"

i: .

td

al 1 04

tbl.5-6 (summarizing a n elasticity study o f children age' 1 2 t o 1 7 that c' u matcd a pncc dastlcll)' o f - 1 4 ,
which made chi ldren b y fa r the most price-sensl!J\ e group i n a l l of the studies suncycdJ

I t is imponant to note as well that change' in sales w i l l reflect �'·eral vanablcs, includi ng how man)

nonsmokers do not begin smoking becau'e of pncc mcn:ase'

111c

dec1>1on not lo become a smol..c r 1s.

obviously, unaffected by the addictive quality of cigarette,, becau� tho� who an: not ) ct 'mol..cr. cannot
be addicted. Consequently, the price elasticme' that V1.cus1 'umman1.e' may 0\ e�tatc the

c:� of quitting

(or understate the addictiveness of smol.. i ng). given that they al'o reflcc1 the dcc1,ion' of nommokc� lo
remain nonsmokers.
In light of these critic1,ms. it b 1llummat1ng to loo!.. clo'cl) at the real-\\orld ' 1 gmlicancc oi \'1,,.;u,1·,
elasticity figures. What are the 1mplica11on� of h1' finding' on. sa) . a t) p1cal long-tem1 "nol.. cr " ho •mol..e
two packs (40 cigarettes) per day'> Suppo'e that the pncc mcrea'e' b) S0.20 per pacl.. trcprcscntmg a 1 0"<
increase over the current pack pnce of appro�1matcl) $2

OOl Our

"noker. \\ho "nol..c ' 730 pacb tor

1 4.600 cigarettes) per year. would have to shell out an add1t1onal $ 1 46 00 per ) ear lo rnam1am •-Urrcnl
levels of consumption. According to the elast1c 1 ty studies that Vi.,.;u,1 'un cys. ho\\ c\cr. .:on,umpuon le'cl'
will, on average, likely be reduced by between 2'!< and 1 0'<- Suppose that our 'mo kc: r \\ I l l re'pond lo the

price i ncrease as an average smoker would. Under the lo" 2"<

c'umate,

the pnce mcrca!>C " 111 lead to "

decrease of fewer than 15 packs per year to a total of 7 1 5 pacb t" l11ch 1' equ1 , alcnt to 1 4,300 .:1garcttcs
per year or 39. 1 7 cigarettes per day-a decline of le" than one cigarette per da) I Under lhc: 1 W cstunate,

the total number of cigarettes consumed per year \\ I l l drop to 657 pacb ( 1 3 . 1 40 mdl\ 1dual cigarettes or

36 cigarenes per day). Either way there 1s plenty of smol.. i ng .
Still more can be said about pnce effecb on 'mokmg habits A"umc that onl) half of the o' crall
reduction in consumption will be on the pan of those 'mol..crs " ho continue to 'mol.. c And •upposc: that
the other half of the total reduction will be made up of tho'e smol..e� " ho quu and thO!>C nommo lcr. " ho

choose not to stan. Assume, finally. that qu uu ng and not ,1amng occur in rough!) equ.. l mca.urc . so thal

each is responsible for about one quaner of the overall cla,t1cll) re'pon!>C Under tho!><: a.'umpuom. the
lower and upper benchmarks would be clo,er: 111e ela,t1C1t) \\ould be bct\\cen -0 1 5 ;ind

-

0 7 5 . " h1ch

would imply an expected reduction from 40 cigarette' to bet"cen 39 4 and 37 c1gan:t1c' per da) �lorc:o,c:r.
those who did not quit would decrease their 'mol.. i ng le\ds b)· '1gmlicantl) le-' tl1Jn thilt in hght of the
fact that one quaner of the total effect 1s. by a.sumpt1on. the con,equc:nce of 'mokcr' " ho quu '11101.. mg
altogether.
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Given that Viscusi's evidence refutes, at most, the straw man model that
assumes all consumers completely ignore risk and price information, it is not
clear why Viscusi believes his evidence regarding the aggregate effect of
information has any relevance to the underlying question. Viscusi himself
stresses that "[e]ven addictive drugs, such as heroin, exhibit price
responsiveness so that the existence of some price elasticity does not rule out
all addictive properties."255 Ultimately, therefore, the evidence that Viscusi
offers to demonstrate that the decision to smoke is like the decision to
purchase other consumer goods fails to demonstrate why that decision is not
equally analogous to the decision to inject heroin. The evidence does not help
answer the question that motivated it.256
This discussion should help to put Viscusi 's elasticity figures into perspective. The price sensitivity
of smokers, particularly long-term smokers, is likely more consistent with even Viscusi's extreme uddiction
model than Viscusi gives it credit for being. In any event, other economists who huve looked at such
evidence have indicated that, contrary to Viscusi 's conclusion, demand for cigarettes is unusually inelastic
and entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are addictive. For example, although Manning
et al. concede that "[e]stimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes vary enormously from study
to study," MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 170, they also indicate that cigarettes are especially price
inelastic when they explain that "cigarette taxes cause relatively less distortion and tax evasion behavior
than other taxes," id. at 24. Moreover, they make the following observation with respect to income
elasticities: "Apparently the demand for cigarettes is income inelastic, with the estimates ranging from a
low of -0.002 to a high of 0.93. This suggests that cigarettes may in fact be considered a necessity (at least
among smokers}, probably because of the addictive nature of smoking." Id. at I 7 I . Another group of
economists recently summarized the price-elasticity evidence as follows: "Cigarettes are widely regarded
as having a relatively low elasticity of demand, with a consensus estimate in the vicinity of -0.4 in many
of the major industrialised nations." Warner et al., supra note 28, at 38 1 ; see also Craig Howell el al.,
Pricing Practices for Tobacco Products, 1980-94, MONTHLY LAB . REV., Dec. I 994, at 3, I O (noting the
"generally low responsiveness of consumer demand for cigarettes to price changes, al least in the short
run"); Jeffrey E. Harris, What Can the Cigarette Industry Afford? Stmclllring a Long-Term Scttlemelll
(visited July 28, I 997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/afford.html> ("Economists generally regard the
demand for cigarettes as not very sensitive to price."). It is fair to say that although other economists
recognize that there is a range of estimates, they also view the evidence as indicating that demand for
cigarettes is relatively price inelastic and as entirely consistent with medical evidence that cigarettes are
addictive.
255. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at I O I .
256. Cf Croley & Hanson, A Defense o f Pain-and-Suffering Damages. supra note 4 0 (making a
similar critique).
A third and final way in which Viscusi attempts to demonstrate that cigarettes arc no different from
"almost all economic commodities" is by pointing to the numerous ways in which the term "addiction" hns
been overused:
In recent years the addiction label has been liberally applied to a variety of behavioral
phenomena. Most residents of Los Angeles claim to want to move out of the city but do not.
Similarly, millions of workers profess a desire to leave their jobs, but they do not quit. Self-help
psychology paperbacks provide guidance for overcoming addictive relationships.
Viscusi, supra note 205, at 372; see also V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 20. Here again, Viscusi's argument
begs the question. If the addiction label has been liberally applied, that docs not tell us whether cigarettes
are addictive. Does the fact that some Los Angeles residents said they wanted to move out of Los Angeles,
but did not, imply that heroin is not addictive?
We suspect, moreover, that the disparity between what unhappy Los Angeles residents say and what
they do may be quite analogous to the problem that we believe some smokers face. Within the last decade
Los Angeles has been plagued by crime, racial strife, natural disasters, and controversial jury verdicts. The
Los Angeles economy, among other things, has suffered tremendously as a consequence. See Natulie
Kostelni, Phoenix Area Led Nation in New Jobs; Los Angeles Posted the Biggest Decline, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 22, I 996, at A2. The fact that some current residents do not move out of Los Angeles docs not mean
that if they were currently living elsewhere they would return to Los Angeles Similarly, you will not hear
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Summary

A number of efficiency-minded scholars appear to have concluded that
Viscusi's evidence significantly undermines the case for consumer-protection
laws with respect to smoking.257 While we applaud Viscusi 's efforts to shed
empirical light on this important question. his evidence does not have the
policy implications that he endorses. In the following section. we explain how
an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, such as enterprise liability. would
respond to all of the information-based market failures discussed in this part.
including those related to addiction.
C. The Jnfonnational Effect of Ex Posr lncemive-Based Regularion Revisired
Having described in detail the variety of information-related reasons that
consumers may be undeterrable, it may be helpful to revisit the question of
how ex post incentive-based regulation would respond. :?5K If cigarenc
manufacturers were liable for all the harms caused by cigarenes. whether
through tort law or another compensation system, they would have to raise
their prices to offset those liability costs. And through product prices
consumers would internalize the costs of smoking. Manufacturer liability
of nonresidents of Los Angeles staling 1ha1 they do no! want lo hve in Lo> Angele:; and then moving there.
Residents are "stuck." For instance, many homeowners will lose cons1der.1ble money 1f 1hcy sell al currcnl
market prices. In other words, some residents of Los Angeles may nol move away-and wme smokers may
not quit-simply because exit costs arc unexpectedly high. Under !hose e1rcums1ances. II 1s nol clear 1ha1
the "revealed choice" is efficient. See supra Subsecuon 11.BA.b. Wha1ever label 1s u� 10 dcscnbe such
a state of affairs, it seems inappropriate 10 be sanguine or d1>m1sm·e aboul 11. Elsewhere Viscus1 poinl5 oul
that "[t]he fact that reversing . . . decisions is cosily docs nol imply 1ha1 lhe choices arc incorrccl. l mtcad,
we must be cognizant of the potential losses from m1>1al.es when dec1>1ons arc hard 10 aher •· Visci:s1.
supra note 49, at 1 1 . Perhaps so, but Viscusi ignores 1ha1 many people m1gh1 nol a:>sume 1ha1 the dec1S1on
is hard to alter. And absent that assumplion, consumers have no need 10 lake inlo account the polenual
losses.
Finally, we agree with Viscusi's suggeslion 1ha1 lr.insacuon co>ls m1glu prevent people from doing
what they purport to wan! 10 do. See Viscus1, supra nole 205. al 372.73 The lr.imacuon cos! label,
however, which has been liberally applied 10 a vancty of efficiency 1mped11nents in recenl years, " no more
precise or illuminating than the addiction label that Viscus1 cn11c1zc>. In any even!, a:>surmng 1ha1 V1scus1
does not mean "addictive" as we have used the term (including path dependence). !hen 11 1s e'.\lrcmcly hard
to understand what transaction costs could possibly be incurred by q111111ng smoking. Ahhough II 1s easy
to imagine the sizeable transaction costs associated with moving or even wuh ending a rcla11onsh1p, "' e arc
unable to conjure up similar costs that might resuh from the decision 10 stop smolang. I f anything. we
would predict a significant reduction in transacuon costs. as 1ha1 ienmnology has been conventionally
employed. Given that Viscusi must be referring 10 the wuhdrawal effecl> of smoking c�uon. ''add1cuon"
and not "transaction cost" more accurately descnbes the underlying problem.
257. See, e.g., Taxin. supra note 49. al 230-42. 260-63; Jacob Sullum. Up 111 Smok.-, 25 REAsos 66
( 1 993) (reviewing VISCUS!, supra note 49) (''Viscus1 demolishes !hi> view of smokers [as mcoune slaves),
which has long been a basic tenet of U.S. heahh policy."); sa also V1sn1s1. supra noie 49. al boo k Jackel
(statement of Michael Grossman) ("Viscus1's resuhs-that on average. persons o\·ercsumale the nsk of
contracting lung cancer from cigarette smoking and . that an incrca5e in the perccpuon of 1h1s nsk lo"'ers
the probability of smoking for adults and teenagers-have profound 1mphca11on� for pubhc policy wuh
regard to this behavior.").
258. For a fuller treatment of the general argument. sec Crolc) & Han>on, fj11.-,.,1ru.- Lwbilm. mpra
note 40, at 770-79. 786-92; and Hanson & Logue. Producls L1ab1l11y in Contexl. mprn nole -10, al 23-33
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would, in other words, help to educate consumers concerning the full costs of
each and every cigarette. This is not to say that manufacturer liability would
educate consumers about cigarettes on a cognitive level. The point is, rather,
that consumers would, in reacting to changing product prices, respond as if
they were adding the health costs of smoking to what had been the nominal
costs of smoking. They would do so precisely because under enterprise liability
the nominal costs of cigarettes would reflect those health costs. Consumers
need never do any calculations.259 Furthermore, to the extent that different
manufacturers' products pose greater or lesser health risks (through variation
of tar and nicotine levels, the presence, size, and type of filters, and so on),
consumers educated by the price mechanism would, all else being equal,
consume fewer relatively dangerous cigarettes and more relatively safe
cigarettes.260
By incorporating the total costs, including the expected ill-health costs, of
each cigarette into the price of each cigarette,26 1 the addictive qualities of
cigarettes may also be overcome. The sources of addiction, it may be recalled,
are all related to the ways in which the consumer encounters the costs and
benefits of smoking. Presumably, if the costs and benefits were presented
simultaneously, these problems would not arise. Manufacturer liability for the
costs of cigarettes has the effect of presenting individual smokers with the
costs and benefits of smoking at roughly the same moment, the point of
purchase. The path dependence model of addiction would therefore pose less
of a problem: The consumer's initial path would need less reorienting because
she would take future costs into account. More concretely, higher prices would
be more likely to discourage nonsmokers from starting than they would be to
encourage current smokers to quit.262 Similarly, the problem of the temporal

259. This means of "infonning" consumers through price is one that economists accept. See, e.g.,
Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 56; Warner et al., s11pra note 28, at 3 8 1 -82: cf V1scus1, s11pra note 49, at 1 06
("[H]igher taxes will [by increasing prices] reduce the demand for cigarettes in much the same way as
would higher risk perceptions.").

260. We return to this point below. See infra Subsection V.B. I .
26 1 . We are assuming here that the cost function o f cigarettes i s linear. This assumption, though
questionable, is common. See s11pra note 1 50.
262. See s11pra note 1 60 and accompanying text; see also Warner ct al., s11pra note 28, at 385
("Taxation has been shown to be an effective deterrent to smoking, however, with the preponderance of
evidence suggesting that this is especially true among children, and even many smoking adults support tax
increases with the expectation that they will discourage children from initiating nicotine addictions."
(footnote omitted)); Philip J. Cook, Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and C11l111re, 262 SCIENCE 1750, 1750
( 1 993) (book review) ("[T]here is definitive evidence . . . that raising the . . . [price] on cigarettes
discourages youths from developing a smoking habit and causes some adult smokers to desist.").
Some might want to reject any liability proposal that is justified in part on the grounds that consumers
do not act in a way that is consistent with the rational actor model, for fear that doing so will crcalc a
slippery slope toward a world of paternalistic laws. We are not similarly concerned, for a variety of reasons.

See Hanson &
The First-Party lns11rance Externality, s11pra note 40, passim; see also Croley & Hanson, Enterprise
Liability, s11pra note 40, passim (making the case for mandatory absolute manufacturer liability for all
First, we are not certain that such a slope is undesirable, at least on efficiency grounds.
Logue,

products). Second, even i f we were certain, relying on multiple selves analysis in this context to justify
liability does not imply that liability would be juMified on that basis for all products. Scholars have offered
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separation of costs and benefits would be mitigated. Consumers would confront
costs and benefits simultaneously, at the point of purchase. Finally, multiple
selves would also present less of a problem. The costs that would otherwise
be borne by a smoker's future selves would, under enterprise liability, be borne
by the present self in the form of an increased price. In sum. ex post incentive
based regulation would address many, if not all. of the sources of consumer
misinformation.
Ill . THE SECOND SOURCE OF CONSUMER UNDETERRABILITY:

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

In Part II, our argument for implementing some form of ex post incentive
based regulation in the cigarette market was based on informational
i mperfections. More precisely, we relied on the claim that consumers . when
deciding whether to purchase and smoke the next pack of cigarettes. either
underestimate the long-term risks of smoking or do not fully take those risks
into account. That fact, we said, was a primary source of "consumer
u ndeterrability." In this part, we introduce a second source of consumer
undeterrabi lity: the fact that many of the harms caused by cigarettes are not
internalized by smokers themselves but are instead externalized to third
parties.263 We describe the sources of those negative externalities in the
cigarette market, focusing on "insurance externalities" in Section Ill.A and
"noninsurance externalities" in Section lll.B. In Section III.C . we mount a
response to the argument made by some economists that, given the external
social "benefits" of smoking from pension and other savings that occur when
smokers die relatively young, and assuming that many of the costs to smokers'
fami lies are already fully internalized by smokers, there is a net positive
some guidelines for recognizing when the multiple •Che• problem will be mo't •1gmhcant

5u

e � .

SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 70 (noung the n<-cd for "a ') •temauc " a) of Jnal) 1mg the hJbll or
weakness along relevant dimensions: the vulnerJb1l1t1c• of 11, \'ICtnn. the environment m " h1ch 11 occur•.
and the information, communication. and mstituuonal commitment> that can be brought to bear" 1 �lo-.1 of
those scholars view cigarenes as a parad1gmauc example of a product for \\Inch lhe mult1plc \Che•

problem plays a role. Schelling, for instance. frcquenily choo•e• c1garc!le •mo1.mg 10 mal.e h1• more
general points.

See, e.g., id. at 58; see also mfra note 784 (de.cnbmg other •1gmlieant d1.11nc11on• bel\\ccn
under any

cigareues and other consumer products). llurd. n 1• not clear 1ha1 manufacturer hab1hl) can.

circumstances, be characterized as especially patcrnah•llC. After all. hab1ht} doc• nol purpon to be. nor
does it necessarily have the effect of, a prol11bit1on L1ab1hl) .impl) en•Ure• 1ha1 lhe Clhl• borne in the

future are internalized in the present. Con•umers are •till free to ma1.e lhe choice thJt 1he) \\anl 10 ma1.e

given those costs and benefits. For an argument that only an e� po•t mcenll\ e·� regulJ!Or) regnne \\ 111
ensure that consumers and manufacturers tal..c personal rc•pon•1b1lny for their acuom .

.cc 111/rn le�l

accompanying notes 775-778. Finally. there 1• abo the quc,uon of \\h1ch 1• the au1hen11c \CU-the one \\ho

wants to smoke or the one who doe• not. For an argument 1ha1 1he authenuc \Cll 1• lhe IJ!ter.

SCHELLING, supra note 1 83, at 67-68.
263. An externality occurs when ""the acuv11y of one person affe<:l[•) lhe \\ clfarc of J1101hcr
that is not outside the market." HARVEY S . ROSE!'. Pl BLIC' Fl'A'CE 53

t::!d cd 1 % 8 1 Thu•.

.cc

111 J \\ilY

ii negal1\e

externality occurs when the activny of one cnmy 1mpo•C• a co•l on anoiher 111 a " a) 1ha1 I • nol fully

reflected i n market prices, and a po•itive extcrnaluy occurs \\hen the e\lernal effe<:l 1• ii benelil 1hJ1 I• not
reflected in prices.
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externality associated with smoking (and, therefore, that smoking should not
be regulated). Using those economists' data (but changing some key
assumptions), we show in Subsections III.C.2.a and III.C.2.b, respectively, that
the negative externalities are greater than these economists have estimated and
that the positive externalities have been overstated. We conclude that a smoker
externalizes approximately $7.00 of costs per pack on average.264 In Section
III. D, we explain how an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime could
internalize those costs, thereby leading to more efficient care levels (safer
cigarettes) and activity levels (less smoking).265
A. Insurance Externalities
The presence of first-party insurance266 can cause many of the costs of
smoking to be externalized by smokers to nonsmokers or by heavy smokers
to light smokers, if the insurers fail to make premium or coverage adjustments
based on the insureds' smoking choices. Any of the costs caused by cigarettes
for which first-party insurance coverage exists can be externalized in this way.
Those costs include increased health care expenses because of smoking-related
illnesses, lost income (either lost income to the smoker due to smoking-related
absence from work or lost to the smoker's dependents due to the smoker's
illness or premature death), and property damage due to smoking-related fires.
To understand in general terms how the insurance extemality works, start
by imagining a world of perfect first-party health, life, disability, and property
insurance, a world in which insurers could not only distinguish costlessly
between smokers and nonsmokers but could also make fine-grained distinctions
at all levels-for example, between light smokers and heavy smokers, and
between smokers of Camel filterless and smokers of Carlton Ultralights. In
264. Furthennore, we argue that in any event the so-called savings from smokers' premuture
deaths-whatever their amount-should be ignored. See infra Subsection 111.C.2.b.iv.
265. Others have made the argument that market externalities warrant regulation of tobacco. See, e.g.,
Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 48, at 945-48; Gamer, supra note 48, at 272-73; Yandull.
supra note 48, at 4 1 7- 1 8.
We should note that much of our analysis in this part depends in important ways on the imperfect
infonnation arguments from supra Part II. For example, Subsection 111.C.2.a.iii draws heavily on those
arguments. Indeed, there is a sense in which the imperfect infonnation arguments can be readily trnnslutcd
into an extemality argument-an "intrapersonal extemality" from the smoker to her future selves. Cf
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 53 (explaining that smokers might "ignore the externnlity to their future
selves"); id. at 66 ("[T]here is a time lag before the adverse effects of smoking will become apparent . . . .
[O]ne's future self may make different decisions than one would make if fully apprised of the long term
consequences of smoking."). But cf id. at 66-72 (ultimately rejecting on empirical grounds the notion thut
cigarette-related risks are externalized to smokers' future selves).
266. The phrase "first-party insurance" is often used to refer to insurance arrangements that cover
insureds against some loss to the insured other than legal liability. Although most first-party insurance· is
sold to individuals-e.g., health, life, auto-collision, or homeowners' insurance-it can also be �old to
businesses-e.g., fire insurance or business interruption insurance. First-party insurance can be provided
privately through individual insurance policies or group policies, or it can be provided publicly through
government insurance programs. The phrase "third-party insurance" is often used to refer to covernge for
the risk of some type of legal liability.
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such a world, insurers would, in an effort to attract customers. charge different
premiums to different insureds based on the insureds' levels of smoking and
on the types of cigarettes smoked. Those premium differentials would perfectly
reflect the d ifferences in expected costs posed by each insured, based on his
or her smoking habit. Consumers would thereby be induced through insurance
premiums to make efficient smoking decisions (whether to smoke at all, how
much to smoke, what brand to smoke), as they would bear the full costs of
their consumption choices with respect to cigarettes. Consequently, care levels
and activity levels would be optimized.167
But that is not our world. In reality, insurers make virtually no distinctions
in premiums (or, in the case of publicly provided first-party insurance. taxes)
or benefits between smokers and nonsmokers, or among different classes of
smokers. This means that most of the insured costs of smoking are
externalized; that is, the costs of smoking are not taken into account by
smokers. As a result, as compared with the world of perfect insurance ( or as
compared with a world with no insurance but with perfect information).
tobacco companies are not induced to invest optimally in reducing the risks
posed by cigarettes, smokers are not induced to take all cost-justified steps to
smoke cigarettes carefully, and there are too many cigarettes produced and
consumed. 268
Those inefficiencies can occur in connection with any cigarette-relatc:d risk
that is covered by first-party insurance. As it turns out, many cigarc:tte-relatc:d
risks are in fact insured through first-party arrangements. Most of the increase
in health care costs caused by cigarette smoking is funded through some: form
of first-party health insurance arrangement. Such arrangements include, for
example, fee-for-service policies, managed care contracts, or
government-provided plans such as Medicare or Medicaid.1"" Likewise, a
267. Cf Hanson & Logue, The Firsr-Parf\· /11s11ra11ce £11enwlm. mprn nole -10. al 1 63·6-I ( e \ pl am mg
how perfect first-party insurance can produce opllmal dc1cm:ncc e'en m a "' orld \\ llhoul !Ort law)
268. Cf id. at 1 64-68 (explaining care level and acll\'ll)' lc"cl mcffic1enc1C\ rc>ulung from !he prC\Cnce
of imperfect first-party insurance). There 1s abo a 'L-cond 'ourcc of acll\'ll)' le' cl 1 neffic u :nc) . but 1h1' one
is in the market for insurance r.uher than in the marl.. cl for c1garclle> TI11> me11ic1 enc ) folio" ' lrom the
first-party insurance extemality becau'e >Orne non>mol.. cr.. who \\ould be m>urcd 111 a \\orld of pc:rfecl
i nsurance may, given the insurance ex1emali1y. decide nol 10 purcha>c ut>urancc or decide 10 pun:ha,,c le"'
insurance than otherwise; and 'ome 'moker.. who "'ould nol ha' c purcha.>cd m>uram:e lor a> much
insurance) in a perfect-insurance world can be induced to bU)' lll>Ur.mce (or more m>ur.ince than 01hen• 1..cJ
Those changes in the allocation of i nsurance cover.ige can produce a \\ clforc lib> Se.- �hchacl Ro1h...c h 1ld
& Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Comperirii'e /11s11ra11ce Markers An Essa\· 011 rlze Eco1101111< J of lmp.-rfnr
Informarion, 90 Q.J. EcON. 629, 629 ( 1 976). There " abo a po1cn11al d"inbuuonal 1"ue. "" "' callh I>
transferred from nonsmokers 10 smoker... Thi> occur.. bccau.c >Orne >mol..er> can conunuc 10 >mole tor
smoke at a higher level) and simply pocket the >:l\'lllg' m lll>Ur.ince prcnuurm. " here"" .ome non>mol..c "
remain insured but at a higher premium The.c effect>. m combmauon. produce a pure 1ran>fer from
nonsmokers to smokers and from light smoker.. 10 he;I\ ) >mol.. er..
269. The vast majority of individuab in 1he United Stale> are co, ercd for a large fra.:uon of 1he1r
overall medical expenses either through employer-pro\'1ded hcallh tn>Urance. md1\ ldual heJhh tn>urance
policies, or some form of government heallh m>urance progr.un See L' S Dl:P'T OF CO\l\ll:RCE.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U NITED STAlCS- 1 996. at 1 20 ( 1 9%) (herctnafler STATISTI(' .\L
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STAlCS) (reporttng that approAnnalel) 85'<- of Amencan' h;l\e >Orne form ol
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large fraction of the risk of lost income due to smoking-caused deaths and
illnesses is covered through life insurance or disability insurance policies or
through employer-funded sick leave.270 And the risks of property damage
arising out of cigarette-related accidental fires are largely insured through
homeowners insurance or other types of property or fire insurance policies.27 1
Although some insurers attempt to charge higher premiums to smokers than
to nonsmokers, for the most part first-party insurers do strikingly little
classification of smoking risks.272
Of all the types of first-party insurance, life insurance and disability
insurance do the best job of classifying smoking risks.273 For example, some
life insurance applications ask whether an applicant has smoked in the
preceding twelve months or, more generally, whether the applicant is a
"smoker."274 If applicants answer positively to either question, they must pay
a somewhat higher premium for a given level of coverage than nonsmokers do.
A similar story can be told about individual disability insurance policies and
their applications.275 H!!alth insurers, on the other hand, have lagged far
behind life insurers in offering premium discounts to nonsmokers (or in
reducing benefits to smokers). According to a 1 987 survey, only 14% of
commercial health insurers and only 1 6% of B lu� Cross/Blue Shield plans in

health insurance). Those insurance arrangements contain no exclusions for smoking-caused harm. See
TOLLISON & wAGNER, sapra note 49, at 77-78.
270. A large number of individuals in the United States have some level of life insurance or disability
insurance. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1 996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 6 ( 1 996) (reporting
that 67% of adult Americans in 1 995 owned life insurance). Those insurance arrangements either contain
no exclusions for smoking-caused harm or do a poor job of drawing such distinctions. See infra notes 276278 and accompanying text.
27 1 . Many buildings in this country have some level of fire or property insurance (as is required by
virtually all mortgage lenders). See Guy Halverson, Insurance Described as a Financial Necessity.

CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8, 1995, at 9 (reporting that 95% of homeowners in the United Stales have
homeowners' insurance, according to the Insurance Information Institute). We arc aware of no instances
in which fire or property insurers have refused to pay a damage claim because the fire damages were
smoking-related.
272. It is, of course, next to impossible to "prove" such a negative. Nevertheless, bused on our
assessment of insurance policies and based on our conversations with people in the insurance industry. ii
is safe to say that the vast majority of private insurance companies do very little (and most do absolutely
nothing) in the way of risk classification on the basis of smoking status. Furthermore, virtually all the
economists writing on this topic seem to accept that there is an insurance externality of the sort that we
have described. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., sapra note 49, at 27-28, 36, 62; Viscusi, sapra note 1 02, at
75; Warner et al., supra note 28, at 3 8 1 .

273. See Smoker Rates Same a s Rest, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 7 , 1 993, at S A (reporting tlmt
the only types of individual insurance that provide nonsmoker discounts are life and dbability covcmge).
274. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 294 ( 1 995) (reprinting a �landard
life insurance application form that asks, "Have you smoked one or more cigareltcs within the last 12
months?"); Gary Schuman, Misrepresentation of Smoking History in Life lnsarance Applications, 30 TORT
& I NS . L.J. 1 03, 1 08 ( 1 994) ("The key question typically asks whether the proposed insured hus smoked
cigarettes in the last twelve or twenty-four months.").
275. For life insurance and disability insurance sold to nonsmokers, the premium discounts lend to run
between 1 0% and 25%. See Jane Bennelt Clark, Getting What Yoa Need in Disllbility /nsurcmce,
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. I , 1993, at 98, 1 02. With respect to life insumnce policic� in particulur.
it has been reported that nonsmoker discounts can go as high as 45%. See Erin M. Piorek, Neither Wind.

nor Rain, nor Laws Stop Smokers, PROVIDENCE Bus. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1 997, at 22.

1 998)

The Costs of Cigarettes

1 227

the United States anempt to adjust for the increased risks associaced wich
smoking.276 Although there is some evidence that these percemages may
have increased recently,�77 most health insurers still do noc make adJuscments
for smoking in individual health policies. Whal is more. alchough ic is
extremely difficult to come by evidence on chis question. it is our impression
that, in the case of group health, life. and disabilicy insurance. insurers are even
less likely to differentiate between smokers and nonsmokers in setting
premiums.278 The difficulty of verifying answers to questions regarding
smoking status is even greater in these settings. where the whole poinc is 10
avoid much of the cost of individual underwricing by offering coverage 10
entire groups based on where they are employed or some other association. As
far as we know as well, there are no employers who have sick-leave plans chat
draw distinctions between smokers and nonsmokers. and chere are no
homeowners' policies that offer discouncs 10 nonsmokers.
Thus, relatively little risk classification based on smoking scatus is done
by private first-party insurers; and, with respect 10 some types of insurance,
virtually no such risk classification is even attempted. Moreover, even when
276. See Health Promotion and Chemical Abuse 181 TasJ. Forr.-. (:!] 1 987 PRoc !' \T"L .·h� ·, I'�
COMM ' RS 648, 687-97; see also Chns Leo Pasho>. The Role: of Health ln>Urer> 111 Promo110g SrnoJ.. m g
Cessation 53 ( 1 989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissenat1on. HJnJrd l'ni, c:r>ll) 1 Ion rile: " nh 1hc: HJnJrd
University Library). Of the heahh i nsurer> that offered d"coum>. 1hc: amoum of lhc d1..:ounl• rJngc:J from
I 0% to 27.8%. See Pashos. supra. at 52: see also TOLL!50' & \\' .\G,ER. s11pm nole -19. al S I 1 ··Health
insurance companies typically do not offer d1>c0Unt> 10 non>mol..er> onl) about 15 percent of health
..
insurers offer nonsmoker discounts. and wnh tho>e d1>eoun1> running around I 0 10 1 5 pcri:enl 1
277. See Helen Halpin Schaufner. Healrh /11s11ra11ce Polin anti rlze Po/1110 aJ Tob"' '""· 111 S\101>.. l 'G
POLICY, supra note 6, at 1 8-1, 1 9 1 (finding that of the 5-l°c of Companie> re>pondmg lo a 1 993 >Uf\ e) . 35"<
of the health i nsurance companies indicated thal the) ha\'e >old 111d1' 1Jual heahh puh..:1e• 1h,11 cmplo) cuhcr
smoker surcharges or nonsmoker discount>). 8111 cf S1cphen D S ug annan . D1Jp11rnr.- /nmrnrr-111 0/ S11w4rn
in Emp/oymem and /11s11ra11ce, in SMOK!r>G POLICY, Jt1pra nolc 6. al 1 6 1 . 1 6 1 l ..h '' 1101 ) Cl dear \\hcthc:r
disparate treatment of smokers in 1he>e way> repn:>enl> an 1111punan1 trend or merel) J mode'!. Jlld p.:rhJP'
only temporary. devia1ion from < r.i d n iona l pr.icuce ")
278. See Smoker Rares Same as Resr. Sllflr<I nolc 27 J 1no11ng lhJI group hcJhh Hhun:r' Jo ' 1rtualh
no risk classifying according to ind1 v1dual >lllokmg ,1a1u> l Appro\1111a1d) 85'"f ol 1ho..c " uh pm Jlc hcJhh
insurance coverage in the United Stale> are CO\ cred under e111plo) er-pro, 1dcd group poh..:1c> Su J>.i,ho'
supra note 276, at 60. II >hould be no1cd 1ha1 >Ollle group hcJllh, d1-.ib1hl). Jnd 11 !.: m•ur.m.:c h
experience-rated on a group basis. As a re>uh. group> " nh fc\\ er >mol.. cr> \\ 111. other llunp bc111g <:<jUJ l ,
sometimes be able to pay lower premium> as a gnmp See. r � . Schaufnc:r. mprn no1c 277. JI 1 <J 1 1 nollng
that most Americans get their health in>ur.incc through cmplo) Cr> or olhcr IJrgc group,. \\h1ch hJ\C 1101
..
traditionally classified risks on an mdindual ba>J>. bu1 1hat pm al e hcahh ""ur.incc ..:ompa111c' h.;•c Jbo
begun to experiment with nommoker di.counts for gnmp pohc1e>· 1 For e\amplc. II ha• been rcponcJ lhJI
health insurance premium> for busine»e> 1ha1 ban >11101.. mg in 1he \\orl..p lacc .:an be 25'• 10 35'< lo\\cr
than the rates charged to bu>me»e> 1ha1 do not ln>lllulc a ban Sa P1orel.. rnpr11 noic 275 "010..c prcnuum
discounts may give employers an inccnlJ\C to d1>cour.ige 'moJ.. 111g Jrnong 1hc:1r cmplo)CC' · to ban •mol.111g
in the workplace, or to avoid huing >moker> in the tir>t place Although lho•c •on > ol cmplo) er rc'I"'""''
have more of an internalizmg effect than nothmg al all. 1he) do nol pro' 1de 1hc ..amc Jcicrrcn.:c bcncrn,
as would individually diffcrcntia1ed m>ur.incc prem1u111> 1ha1 Jre ba>cd on e.ich " orl.cr·' "nol.1ng
decisions-the number of cigarette> >mol.cd. whal brand. and 1he hJ..c h I > al>0 " on h no1mg lhJI ' er) le"
employers who use self-funded health m>ur.incc plan> attemp1 10 reyu1re d1flenni: k,c:J, ol cmplo)cc
contributions on !he ba.i> of >mokmg >talU>. S<'e Helen Halpin Sc·h.1Uffler. /111ri;rt11111i; !l11ioJ.111� Co111ml
Policies imo Employee Benejirs: A Sun·e.\ of larg<' Ca/1fomw Corpcmmom. 83 A \I J Pl II HI \UH 1 226.
1 227 ( 1 993) (finding 1hat only around 2"l- of 1he companie> re>ponJmg lo a >Unc) mJ11:JtcJ oll en n g
nonsmoker discount> to employee panic1pants m employcr-pro\ Jdctl health plan••
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insurers do inquire about an applicant's smoking status in the insurance
application (to enable them to charge higher premiums to the smokers), the
questions they ask do not necessarily result in better risk classification. For one
thing, applicants may simply lie about their smoking status or smoking history.
Insurers who ask smoking-related questions will have considerable difficulty
monitoring the truthfulness of the applicants' responses.279 Furthermore, if
an insurer discovers that an applicant has falsely represented her smoking
status, it is unclear how useful that information will prove to the insurer. If the
discovery is made during the underwriting process, the insurer can decline to
issue the policy. After the policy has been issued, however, to deny coverage
to the insured on the grounds of falsely answering the smoking questions, the
insurer will have to navigate the murky legal doctrines of misrepresentation.
To be sure, courts that have addressed the issue have held that
misrepresentation of smoking status on a life insurance application can provide
grounds for an insurer to rescind the policy.280 Unless the insured dies within
two years of the date of issuance of the policy (which is typically when the
incontestability clause found in all life insurance policies kicks in), however,
the insurer will not even be able to raise the misrepresentation defense.281
Therefore, although life insurance companies may attempt to charge higher
premiums to smokers, the success of their efforts turns largely on the honesty
of the applicants.282
Even if efforts at classification were completely successful at what they
sought to accomplish, the resulting level of risk classification and thus cost

279. See Schuman, s11pra note 274, at I 09. Perhaps the best way for insurers to test the truthfulness
of applicants' answers during the underwriting process is to conduct a thorough medical evaluation of cuch
applicant. We are told by life insurance agents that there are blood and urine tests that can reliably reveal
whether someone has used any tobacco product within the preceding seven days. Thus, the result of such
tests could be used to determine not only the likely smoking status of the applicant, but also, ufler
cross-referencing against the applicant's answers to questions about that issue, the applicant's propensity
to lie or exaggerate her health status on an insurance application. If the applicant is able to go without
smoking (or using any other nicotine product) for more than seven days, however, those tests will reveal
nothing about prior smoking status.
280. See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. JMR Elec. Corp., 848 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1 988); see er/so
Schuman, s11pra note 274, at 1 1 1 n.63 (citing several cases holding that misrepresentation of smoking status
by smokers justifies voiding a life insurance policy); Taxin, s11pra note 49, at 237 n. I 04 (same). It is worth
noting, however, that there is a dearth of case law on the treatment of misrepresentation of smoking status
in the health insurance context. In fact, we have searched in vain for a single decision holding that
misrepresentation in that context permits an insurer to rescind coverage. The principal reason for the
absence of such cases may be that health insurers rarely ask their insureds or insurance applicants whether
they smoke.
28 1 . See Schuman, s11pra note 274, at 1 30-3 1 . All life insurance policies issued in the United Stutes
contain incontestability clauses. See ABRAHAM, s11pra note 274, at 330. The following is an incontestability
clause from a typical life insurance policy: "'We cannot contest your policy after it has been in force during
the Insured's lifetime for two years from its Date of Issue, except for nonpayment of premiums."' lei. 111
284 (quoting a sample term life insurance policy).
282. Of course, most insureds are likely unaware of that rule and, hence, the fear of recision may, in
conjunction with the insureds' scruples, encourage honest responses. By the same token, however, less
scrupulous insureds may also be unaware of the potential consequences of material misrepresentation on
an insurance application in the first place and therefore may have a greater incentive to answer falsely.
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internalization to smokers would be very crude. For example, insurers never
make fi ne distinctions among smokers. distinctions that could affect
substantially the level of smoking risk that an insured poses.2s3 In addition,
ex-smokers, who may pose disproportionately high risks to the insurance
pool,284 are not segregated in any way, assuming they quit at least one or
two years before completing their policy applications such that they can answer
"no" to any smoking questions.285 Finally, even when some insurers do
attempt to segregate, a smoker is often able to find an alternative insurer that
does not. In that way smokers may be able to avoid at least some of the
additional premium that they would otherwise face.2si.
In sum, there are large negative insurance externalities associated with
smoking. Because private, first-party insurance policies distinguish only
crudely, if at all, between smokers and nonsmokers in their premiums and
benefits, nonsmokers bear a disproportionate share of the health care costs
associated with smoking. Moreover, as severe as this insurance externality
appears to be in the context of private insurance arrangements, it is likely to
be even more severe in the context of public or social insurance programs, on
which many smokers rely for health care and in which no effort whatever is
made to classify smokers into separate risk pools.2s7
B. Noninsurance Externalities
In addition to insurance externalities, there is an assortment of other cost�
associated with smoking that are externalized onto nonsmokers. First, consider
the harm caused by "environmental tobacco smoke" (ETS), sometime� referred
to as "passive" or "secondhand" smoke. ETS is the name given to cigarette
smoke that is inhaled by people other than the smokers themselves. There is
a growing body of evidence indicating that ETS produces substantial cost� to
society.288 Those exposed to ETS include not only the family members and
283. See Hanson & Logue. The First-Parry Insuranc e £t1erna/t1\. s11f1m nolc 40.
284. See MA NNI NG

ET

u

•

14 7

AL.. supra nolc 49. al 66-75

285. See supra note 274 and accompanying 1cx1
286. Insurers who do not adjusl premium' to refkc1 .inokmg ,1a1u, hkd) co,cr a d1,propon1onJIC

share of smokers, which in tum may cau•c their premium' 10 n.c: A "u rmn g 1hat .umc nommokcr- rcm;un

in the pool, however, their premiums will be lower lhan lho>c charged 10 >mokcr.. by m'urcr.. 1tw1 do
segregate. For some indication of 1he ,aving• enjoyed by •mokcr.. \\ho choo.e non.egrcgaung m •u rc r.. . .cc

Pashos,

supra note 276, at 54

1bl.3.

287. See, e.g., Schauffler, supra nolc 277, at 1 93 ("A l prc•cnl, none of 1hc kdcra ll ) ltn.inced he-Jhh

i nsurance programs (Medicaid or Medicare) mk-r.ite beneficial')· con 1 nbu11on • ba...:d on •mol.. m g •lalu' ·· ,

Although we have found no data on 1his que•llon. we would cxpccl 10 find 1ha1 •mokcr.. com po...: .i
disproponionately large percentage of tho•e who depend on pubhc tn>Ur.incc 10 co,· cr 1hc1r hcahh .:Jrc
expenses, given that typically the level of one·, •mokmg hab11 " J O \ cr..c ly rcla1cd 10 one" •oc1occonon11c
status. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT.

SllJ'rll

note

3. al 272-74, V1 ..:u > 1, lllJ'm nolc 1 02. at

58-60.
288. See. e.g., OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR, l'. S E" TI. PROTI:c-tlO' AGl.'n . Tiii:. C�I'>
AND BENEATS OF SMOKING RESTRlc-tlONS: Al\ ASSESS\tE'I OF nu: S\101\E·FREE E" IRO"ll''' An 01·

1 993 (H.R. 3434) ( 1 994): U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTI! & Ht"\(," St:.R\ s . Tl!E HEAL.TI! Co,Sl:.Ql i:'("l:.<;
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coworkers of smokers, but also subway riders, restaurant goers, and pool hall
frequenters who happen to occupy a space next to a smoker.289 Second, there
is the external pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm to the family and friends of
smokers resulting from the smokers' premature death and from the smokers'
years of ill health. For example, family members of a smoker may suffer
significant financial hardship as a result of the smoker's uninsured medical
expenses or as a result of the uninsured loss of the smoker's income on which
the family had been depending. Or the smoker's family and friends may
experience severe emotional costs (which they would ex ante have been willing
to pay a large price to avoid) as a result of watching their loved ones or
friends suffer the negative effects of smoking.290 Third, even the harm to the
smoker herself-that portion of the harm not compensated by first-party
insurance-can be viewed as a form of externalization. Costs are, on this view,
externalized by the smoker's current self to her future selves.291
At this point, we should elaborate on how these noninsurance externalities
actually remain externalities and therefore a legitimate cause for government
intervention. In other words, we need to explain why the market itself does not
respond to internalize those external costs.292 For example, take the external
costs associated with ETS exposure. Why would nonsmokers and smokers not
arrive at some Coasean bargain regarding the efficient level of ETS exposure?
The standard transaction cost response, at least with respect to public ETS
exposure, comes immediately to mind. Except through the political process, it
is difficult to imagine such a deal taking place.
But for some types of public ETS exposure, that response is too simple.
Consider, for example, ETS exposure in the workplace. There, a Coasean
bargain between all nonsmokers and smokers would not be necessary. So long
as nonsmokers were informed of the risks posed by workplace ETS exposure,
and the labor market were otherwise efficient, those risks would be
internalized. Workers would demand either a higher wage to compensate them
for bearing the risk of workplace ETS exposure or a safer workplace. In turn,
employers (again assuming a perfect labor market) would respond either by
paying higher wages to employees exposed to ETS or by taking steps to reduce

INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL ( 1 986) [hereinaflcr 1 986 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT); EPA, PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 4. For a discussion of these costs, �cc infra
Subsection IIl.C.2.a.i.
289. Most of the empirical evidence to date regarding the hannful effects of ETS ha� concentrated on
exposure within the home and the workplace.
290. Note that some of the hanns just mentioned may be compensated through the smoker\ lire
insurance policy. If that is the case, those costs would be externalized to the extent they arc covered
through i mperfectly classified first-party insurance arrangements. In contrast to the previous scclion of the
Article, however, we mean to emphasize in this section the hanns not covered by the smoker's in�uruncc.
29 1 . See supra note 265; cf Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-72 (discussing, but ultimately rejecting,
the notion of cigarette risks' being externalized to smokers' future selves).
292. For a discussion of why the market does not respond to correct insurance externalities, sec
Hanson & Logue, The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 148-50, 1 64-68.
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workplace ETS exposure, whichever approach was cheaper. Such steps might
include banning smoking in the workplace or limiting workplace smoking to
certain areas in the building where special ventilation systems have been
installed to whisk the smoke away from nonsmoker coworkers. Thus, a perfect
labor market would cause workplace ETS risks to be internalized, and. as a
result, the costs of workplace ETS exposure (including the costs of avoiding
that exposure) would be minimized.
The problem, of course, is that labor markets are not perfectly efficient in
this way. In particular, workers almost certainly do not take into account. at
least not fully, the costs associated with workplace ETS exposure. This is true
not only for the reasons that smokers fail 10 iake inlo account !he risks 10
themselves of smoking,293 bu! also because !he risks associated wilh ETS
exposure are much less well publicized 1han arc the risks 10 smokers
themselves and because the studies documenling ETS risks coniinuc 10 be
d isputed.294 In any even!, ii seems 10 be generally agreed, even among
economists, that insofar as ETS does pose subs1an1ial risks, !hose risks are not
internalized through the labor market 29�
A similar story can be told about why !he cosls borne by the families and
friends of smokers will not be internalized 10 smokers. about. !hat is, why
family members and friends do no! enter into Coasean bargains wi1h smokers
to achieve the optimal level of smoking. We lake 1his issue up again in the
next section,296 but for now we say only 1his: Bolh because of imperfect
information on the part of smokers and nonsmokers aboul the risks of ETS

293. See supra Pan II (di,cu,,ing anfom1a11on problcrm ), rnprn Scc11on Ill A 1d1>eU•\lng rn•ur.tncc
ex1ernali1ies).
294. See. e.g., Viscu,1. supra no1e 1 02. al 78 (quc,1ronrng 1hc rclrabrlrl) of EPA , 1ud r c• •ho\\ lng ml.
of ETS exposure). Of cour..e, rf Vi,cu" " ngh1 about 1hc rclrabr lrl) of 1hc ETS co,1 C>Umah:•. and lho>e
costs iurn ou1 10 be small or nonexisiem. 1hcn 1hc need for a regulator) rc'pon.c 10 ETS- rdaicd mh goc,
away. For 1he purpose of responding 10 1he clann 1ha1 'mok111g po'c' no ncl ncgall\C C\lcmalr1). "C •r mpl )
adopl !he ETS es11ma1e given by Manning el al . allhough \\C bclrc\c 1hc aclual number 1lrkc 1hc number
ul1ima1ely used by Viscu" for ETS ri'h) would lrkcly be much higher s.... 111/m Sub...:c lron Ill C 2 .1 1
Later in 1he Anicle, where we de,cnbe po»1blc polrc) rc'pon,e> 10 lhe ncgall\ c c\lcrnalr11c• rrc>emcd b)
cigarene>, we suggest 1ha1 1he be>I way 10 deal " uh ETS-rcla1cd co,b. \\hale\ er 1ho.c co.I> an: ulumalcl)
de1ennined 10 be, may be ,ome fonn of c\ anlc rcgula11on--<:1lhcr co111111and-and·comrol. pcrfonnancc
based, or incemive-based. See 111fra Sub,ec11on VCJ
295. As far as we have been able 10 de1em11nc. none of 1he ccono111"1> \\ n 1 1 n g on ihc •UbJccl or ETS
risks has argued 1ha1, 10 the exiem 1ho'e ml-> arc real. 1hc) " oulJ be 1 111cmalrlcd through 1hc labor marlc1
This omission >eems e'pecially 1 1nponam Ill Vi,cu"" ca><: gl\ en 1ha1 he ha. Jc, oicd a fair amoum of h"
scholarly anenlion over !he year> 10 inve>ugalrng 1hc cxicm 10 " Juch labor marlcl• rc•ponJ 10 \\ orlplacc
risks in jus1 1his way. See W. KIP VtSCL'Sl. E�tPLOYME'ff HAi'.AROS A' 1'\l:STIGATIO' OF �IARKlff
PERFORMANCE ( 1 979); W. Krp Vi.cu" & Charle' O'Connor. ll11::i1rd \\dmmgs for \\'orkf'l<K� Ruh
Effects 011 Risk Percepttons. \foge Rares. and Tunwn:r. 111 LEAR'l'G ABOl T RISK CO,Sl \IER ·"0
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFOR\tATlO'\ 98 (W. Krp V1 " u" & \\blc) A �l agal cd' . 1 9871 8'1.'>Cd
on 1his earlier work, one would expect 1ha1 V1>eu" ·' tir..1 polrC) rc>poni.c 10 the pubhc ETS ml. \\ OUIJ be
10 call for 1he disseminauon of add111onal mfonnauon about 1ho>c mb 111 order 10 iac1hlJlc 1hc m.1rlc1
response. Instead. however, V"cu>i seem> 10 >uggc>I 1ha1 1hc Jppropna1c regu lator) rc•pon.c 10 pubhc ETS
exposure is �ome fonn of direct regulauon. Sa. ,. g . V1 -.· u" . mpr<1 no1c J O:!. al 1 0::! wppan:mly fa, onng
direct regulation of ETS O\'Cr 1axa11on ).
296. See infra Sub,eciron 1 1 1 .C.2.a.1
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exposure, and because of insurance externalities, even the costs of in-home
ETS exposure are unlikely to be fully internalized to smokers.
To summarize, there are large external costs associated with cigarette
smoking, costs that will not be taken into account by the relevant
decisionmakers, unless there is some form of government intervention. In the
following section, we analyze, among other things, why economists writing in
this area have not called for such intervention.
C. A Review of, and Critical Response to, the Economists' Rebuttal
Notwithstanding the arguments made in Sections Il.A-B, few if any
economists have called for any sort of regulatory response to the negative
externalities associated with cigarettes. To state the point briefly, the
economists who have attempted to quantify the social costs and benefits of
cigarettes have concluded that, overall, the total social benefits of smoking
equal or even exceed the costs. In fact, some economists have even suggested
that cigarette consumption should be subsidized.297 In this section, we contest
the economists' cost-benefit analyses, which wrongly exclude some important
costs (for example, those inflicted on smokers' families and friends) and
underestimate others. We arrive at an alternative figure of nearly $7 .00 in costs
per pack. Our analysis in this part is also guided by a conviction that the
economists' calculations ignore important moral elements of the issue.

1.

Summary of the Economists ' Cigarette Studies

There is now a vast economic literature attempting to quantify the costs
and benefits of smoking.298 The most significant recent contributions to that
literature can be found in a 1 99 1 book by Willard Manning, Emmett Keeler,
Joseph Newhouse, Elizabeth Sloss, and Jeffrey Wasserman299 and a 1 995
297. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75.
298. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE TAXES To FUND HEALTll
CARE REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3 - 1 7 (Congressional Research Service No. 94-2 14 E, Mar. 8,
1 994); MANNING ET AL., s11pra note 49; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
SMOKING-RELATED DEAT,HS AND FINANCIAL COSTS, OTA STAFF MEMORANDUM ( 1 985); GERRY OSTER
ET AL., THE EcONOMIC COSTS OF SMOKING AND BENEFITS OF QUITTING ( 1 984); TOLLISON & WAGNER,
supra note 49; V1scus1, supra note 49; W.F. Forbes & M.E. Thompson, Estimating the Health Care Costs
of Smokers, 74 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 1 83 ( 1 983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub, Does Smoking
Increase Medical Care Expe11di111re?, 1 7 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1 907 ( 1 983); Robert E. Leu & Thomas Schaub,
More 011 the Impact of Smoking 011 Medical Care Expendiwres, 2 1 Soc. SCI. & MED. 825 ( 1 985); Bryan
R. Luce & Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Smoking and Alcohol Ab11se: A Comparison of Their Economic
Conseq11e11ces, 1 98 NEW ENG. J. MED. 569 ( 1 978); Dorothy P. Rice ct al . . The Economic Costs of the
Health Effects ofSmoking, 1984, 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL Q. 489 ( 1 986); John B. Shovcn et al., The Social
Security Cost of Smoking, i11 THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 231 (David A. Wisc ed., 1 989); Virginia Baxter
Wright, Will Quitting Smoking Help Medicare Solve Its Fi11a11cial Problems ?, 23 INQUIRY 76 ( 1 986).
299. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. To a significant degree, the book reproduces a Rund study
conducted by the authors in 1989. See Willard G. Manning et al., The Tcues of Sill: Do Smokers cmcl
Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1 604 ( 1 989).
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article by W. Kip Viscusi.300 For simplicity, we refer to those two studies in
the following discussion as the "economists' cigarette studies," and we refer
to any arguments associated with chose two studies as the "economises'
arguments. "301
Although the Viscusi study and the Manning et al. study differ in the
details, their policy conclusions are the same: Smokers should not be forced
to internalize any more costs than they already do.30? Indeed, if any
government intervention is required, their logic implies, it should rake the form
of a subsidy to smokers.303 How do the economisrs reach a conclusion thar
is so divergent from ours? They claim that a complete cost-benefit analysis
should take into account not only the external costs posed by cigarettes but
also the external benefits of smoking, such as the social "savings" derived
from the pension, social security, and nursing home enti1Jemen1s thar smokers
leave unconsumed because of their premarure dearhs. JI}.! Once one rakes inro
account those external benefits and the current level of federal and state taxes
imposed on tobacco products, the economists argue, smokers already more rhan
fully internalize any external costs they may be imposing on the res! of
society. 305
Manning et al. estimate the per pack external costs and benefits of
cigarette smoking under three alternative discount rates: O'lc, 5 o/c . and 1 0% . 306

300. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02.
30 1 . It is our understanding that the main prem"c' under!� mg the Vil>CUSt and rhc �lannmg ct al
studies, premises that we will criticize in >ome detail t n the next >Ub>eeuon. are generally comtstent \\ tth
the standard assumptions of the discipline of economics To annburc tho� pn:mt�> 10 ··cconomt>ts" qua
economists, as we do, therefore seems reasonable. We should note. howe,·er. 1ha1 wme economi s t� who
acknowledge these premises as being pan of the dt>ctphnc of economic• aho bdtc:\c: land stare:

emphatically) that in the debate over cigarettes noneconomic concern> an: a. 1mponan1 a. econonu c one:.

For example, the Office on Smoking and Heahh of the Center> for Dt�a.c: Control and Prc:H:nuon
.
convened a meeting of top economist> in 1 995 . [1]0 evaluale 1hc cnrena for defining an op11mal c1garc:11e
lax, from the perspecth•e of the disciplme of eco1101111cs... Warner ct al.. supra note 28. al 380 (empha.ts

added). Although the group adopted some of the same pn: mt •e> as Vi l>CU >t and lllanmng c:r al . u concluded
that its final positions regarding whar 10 do about

c1garenc. would depend largely on ..con>tdc:ra11ons other

than those that derive from our professional expen i>e as cconom1 >i.." Id. ar 386. Willard G �lanmng and
Joseph P. Newhouse, two of the authors of the Man ning er al. >t udy. ncn: among rhe economt>l\ who
participated i n that 1 995 conference and who >tgned the >latement JU>I quoted. Jeffrey Hams. a phy>1c1an
and economist, is a self-described ..wann" econom1s1. for he refu,o 10 con>1dcr some benefits of smoki ng
and includes some costs that are very difficult to measure. Su Tes1111w111· of Jef/tY\' £. Harns MD PhD
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Rep1Yse11ta111·..s (v,.ued July 25. 1 997J
<http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harri!Jte>timony.hrml>.

302. See MANNING ET AL, supra note 49. al 1 9; Vi>CU >t, supra note 1 02. at 75
303. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75.
304. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. al 7: Vt>cus1. supra note 1 02. al 5 3, su also Warner er al .

supra note 28, at 382 (making the same observation).
305. See MANNING ET AL., supra nore 49, at 1 9 : Vil>CU>J, supra note I 02. al 5-1. 75. ue a/10 Tot.USO'
& WAGNER, supra note 49. at 92 ("Rather than the common allegat ton 1ha1 >mol.er.. arc: 'O\erU>tng'
publicly provided health-care program>. a more careful accounting of >moken' role m pubhc tran,fer
programs would clearly show that, 1f anything. >mo�er> >hould be

candi date> for a

tax refund ·· < footnorc:

omitted)).

306. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. al 7-8 (del>Cn b mg the n:a>on for dtl>Counungl
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Because Manning et al. believe that 5% is the most accurate discount rate,307
their "best" estimates are as follows: total medical costs, $0.26; sick leave,
$0.01 ; group l ife insurance, $0.05; nursing home care, -$0.03; retirement
pension, -$0.24; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings, $0.09.308 The authors
summarize the data as follows:
Our best estimate is that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is 15
cents. Smoking leads to higher medical costs (principally hospital
costs), more covered work-loss days, less years of work and life, and
more disability retirements than not smoking. The external financial
impact of smoking is greatly reduced, however, by the effects of early
death. Because smokers die younger on average, they receive less in
pensions, Medicare benefits, and other long-term care. Thus, smokers
subsidize nonsmokers' Medicare and retirement benefits, while
nonsmokers subsidize smokers' medical care, disability, and sick leave
early in life.309
To this figure of $0. 1 5 per pack, Manning et al. add the costs of
noninsurance externalities, which they estimate to range between $0. 1 6 and
$0.39.310 They thus conclude that the total external cost per pack of
cigarettes is somewhere between $0.3 1 and $0.52.3 1 1 As Manning et al.
emphasize, this estimate of the external costs of smoking is around or below
the average combined state and federal excise and sales taxes on cigarettes,
307. Manning et al. say little about their choice of discount rates other than to observe that "[t]he
'correct' discount rate is always a matter of controversy. The costs estimates in this part of the book reflect
a 5 percent (real) discount rate." Id. at 8. Based on the structure of their analysis it appears that they chose
5% because it falls midway between 0% and 1 0%. How they chose those benchmarks is not clear, however,
except inasmuch as they are focal points within a range of reasonable discount rates.
308. See id. at 79 tbl.4- 1 6; see also infra Table I .
309. MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 127 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Under a 0%
discount rate, total net costs are -S0.9 1 ; under a 10% discount rate, total net costs arc S0.24. See icl. ut 79
tbl.4- 1 6.
To determine the costs that are fairly attributable to cigarettes, Manning ct al. do not compare smokers
to nonsmokers; instead, they compare smokers to "nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 8. They "controlled for uge,
sex, race, education, drinking habits, exercise habits, family size, income, self-assessed measures of
physical, mental. and general health, and seat-belt use. Thus [they could] calculate the external co5ts of
smokers if they had never smoked but had retained all their other characteristics"-that is, as if they were
"nonsmoking smokers." Id. at 29-30. Manning ct al. express some concern that their $0. 1 5 per puck
estimate may overstate the external costs of smoking inasmuch as they did not control for "bad dictury
habits or an affinity for high-risk activities." Id. at 30. Arguably, however, the SO. I S figure understates the
external costs they were attempting to mea�ure inasmuch a� the deci�ion to smoke cigarettes may be
causally linked to smokers' other rbky lifestyle choices. The more accurate comparison may be between
smokers and nonsmokers. That comparison, according to Manning et al., yields an estimate of $0.28 per
pack. See id. at 14. Nevertheless, we will, for the sake of argument, accept Manning ct al.'s npproach to
this issue.
3 1 0. See id. at 83-85, 1 33-34.
3 1 1 . See id. at 85. Note that Manning et al. omit from this total any cost� attributable to ETS exposure.
See infra note 360 and accompanying text. Also, there is a small dhcrepancy in the Manning ct ul.
numbers. Whereas in one place they state that the total external cost of cigarettes ranges from $0.3 1 to
S0.52 per pack, see MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 85, in another place, where they report
noninsurance and insurance externalities separately, the top number i n the range would sum to $0.54 per
pack, see id. at 1 33.
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which they report as $0.37 per pack.312 They therefore conclude that
"[s]mokers are already paying their way, if we judge solely on the grounds of
economic efficiency."31 3
Viscusi's analysis has the same structure as that o f Manning et al. Indeed,
Viscusi uses the Manning et al. study as a baseline and simply updates that
study in a number of ways.314 Using a 3% discount rate.m Yiscusi
calculates that smokers on net externalize $0.32 of benefits with each pack of
cigarettes they consume. The breakdown is as follows: total medical costs,
$0.50; sick leave, $0.0 1 ; group life insurance, $0. 1 3 ; nursing home care,
-$0.22; retirement pension, -$ 1 . l 0; fires, $0.02; and taxes on earnings.
$0.35.31 6 Viscusi therefore concludes: "In effect, smokers are already paying
their own way in the sense that there is a net externality cost savings to society
from their smoking because of the cost savings arising from their premature
deaths."317 When Viscusi considers the external costs of secondhand smoke,
he concludes that the total external costs associated with each pack of
cigarettes range between -$0. 1 8 per pack (i.e., that smoking on balance saves
society resources) and $0.41 per pack.3 1 8 In any event, he argues, smokers
more than pay their own way at current levels of taxation. which he estimates
at $0.53 per pack.319
As in the Manning et al. study, all of the external savings in the Yiscusi
study come in the form of reduced amounts collected by smokers from private
pensions and social security and from reduced nursing home expenses. Given
this net external benefit of smoking, Viscusi (like Manning et al.) concludes
that current levels of federal and state taxation on tobacco are excessive.320
In fact, under this analysis, any tax on tobacco would be excessive. In
Viscusi's words: "Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that, if one

3 1 2. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 1 8.
3 1 3. Id. at 1 9; see id. at 24 ("Taxes on cigarette. are at a le,el >Uch that smolers pay approximately
the costs they impose on others."). For their discussion of pas"ve >mokmg co>ts. sec rd. at 83.
3 1 4. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 72. Viscu" dcnves hi> table by t�mg Table 4 - 1 6 from �tanning
et al., see MANNING ET AL.. supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4 - 1 6. and updaung 11 for mll at 1on , real cost mcn:a.cs.
and other trends. Viscusi's cost estimate> are based on data a\ ailable as of 1 993. V1.cus1" table also
includes columns showing how the various costs of >mokmg change 1f one attempt> to talc into account
the fact that, over time, the tar content of cigarettes has been reduced. Becau>e \\C be hc vc that the tar
content of individual cigarettes is a poor predictor of the heal th hanm of smol mg. sa supra notc:s I Q.I - I 05
and accompanying text, we omit the tar-level-adju>ted numbers from our tabulations that follow
3 1 5. Without commenting on Manning et al.'> choice o f discount rate.. Vi.cus1 as>eru that "the mo't
reasonable [discount] rate corresponding to the long-run real rate of return an the U.S. economy 1s around
3 percent." Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 73. If Viscusi had used the same di.count rate as Manning ct al
used (5%), Viscusi's results would have been strikingly similar to theirs.
3 1 6. See id. at 74 tbl.4; see also infra Table I . At a 0% discount rate. the net cost per pack 1s - S I 57;
at 5%, it is S0.27. See Viscusi, supra note 102. at 74 tbl.4.
3 1 7. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75.
3 1 8. See id. at 77 tbl.4.
3 1 9. See id. at 57 : see also 1d. at 93 ("[C]1garette taxe> already exceed the lc'cl of the csumatcd
externalities.").
320. See id. at 92-93.
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were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount results,
cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed."321
Whether or not one takes Viscusi's suggestion at face value, the general
message of his and Manning et al.'s studies is clear: Any proposal for
internalizing the external costs of smoking through some form of regulation
should be rejected (or at least reevaluated) in light of the external benefits of
smoking.322
2.

Critique of the Economists' Cigarette Studies

For a variety of reasons, we disagree with the economists' conclusions.
B roadly speaking, the economists' studies significantly understate the external
costs of smoking, greatly overstate (if not mischaracterize) the external benefits
of smoking, and rnischaracterize the effect of current excise taxes. The
principal areas of disagreement come down to which costs and which benefits
of smoking should be considered external to the smoker, and which should be
considered internal. As will become clear, our conclusions with respect to
those issues derive largely, though not entirely, from the imperfect information
arguments that we detailed in Part II. Based largely on those disagreements
with Viscusi and Manning et al., we ultimately conclude that the economic
case for some type of government intervention in the cigarette market is
reasonably strong.
a.

A Closer Look at Negative Externalities: Incorporating the
Imperfect Information Argument

One of the main reasons that the economists reject the goal of requiring
manufacturers to internalize more than they now do is that they grossly
underestimate the negative externalities created by smoking. As a starting
point, it bears noting that Manning et al. intend to generate a conservative
estimate of external costs.323 As we argue, however, a better estimate would
include many costs that the study's authors sometimes recognize as potential
costs, but choose to exclude from their "best" estimate. In the next two
sections, we focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the Manning et al.

32 1 . Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
322. According to many commentators, the future of tobacco regulation will certainly be informed by,
and could well tum on, the evidence regarding social costs provided by these economists. See, e.g., Fromu
Harrop, Smoking Is Becoming a Social Taboo, DENVER POST, June I I , 1 996, at 87; Laura Mnnsncrus,
Tobacco on Trial, Making a Case for Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1 996, § 4, at I ; Matthew Miller, Clecm
Lungs at a Price: Do Smoking-Related Deaths Save the Nation Money?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
7, 1 997, at 52; Robert J. Samuelson, Who Elected the Lawyers?, WASH . POST, July 2, 1 997, at A23.
323. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 4 n . 1 95 (stating that their goal is "to provide
conservative estimates of the external costs"); id. at 1 3 ("We believe [our estimates] arc reasonable, even
conservative.").
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estimates and methodologies. Because the Viscusi study relies on the Manning
et al. study's findings as a baseline, most of the criticisms that we make of the
Manning et al. study apply in roughly equal measure to the Viscusi study.
1.

Costs to the Smoker 's Family and Orlzer Third Parries

Manning et al. 's "best estimate" assumes that smokers internalize all of the
costs that their smoking imposes on members of their families.324 In the
authors' words, such costs are "internal because the family constitutes an
economic unit (it pools income)."325 Strikingly, neither Manning et al. nor
Viscusi carefully explores how plausible the assumption is.m' Indeed, they
seem to rely on the fact that the assumption is conventional among economists.
Examined on its own terms, however, the assumption that smokers internalize
the costs of smoking imposed on their families seems implausible.
The prevailing model of the family as a single preference function with an
altruistic head of household allocating resources was developed by economist
Gary Becker.327 Neoclassical and feminist economists alike, however, have
levied a variety of criticisms against that model.328 These scholars note, for
example, that because Becker fails to look within the black box of intra
household bargaining, he does not explain intra-household allocation of
consumption choices.329
324. See id. at 4 n.5 ('"(W]e are considering the family as a "ngle dec1S1on-malang unit and treating
costs imposed on other family members as internal.'").

325. Id. at 28-29.
326. Viscusi offers a somewhat more developed JUst1fica11on for the assumption He wntes
Theories of the household typically assume that the household hc:41lh make decmons on behalf
not only of themselves but also on behalf of other family members. Thus. the husband or wife
would take into account his or her own welfare when making the smoking dec1S1on as well as
the implications that the smoking behavior would ha\"e for the well-being of other family
members. If individuals do in fact internalize these intrafamily ex1ernaht1cs. then they will be
already reflected in the individual deci,ions. Rational individual decisions consequently will

internalized as well and need nol be considered.
supra note 1 02, at 7 1 -72 (citing GARY S. BECKER. A TREATISE OS TIIE fA\llLY (en larged ed.
1 99 1 ), and MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, for the same assumption).
327. See BECKER, supra note 326.
328. A number of feminist scholars have cn11c1zcd Beeler\ model. Sa. e g Barbara R. Bergmann,
Becker 's Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusums, I FEMlSIST Ecos. 1 4 1 ( 1 995) (arguing !hat
Becker ignores intra-familial dynamics and power dbpanucs ) : Frances Wooley. Getting the Beller of
Becker, 2 FEMINIST EcON. 1 1 3 ( 1 996) (describing a vanely of allernat1vcs 10 Becker's model of the family):
id. at 1 1 6 (noting that '"(t]he common thread 1ha1 linls these models 1s a recogmuon that fanuhcs cannot
imply that household externalit1es are

Viscusi,

.•

be treated as if they were a single individual: there are complex interactions bet\\ccn the behavior of
different family members, and family hfc doe' not benefit all family members equally"")
neoclassical camp, see, for example, Pierre-Andre Chiappon .

Within the

Collectm.• Labor Suppl\ and \Ve/fare, 1 00

1. POL EcON. 437 ( 1 992), which develops a collective model o f household labor supply and resource
allocation.

329. See. e.g., Martin Browning el al., Income and Outcomes: A Stnic/llral Model of /nrruho1uchold
A/location, 1 02 J. POL ECON. 1 067, 1 069-70 ( 1 994) ('"What recent empmcal analym points toward 1s that
multiperson households cannot be treated as 'ingle dec"1on makers and that household allocallons should
probably rather be considered as the outcome of >Orne mteracuon between household members with

& Peter S. Bunon. Slwn11g \\7tlun Fanuhe1 lmplu:atwns for
the Measurement of Po1·erry Among lndii-iduals 111 Canada. 28 CA� J Ecos 1 77 ( 1 995) (demonstrating

different preferences."); Shelley A. Phipps

·

1 238

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63

Even if the assumption that family costs are fully internal to individual
decisionmakers were plausible with respect to other types of costs, it is
implausible with respect to the costs of smoking. If the costs and benefits of
smoking were truly internalized across members of a family, one would expect
nonsmoking members of a family to be more encouraging of those family
members who smoke. Yet one does not hear statements of the following sort
from family members of smokers: "It's fine that my spouse (or child or parent)
smokes. In light of the fact that she has taken into account the costs to herself,
to me, and to other family members, it must be that she is benefiting greatly
from the cigarettes. I would not want to deprive her of that tremendous
pleasure. Indeed, given the net benefits, I am glad that she smokes." Similarly,
it would be astonishing to hear a smoker say: "It's worth it to me to smoke
even when I consider the costs to my loved ones of my dying earlier than I
otherwise would and of their dying earlier than they otherwise would." It is
likely that neither nonsmokers nor smokers frame the matter in those terms
because smokers do not, in fact, fully internalize the costs that they impose on
others.330
There is another way to put the point that smokers do not fully i nternalize
the costs their smoking imposes on their family and friends. Even if it is
assumed that smokers to some extent behave altruistically with respect to their
loved ones-that is, they derive utility from bestowing benefits on loved ones
and they experience disutility when they impose costs on loved ones-smokers
do not take into account the fact that those costs experienced by their loved
ones should, in and of themselves, count in the social welfare calculation.
Thus, even if smokers in some sense "feel the pain" they are causing others,
that is not enough from the perspective of overall social welfare. There is still
a need for incentive-based regulation. One could argue, therefore, that it is
through simulation how intra-household distribution can drastically affect the incidence of poverty
experienced by different family members, especially children); Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton,

Social/Institutional Variables and Behavior Within Households: An Empirical Test Using the Luxembourg
Income Study, I FEMINIST ECON. 1 5 1 ( 1 995) (analyzing social and institutional factors that inHucncc
bargaining power within a marriage); Duncan Thomas, Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential
Approach, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 635 ( 1 990) (noting that intra-household consumption decisions,
particularly those regarding the well-being of children, will vary depending on whether the mother or father
has control of resources); Frances R. Woolley & Judith Marshall, Measuring Inequality Within tire
Household, 40 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 4 1 5, 425-28 ( 1 994) (describing a study of household members'
inequality in control over expenditure and consumption decisions).

330. Cf. Financing Provisions of the Administrations Health Security Act and Other Health Reform
Proposals, Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 1 03d Cong. 3 1 7 ( 1 994) (statement of
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) [hereinafter Health Care Reform
Hearings] ('"Cold' economists [those who ignore all difficult-to-quantify costs] assume that smokers and
their families privately, rationally, and voluntarily bear the costs from smoking-related disease and death.
This is a fiction that ignores the dual reality of teenage initiation into cigarettes and adult addiction to
cigarettes."); Linda B. Ford, M.D .. President-Elect, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at News Conference
on Potential Tobacco Settlement, Wash., D.C. (June 1 7, 1 997) (transcript on file with the Yale Law Journal)
("I've seen the fear in the eyes of a child who suffers an asthma attack triggered by environmental tobacco
smoke. Since it is the child's parent who smokes, I know I will sec this child again and again because of
a parent's addiction to tobacco.").
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appropriate for the societal cost-benefit calculus regarding smoking to take into
account both the cost to the smoker of her feeling that she has i mposed a cost
on a loved one and, separately, the actual cost imposed on the loved one by
the smoker.331
We should also note that the economists' assumption that family costs are
fully internalized by smokers is subject 10 the same types of critiques that we
made i n Part II. For many of the reasons that we argued there that smokers
tend to externalize costs to their future selves,332 they would also likely
externalize costs to their families. For instance, if smokers behave
optimistically with respect to the risks of smoking, then they would be just as
likely to behave optimistically with respect to the risks 10 their families.333
Similarly, if smokers externalize some of the costs of firsthand smoke 10 their
insurers, then smokers' family members undoubtedly externalize some of the
costs of secondhand smoke to their insurers.3:;.a
Finally, there are many more persons harmed by smoking than just the
smokers themselves and their immediate families. Among others, friends,
coworkers, and extended family members (those who do not share in the
household income pool) all bear some of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs
of smoking. For the most part, those third parties and the external costs they
bear are ignored in the economists' studies.
To their credit, Manning et al. seem to recognize that family costs might
properly be characterized as external.335 Consequently, they make an effort
to quantify how their estimates would change if some of those costs were
treated as external.336 At the same time, they briefly consider some of the
external costs to "those outside the smoker's family.'"37 Using as a value of
life $ 1 .66 million and treating all deaths as external, they estimate a per pack
33 1 . This argument is a version of an obscrva11on made: rc:cc:ntl) by Lollis Kaplow m lhe contc:\I of
See Louis Kaplow, A Nole 011 Subs1d1:111g G1f1s. 58 J PL B. EcON 469 ( 1995 J What

altruistic gift giving.

is interesting for current purposes is lhal Kaplow·, point applu:• nol only lo the: bestowal of gifts but al'°
to the avoidance of costs. As Kaplow points oul. 11 ma)' be con1rovc:r.ial lo count

as a social cosl-�aratc:

from the cost to the loved one imposed by the smokc:r°• prc:malurc: death-the pam fc:h by the smoker
purely from knowing that she is imposing 1his CO•l on olhc:r..

See 1d.

ul

475 & n . 1 2 . Such costs. howc:, c:r.

arc nol significanlly different from the types of psychic cost. lhal gc:t included. uncontro, c:r.1ally. m lhe
social welfare function.

332. See supra Subsection 11.B.4.d.
333. Note that Viscusi and Manning et al. do nol c:vc:n claun lo prondc: C:' 1dc:ncc: th.11 •mol..eo and
those around them are well-informed of lhe ml.. of pa.•1 \ c: .mokc: or lire: or olhc:r "'�" facing the fanuly
members of a smoker.

334. We know of no life, heallh, or d1•ab1hl) pohcy lhal adJU•l> prc:m1ums to tal..c: into .,.;count lhe
h 1• •lnkmg lhal the: c:.:onom1sts'

fact that one or more of an in,urance applicanl'• family member. •mokc:•

studies seemed to mi•s lh1s fairly obv1ou' potnl. Con.1dc:r, for 1n•lancc:. lhc: 1c:n•1on m lhe folio" mg I\\ o

statements, which are in close proximily lo each olhc:r m Manning c:l al

" boo l.. ( I l

··11Jo the c:\tc:nl thal

passive smoking generale• health care and olher collc:cll\ c:I)· linancc:d co•l•. a pomon of tho..:

c0>!> 1• alw
(2) "[w]e do nol con,1dcr . . . the: CO•l• of pa.-1\ c •mot-mg \\ llhtn fo1111hcs
as external." MANNING ET AL.. supra nOle 49. al 4.
335. See id. at 4, 32, 1 95 n.5.
336. See id. at 1 8.
337. Id. at 83.

paid by nonsmokers"; and
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cost of $0.09 for lost lives in fires and another $0. 1 4 for fetal deaths caused
by smoking.338 In addition, they estimate $0.02 per pack for smoking-caused
neonatal intensive care costs.339 Finally, Manning et al. estimate the external
costs of ETS to be $.014 per pack.340
In sum, the economists exclude from their calculations substantial costs
imposed by smokers on those around them, even though there are good reasons
to count those costs as noninsurance externalities. Including those costs affects
the cost-benefit calculation significantly.
ii.

Insurance Externalities

For the sum of the insurance externalities, we accept the numbers given
by Viscusi, with a few notable exceptions. Again, those numbers are based on
the Manning et al. study but were updated by Viscusi in various ways. Thus,
we accept per pack figures of $0.50 in medical costs, $0.01 in sick-leave costs,
$0. 1 3 in group-life insurance costs, and $0.02 in fire-related property costs. We
deal with the positive externalities in Subsection III.C.2.b below.341
iii. Costs to the Smoker
For all the reasons set forth in Part II, another cost that should be taken
into account in an incentive-based system is the costs to the smokers
themselves of their smoking habit. Although Manning et al. emphasize that
"[t]he biggest component of total costs is the cost to the smoker of premature
death and disability," they exclude that cost from consideration "[b]ecause this
338. See id. at 83-84.
339. See id. at 83-84; id. at 1 33 (summarizing their calculations of these costs); see also id. at 14 ("If
we were to expand our external cost definition to include the costs of passive smoking. neonatal
complications caused by mothers' smoking, and other costs to individuals other than the smoker, the
external costs would range up to 52 cents per pack.").
340. See id. at 83. In arriving at S0. 1 4 per pack, Manning et al. assume that all ETS·cuuscd dculhs
are "external" and that the value of each life, on a willingness-to-pay measure, is $ 1 .66 million. See id.
Viscusi provides a more thorough analysis of ETS costs than Manning et al. do, and Viscusi takes into
account government studies of ETS costs that were issued after the Munning et al. book was published. See
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 78-92. For two general reasons, however, we use the Manning ct al. estimate
of $0. 1 4 per pack for ETS costs. First, we cannot determine what number Viscusi uses for overall ETS
costs i n his final analysis of total external smoking costs. Viscusi states that the total passive smoking costs
that are included in his final calculations "are assessed as the low, median, and high numbers from Tables
6, 7 (lung cancer), and 9 (heart disease)." Id. at 93 n . 1 9. Those tables have so many different numbers and
capture so many alternative assumptions, however, that we are unclear which numbers he means. We
suspect that the final numbers exceed the S0. 1 4 estimated by Manning et al., but we cannot be sure. Cf.
infra note 361 (discussing Viscusi's later estimate). Second, Viscusi omits all costs attributable to in-home
exposure to ETS. See Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 93 & n. 1 9 (describing his table summarizing the externnl
costs of smoking as being derived from an earlier table that included only outside-the-home ETS cost). We
regard that omission as a serious mistake, for the reasons discussed in the text.
34 1 . As we explain infra Subsection III.C.2.b, we regard those positive externalities as having zero
i nternalized value to the smoker. Note also that we omit the external costs attributable to lost tux revenues
because the assumption underlying the estimate of those lost tuxes was that the entire amount would be
returned to the smoker in the form of government benefits.
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cost i s borne by the smoker."342 Implicit i n the logic that those costs are
already internalized by smokers because they bear them is an assumption that
smokers are well-informed of the health risks and addictiveness of smoking
and that their smoking decisions take all of that information into account.
Unlike Viscusi, Manning et al. do not attempt to justify that assumption.J.13
Indeed, they acknowledge that, if the assumption were false, then the negative
externalities (including the intrapersonal externalities to future selves) would
greatly exceed their estimates of $0. 1 5 per pack. :144 Specifically, the negative
externality from death and disability "would be on the order of SS per
pack."345 In addition, "[s]mokers also pay 7 cents per pack more on
out-of-pocket medical costs, and lose 86 cents in wages in salaries."J.16
In Part II, we argued that smokers do not internalize those costs (even if
their future selves must bear them) because of numerous consumer-information
problems. Therefore, we conclude that those costs-for regulatory purposes
and from the perspective of economics-should be viewed as external to the
smokers. According to Manning et al. 's calculations, which we accept for
present purposes, those costs total $5.93 per pack.J.17

342. MANNING CT AL., supra note 49. at 82.
343. In his anicle measuring externalities. Vi.cu" prov1dei. a thumbnail version of the arguments thal
we summarized and criticized supra Pan II regarchng the nature and extent of consumer mformauon. Su
Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 66-72.
344. See MANNING CT AL., supra note 49, at 2 1 .
345. Id. The basis and precise meaning of thi. estimate " not clear to us. As far as " e can tell. the
$5.00 figure is meant to represent only the externality to each >moker"s future >ehcs and thU5 would need
to be added to any other net negative externalities associated wnh >mokmg

El>ewhcre Manning cl al.

emphasize the imprecision of that number and suggei.t that the real number las 1f there were such a thing)
may be lower:
What is the cost to a person and his or her family of lo.mg

28 di.counted nunute• for c;u:h

pack of cigarettes smoked? In monetary term>. thi. " 93 cents of wage.

But >Urvcys ha' c

shown that most people are willing to pay many umes their expected increase m earnmp for

as much as S5.00 a pack
82 (citations omitted). Manning ct al. appear to have di.counted 1 37 mmuto of lost hfe expectancy
per pack of cigarettes smoked to 28 minutes. See id. at 79 tbl.4 - 1 6. In another place. Manning et al. appear
to offer a different calculation. See id. at 1 34 ("For cigarettes the di.counted cost 1s 0 4 hour per pack for
the smoker . . . . At $5 per hour, these costs amount to S I to S2 per pack . . . . "). Mann mg et al. do not
make clear where they got these numbers or how they fit wnh the S5.00 per pack number u><:d earlier.
346. Id. at 8. Understanding the meaning and proper interpretation of Manning cl al 's figure" 1s not
easy. Indeed, they at times give different numbers for tho><: that we have noted m the text Su. e.g . td.
at 1 4- 1 5 ("If we were to add the internal costs of disab1hty and premature death to our c.umatc. the costs
could range from 78 cents to $5 per pack, depending on how we valued the lost year. of hfc. ") In add1t1on.
additional safety. Thus, this component of costs may be

Id.

at

we are not clear on whether the costs of pain and suffenng borne by the smoker are included m thc::>e

id. at 28 (suggesting that pain-and-suffenng costs are excluded)
347. That estimate includes costs to the smoker of premature death and d1sab1ht)· (S5 00). out-of
pocket medical expenses (S0.07), and lost wages ($0.86). Su 1d. al 8, 21 Ag;un. some might object that.
insofar as smokers are mindful of those costs, counung them as costs m an mccnu,·c-ba>Cd system of
numbers. Cf

regulation would produce overdeterrence-i.c., too httle smoking. Below. we explain how some mcenuve
based systems ameliorate the overdeterrence problem. whereas others do not.

Sa 111/ru Sub>Ccuon IV.D.3.
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TABLE 1 . ESTIMATED EXTERNAL COSTS PER PACK OF CIGARETIES

:I

HANSON &
LOGUE'S
ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS

COSTS

MANNING
ET AL. 348

VIscusI349

Medical Care

$0.26

$0.50

$0.50

Sick Leave

0.0 1

0.0 1

0.0 1

Group Life
Insurance

0.05

0. 1 3

0. 1 3

Nursing
Home Care

-0.03

-0.22

-

Retirement
Pension

-0.24

-1.10

-

Fire Insurance

0.02

0.02

0.02

Taxes on
Earnings

0.09

0.35

-

Total
Insurance
Costs to
Smoker

I

0. 1 5

-

I

-0.32

-

ETS

-

-

Other

-

-

Total
Noninsurance

�

I

0.66
5.93

I

0. 1 4
0.25350

0. 1 6 to 0.37

0. 1 4 to 0.73

6.32

0.3 1 to 0.5235 1

-0. 1 8 to 0.4 1 352

6.98

We also accept (without endorsing) Viscusi's estimates for the negative
insurance externalities associated with medical care, sick leave, fire insurance,

348. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4- 1 6 (utilizing a discount rate of 5%).
349. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 74 lbl.4 (utilizing a discount rate of 3%).
350. This estimate, based on Manning et al., includes lives lost in tires ($0.09), fetal deaths ($0. 14),
and neonatal intensive care ($0.02). See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 83-84.
35 1 . See id. at 85. The "Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting "Totul Insurance
Costs" from 'Total Costs."
352. See Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 93. The 'Total Noninsurance Costs" were derived by subtracting
'Total Insurance Costs" from 'Total Costs."

1 998]

The Costs of Cigarettes

1 243

and life insurance.353 When it comes to the negative costs (or ··positive
externalities") that Viscusi and Manning et al. attribute to nursing home
savings and pension savings, however, we part company with the economists.
As we discuss in detail in Subsection III.C.2.b.iv, we take the position that the
"savings" to society resulting from the fact that smokers tend to die at a
younger age than nonsmokers should not be included in the calculation of the
size of the net externality produced by cigarettes. For essentially the same
reasons, and in the interest of consistency, we also treat the external costs of
lost "taxes on earnings" because of smokers' premature deaths as being
zero354 whereas Manning et al. and Viscusi assign a positive number to those
costs, as is consistent with their view of the positive externalities associated
with smoking.355 This leaves us with a total negative insurance extemality
of $0.66 per pack. To that, we add the costs to the smokers themselves
($5.93), the total ETS costs ($0. 1 4), and other assorted costs attributable to
cigarettes ($0.25). As Table 1 shows, we arrive at a total cost of almost $7.00
per pack, which greatly exceeds the estimates of both Viscusi and Manning et
al.356
iv. Additional Concerns
At this point, let us emphasize that our decision to take at face value the
economists' estimates of external smoking costs (with the exceptions already
noted of family costs and costs to the smokers themselves) should not be
understood as an endorsement of those numbers or of the methodology used
in arriving at them. To the contrary, there are reasons to believe that those
numbers substantially understate the external costs of smoking. For example,
when Manning et al. calculate the total life insurance externality associated
with cigarette smoking, they limit their analysis to group life insurance.357
They j ustify this limited focus on group insurance by assuming that individual
l ife insurance policies adequately classify risks according to smoking status,
thus creating no insurance extemality.358 We strongly disagree with that
assumption. For many people, individual rather than group policies are their

353. For a discussion of our reservations about Vi�u.i·, and Manning cl al \ cakulauons . .cc m/rt1
Subsection III.C.2.a.iv.
354. Our rationale b that, if the pen,ion and nur.mg home .a\ mg' due 10 the earl) deal� of 'mokcr.
are to be excluded, it make' 'en'e 10 exclude from 1hc analy.i' a. \\ Cl l 1hc i;nc> 1ha1 \\ould ha\e been
collccled had smokers lived a s1a1i,1ically nom1al nommol.cr hfc,pan
355. Manning et al. and Vi,cus1 include only the 10,1 tal(C' that \\OulJ have been u.cd lo fund the
costs accounted for in their numbers . such a. medical care and pen.ion,.
356. Our total cos! number. ignore exi,ting foderal and '!ale cxc1>c lal(C:> on c1garellc:>. though V1"1Cu>1
and Manning et al. analyze these costs. See supra note' 3 1 2. 3 1 9. and accompany ing lc:"l For ihe reason>
why we believe those taxes should be ignored . see 111/ra Sub>cclion 111.C.2 b 111
357. See MANNING ET AL., supra nolc 49. al 37-38. \'i>cu,1 adopl' lhc .ame approach. although he
updates the figures. See Viscusi . supra note I 02 . al 96.
358. See MANNING ET AL. . supra nole 49. al 37-38.
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major form of life insurance coverage, and, as we observed above in Section
III.A, those policies, even when they attempt to classify smoking risks, do a
poor job of it.
Another reason that we are inclined to doubt the reliability of Manning et
al.'s and Viscusi's numbers is their treatment of ETS costs. For instance,
Manning et al. estimate the total cost of ETS to be $0. 1 4 per pack,359 but
they omit that number from their final calculations for reasons that are
unclear.360 Viscusi, on the other hand, includes a figure for ETS costs that
is based on more recent evidence, although we were not able to determine
from his tables precisely what the final number is or how exactly it was
calculated.361 More troubling with respect to Viscusi's ETS calculations are
the questionable assumptions upon which the calculations are based. For
example, Viscusi assumes that the morbidity costs associated with ETS are
zero.362 This seems especially odd, given that the studies upon which he
principally relies for his mortality-cost estimates also include substantial
morbidity-cost estimates.363 In addition, consistent with his treatment of
family members of smokers elsewhere, Viscusi omits all ETS-caused mortality
costs attributable to in-home exposure to ETS.364 When we attempt to
calculate the total ETS costs, using the EPA's estimates of total ETS-induced
mortality and morbidity costs and applying a plausible willingness-to-pay
measure of the value of a lost life, we arrive at a number in the neighborhood
of $ 1 .00 per pack.365 Nevertheless, we have chosen simply to accept in this
359. See id. at 83.
360. See id. at 79 tbl.4- 1 6 (omitting the ETS cost estimate from final totals). Viscusi claims that
Manning et al. omit the $0. 1 4 because they concluded that "the evidence at the time of their study was too
fragmentary to make a reliable judgment." Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 78. But Viscusi cites no specific
language in the Manning et al. studies to support that interpretation.
36 1 . In a more recent summary of his earlier work, Viscusi writes: "Using the uppcr·bound EPA
estimates of the ETS body counts in conjunction with a figure of $5 million per life lost, I have estimated
that the external cost per pack of cigarettes is as high as 41 ¢ per pack." Viscusi, s11pra note 150, at 46.
362. We take that to be Viscusi's assumption because his study does not mention ETS morbidity costs
and because the tables summarizing his calculations do not contain any morbidity cost estimates. For the
same reasons, we conclude that Manning et al. make the same assumption.
363. For example, the EPA study on which Viscusi bases some of his calculations estimates the total
annual morbidity costs of ETS to be between $2.7 billion and $6.5 billion. See OFFICE OF RADIATION &
INDOOR AIR, s11pra note 288, at 1 3. Those costs include the medical expenses associated with an assortment
of ailments, particularly asthma.
364. He omits inside-the-home heart disease mortality costs because they "may well be internalized
by the smoker" and because "the underlying scientific basis for these estimates is extremely fragile and
highly speculative." Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 87. He omits inside-the-home lung cancer deaths from his
analysis for similar reasons. See id. at 85.
365. For the purpose of making this calculation, we used as a starting point the estimated mortality
and morbidity losses shown in OFFICE OF RADIATION & INDOOR AIR, s11pra note 288, exhs.2·6, 2-7. To
arrive at an annual dollar cost for mortality losses (discounted to present value to account for the fuel that
tobacco-smoke exposure shortens one's life at the end, which will typically be years in the future), we used
a valuation of $924,000 per life lost due to ETS. Applying this approach, we found that the total annual
cost of in-home ETS exposure falls somewhere between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion.
We should also note that Viscusi, in his calculation of total insurance externalities, includes u range
of estimated "ETS insurance externalities." Viscusi, s11pra note 102, at 9 1 tbl. 1 1 . Again, we arc not entirely
sure how he arrived at these numbers; the only discussion of his methodology that we can find is one
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part the Manning et al. number of $0. 14 per pack for the external ETS-related
costs of cigarettes. 366
There are other examples of questionable calculations in both the Manning
et al. and Viscusi studies. From the positive externality side, when Manning
et al. (and thus Viscusi) attempt to compute the total external benefit
associated with pension savings attributable to smokers' dying young. they
assume unrealistically that all pension plans are defined benefit plans that
terminate when the smoker dies.367 A majority of people in this country who
have pension plans, however, have some form of defined contribution
plan.368 In contrast to defined benefit plans. the benefits of defined
sentence that reads:

The insurance externalill<!l> from ETS are the lir..t csumale> of lh1' I-ind and n:llect

..

the analog of the insurance externalities from smoker.. them,elvc' "

Id

at 87. Ba.cd on that sentence. and

because the ETS insurance externality numbers in Vi.cu"'' table end up being po"l l ' c c�tcrnah11c,, we
assume that those numbers are the excess of the pem1on and nur..ing home ··saving>" �mtcd \\ llh the
premature death of those exposed to ETS over the medical. "ck lea\c, hfc insurance, and lirc·rclated
external costs of that exposure. Therefore. if we were to apply to the ETS i nsurance c�tcmahty the
approach developed in this Article--that 1s, eliminating the pen,1on and nursing home clement from the
fonnula--the ETS insurance externalitie' would clearly be net co'!' rJthcr than net benefit, to wc1cl) We
do not, however, attempt to quantify those additional external co'i.

366. The most recent reports suggest that then: 1s growing C\ 1dcncc of hc:lft J1sea.c ml �1a1ed
with ETS exposure.

Disease,

See, e.g.,

Denise Grady.

S1ttd\ F111ds Seco11dlu111d Smoke Doubl.-1 Ruk of lleun

N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1 997, at A l (reporting on the finding> of a recent ,1ud) b) !lan ard

researchers suggesting that there may be 50,000 ETS-cau,L-d heart J1sea.c death. per ) car in the L:mtcd
States). It is the connection between ETS exposure and heart disease that V1.cu'1 'uggot' 1• most

See Viscusi, supra note I 02, at 85.
367. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 29 B y a defined benefit plan. �tanning ct al mean

questionable.

.i

private pension plan that, upon the worker·, retirement, pay' her 'omc annual amount that 1• a funcuon
of her salary at retirement. What is key for our purpo":' 1' that Manning ct al �umc that. 1f the woricr
dies prematurely (whether due to smoking or 'omc other cau•c). the pen,1011 re•oureo that would ha'c
gone to the worker are instead returned to the other par11c1pani. i n the pen,1on plan, cuhcr in the fom1 of
smaller required contributions or larger pensions.

Thur effect

" the •Upposcd pen.ion sanng> to wc1c1y of

cigarette smoking. Viscusi does not menuon speci fically what

Im

"''umpuon• are regarding dclincd

contribution and defined benefit plans, but he seem• to ha\C adopted the Manning ct al approach
368. See U.S. DEP. T OF LABOR. PENSION AND HEALTII BE.'\ El'ITS OF AMERICA' WORKtRS

:-It'\

FINDINGS FROM THE APRIL 1 993 CURRENT POPL1LATION StRVE\ al B - 1 9 ( 1 99-1) According to that •tudy.
of those workers in the United States covered by only one or the other type of pen"on plan. alma.I 1w1cc
as many report being under a defined contribuuon plan a. report being under a Jctincd bench! plan

id.

Sa

Additionally, when those wage and salary worker.. who reported par11c1pa11ng in bolh defined benefit

and defined contribution plans were asked to identify which type of plan wa. ··ma.I unportam:· 60% .aid
defined contribution and only 40% said defined benefit.

See 1d

at B·20

Finally. 75% of "' orkcr.

participating in private pension plans report being ve,tL-d: only 1 5"<- report being UO\ c•ted
reported not knowing the answer 10 the question.)

Sa 1d.

<The rest

at B -2 1 .

A defined contribution plan, in contrast to a defined benefit plan. 1 ' more of an ··employer-enhanced
private savings plan." MANNING

ET AL, supra note 49, at 29. After 'ome penod of lime, 1f the worker >ta}'

on the job long enough, the contributions to a defined contnbuuon plan and the accumula1ed earning• on
those contributions begin to vest to the worker. That mean• that those :is.ct" c.scnually become 1hc
property of the worker: She can take those benefit, wuh her 1f 'he change> JOb>. and her otalc " ould
receive the benefits if she were to die prematurely. With defined contnbuuon plan>. therefore, the \\Orkcr'•
benefits, to the extent they have vested. do 1101 go back into the pen"on poo l . Set:"
(visited Nov. 7, 1 997) <http://www.pen"onapprJ1.cr...com/penba.1c' html>

Plans

Tlie B11s1n of Pt'llsw11
Consequently. to the

extent private pension plans take the form of defined con1nbu11on plan" there " no po•l l l ' c c\lcrnaht)
even under Manning et al. 's own analy'i'.
Manning et al. base their decbion 10 ignore defined contnbuuon plans on I\\ o rauonalo

"( 1 1

[D)efined contribution plans are a minority of pnvatc pen"on plan>. Jnd !2l C\ en in defined contnbu11on
plans, the amount of the annuity is usually not a funcuon of habit •tatu' " �IA.,.Nl.,.G

ti AL, rnpru

note

49, at 29. The first rationale appears to be a product of the author.. ' n:hance on no" -dated stat1>11cs. A!>
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contribution plans do not terminate at death and, according to the Manning et
al. analysis, would not be considered a positive externality associated with
smokers' dying young. We will address the concept of positive externalities
from premature death below.369 Here we only mean to suggest why our
confidence in the economists' numbers, which we are taking as given for the
purposes of argument, may be unfounded.
In addition, although we follow Manning et al.'s and Viscusi's lead in
omitting a number of important categories of smoking costs, ideally those costs
should be included in the analysis. For example, wholly separate from ETS
costs, we would expect there to be large pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs
experienced by smokers' families and friends as a consequence of smokers'
protracted smoking-related illnesses and their smoking-caused premature
deaths.370 Neither Manning et al. nor Viscusi attempts to measure these costs
(which could, in theory, be quantified by using some combination of estimated
out-of-pocket costs together with a willingness-to-pay measure for the
nonpecuniary element). If those costs were taken into account, it is likely that
the external costs of smoking would be much higher than is reflected in the
third column of Table 1 . Less significant than those suffering costs, but
perhaps more familiar, are the annoyance costs faced by nonsmokers. As at
least one commentator has correctly noted, many nonsmokers would be willing
to pay something for smoke-free and smoke-residue-free environments: "If
nonsmokers were willing to pay $50 a year for this privilege, it would add up
to $ 10 billion. That in turn could justify a 42-cent-per-pack tax, forcing
smokers to pay for their annoying habit."371
Finally, there are also a number of non-health-related costs to the smokers
themselves that Manning et al. and Viscusi overlook. For instance, smokers
likely pay, on average, higher home cleaning costs, higher dry cleaning bills,
and higher amounts for teeth cleaning products and services.372 Many of
them are also likely to spend more on breath mints and sprays and on repairing
or replacing scorched clothing or furniture.373 Because of lingering smoke
to the second rationale, we agree wilh the premise, but not with the conclusion. It is true that defined
contribution pension plans and the annuities lhat are issued in connection with those plans do not typically
distinguish among beneficiaries on the basis of their smoking status. That fact, however. has no implications
for the question at hand. The point is that the "benefits"' of early death are not enjoyed by other pension
plan participants; they remain with the decedent's estate. They are not, in other words, e:cterna/izecl. Those
pension payouts should therefore be excluded from any calculation of the positive externalities of smoking.
Manning et al. may have wrongly decided to treat pension payouts of this sort as an externality simply
because of their more general definition of externalities. See, e.g., icl. at 45 ("(T]hc concept of externality
is usually clear: a portion of the costs is generally external if costs are financed by a large pool of insured
individuals, and premiums (or taxes) do not depend on smoking status.").
369. See infra Subsection III.C.2.b.
370. See supra Section IIl.B.
37 1 . Miller, supra note 322, at 53; cf. infra text accompanying note 404 (describing possible psychic
costs of "sin").
372. See Vivian Marino, Smokers Cough Up Big Bucks To Feed Habit, AP, July 8, 1 997. cm1ilt1ble
in 1 997 WL 487404 1 .
373. See id.
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odors, smokers may also face additional costs in terms of reduced resale
market value of their homes and cars.374 Finally, a large number of smokers
have paid billions for various sorts of smoking-cessation aids.m I! seems
doubtful that most smokers take those added costs into account when deciding
whether to smoke.376 Indeed, the fact that economists such as Manning et al.
do not even consider those costs provides some evidence that they are not
widely recognized as costs.377
For all of those reasons (especially the apparent omission of in-home ETS
mortality costs and all ETS morbidity costs and, perhaps most significant, the
omission of any pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers'
family and friends), it is likely that our final estimate of the total external costs
of smoking shown in Table I -roughly $7.00 per pack-may understate by a
large amount the magnitude of the problem.378 In sum, even our conservative
estimate of $7.00 per pack of external costs dwarfs the numbers derived by the
economists. As we have stated, the main reason for the difference is our
decision to include the costs of smoking to smokers themselves, which we do
for the information-based reasons discussed in Part II. In the following section,
we explain the other principal difference between our final estimate and that
of the economists, namely, our decision not to include the social benefits of
smoking.
b.

A Closer Look ar the Positive Exrernaliries

As we noted at the outset of this section, economists argue that the
external costs of smoking are offset (or more than offset) by the social
"benefits" of smoking. In the previous subsection, however. we explained that
the external costs of smoking have been drastically understated. In this
subsection, we explain that the external benefits of smoking have been at least
as drastically overstated. We argue further that the so-called social savings

374. See id.
375. See Health Care Reform Hearmgs. supra note 330. at 3 1 6 (>tatement of Jeffrey Ham>). Eben

Shapiro, After Nicotine Parches: Sprays, Ptlls. Inhalers '. WALL ST. J.. Nov 8. 1 993. at B I , '"'" also
Parker-Pope, supra note 1 4 1 (reporting annual cx pend n ure> on >mol.ing-ce>>allon de,1ces and programs
at $4 1 7.7 million).
376. See Health Care Reform Hearmgs, supra note 330. at 3 1 6 (>tatement of Jeffrey Ham>)
377. Jeffrey Harris has cnticized the sort of >tudtc> conducted by Manning et al and Vi'ICw.t for
focusing "only on the easy-to-measure costs." Id. at 3 1 6. Tut> "cold approach," according to Hams.
assumes "that all unquantifiable costs somehow cancel each other out." Id. Ham> adopt> instead the '°" arm
approach," which resists the temptation to "di.mi» i nj ury and >U ffenn g mere!)· becau>e: n cannot be: simply
calibrated." Id.
378. We omit some costs that other economt>l> include. For in>tance. Jeffre) Ham> calculate> a Joss
in personal income taxes of $ 1 4 billion per year due to premature death> from smoking Sa 1d. at 3 1 7
Simi larly, Manning et al. calculate a per pack cost of S0.09 for lo>t income taxes. ue �IA'l.'1.1'1.G cl AL.
supra note 49, at 75, while Viscu>i e>timatcs such lo» at SO 35. su V1scu>1. mpra note I 02. at 74 r bl .-1
We exclude those costs. for reasons di>CUS>Cd supra note 35-l

1 248

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63

resulting from cigarette-caused deaths should, for economic and noneconomic
reasons, be excluded from the policymaker's calculus.
All of the alleged external benefits of smoking derive from the fact that
smokers, as compared to nonsmokers, tend to die near the end of their most
productive years and at the beginning of the years in which they will draw
down the various accounts they have accumulated over a lifetime of productive
work. As a consequence, the argument goes, when smokers die, large amounts
of resources (especially public and private pension entitlements as well as
nursing home entitlements) are, on average, left to be consumed by the rest of
society. This translates into lower pension and nursing home premiums for
nonsmokers during their lifetimes.379
Based on that rationale, and according to Manning et al.'s calculations,
smoking saves society $0.24 per pack in smokers' unclaimed pension
entitlements and $0.03 per pack in smokers' unclaimed nursing home
entitlements.380 After making a number of updating adjustments, Viscusi
reports those per pack benefits at $ 1 . 1 0 for pension savings and $0.22 for
nursing home savings.381 Ultimately, the conclusion of the positive
externality story is that, instead of trying to deter cigarette consumption, we
should be subsidizing it.382
When we first encountered this positive externality argument, it struck us
as bizarre and counterintuitive. Because we are responding primarily to
economic arguments, we emphasize here the economic flaws in the positive
externality story. This focus on economics and efficiency, however, should not
be interpreted to mean that we think the strongest responses against the
positive externality argument are economic ones. To the contrary, as we
suggest briefly below,383 we suspect that the moral objections to this story
are at least as strong as the economic objections.384

379. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 28; Viscusi, supra note 102, at 75.
380. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 79 tbl.4- 1 6; see also supra Table I . Herc, ns elsewhere
in this Article, we use Manning et al.'s "best estimates"-i.e., the figures arrived at using n 5% discount
rate-in discussing their calculations. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. We use Viscusi's 3%
discounted figures in discussing his calculations. See supra note 3 1 5 and accompanying text.
3 8 1 . See Viscusi, s11pra note 1 02, at 74 tbl.4; see also supra Table I ; cf. Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at
95-97 (discussing his updating adjustments to Manning ct al.'s numbers).
382. See, e.g.• Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 75 (''Taken at face value, these estimates indicntc thnt, if
one were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based in the 3-percent discount rate results, cignrettc smoking
should be subsidized rather than taxed.").
383. See infra Subsection III.C.2.b.iv.
384. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that there is a positive extemality associated with the
lethal effects of smoking and that it has been properly measured (both of which clnims we contest in the
following subsections), the positive extemality identified by the economists' studies is still swamped by
the nearly $7.00 of negative externalities that we have identified, see s11pra Table I , using basicnlly the
economists' own numbers. From an economic perspective, this fact calls for more intemaliwtion of costs,
not less.
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Assets Enjoyed (and Not Enjoyed) by Others

Even if we were willing to consider the savings from premature deaths in
our social cost-benefit calculation, the only possible positive extemality
associated with the premature deaths of smokers would be the assets that the
smokers themselves would have consumed had they not smoked and, as a
result, had lived longer. Any assets that would have been consumed by anyone
other than the smokers had they not smoked cannot be considered part of the
extemality. When the smokers die early there may be a trnnsfer of those assets,
but this transfer should not go into the efficiency analysis. For example, assets
that would have been consumed by the family of the smokers (or by charities
to which the smokers would have made contributions, etc.) but that instead get
consumed by the smokers' fellow pension plan participants do not count as a
positive externality. (Our conclusion here assumes that everyone other than the
smokers, including the smokers' family members, is external co the
smokers.)385 Therefore, the economists' estimates of pension savings should,
at the very least, be reduced to take into account the extent co which those
so-called savings represent such transfers.
Similarly, the positive extemality story seems to assume that smokers die
leaving no liabilities. That is, the economists make no anemp! co offset the
pension and social security savings associated with smokers' premature death
by whatever l iabilities go unpaid when smokers die. It may be the case that
smokers, on average, have fewer liabilities when they die than nonsmokers do.
B ut no evidence to that effect is offered. In any event, some adjustment should
have been made to account for whatever liabilities smokers do tend to leave
when they die.
ii. Do Smokers Really Extemali':.e Forgone "Benefits " ?
The positive externality argument also seems wrong based on the fact that
information problems (such as the ones we discussed in Part II) prevent
smokers from experiencing the loss of future pension benefits as a current cost
in their decisions regarding whether to smoke the next pack. If the forgone
pension benefits of smokers are indeed to be understood as a positive
externality, then their loss must affect the incentives of the smokers. 1116 To

385. See supra Subsection 1 11.C.2.a.i. If we were 10 accept the ;i,.,umpuon made by Manning cl al and

Viscusi that costs borne or benefits enjoyed by a 'mokcr\ hou•ehold member arc 1memal 10 1he •moker.

their mistaken assumption 1ha1 all pen,ion plan' are defined bcnefi1 plan• would pronde anot her b;i,." 10

See supra nole> 367-368 and accompan) mg le\t
386. There is linle doubt that Manning el al. arc makmg a po"11ve cx1cmahl)' argument s..... <" 11 •
MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, al 28 ("[S]mokmg lead> 10 a •haft m future claim> or bcnefiu from

criticize their estimate of positive extemalitie,.

smokers 10 nonsmokers, thereby yielding a po,111vc cx1cmah1y to non•moker.. 00) 01her langtrage m their
book also indicates Iha! they have !hi' son of mccn11ve-affcc11ng cxtcmaluy m mmd 1mtcad of a transfer-
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see why this is so, take a standard example of a positive externality: paying to
have one's lawn beautifully landscaped. If we assux:ne the cost of landscaping
to be $400, but the benefit to the homeowner herself to be only, say, $ 1 00,
then the homeowner will not make the investment. That would be inefficient,
however, if the landscaping would produce anything greater than $300 worth
of benefits to the homeowner's neighbors. The reason, in the absence of
government intervention, that the landscaping would not get done, despite the
overall social benefit of its getting done, is that the homeowner would
experience the full $400 cost of landscaping investment but would not
experience enough of the social benefits to justify the cost. Hence, it might be
appropriate for the neighbors (or the government on behalf of the neighbors)
to pay the homeowner a subsidy in an amount that is just enough to outweigh
the costs to the homeowner but not so much as to exceed the external benefit
to the neighbors. In such a situation, the positive externality would be fully
internalized to the landowner.
Now turn to the cigarette example and the potential external benefit to
nonsmokers of smokers' dying prematurely and leaving unconsumed pension,
social security, and nursing home entitlements. Recall our earlier example of
the consumer who values a pack of cigarettes at $3.00 and who must decide
whether to purchase the next pack of cigarettes faced with a nominal purchase
price of $2.00, which represents only the production and distribution costs of
the product.387 Assume also that there are no health costs, or other external
costs, to nonsmokers associated with smoking, but there are $2.00 of pension
"savings" to nonsmokers associated with each pack. From society's
perspective, therefore, the $2.00 is an extra benefit (just as the additional $300
of value to the homeowner's neighbors in the landscaping example was a
benefit). The problem, according to the positive externality story, is that the
consumer experiences the $2.00 transfer to nonsmokers as a personal cost to
herself with no offsetting benefit (just as the homeowner experiences the extra
$300 of the landscaping cost as a cost with no offsetting personal benefit).
Thus the consumer in the smoking example would inefficiently choose not to
consume the pack of cigarettes. Why is that outcome inefficient? For the same
reason it was inefficient for the homeowner not to make the landscaping
investment: There are social gains that could be made. The suggested solution
The customary arguments for ignoring transfer payments in assessing economic efficiency do
not apply here. . . . In the usual case, transfer payments do not depend on the behavior of the
consumer. Thus, they do not alter behavior unless the payment is large enough so that income
effects are considerable. In the case of smoking, however, receiving the transfer depends on
choices made by the consumer . . . . Suppose the government were to promise that everyone
who reached age 70 would receive a million-dollar payment (transfer). It seems likely that many
people would stop smoking (or never start) and engage in other less risky activities so that they
might receive the "transfer." The ability to change one's activities to get the million-dollar
bonus implies that it is not a pure transfer.
Id. at 27.
387. See s11pra text accompanying note 44.
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of the economists to this problem is to subsidize the consumer (by paying her
up to $ 1 per pack) to induce her to purchase and consume the pack of
cigarettes.
The problem with this argument is that the potential positive extemality
associated with smoking is importantly different from other positive extemality
situations, including the landscaping scenario. The difference is that. for all the
reasons explained in Part II, smokers do not experience (or take into account)
the lost pension, social security, and nursing home benefits as a $2.00 per pack
cost today.388 Either because they are optimistic with respect to those costs,
because they apply an inappropriately high discount rate, or because they
simply regard those costs as being zero (for example, expecting that they will
be able to quit smoking and reverse the effects of their habit), it seems
extremely unlikely that a consumer would take those costs into account when
making the pack-by-pack decision regarding whether to smoke.3S9 If such
costs are not taken into account, there is no positive extemality.390
If consumers did take into account the forgone pension benefits associated
with smoking, and if transaction costs were low, the market might produce a
Coasean bargain that would achieve the efficient result. One mechanism

388. If this particular efficiency argument were our only respon..: to the pos1t1ve exlemahty story. we
might be running some risk of double-counting the external co'ts of cigarettes. m the following sense We
argued supra Section 11.C that the costs to the smokers them.elves of dying prematurely. measured in terms
of willingness to pay, should be internalized to cigarette compamc.-. and. through the pnce mechanism. to
smokers because smokers do not otherwise fully take tho..: cost' into account. owing 10 imperfect
i nformation. That number, taken from the Manning et al. 'tudy. came to as much as S5.00 per p;u:lc Su
supra note 345 and accompanying text. It may be the ca..:. however. that the S5.00 figure includes the cost
to smokers of forgone pension, social secunty, and nursing home enutlemenb. That 1> 10 say. that S5.00
figure may represent, in per pack terms, what a consumer would be w1Jhng to pay 10 avoid losing the
relevant number of years at the end of her life. assummg slit' 11'111 TYan·e all of ha penswn and other
enriclemenls during chose years. If that was what those con,umers were thinl.ing when they made the
choices that served as the basis for the $5.00 figure. then an efficiency argument for offscmng wnh permon
savings might be plausible. We do not know, however. what exactly that S5.00 figure includes; we would
not be surprised if the consumers whose behavior W3' the foundauon for that number " ere not thinking
about forgone pensions at the time. In any event, our other arguments in 1h1> ..ecuon-espcc1ally those infra
Subsection 111.C.2.b.iv-are more than enough on their own to JU,ufy 1gnonng the pension saving.s.
389. The difference with the landscaping example. of course. 1> that the costs to the homeowner of
getting the landscaping done are experienced fully by the homeowner al the same ume as the benefit would
be bestowed upon the neighbors. That is, in the landscaping example. there 1s no temporal scparauon of
costs and benefits as there is in the cigarette setting. If there 1> any temporal separauon. II would be in the
opposite direction-the cost to the homeowner would be felt bt'foTY rather than after the benefi!S were
bestowed on the neighbors.
390. Although we have done only a casual in\'e,ugauon of the matter. no smoker to whom we ha\·e
talked has given any indication of consciously perceiving that h1> or her pen>1on and nursing home
arrangements have influenced his or her smoking calculauon. Moreover. in newspaper amclo that we have
seen purporting to measure the costs of 'moking to smokers. the forgone pension and nursmg home benefits
are never included. See, e.g., Marino. supra note 372 (poinung out many of the obvious and not-so-obvious
costs to smokers, but excluding entirely any mention of forgone benefit, resulting from early death). lbc
fact that the point we are here making has never before been made. together wnh the fact that V1KUS1 and
Manning et al. focus mostly (though usually implicitly) on cro"·'ub>1d1zauon 1,,,.ues. S.-<' MA,Sl'G ET AL,
supra note 49, at 127; Viscusi, supra note I 02. at 5 1 . may be indirect evidence that people do not 1yp1cally
consider forgone pension and nursing home benefit, 3' co't' 10 be con>1den:d " hen deciding " hether 10
take a risk.
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through which such a Coasean bargain could in theory be achieved would be
the labor market-specifically, the market for salary/pension packages. In
theory, workers who plan to be long-term smokers could negotiate with their
employers to receive more of their compensation in the form of up-front cash
and less in the form of pension benefits. Hence smokers and nonsmokers
would have different salary/pension packages. Interestingly, however, we do
not see such distinctions in actual salary/pension packages. One reason that
smokers do not attempt to negotiate such deals with their employers may be
that they do not think about the effects of their smoking habit on their ability
to claim pension entitlements.391
Even if we were to assume for the moment that consumers do take into
account the general mortality risk of each cigarette they smoke, we doubt that
they take into account the accompanying forgone pension benefits. There is a
fair amount of evidence suggesting that, broadly speaking, individuals tend to
ignore or give less weight to costs that take the form of forgone benefits, even
when those same individuals would take into account costs of equal present
value that take the form of actual payouts.392 This phenomenon is sometimes

39 1 . We do not wish to overstate our reliance on this sort of rough-and-ready empirical observation.
There are obvious reasons, besides lack of consumer demand, for the absence of discrimination between
smokers and nonsmokers in employment packages. For example, there might be severe moral hazurd and
adverse selection problems that prevent employers from making such distinctions. See Hanson & Logue,
The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 1 48-5 1 . There may be some reason to believe that
the sort of market failures that prevent first-party insurers from reliably identifying smokers for tho purpose
of charging them higher insurance premi11ms will not pose as significant a problem to employers who seek
to identify smokers for the purpose of "charging" them lower pension contrib11tions. For instance, given
that, for pension contribution purposes, smokers would stand to benefit from being identified as smokers,
they would obviously have an incentive to divulge rather than to hide their status as smokers. The supply
side problem in this context, therefore, would be nonsmokers seeking, for pension purposes, to make
themselves look like smokers. But smokers might be able to signal their status more reliably than
nonsmokers. For example, given the addictive nature of cigarettes, if a smoker can demonstrate she is
currently a smoker, she has provided a credible signal that she will continue to be a smoker; in the case
of a nonsmoker, demonstrating that she is a nonsmoker at the time of her application for insurance suggests
less about her likelihood in the future of remaining in that status. Also, if a person could show that she had
a health condition that strongly correlates with smoking (such as emphysema or lung cancer), that showing
would constitute good evidence of smoking status. Moreover, if supply-side rather than demand-side
difficulties were responsible for the absence of smoking-based distinctions in compensation packages, it
is a little curious that we have not heard stories of workers at least attempting to negotiate such packages
with their employers. In the first-party insurance context, there is at least some attempt (albeit largely
ineffective) to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, which suggests a demand on the part of nonsmokers
for such a distinction. In sum, there is very little market evidence to suggest that smokers, under the current
regime, give much thought to the possibility of negotiating more favorable pension arrangements with their
employers.
If we shift to an enterprise liability regime, however, then once the full costs of cigarettes (including
the costs to the smokers of their foreshortened lives) are impounded into the sale price of cigarettes,
smokers may then be induced to give greater consideration to the possibility of negotiating more favorable
pension arrangements with their employers. This might happen both because the rise in cigarette prices
would make the issue more salient to smokers and because, for those who opt to continue smoking, the
price increase might necessitate "borrowing" against future pension claims in order to help fund the higher
cost of smoking.
392. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Stcttlls Quo Bicts,
5 J. EcON. PERSP. 1 93 ( 1 99 1 ) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Stcttlls Q110 Bicts]; Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimentctl Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coctse Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1 325 ( 1 990); Jack
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called the "status quo bias."393 In light of this bias, i t seems implausible that
smokers would say to themselves: "I need to cut back on my smoking, lest I
give up too much of the pension and nursing home benefits that I will enjoy
if I don ' t smoke."
But perhaps the positive externality story is not an externality or efficiency
argument at all. One could reasonably interpret both Viscusi and Manning et
al. to be taking the following position: Regardless of whether the social
benefits of smoking are externalized by smokers (that is, regardless of whether
smokers' incentives are affected by the potential social savings attributable to
their smoking habit), so long as cigarette smoking in the aggregate produces
social benefits that exceed the social costs, there is no need for government
intervention.394 Such an argument is not an efficiency argument, since it does
not require cost internalization of any kind. Instead, it is a distributional
argument. S mokers as a group enjoy the benefits of smoking. the argument
goes, so they (as a group) should bear the costs of smoking as well. Therefore,
so long as smokers transfer sufficient funds to nonsmokers (via unclaimed
pension entitlements, for example) to offset whatever transfers go in the
opposite direction (via insurance externalities and passive smoke). there is no
distributional need for a regulation. That may be so.
The best justification for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes, however,
is not the need for redistribution, but the need for improved efficiency through
increased cost-internalization. Another way to put our response to the
distributional argument is this: As with other normative economic analyses of
accident law, we take as one uncontroversial objective of tort law, and of
safety regulation generally, the minimization of the costs of accidents.m As
we explained in Section LB, if there are market failures that give rise to care
level and activity level inefficiencies, achieving the goal of minimizing
accidents requires a regulatory response of some sort. Merely to determine that
the aggregate costs of an activity are borne ultimately by the parties
participating in the activity is, therefore, nor a cost-minimizing response to the
problem. So, for example, if we determined that all of the harms caused by
automobiles were borne ultimately by the people who benefit from the
existence of the automobile, such a finding would not be an efficiency
17ze Endowment Effecr and El'ldence ofNcm�1·ers1ble /lld1fle�nce Cun·es. 79 AM ECO'< REv
1 277 ( 1 989). See generally David Cohen & Jack L. Kneli.ch. J11d1cwl CJ101ce and D1spanr1es Berwun
Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J . 737 ( 1 992) (>ummanzmg expcnmental evidence
L. Knetsch,

indicating !hat people evaluate aclual payouls and forgone gain> differently and arguing !ha! !he la"' should
and does take that difference into account).
393.
394.

E.g., Kahneman el al., Sraws Quo Bias. supra nolc 392
See, e.g., Viscusi. supra nole I02. al 92 ("A comprehcn>1,·c a.scssmcnt of these costs suggests

that on balance, smokers do no! cos! sociely re>ource> bccausc of lhetr >mo!.. m g ac11vu1e:s. bu! ralhcr save
society money."). We should nole. however. !ha! !he cconom1,l> sccm confl™:d aboul whether !hey are

See. e.g . . MANNl"<G 1:1 AL. supra nolc 49. at
1 9 ("Smokers are already paying !heir way. if we JUdgc >Olcly on !he ground> of economic efficiency.")
395. See GUIDO CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF AC'CIDE.'\'TS 26 ( 1 970).

making a distribulional argument or an efficiency argumcnl
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justification for abolishing tort law in this area or for eliminating auto safety
standards more generally. Such a response, rather than reducing the costs of
auto accidents, would likely increase those costs.
iii. What About the Current Level of Excise Taxes?
The economists, given their calculations of the external costs and benefits
of smoking, conclude that current levels of federal and state excise taxes on
cigarettes more than fully internalize any remaining external costs imposed by
cigarettes.396 Indeed, they go so far as to imply that current levels of
cigarette taxation are excessive, because cigarettes are socially beneficial on
net.397 Therefore, they argue, imposing any additional incentive-based
regulation would only worsen the overdeterrence problem.
We have several responses to that line of argument. The first and most
obvious response is that, based on our recalculation of costs and benefits,398
current excise taxes appear to be drastically inadequate. According to Viscusi,
the combined state and federal taxes on cigarettes total, on average,
approximately $0.53 per pack. 399 And, as we indicated in Table 1 , the
external costs of cigarette smoking come in around $7.00 per pack-roughly
thirteen times the average combined federal and state tax rate.
It might be argued that because the excise tax does internalize some of the
costs, any proposal to add further incentive-based regulation should take the
existing level of deterrence into account. The argument initially seems
appealing.400 Upon closer examination, however, the argument that future
incentive-based regulation should be adjusted to take the current excise taxes
into account seems flawed, for two general reasons. The first, which we will
discuss more fully in Section IV.C, is that excise taxes are a less efficient form
of incentive-based regulation than some other forms, such as enterprise
liability. There is a strong argument that the more efficient approach should be
adopted, and any overdeterrence that results from the presence of the
inefficient excise tax is best remedied by removal of the redundant excise
taxes.401 The second reason that we are hesitant to adjust any new incentive
based regulation to account for current excise taxes is that those taxes may
396. See, e.g., MANNING ITT AL., s11pra note 49, at 24 ("Taxes on cigarettes are at a level such that
smokers pay approximately the costs they impose on others.''); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 93 ("(C]igaretlc
taxes already exceed the level of the estimated externalities.").
397. Cf. Viscusi, s11pra note I 02, at 75 (arguing that, even without taxes. smokers more than pay their
way).

398. See supra Table I .
399. See Viscusi, s11pra note 102, at 57.
400. The deterrence objective of tort law would favor making adjustments to the level of tort damages
in order not to overdeter. See Hanson & Logue, Tort Law in Context, supra note 40, at 8. There muy be
nondeterrence reasons such as insurance, however, not to adjust damages downward.
40 1 . This argument seems especially strong in the current climate, when Congress is considering
adopting a comprehensive regulatory strategy.
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serve the purpose of internalizing a different set of costs than the ones we have
been discussing in this part. Indeed, there is agreement even among economists
that the current system of cigarette taxes was almost certainly not designed and
calibrated to internalize the costs at issue here.402
So what is the function of cigarette taxes? One might contend that
cigarette taxes are merely another source of government revenue, and a
relatively efficient (that is, nondistortionary) revenue source at that given that
consumer demand for cigarettes is relatively price inelastic compared to many
other products.403 But demand inelasticity cannot fully explain why we have
such a high level of excise taxes on cigarettes as compared to the taxes
imposed on most other consumer products. There are many other products with
low demand elasticity that we do not tax at nearly the level we tax cigarettes
(for example, staple foods). In our view, one plausible explanation for the
current level of excise taxes on cigarettes is suggested by the name commonly
given to this type of excise tax: "sin tax." To put this idea in tenns of cost
internalization, sin taxes serve to internalize the psychic cost that nonsmokers
(and perhaps some smokers) incur merely by living in a society where
cigarettes-a nasty, unhealthy, strongly addictive, ultimately debilitating, and
eventually l ife-shortening product-are marketed for profit and widely
consumed not only by adults, but also by children.� In any event, if the
current sin taxes are meant to impose those costs on smokers and tobacco
companies, then all of the external costs calculated above remain to be
internalized.
Even under this theory, of course. part of the reason for society's
disapproval of cigarettes may be the fact that smoking produces costs that
smokers externalize to their future selves as well as to nonsmokers. Thus.
current excise taxes on cigarettes probably do some of both things (some
internalization of the external costs discussed in Section III.B and some
internalization of the psychic or expressive harm just mentioned). but only in
a very rough way. In any event, for reasons that we discuss in Section IV.C.
there are efficiency reasons to use some other type of incentive-based
regulation to internalize the external costs of smoking.
iv. Morality and Social Norms
We have focused on the economic responses to the positive externality

402. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 49. at 1 8-22; Vi>eu.i. mprn note I 02. al 54. 72
403. See supra note 254; see also. e.g., MANNING ET AL . supra note 49. al 24 ("(C]lgarene laxo
cause relatively less distonion and tax evasion behavior than other taxo."J.
404. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER TilE RIGHTS REVOLIJTION 44 ( 1 990) (explaining that legal

rub

can enhance social welfare by altering preference. in a way that ""decrca>(e,) ham1ful behavior [,uch as
smoking). remov[es] the secondary effect' of tho>.: harm>. and produc(o) more healthful and >ausrymg
lives"); Rabin & Sugarman,

supra note 28. at 1 2- 1 3 (noung that many 'ocial nonn> condemn >molang)
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argument because this Article is, after all, an attempt to make the economic
case for incentive-based regulation of cigarettes. Because of the nature of the
positive extemality story, however, it is appropriate at least to suggest the
possibility of equally powerful, and perhaps considerably more powerful, moral
objections. To adopt the positive extemality argument, on this view, would
constitute a costly breach of social norms. Perhaps the most straightforward
and compelling support for that claim is that the positive extemality argument
simply is not used (or at least is not taken seriously) in any other policy
context. For example, in debates over the appropriate response to
environmental hazards, we do not hear polluters urging policymakers to take
into account the many pension-saving deaths that would result if Congress
would only leave polluters unregulated. Likewise, opponents of gun control are
not heard to tout the enormous financial windfall to society from all the
premature deaths caused by handguns. And in no context other than smoking
that we can identify do we hear calls for affirmative subsidies to promote the
positive externality of premature death.405
Perhaps the most revealing societal rejection of the positive extemality
story can be found in tort law-specifically, in the calculation of damages in
wrongful death cases. If the positive externality argument were fully
implemented in such cases, one would expect to see tort damages being
reduced by life insurance proceeds as well as by that portion of decedents'
pension benefits that go to compensate plaintiffs' losses. That, however, is not
the law. The collateral source rule has long forbidden courts from reducing tort
damage awards by the amount of any payments that have already gone to
compensate the plaintiffs' losses.406 What is perhaps more interesting, of the
ten states that have recently altered the collateral source rule legislatively, all
but one have drawn a distinction between health and disability insurance (with
respect to which the collateral source rule has been repealed) and life insurance

405. The economists' response to these observations might be that the activities mentioned would lend
to end lives before individuals have reached an age at which they begin lo consume more of society's
resources than they produce. If, however, the only reason such proposals are not seriously considered is
this "target-age problem," we would expect to see some empirical analyses by policymakers and scholars
to determine what the optimal target age actually is. In addition, if retirement age did turn out to be the
target age, we would expect to hear some discussion of subsidizing activities (or not penalizing activities)
that tend to kill people in their post-retirement years. As far as we can tell, no such empirical investigations
are done, and no such proposals are seriously made.
Another objection to the handgun example might be that it lacks the element of voluntary assumption
of risk that exists in the cigarette context. We have two responses. First, we do not regard the cigarette
context as one that involves a clear case of voluntary assumption of risk, for ull the reasons discussed supra
Part II. Second, even if voluntariness is present, we doubt that the positive externality argument would be
acceptable. See infra text following note 4 1 4 (discussing an extreme example of "voluntary" mass suicide
that seems patently objectionable).
Jeffrey Harris has made an argument very much like the one we make in this section. He compares
the economists' arguments to opposing breast cancer research. See Health Cure Reform Heari11gs, supm
note 330, at 3 1 7 (statement of Jeffrey Harris). In his view, the positive externality argument is simply "not
the kind of calculation that a civilized society engages in." Id. We agree.
406. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b ( 1 965).
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(with respect to which the collateral source rule has generally been
maintained).407 Moreover, the American Law Institute in a recent report
advocated the repeal of the collateral source rule in every context except life
insurance.408 Likewise, a recent bill backed by the Clinton Administration
proposed eliminating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases as
the rule applies to disability insurance and health insurance. but not as it
applies to life insurance.409
The extent to which tort law has rejected the assumptions underlying the
positive extemality argument can also be seen in wrongful death cases
involving children.410 If the logic of the positive extemality story were
applied strictly in such cases, the damage awards would typically be very
small, or even negative, because the pecuniary costs to parents of raising
children typically outweigh the pecuniary benefits. Indeed, in the late
407. The ten states are Arizona, Ronda. Indiana, M1ch1gan. Minnesota. New Jersey. New York. Nonh
Dakota. Ohio, and Oregon. Arizona is the one stale that did not draw a d1suncuon between health and
disability i nsurance, on the one hand, and life in,urance. on the other. Su ARIZ. REV. STAT A:-.N § 1 2-565
(West Supp. 1 996) (allowing evidence of paymenb from any collateral source, mcludmg hfe insurance. m
medical malpractice actions). As for the other slates. some statutes also repeal the collateral source rule as
it applies to pension benefits or social security paymenb. Su FLA. STAT ANN. c h. 768.76 ( Hamson 1994)
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral source other than h fc insurance bene fi u J ; I'D CODE
§ 34-4-36-2 ( 1 996) (allowing evidence of payments from any collateral •ource other than hfc insurance.
social security, and workers' compensation); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6303 ( 1 996) (,.;ime as FlondaJ.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 1 988) (allowing evidence of paymenb from any collateral source other
than life insurance, pensions, and social secunty); N J . STAT ANN. § 2A 1 5-97 ( \Vest Supp 1 997)
(allowing evidence of payments from any collateral •Ource other than hfe insurance and "'orkers'
compensation); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 1 992) (a llo wi ng evidence of pa) ments from any collateral
source other than life insurance, some social sccunty. workers' compcnsa11on. or employee benefit
programs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 ( 1 996) (al l owi ng evidence o f payments from any collateral
source other than life insurance, other death or rcuremcnt benefits, or any m•urance or benefit purchased
by the recovering pany); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2 3 1 7 45 (Anderson Supp. 1996) (,.;ime as R onda ) ; OR
REv. STAT. § 1 8.580 ( 1 995) (same as Minnesota); su also Gary T. Schwanz. A N1ma11ul flt-11l1h Cure
Program: What Its Effect Would Be 011 Amer1cu11 Tort Lu"' and Malpractice Law, 79 COR SELL L. REv .
1 339, 1 345 ( 1 994) ('Though many stales in recent years have abrogated the collateral source rule. the:sc
abrogations have typically excluded life i nsurance.").
408. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 100, al 1 6 1 . 165 Indeed. then: .ccms 10 be almo.-st no
support for repealing the collateral source rule as 11 apphe• 10 hfe m•urancc proceeds Su. <' g • Jerry J
Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reflections on Chw:gmg Our Tort S\Stmr. 46 Mo. L. REV 55. 58 I 1 986)
("Curiously, no one suggests that the collateral source rule •hould be ehmrnated wuh rcfcn:nce to lrre
i nsurance proceeds, although clearly such proceeds arc a collateral •ource m a wrongful Jeath ca>e -, E'en
the most extreme opponents of the collateral source rule make an exceptron for hfe m•uram:e proceeds Sa.
e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00. at 1 82 ('"We recommend vinually complete rc\er,.;il or the
collateral source rule wherever such an approach i> feasible A pl ar nt r ff'• ton rccO\ ef) ,hould be reduced
by the amount of present and estimated future payments from all •ources of collateral benefit, <' •<"<'pt lr/t'
insurance." (emphasis added)).
409. See S. 1 757, 1 03d Cong. § 5305 ( 1 993), cued 111 Sch wanz. supra note -107, at 1 345. Ut' also
Schwartz, supra note 407, al 1 345-46 (suggesting that one explanatron for m ar ntammg the collateral source
rule for life insurance is that "life insurance continue> to be acqu ired m accordance wuh nmeteenlh<entury
norms," by which he means that life insurance. rn contrast wuh health rn•urance. " far from uni versal and
varies significantly from policy 10 policy).
4 1 0. Cf VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 138-68 ( 1 985) (dcscnbmg ho"' the
evolution of damage calculations in child wrongful death cases demon•lralcs the law's eventual rcJectron
of the devaluation of children's lives): Croley & Han•on. supra note 22. at 1 9()6.-08 l usrng Zchzcr 's
discussion of child wrongful death damages 10 illu•lrale •OC1ely°• acceptance of the 1deoi that, m certarn
circumstances, quantifying pain-and-suffering damages " acceptable ).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the damage awards in such cases were
calculated in just such a manner-by netting the pecuniary costs and benefits
of raising children.41 1 Over time, however, as that traditional formula began
to produce lower and lower awards, and as child labor laws increasingly
removed children from the workplace, the law moved in the opposite direction,
taking into account the nonpecuniary value of the lives of children. Indeed, tort
awards for the wrongful death of children increased significantly after 1 920,
notwithstanding the declining pecuniary value of children during the same
period.412 The relatively large damage awards in child wrongful death
cases-large relative to the damages that would be awarded under the
nineteenth-century formula-appear not to have abated (and perhaps have
continued to increase),413 a fact that strongly suggests society's rejection of
the positive externality argument in the tort context.
The positive externality theorists might offer the following response:
Subsidizing premature death to save on pension payments is not significantly
different from what our society does in other contexts. For example, the market
often pays premiums to compensate individuals for accepting unusually high
levels of mortality risk. Furthermore, the government in some circumstances
directly subsidizes the payment of such risk premiums. For example, some
portion of the salaries paid to firefighters probably constitutes a premium for
accepting the substantial risk of injury or death associated with performing
their jobs. Similarly, soldiers who are exposed to combat conditions typically
receive additional money in partial compensation for the special risks they bear
for defending their country. So, the argument might go, if we can pay people
in those contexts to take risks that, statistically speaking, shorten their lives,
why is it unacceptable to pay people (through subsidized cigarette prices) to
do the same thing by smoking?
The decision to smoke and the decision to accept a mortality-risk premium
for undertaking a dangerous job, however, are different in important ways. For
one thing, because of the information problems discussed in Part II, the
payment of a smoking subsidy looks less like a well-informed, voluntary
transaction than does the payment of a mortality-risk premium in connection

4 1 1 . See ZELIZER, supra note 4 1 0, at 142.
4 1 2. See id. at 1 53 ("By 1 930, it was estimated that a typical family with an income of approximately
$2,500 per year would spend an average of $7,425 to raise a child to age eighteen. . . . [T]he deceased
child was a financial liability. . . . Yet, all evidence points to an increase in awards for children after the
1 920s."). According to Zelizer, this trend reHected the increasing noneconomic or "sentimental'" value of
children. See id. at 1 53-54, 1 64-65.
4 1 3. We have uncovered no recent systematic studies on the size of wrongful death awards in cases
involving deceased children. There are, however, numerous news accounts of extremely large jury awards
in child wrongful death cases. See, e.g., Michael Bradford, Largest Awards of 1995, Bus. INS., Jan. 22,
1 996, at 3 (reporting a $500 million verdict in a wrongful death case in Tampa, Florida, involving the death
of a nine-year-old boy); Maggie Mulvihill, Couple Awarded $23 Million for Baby's Wrongful Death,
BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 25. 1 995. at 25 (reporting a $23 million verdict in a wrongful dealh case in
Connecticut involving the death of a couple's infant daughter).
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with hazardous jobs. If, however, it could be demonstrated that individuals
who enter into transactions involving "hazard pay" do not understand or fully
take into account the mortality risks they assume by doing so. there would be
an argument for regulating those transactions in some way-either through tort
law, contract law, or direct regulation.
Even if we ignore the information problems and addiction problems
associated w ith cigarettes, there still seems to be an important intuitive
distinction in context between the typical employment transaction that involves
a mortality-risk premium and a smoking subsidy.414 Specifically. the decision
to accept a mortality risk is part of a larger decision to accept a job, an
independently productive endeavor. The decision to smoke. on the other hand.
is pure consumption. In order to induce soldiers to accomplish a socially
valuable task, we compensate them with combat pay for assuming a risk of
death. With a smoking subsidy, by contrast, we would simply be paying people
to die early. The latter seems objectionable in a way that the former does not.
Before we leave the positive externality argument behind. let us consider
one final economic response to it. To the truly hard-core economist who
remains unpersuaded by the arguments in the preceding section. we offer the
following observation: As a mauer of pure cost-benefit analysis. the
economists seem to have overstated the size of the positive externality
associated with smoking because they have ignored far less costly means of
achieving their desired goal. The goal, starkly described, is to create the
incentives nece!>sary to induce a large group of people approaching retirement
age to commit suicide so as to maximize the pension windfall to everyone else.
B asic principles of cost-benefit analysis. then, require the adoption of the
lowest cost means of achieving that goal. Even if we were to assume for the
moment that the smoking decision is made "knowingly and voluntarily,'' there
must be cheaper ways of inducing people to kill themselves than through the
use of cigarettes.
One cheaper and more straightforward approach might be to offer a deal
to all American citizens on their sixtieth birthday: If they will agree to commit
suicide on their sixty-fifth birthday, their government will pay them an annual
financial supplement to make the last five years of their lives especially
pleasant and enjoyable. The only substantial costs would be the costs of

4 1 4. Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has wnnen at length

about the nnponancc of >OCial

determining the appropriateness of including monah t y mk J O •oc ial co>l-bcnefil analy">C>

con tex t

JO

Because people's anitudes toward mk vary w11h the •OC1al context. co•t-bcnclit analy•l> an: nor
entitled to assume that the ri>klmoney tr.idcofh people make al work or

m ol hc r rnaric1 chou.:""
an: JO\ olumanly subJc<:lcd
to risks by the state or third pan ic>. or when !hey arc • UbJcc lcd 10 mh for lhe .al..c o f

express how people think the>e tradeoff> •hould be made " hen !hey
achieving purpo.es they do not value.

ANDERSON, supra note 1 34, at 200. Likewi>e. JU>l bccau>c \\e
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whatever means were chosen to accomplish the task and the payments
necessary to induce some people to accept the deal. As long as those costs
remained less than the pension, social security, and nursing home savings
associated with killing people at age sixty-five, we would save money vis-a-vis
the cigarette alternative, which poses enormous additional medical costs.
Obviously we are not recommending government-subsidized mass suicide
as a way of economizing on resources. To the contrary, we believe that the
so-called external benefits of premature death-for moral as well as economic
reasons-should be excluded from the social cost-benefit calculus altogether.
(Or at least we are unpersuaded by the economists' arguments that these
benefits should be taken into account.) Our only point here is that, if such
considerations are to be given weight (as the economists clearly believe), it is
important that we do the cost-benefit analysis properly. Thus, even if the
benefits of causing early death exceeded the external costs of cigarettes,
choosing cigarettes as the means to achieve that goal would be economically
unjustifiable.415

D. The Potential Internalizing Effects of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
How would an idealized ex post incentive-based system of regulation, such
as enterprise liability, respond to the problems of negative externalities? For
purposes of this analysis, we continue to assume away any difficulty in
determining the causal connections between specific harms experienced by
smokers and by third parties and the specific brands of cigarettes that cause
those harms.416 Given that assumption, an idealized incentive-based system
could produce optimal deterrence-both in terms of manufacturer care levels
and activity levels. For example, under enterprise liability, tobacco companies
would be held liable ex post, either by a court or by a regulator, for all the
harms caused by cigarettes. In addition, each manufacturer's ex post liability
would reflect the harms caused by that manufacturer's brand. Ex post liability
coupled with competitive market forces would give manufacturers incentives
ex ante to make all optimal investments in reducing the risks posed by their

4 1 5. We can illustrate this last point with a more traditional example of a positive externality: If we
wanted to create the external benefit of safe shipping in an especially treacherous harbor, we would choose
the least costly means of achieving that goal. Thus, we ccnainly would not spend $400 on a computer
navigation system that produced $500 in safe-shipping benefits if we could generate the same benefits by
spending only $200 on a lighthouse. What is more, if we were for some reason to adopt the more expensive
alternative-the computer navigation system-we could not say that we were saving society $ 1 00 (the
difference between $500 and $400). Instead, we would be costing society $200 (the difference between
$400 and $200).
4 1 6. We explore the implications of relaxing those assumptions infra Section V.A and compare how
alternative forms of incentive-based regulation might deal with problems of causation. In addition, infra
Section V.C we examine circumstances in which either ex ante incentive-based, performance-based, or
command-and-control regulation would be necessary or at least useful as a supplement to ex post incentivc
based regulation.
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brands o f cigarettes. And because cigarette prices would reflect not only their
production costs but also their expected accident costs, something approaching
the optimal quantity of cigarettes would be produced and consumed.�17
Moreover, because enterprise liability would place che full coses of
smoking a particular pack of cigarettes upon the manufacturer of that brand
and, in turn, upon the smokers of that brand, it would go a long way toward
eliminating inefficient cross-subsidies within pri vale and public first-party
health, life, disability, and property insurance markets. Manufacturers would
become quasi-insurers; in that capacity, they would charge more tailored
premiums to cover the risks associated with cheir produces. Under such a
regime, nonsmokers would no longer subsidize the activities of cigarette
manufacturers and smokers: Whereas there would be a subscamial increase in
cigarette prices (with all the beneficial deterrence effeccs just described).� 1 8
there would also be a nearly commensurace reduction in premiums paid 10
public and private first-party health, life, disability, and property insurers.�19
To the extent such an idealized system of encerprise liability were able 10
take into account expected-cost differences across brands of cigarettes, there
would be efficiency-enhancing segregation even within the population of
smokers. Manufacturers whose cigarettes were relatively risky would charge
higher "premiums" in the price of their brands 10 cover the greater liability
costs, while manufacturers of relatively low-risk cigareues would charge
relatively lower premiums. Thus, whereas some private first-party insurers try
in whatever rough way they can to segregate smokers from nonsmokers, an
idealized system of enterprise liability would segregate and inform smokers
further according to the type of cigarettes they smoke. Indeed, perfect
enterprise liability would segregate smokers according to more than just the
4 1 7. For a fuller treatment of chis general argument. sec Han>0n & Logue. Tli� F1nt·P11rt1 /11.rnr11nce
40, at 1 87-88. Note also that once the mcffic1enc1c> m the cigan:ne market \\en:
corrected by enterprise Jiabilicy, the relaced mefficicnc1e> in the marke1 for m>urance. 1a 111prct nolc 268.
would likewise be corrected. That is true because >mokmg mh would. m �sence , be tramfcm:d out of
the first-party insurance sysccm and into the con-law-qua-msurJnce sy >l em . m which rherc " ould be belier
Extemaliry, supra note

segregation of smoking risks 1han currently ex1s1s.
4 1 8. We assume rhac the excise tax and the expected CO>l> of ton hab1h1y \\Ould be rcficctcd fully m
consumer prices. This is a standard assumpcion in the li 1era1un: on the mc1dence of exct>e iaxe> s�... � g .

MANNING rr AL, supra note 49, at 1 70 ("Empirical C\'tdencc suggesu that cxc1>e ta.\ mcn:a>e> arc m foci
passed on 10 smokers."); James M. Potcrba, Lifetime /11c1Jena mid rlt.- Du1rtb111w1111/ 811rd.-n vf £1cue

79 AM. EcoN. REV. 325, 327 ( 1 989).
4 1 9. With this particular syslem of incenti ve-based regulation. we imagine that at

Taxes,
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who suffer smoking-caused harms would continue 10 >eek n:1mbur..emenc 1m11ally from 1he1r lir>r-pany
health, life, disability, and property insurers. In 1ho>e case.. either !he mJured party or rhe msun:r. who m
mos! instances would be at lease partially subrogaced 10 the claims of the m>un:d, \\Ould bnng the ton sun

against the relevant cigarette manufacturer. To 1he extent there i> >Ubrogauon 10 the finl·pany m >u rer. 1he
consumers' first-party premium would no longer need 10 reflect the mb of >mokmg. Fir..1 -�ny m>urancc
premiums, however, would probably include a surcharge co cover the m>un:n' lmg:lllon e\penses and
perhaps to cover the risk of judgment-proof defendant>. In add111on. under certain crn:um>tance>. \\e would
expect 1ha1 !he insurer and insured. for decerrence and m>urance =on>. m1gh1 agn:e 1101 10 gn·c full
subrogation righcs co the insurer. In chat ca.e. firs 1 -pany premiums would n .e 10 reficct 1 h1 s n:.. 1dU<1I
retention of smoking risks by the insurer.
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type of cigarettes they smoke. It would also, for example, cause heavy smokers
to pay higher premiums than casual smokers.420 And because the
consumption of cigarettes is a "pay as you go" activity, high-risk consumers
(in terms of activity levels) would contribute more to the tort-provided
insurance pools than would low-risk smokers, even within a given brand of
cigarette.
E. Summary
The large negative externalities produced by cigarettes, together with the
consumer-information problems discussed in Part II (which can also be
understood as a species of intrapersonal externality), create a prima facie case
for adopting some type of regulation of cigarettes. What is the magnitude of
these externality and information problems? In this part, we adopt the numbers
derived from the economists themselves (albeit with some important changes
in assumptions about whether some costs should be considered external or
internal to the smoker's decision to buy the next pack of cigarettes) to arrive
at a total external cost per pack of cigarettes of approximately $7 .00. Because
we made no effort to arrive at our own calculation of the total costs and
benefits of cigarette smoking, and because there were numerous external costs
that were not included in this number (such as the large nonpecuniary costs to
families and friends of smokers resulting from the smokers' years of suffering
and their premature deaths), this $7.00 figure must be kept in perspective. It
is not even a rough estimate of the total external costs of smoking, much less
a precise measure. Instead, it is meant only to indicate that, contrary to some
economists' reports, there is a large and pressing need for regulation in the
cigarette market.
Notwithstanding that the $7 .00 per pack figure may well understate the full
external cost of a pack of cigarettes, we expect that the vast majority of our
readers will find the $7 .00 per pack figure to be surprisingly high. That
reaction serves, however, to confirm the principal claim made in this part and
Part II-that consumers do not fully take into account the total costs posed by
cigarettes. In the next part, we offer a theoretical framework for comparing,
contrasting, and evaluating alternative regulatory responses to this failure in the
cigarette market. We discuss the serious informational disadvantages of
command-and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based
regulation; and we describe the advantages of an ex post incentive-based
regime. In addition, we provide a brief outline of a particular ex post incentive-

420. This is true given the nature of cigarettes-nondurable products that must be purchased in grcntcr
quantities the more they are used.
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based approach, which we call smokers' compensation and which is modeled
loosely on the workers' compensation model.421
IV. CHOOSING AMONG REGULATORY APPROACHES
In Parts II and III, we concluded that the cigarette market is characterized
by significant market failures and is therefore very much in need of regulation.
Along the way, we showed how one form of regulation-an idealized regime
of enterprise liability-could counteract such market failures. Of course, in
order to make a strong case for any particular regulatory approach, we must
answer two further questions. First, are there other regulatory regimes that
could serve to correct the market failures just as well as, or better than,
enterprise liability? Second, might any real world factors cause our idealized
enterprise liability regime to perform less well (especially as compared to
alternative regulatory regimes)? This part provides a theoretical framework for
answering the first question; in Part V. we take up the second.
As noted in Section l.B, some scholars divide regulatory approaches into
three types: command-and-colllrol regulation, petforma11ce-based regulation,
and incentive-based regulation.422 In this part, we further divide incentive
based regulation into two general types (ex ante and ex post), and we then
divide ex post incentive-based regulation into two general types (victim
initiated and state-initiated).423 We argue that when it comes to certain
product-market failures (especially those in the cigarette market), one type of

42 I.
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among the three types of regula1ion are no1 perf�-cl and m >ome m>1anccs blur Thu>. some examples of
command-and-control regulation begin 10 shade 11110 perfonnance-b:t.>Cd regulauon. \\ lule some e'l.ample"
of performance-based regulation begin 10 look lil..c incenuve-b�d regulauon
note

38, at 699 ("[T]he dividing line between

Sa

Cropper

& Oa1es . 111pru

so-called (command-and-con1rol] and mccnll\ e·bascd pohc1cs

is not always clear."). It is probably more correct 10 understand the three categoncs of rcgulauon as
demarcating three points along a continuum. wuh command-and-control regulauon al one end. mccnuve·
based regulation at the other end, and perfonnance-b:t.>Cd regulauon >omewhere m bcl\\ccn Neverthdcss.
it is useful to maintain the conceptual dis1inc11on> among the three type> of regulation m order 10 1den11fy
more distinctly the costs and benefit> of moving in one dm:cuon or the 01her along 1he conunuum.

423.

As far as we can tell. Donald Winman wa> the firsl 10 dra\\ exphculy 1he d1>11nc11on bcl"ccn

See Donald Winman. Prior Reg11ltlt1011 \'.-rs11s Post Lwb1/m· TI1e Cl101a
Betwee11 lllpur tllld Outplll Mo111tnri11g. 6 J. LEGAL Sn·o 1 93. 1 93-95 ( 1977) (cumg Gary S Becker. Crime
""d Punishmelll: An Economic Approach. 76 J. POL. Eco?-.. 1 69 ( 1 968)) Ste,·en Shavell also draw'< the
distinction between ex ante and ex post rcgula110n. Sa STioVE..-.: Sl!AYELL Eco�O\llC A'ALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 277-82 ( 1 987). In addition. Shavell draw> a dt>ltncllon between s1a1e-1m11a1ed anJ pnva1ely
initiated regulation. See id. at 278. 283-84: Steven Shavell, Lwbt/11\ for Hann Versus Reg111"1w11 af S<t[elY.
1 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 ( 1 984).
ex ante and ex post regulation.
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incentive-based regulation-victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulation
(of which enterprise liability is one type)-has substantial efficiency
advantages over its alternatives.
A. The Disadvantages of Command-and-Control Regulation
Under command-and-control regulation, the regulator imposes specific
requirements on the regulated firm. In the pollution context, for example, the
command-and-control regulator might prescribe specific technologies that must
be used by manufacturers to reduce the level of pollution emitted into the
environment by their production processes.424 In the product safety context,
the command-and-control regulator might require manufacturers to implement
particular safety-related designs in the manufacture and distribution of their
products.425
The command-and-control regulator must tell the manufacturer precisely
what care level investments to make. Selecting the optimal level of care for a
given product, however, would be a virtually impossible task for a regulator.
This is because the question of what care level investments to make with
respect to a given product is just one of a series of complex and interdependent
questions of product design, manufacture, distribution, and marketing. To
know, for example, how "safe" to make a product-that is, how much money
to invest in making the product safer and how to spend that money-the
regulator must know not only what safety improvements could be made to the
existing product design, but also what design changes could be made to
improve safety and how much safety would be enhanced by those changes. In
addition, the regulator must know what those safety improvements or design
changes would do to the demand for the product. She must know how much
consumers would be willing to pay for the safety improvements and whether
the additional consumer demand would exceed the costs of those
improvements. That analysis would be especially difficult with respect to
products that present long latency periods between initial exposure and the
final manifestation of harm.
Essentially, then, to determine the optimal manufacturer care level for a
given product, the regulator must construct supply and demand schedules for
the product in question-indeed, for all the different designs of the product in
question, including substitute products.426 Such an analysis would require
424. See Hahn, supra note 38, at 95.
425. Command-and-control regulation is sometimes referred to as "input regulation." Other non
cigarette examples of this type of regulation include requirements that manufacturers install scrubbers nnd
other pollution abatement devices or that smokestacks be constructed to a given specification. See JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 226 (2d ed. 1 988).
426. It turns out that choosing the proper care level requires all the same information as choosing the
proper activity level. In a previous anicle, we made a similar observation in connection with the question
whether a coun in a products liability case can achieve optimal deterrence through an ex post negligence
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regulators to have an enormous amount of information that they typically do
not have at their disposal.427 With cigarettes, a command-and-control
regulator would need to determine the exact safety-enhancing technologies
(e.g., a reduced-carcinogen cigarette recipe) that the industry could use in
making cigarettes as safe, and cost-justifiable. as possible. Such an analysis.
however, would require the regulator to conduct complete marginal-cost-benefit
analyses of every potential smoking technology at every level of cigarette
production, taking into account, among other things. the overall effect of each
technology on not only accident costs, including the costs of accident
prevention, but also cigarette demand. Thus, command-and-control regulation,
done properly, would require the regulator to evaluate both safety elements and
aesthetic elements of cigarettes, such as taste.428
What complicates the analysis further is that, to construct a demand
schedule for cigarettes, given the consumer information problems described in
Part II, the regulator would not be able to use the same sort of information that
might be used for other products. Smokers· revealed preferences through
purchasing decisions, for example, may not be especially helpful to the
regulator, given that smokers' consumption decisions are one of the sources of
market failure in the first place. Moreover, even if the regulator were able to
construct supply and demand schedules for cigarettes once, the regulator may
be slow in updating its calculations from year to year. If so, once a given set
of regulations were put into place and once manufacturers had responded to
those regulations in their production decisions, there would be a strong
disincentive for manufacturers to improve upon current technologies, at least
until the regulators got around to updating their regulations.

See
The First-Party lns11rance E.rtema/1ry. s11pra note 40, at 1 69-70 Such dctcmunanoM

analysis that anempts to detennine what precautionary measuro a manufactun:r would ha'c taken
Hanson & Logue,

are arguably even more difficult when done ex ante rather than ex po't. The frame" orlr. of the curn:nl

Article makes clear that the ex post cost-benefit analys1' perfonned by a coun m a ton ,uu ts a type of ex

post command-and-control regulation.
427. Funhennore, it is a type of analysts that we nonnal ly do not than!- n:gulators an: competent to
undertake. After all, our decision to adopt a market economy rather than a planned economy rcpn:senl!> a
recognition that, in selecting what producb and scrv1co to make. ho" to make them, and what to charge
for them, the market rather than the government ., the pn:fcrn:d means of generaung and !>Orting through
all the relevant information regarding costs and benefit,. Of course. 11 ., marl.et fa1Jun:' that have made
us look to a regulator in the first place. As we argue

111/ra

Secllon JV D. howe\'er, for tho..: who behe\c

generally in the market's superior ability to generate and :1.!>Wntlate Va.!>! quanuucs of mformat1on regarding

product and service supply and demand, the bot mean' of corn:ctmg market failure> . , 10 find government
responses that are tailored to the market failure m que,t1on and that, 10 the extent feasible, n:Jy on the

market rather than the regulator.

428. It is important to empha.!>izc that the mformallonal di.advantage of regulators would not be
limited to manufacturer care levels. Given that the opllmal acll\'lt)' level will depend on the can: Jc, cl
chosen, i f regulators cannot choose the most efficient technology. then they cannot detennme the efficient
activity level. (Other things being equal, the •afer a manufacturer·, technology

ts. the gn:ater the

manufacturer's efficient level of activity.) The mformauon problem ..:ems relevant 10 v1nually all aspects
of cigarette regulation, as past failed efforts to regulate the industry demonstrate.

Sa s11prt1 note 9
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B. The Disadvantages of Peiformance-Based Regulation
Scholars and policymakers tend to prefer performance-based regulation to
command-and-control regulation.429 The potential advantage of performance
based regulation is that it can create incentives for manufacturers to choose the
best current technology at the time the regulation is implemented and to
develop better technologies over time. For instance, a performance-based rule
might, without specifying a particular technology to be used, prohibit cigarette
manufacturers from making cigarettes that expose smokers to more than a
given amount of nicotine or a given amount of carcinogens.430 Or a
performance-based rule might require either that the number of underage
smokers be reduced by a given percentage431 or that the number of cigarette
caused deaths be brought down from 420,000 per year to, say, 50,000 per year.
As a means of enforcement, the regulator would then declare that failure
to meet those performance requirements would result in drastic consequences
for the manufacturers-for example, being shut down completely. The
consequence of an ideal performance-based regime would be that
manufacturers would, seeking to minimize their own costs, select the cheapest
technological option for complying with the relevant performance goal. That
many economists prefer performance-based regulations to command-and
control regulations is a consequence of those scholars' assumptions that
manufacturers are better informed of their options and the costs and benefits
of those options than regulators are.432
429. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAliDIRTY AIR 1 2 1 -28 ( 198 1 )
(arguing for greater reliance o n "ends·oriented" environmental regulation and less o n "means-oriented"
regulation); OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSJ"EMS: ACCOMPANYING REPORT
OF Tl!E NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 24 ( 1 993) ("Performance standards are generally preferable to
prescriptive or design standards because they give the regulated industry the Hexibility to determine the best
technology to meet established standards."); ROSE· ACKERMAN, s11pra note 422, at 1 9 (expressing preference
for performance-based regulations if financial incentives to manufacturers cannot be implemented);
STIGLITZ, s11pra note 425, at 226 ("What society is concerned with is the level of pollution, not how the
pollution is produced. The firm is likely to know better than the government the best ways of reducing the
level of pollution (how to reduce the level of pollution at least cost)."). Much of what goes by the name
of incentive-based regulation would actually fall under our definition of performance-based regulation. For
example, one commonly cited example of incentive-based regulation is marketable permits for pollution.
In our framework, pollution permits would constitute a performance-based approach, given that such u
system requires an initial determination of a maximum quantity of permissible pollution.
430. Cf infra Subsection VI.D.2 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement
that call for FDA-imposed nicotine target levels).
43 1 . Cf infra Subsection Vl.B.3 (discussing performance-based standards in the tobacco settlement
that call for certain percentage reductions in the level of underage smoking by given target dates).
432. The following quotation from a popular textbook in public economics, written by one of the
nation's most prominent economists, captures this conventional economic wisdom:
It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the government has a fair estimate of the marginal social
costs associated with pollution. But it is likely that the government is not well informed about
the technology of pollution abatement and control, at least not as well informed as are private
firms. This is particularly true in those cases where the pollution control devices have not yet
been developed. Neither side has very good information: both arc simply making guesses, but
since producers know more about the technology of their industries than does the government,
their guesses are likely to be more accurate.
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We agree with those assumptions of economists. It is not obvious.
however, that performance-based regulation would avoid any of the problems
of command-and-control regulation. For a regulator to set performance-based
regulations that fully correct market failures, the regulator would need all the
same information that is necessary to write fully efficient command-and-control
regulations.
Imagine that a regulator, rather than telling cigarette manufacturers how
to make their cigarettes (which would be a command-and-control approach).
told them that they must reduce the level of nicotine and that they could do so
in whatever manner they saw fit. Failure to achieve the goal, however, would
result in a very serious penalty, such as the banning of cigarettes altogether.
Such an approach would seem to have many of the benefits of a market
oriented or incentive-based approach. (Indeed, one might include performance
based regulation as a subset of market-oriented regulation.) But that
appearance, at least from an economic perspective, is an illusion. The choice
of the permissible level of nicotine itself-if done to achieve efficiency-has
built into it the same elaborate cost-benefit calculation that is required in
command-and-control regulation. How should the regulator choose the
permissible level of nicotine (or of carcinogens or of smoking-caused deaths
per year)? To reach an efficient number on any of those questions, and to
reach the prior decision to choose those measures of performance instead of
others, the regulator would have to include in her massive cost-benefit
calculation not only all the costs (including expected health costs) associated
with the different levels of nicotine. but also the costs of alternative designs
that might have been plausible substitutes to nicotine-reduction as ways of
reducing cigarette harms. In addition. the regulator would have to determine
the aggregate value to consumers of smoking cigarettes with different levels
of nicotine, taking into account all the other plausible cigarette-design
alternatives.
In sum, under fully efficient performance-based regulation-as under
command-and-control regulation-it would be necessary for the regulator to
be able to construct demand-and-supply schedules for every conceivable
alternative design of cigarettes. And to determine the answer to that question
would require all the same information that a fully efficient command-and
control regime would require.4'3
This is not to say that there are no advantages of performance-based
regulation over command-and-control regulation. If, for example. society

STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at

230; see also Cropper & Oate,. mpra note 38. at 699· 700 (e�plammg the cost
:wpm note 38. at 96-97

savings possible with incentive-based policy in environmental regulauon); Hahn.

(discussing theoretical efficiency gains from the u.e of marketable pcnmt' for pollution)

433. Cf Cropper & Oates, supra note 38. at 682 (noung that. "m a world of perfect 1.nowlc:<lgc,"
marketable emission permns. a form of performance-b3'Cl.I regulauon m our taxonomy. can replicate the
efficiency benefits of a Pigouvian tax).
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decided, for reasons not considered in the efficiency model being deployed
here, that it wanted to reduce the number of children who are smoking to some
de minirnis amount,434 it might be useful to have a performance-based rule
that imposed huge fines (or, better yet, banned all sales to adults as well) if the
target level of underage smoking was not achieved. The additional layer of
performance-based regulation on top of ex ante policing would have the
following benefit: Given the political decision to eliminate underage smoking,
the approach would allow manufacturers, rather than the regulator, to
determine the most cost-effective way of achieving that goal.435
C.

The Disadvantages of Ex Ante Incentive-Based Regulation
1.

The Informational Demands of an Ideal Pigouvian Tax

Economists often contend that ex ante incentive-based regulation is
superior to command-and-control regulation (and perhaps even superior to
performance-based regulation) because, under such an incentive-based
approach, the regulator needs less information to counteract the relevant market
failures.436 Under this view, a regulator applying an incentive-based approach
need not know the marginal costs to manufacturers of taking additional
precautions. Instead, by forcing the manufacturers to take into account the full
marginal social costs of not taking precautions (that is, the amount of the
external cost), the manufacturer-who, by hypothesis, is better informed on
this question-would decide whether the benefits of prevention exceeded the
costs.437 In contrast to that conventional economic wisdom, however, we
argue that, as between the idealized versions of incentive-based regulation (ex
ante versus ex post), it is usually only the ex post version that has the oft
mentioned informational advantages over command-and-control and
performance-based regimes. Given these informational advantages, ex post
incentive-based regulation has both care level and activity level benefits over
its ex ante counterpart.
What we call an ex ante incentive-based system, an economist would call
a Pigouvian tax.438 Under a Pigouvian tax, the manufacturer is required to
pay, on each unit of production, an amount just equal to the marginal external
434. Cf. supra note 204 (indicating that the case for parentalistic Jaws may be especially strong where
consumers are children and the product is addictive).
435. For a discussion of how the performance-based provisions in the tobacco settlement agreement
having to do with reducing underage smoking fall short of this ideal, see infra Subsection VI.B.3.b.
436. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 230.
437. This seems to be the conventional wisdom among economists. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, makes
the point in connection with pollution regulation, comparing fines (an incentive-based system) to command
and-control or performance-based regulation: 'The government need ascertain only the marginal social costs
of pollution. Then the firms decide whether the costs of the pollution control devices exceed the benefits
of the pollution control as measured by the penalties imposed for failing to control pollution." Id. at 230.
438. See, e.g., Cropper & Oates, supra note 38. at 680 (defining a Pigouvian tax).
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cost that the unit causes at the efficiem level of output and ar rlze efficienr level
of manufacturer care.439 The difficulty that the Pigouvian tax presents to the
regulator lies hidden in the choice of the optimal tax rate. For the regulator to
arrive at the efficient tax rate, she must first determine what the efficient
activity levels and care levels are.
Imagine how the regulator would determine what the optimal Pigouvian
tax rate would be for cigarettes for a given year. It would almost certainly not
be exactly $7.00 per pack. At best, the $7.00 per pack figure represents a very
rough approximation of the average annual external cost of a pack of cigarettes
at roughly the current level ofproduction and assuming essemially the current
design of cigarettes. For the Pigouvian regulator, however. that is the wrong
number, even in theory.440
First, if the Pigouvian rate were chosen without taking into account the
efficiently safe design, manufacturers would have no additional incentive to
make safer cigarettes beyond that which exists in the absence of regulation.
For example, if all manufacturers were charged the same per pack tax, there
would be no incentive for manufacturers to improve safety. After all, smokers
would have to pay the same tax regardless. By comparison, one could imagine
a theoretical ex ante tax regime under which manufacturers would be charged
not some fiat, industry-wide tax but instead some amount commensurate with
the level of safety of each manufacturer's individual cigarette design. So, for
example, the manufacturer would have the burden of proving to the regulator
each year how safe its cigarettes were. Such a finely tuned Pigouvian tax, if
possible, could have a substantial corrective effect on manufacturer care levels.
For such a regime to work, however, the regulator would need a great deal of
information about the differing external costs associated with alternative safety
designs.441 Thus, to have such beneficial effects on manufacturer care levels,
the regulator using tl1e Pigouvian tax must have all the information necessary
to determine what the efficient manufacturer care level is. That inquiry requires
the Pigouvian regulator to have all the same information required by the
command-and-control regulator.442
439. See ROSEN,

supra note 263, at 1 3 1 -33. Roo.cn·, detimuon of a P1gouv1an

ta\ foe= on the case

of environmental pollution, and it focuses only on polluter acuvny levcb. assuming away. for >1mphcny,
the possibility of changing polluter care levels. Su td. at

1 28 n.7 ("(T)h1s model iu.sumcs the only way

10

reduce pollution is to reduce output. If antipollution technology 1s available. II may be possible 10 mamtain
output and still reduce pollution. However, the analy"s " bai.1cally the same, ""cc the adoption of Jhe
technology requires the use of resource•."). BccauM: we arc mtcrcstcd m both acuvny levels and

manufacturer care levels, however, we take both into account

m our detim11on of a P1gouv1an !ax.
440. As we argue infra note 579. even under our propoo.cd ex post mccnti,·e-bascd regime. for reasons

of political and administrative feasibility, the implicit tax would likely be much lower than S7.00 per pack.

44 1 . Such a system would also create incentive. for manufacturcn.

10 dcccl\ e the regulator regarding

the safety effects of their individual product design•.

442. In the next subsection, we discuss additional detem:nce problem• that ;ire caused by a P1gouv1an
tax that does not differentiate among individual br.md•.
The activity level point is more subtle. To make the argument clear. assume away manufacturer care

level issues for the moment; assume as well that cigarette deMgn• arc already as safe as they can possibly
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In sum, with respect to the information that she needs to do her job, the
ideal Pigouvian regulator is in essentially the same position as the ideal
command-and-control regulator.443 Both need to know enough to do precisely
that which we normally expect product markets to do for us-to produce the
optimal product design at the welfare-maximizing price and quantity. All of
this is not to say, however, that economists and others are wrong to prefer
Pigouvian taxes and performance-based regulation to command-and-control
regulation, or to prefer Pigouvian taxes over performance standards.444 If, for
example, it were the case that monitoring tax compliance by manufacturers
were easier than monitoring output compliance or care level compliance, then
the Pigouvian approach might be the best alternative of the three. Alternatively,
if we had some noneconomic reason for choosing a particular performance
goal, then the choice of a performance standard could be defended on
economic grounds.445 Finally, there may be occasions when neither the
Pigouvian tax nor the performance standard is as useful as a command-and
control approach.446 Regardless, we argue in Section IV.D that in most
be and that the external cost of a pack of cigarettes still turns out to be on average $7.00 at the existing
level of production, which is roughly 24 billion packs per year. Cf. Tobacco Selllement Review: Hearings
on the Tobacco Settlement and the F11111re of the Tobacco Industry, 1 05th Cong. 5 ( 1 997) (statement of
Jeffrey E. Harris, Professor of Econ., Massachusetts Inst. of Tech.) (stating that the current level of annual
cigarette production is 24 billion packs), available in 1 997 WL 1 4 1 50659 [hereinafter Tobacco Selllemell/
Hearings]. In addition, assume (as most economists typically do when discussing analogous negative
externalities, such as pollution) that the marginal social cost of cigarettes increases with output. Cf. ROSEN,
supra note 263, at 1 27 (noting that he drew the marginal external cost curve in his supply-demand diagram
sloping upward to reflect the assumption that as people arc subjected to additional pollution they are
harmed at an increasing rate). This assumption-that the tenth unit causes more harm than the first unit of
production-may be as plausible with respect to cigarettes as it is with respect to pollution, though we have
no independent confirmation of this. Under these assumptions, if a tax were imposed, some of the cost of
the tax would be passed through to consumers. This would, assuming less than perfectly price-inelastic
demand for cigarettes, result in a reduction in the quantity of cigarettes demanded and produced. 11mt
reduction in quantity, under current assumptions, would cause the e'{ternal costs of cigarettes to full. Thus,
given that the tax would remain at $7.00, there would actually be too little smoking.
The intuition behind this point is simple enough. If cigarettes become relatively less harmful when
the quantity declines, then as production shrinks in response to the initial Pigouvian tux, there should be
an adjustment to the tax. Failure to anticipate that reaction in advance and to adjust the tux rate downward
accordingly would produce too much deterrence in terms of activity levels and too little smoking. If a
Pigouvian regulator wanted to anticipate all of these market reactions and choose a theoretically ideal tux
rate up front, she would need all the information that was required by the idealized command-and-control
regulator.
443. Economists seem to recognize the practical difficulty in choosing the optimal Pigouviun tux, but
they also seem to believe that the necessary concessions to practicality are less with such u tux than with
other forms of regulation. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 263, at 1 00 ('There are practical problems in
implementing a Pigouvian tax scheme. In light of the . . . difficulties in estimating the marginal damage
function, it is bound to be hard to find the correct tax rate. Still, sensible compromises can be made.").
444. A number of noneconomists have called for increased use of incentive-based regulation. See, e.g.,
CHARLES SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 57 ( 1 977) (arguing for greater use of
"injury-rate taxes" and other "incentive-oriented" approaches, in place of existing "specific regulations");
SUNSTEIN, supra note 404, at I 09 (calling for "market-oriented" and "incentive-based" approaches to
environmental and workplace safety regulation, including the possibility of a "tax" on employers for
workplace risks).
445. See supra notes 434-435 and accompanying text.
446. It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is superior to performance-bused
regulation where inputs are more easily monitored than outputs. See, e.g., STIGLliZ, supra note 425, at 226
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situations-and especially in the cigarette context-an ex post incentive-based
approach is preferable to any of the other three regulatory altematives.�7 The
main reason is that ex post regulation requires less information on the part of
the regulator, because it relies instead on manufacturers and the product market
to make decisions about costs and benefits.
2.

Additional Deterrence Problems with Current Eccise Taxes:
The Unraveling Effect and Errors of Omission and Commission

In the preceding subsections, we noted that an ideal Pigouvian regulator
would impose an ex ante tax on each cigarette manufacturer equal to the
expected external cost of that manufacturer's brand of cigarettes. As cigarette
taxes are currently designed, however, all manufacturers are taxed the same
amount per pack regardless of the specific risks posed by their particular
brands.448 Even if we were to assume that current cigarette taxes reflect the
average external costs of smoking (which they almost certainly do not), and
even if we were to assume that future cigarette taxes would be changed to
reflect changes in the average external cost per pack of cigarettes (which is
also unlikely to happen), an excise tax presents significant deterrence problems,
both in manufacturer care levels and activity levels.�9
The manufacturer care level problem would result from the fact that
manufacturers would have less than optimal incentives to make investments in
cigarette safety: They would reap little of the competitive benefit of making
such i nvestments because they would continue to pay the same excise tax as
their competitors.450 Thus there would be an "unraveling" effect of sorts with
(suggesting that in some cases rnoniionng rnanufac1urer.. · inpul•. such a> their u� of i.crubbc:� m
smokestacks, may be easier than monitoring the level of polluuon ern111ed by each rnanufactureo. Wmman.

supra note 423, at 1 96-97. The argument has 'orne plau"b1h1y. For example. 1f lhe regulaior J.. new thal
adding at least one scrubber to a srnoke,tack generJlly " as a co,1-cffecuve mean• of reducing polluuon.
but the regulator for some reason could not easily rnonnor the le\cl of polluuon being ermned by any
particular manufacturer, the optimal response might be to require all manufacturer.. 10 '"'tall at lc:a..1 one
scrubber. Even in the situation just described, however, the command-and-control regulator would ha\e to
know a great deal about the overall external co'!' cau'cd by the manufac1urer's product when consumed
(or, in the case of pollution. in the manufacturer\ production proces•) to be: able to make a '°und
judgment.
447. We also observe, however, that one or more of 1ho� approache" rmght be a u�rul 'upplement
to the ex post incentive-based regulation of crgareuc,.

448. The same can be said of propo•ab in recent year.. to mcrea.e the federal e":'"' ta\es on
The Senate s Heu/th Curr Fo/11.-s
A11J C1�"'"""
Revenues up in Smoke. WALL ST. J., Aug. 9. 1 994. al A 1 2 (d1i.cu"ing propo� mere= m crgan:ne la\�
cigarettes. See Gary S. Becker & Michael Gro"man.
to help fund health care reform).
449. As we noled above,

see supru note 402 and accompanying texi. crgarene la\� are in fact "''

without any regard to the expected external co'b of c1gare11e •moJ.. m g ln•lead. they are the r�uh pnmanly
o f revenue-raising objectives.

See supru text accompanying nole 403 To the ex1en1 1ha1 lhen: " ' anat1on
. supm nole 49. at 1 70

in tax rates, it is across 'tales, not brand,. See MA�Nl�G ET Al.

450. There would be some competitive benefit from maJ.. r ng >afety in•e•tmenl•. '"'°far a> .:on,umel">

are uninsured and accurately perceive and procc" the di fference> among crgarene brand, rn 1em1' of �fety
characteristics. In our view. however, becau'e of the con,umer 111fonna11on problem> d1.cu'>..:d
II, this effect would be small.

mpm

Part
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respect to manufacturer care levels.451 Competitive forces-that is, smokers'
demand for, all else being equal, the cheapest available cigarettes-would
induce manufacturers to lower the overall price of their cigarettes by cutting
back on investments in safety, cutbacks that (we are assuming) consumers
would not perceive.452 Thus cigarette manufacturer care levels would be
suboptimal.453
The activity level inefficiency is a bit more subtle. Assume for the moment
that manufacturer care levels are not an issue so that we can focus on the
activity level effects of the excise tax. In a world with an excise tax on
cigarettes that is computed on the basis of their average risk, activity levels
(the number of cigarettes produced and consumed) may be, on average,
roughly optimal. Nevertheless, there would be welfare losses because some
individual consumers, compared with their perfectly informed selves, would
be smoking too much and some too little. These are the same kinds of welfare
losses that would occur in the absence of such an excise tax, if it were true
that consumers (on average, but not individually) accurately perceived the risks
of cigarettes.454
The problem with the excise tax solution is that consumers facing a higher
price would adjust their consumption decisions to reflect their own estimates
of risk given that they would not expect to be compensated by the
manufacturer for any harms that materialized. Their individualized risk
assessments would lead them to continue making errors of commission and
omission.
Nonetheless, even the imperfect excise tax takes us closer to efficiency
than no excise tax at all (assuming, of course, that some superior ex post
incentive-based system is not an available policy option). If manufacturer care

45 1 . For discussion of how ex post incentive-based regulation responds to the unraveling problem, see

infra Subsection IV.D.3.
452. The discussion supra Part II regarding consumer information problems provides support for our
assumption that these cutbacks would not be perceived by consumers. Cf. Hanson & Logue, The First·Party
Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 1 76-77 (describing unraveling of manufacturer care levels under
circumstances of imperfect consumer information and imperfect insurance in the absence of excise taxes).
453. This is the same species of problem that we discussed supra Subsection 11.B.2 regarding the
problems of imperfect brand-specific information. Any time the incentive structure is not tailored to specific
manufacturers and specific brands, the incentive structure will be Hawed in this way. Even economists and
policymakers who have recognized this unraveling problem with respect to markets and consumer
information have failed to recognize the numerous alternative ways in which other market and regulatory
mechanisms can lead to the same unraveling effect. As we describe below, see infra text accompanying
notes 64 1 , 709-7 1 3, there are a number of ways in which the proposed national settlement reflects this
failure.
Interestingly, even the economists who support using excise taxes on cigarettes (at least as a
"component of a package of policy measures directed at discouraging smoking by children," Warner ct al.,
supra note 28, at 385) acknowledge that "[t]axation is a rather blunt instrument" and that higher cigarette
taxes might "encourage smokers to switch from higher priced branded cigarettes to lower priced (and often
higher tar and nicotine) generic and discounted brands, thereby possibly increasing smokers' exposure to
the toxic substances in cigarette smoke," id. at 385-86 (citation omitted).
454. Those welfare losses are sometimes referred to as errors of omission and commission. See Hanson
& Logue, The First-Party Insurance Extemality, supra note 40, at 1 77-79.
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levels unravel, the amount of the tax would rise; thus, the nominal price of
cigarettes would rise, which would cause a reduction in the aggregate amount
of smoking. Although in this scenario there would still be welfare losses from
errors of omission and commission, the aggregate activity levels may be closer
to the optimal levels than if no tax were imposed.
D. The Advantages of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation

1.

The Reduction of Information Problems

In contrast to any of the previously discussed forms of regulation, under
an idealized ex post incentive-based system (such as an idealized enterprise
liability regime), the regulator would not need to know anything, ex ante,
about the product's supply and demand curves. Instead, the regulator would
simply commit to charging the manufacturer, ex post, for any costs that the
product winds up causing. It would therefore be the manufactllrer that would
make the ex ante expected cost calculation, and it would be the manufacturer
(and the product market) that would determine, ex ante, optimal product design
(including safety considerations) and optimal quantity. Thus, under an ex post
incentive-based system of cigarette regulation, the cigarette manufacturers
would, ex ante, take into account the fact that, ex post, they would be held
liable for any costs caused by their products.455 They would build those
assumed costs into their design, production, and pricing decisions. Once an
equilibrium was reached in the market, the optimal quantity of cigarettes would
be sold at the optimal level of safety.456
455. It should be clear that an ex po•t inccnuve-b� regime docs not entail any Jctcm11nat1on as to
••. in other worih. a no-fault system. By contrast. a ton

the reasonableness of manufacturers' conduct. It

regime that relied on fault-based principles of ··=onablcne""" and the hke would. under our taxonomy.
be considered an ex post command-and-control regime.

456. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 423, at 52-54 (arguing that. under cen:un assumpllon>. 'Incl habthty
with a defense of contributory negligence could lead to optunal ac11v11y levels and care Je,·eh in the product
market). In addition, because the price of cigarenes would reficct their full costs and

because consumers

would anticipate being compensated ex post for cigarene-cau.cd hamt>. there would be no "clfare lo=
associated with errors of omission and commis•ion.
Some readers might be tempted to argue that an ex po't sy•tcm of regulauon would be more
expensive than an ex ante system because the ex po•t regulator would have to tdcnufy and mea.un: th<:
harms that the product actually caused. That argument. however.

•• a red hcmng. Any form of regulauon

that seeks to internalize costs must mea.ure actual damages. To argue 01hcrw1..: •• to misunderstand the
idea of internalizing costs. The real difference, as •lated in the text. " tht•: Under ex ante regulauon

(whether it be command-and-control, performance-based, or mccn11ve-�). th<: regulator would have to
estimate the furure costs and benefit. of the product, tn all of 11> vanous altcmauvc dotgns Thll!I, in

addition to examining the costs as they occur today in making that c•Umauon. the regulator would have
to examine how those costs were likely to change in the future. The regulator, therefore. would aucmpt to
measure the influence of a variety of mutable factor... including the product dotgn. the consumer mu:, the

"'fc and
25 to 60 years. •Uch ot1ma1tons would be

medical system's ability to reduce or eliminate the threat of harm. the industry"> ab1hty to offer a
viable cigarette substitute, and so on. Over a latency penod of

extremely speculative. Under an ex post approach. by contr.ist. the regulator would not need to make such
an estimate. Instead, the manufaccurer would make che csumace. The regulacor would have 10 �ruun only
the harm caused by the product after it had occurred.
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Not only would ex post incentive-based regulation use the manufacturer's
grasp of existing information to guide production decisions, it would also
encourage the production of more information. Some commentators argue that
under command-and-control regulation (and perhaps under performance-based
regulation), manufacturers have an incentive to conceal information about the
harmfulness of their products or about potential technologies for improving
their products' safety.457 Ex post incentive-based systems respond to those
types of problems. Under an ex post incentive-based regime, manufacturers
would use all the information they have. Moreover, because manufacturers
would have to pay for cigarette-caused harms once they occur, manufacturers
would learn something about the probability and magnitude of those harms as
a result of the process of regulation itself.
There is yet another information problem that ex post incentive-based
regulation reduces: Under an ex ante system of regulation, manufacturers
would have an incentive to convince regulators and consumers that the risks
of their products were lower than they truly were. By doing so, they could
lower the perceived costs of their products and benefit from a lower Pigouvian
tax rate.458 Under an ex post regime, in contrast, the manufacturer would not
escape paying those costs, no matter what regulators and consumers were led
to believe ex ante. Thus, manufacturers would have no reason to convince
regulators or consumers to be optimistic under an ex post regime. Cigarette
manufacturers under an ex post incentive-based scheme would, in essence, be

bonded.459
2.

The Reduction of Overdeterrence Problems When Information Varies
Across Consumers

Another significant advantage that idealized ex post incentive-based
regulation has over idealized ex ante incentive-based regulation stems from the
possibility that some consumers may be better informed than others.
Economists typically assume that consumers are homogenous with respect to
information levels. So, for example, Viscusi premises his policy
457. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 425, at 230 (arguing that under direct regulation, private producers
"have every reason to try to persuade the government that the technology for pollution abatement will be
extremely hard to develop, so that it will be impossible to satisfy stringent regulations").
458. It might be argued that regulators could simply ignore the information provided by munufucturers
regarding product risks under an ex ante regime. Such a policy would come at a cost, however, because
manufacturers, as we have repeatedly argued, are typically better informed about their own products thun
regulators are.
459. Cf. Croley & Hanson, Ellferprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92 (explaining the informntionul
benefits of bonding in the products liability context). Of course, an ex post approach may not eliminate the
information problem with respect to questions of causation or damages. Manufacturers would be able to
lower their costs if they could persuade regulators that their products caused fewer harms than they actually
did. That problem. however, would exist for any type of regulation that seeks to correct the market. But
see infra Subsection V.A.2.a (describing how an ex post incentive-based system could be employed to
overcome the causation problem).
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recommendations l argely on consumers' ai•erage estimates of risk.�60 even
though his own evidence shows that some people underestimate nsks.�1
Viscusi would have to concede that his policy recommendations would be
inefficient with respect to such optimistic consumers. If one takes seriously the
possibility that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to information levels,
therefore, the question of which specific type of incentive-based regulation is
adopted becomes very important.
If the quality of information varies across consumers, any ex ante form of
incentive-based regulation, such as a Pigouvian tax, would create a problem of
either overdeterrence or underdeterrence. To understand this point, it is
necessary to distinguish between two categories of ex ante incentive-based
regulation, based on who receives the proceeds of the tax (or charge or fine)
that is collected ex ante. In one category, the potential victims would receive
the proceeds, based on the ex ante risks they face. We call this category
"victim-initiated ex ante incentive-based regulation.' ..:6� One can imagine a
regime i n which consumers, after buying their cigarenes, submit to the
regulator all receipts (or empty packs) for cigarenes purchased; and then,
before any injury occurs, they receive a rebate equal to their per pack share of
the tax collected.463 Although such a regime would raise the nominal retail
price of cigarettes, it would fail to have any effect on consumers' consumption
choices. The rebate would lower the price that consumers would have to pay
for cigarettes; the consumers, in making their decisions, would be responsive
only to the price net of the rebate. Optimistic consumers would continue to
behave optimistically, leading to an underdeterrence problem. while those
consumers who accurately measure or overestimate the risks of cigarenes
would continue to do so. As to those laner consumers, there would be no
deterrence benefits from this ex ante incentive-based system.
Now consider the effects of a different ex ante incentive-based system, one
in which the proceeds from the tax are paid to someone other than the
potential victims-most likely the state. Under such a state-initiated regime.
consumers who correctly estimate or overestimate the risks of cigareltes would
be overdeterred-or doubly deterred-from smoking. Not only would those
consumers pay the additional price to cover the ex ante tax charged to
manufacturers, but they would also continue to take into account their own risk
estimates of smoking because they would still fully bear those costs ex post.

460. See, e.g., Vbcusi. supra note 1 02. at 70 (;i,,'c ' " n g ho\\ \\ Cll con,umcr.. arc 111fom1cd on a' cragc >.
id. at 92-93 (concluding that higher cigarette taxc' would be mappropnalc. m pan bccau>e m o,1 '111okcr..
overestimate the risks of smoking).

46 1 . See VISCUS!, supra note 49. at 1 24 & tbl.6-3
462. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 283-84 (d"cu,_.ng the 1r.1dcofh bct\\ ccn ··pm .11cly mma1cd""
versus "state initiated" approache' to regulation).

463. Such a system might operate very much hkc a bot tle dcpo,11 ,y,1cm
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Thus only consumers who were purely optim1st1c (and thus who assume
cigarettes are riskless) would be optimally deterred from smoking.464
This type of overdeterrence problem, coupled with an overly narrow focus
on ex ante incentive-based regulation, appears to be one of the main reasons
that economists who have studied cigarettes have not called for increased
efforts to internalize costs.465 Those economists start with the assumption that
a large fraction of consumers are, even in the absence of any regulatory
intervention, already deterred or overdeterred regarding smoking risks (at least
with respect to those risks that are not externalized to third parties), because
those consumers are well-informed of or actually overestimate those risks.466
Then the economists focus their analysis on only a single regulatory policy
tool, the excise tax,467 which is a very crude form of ex ante incentive-based
regulation. That approach creates the potential for overdeterrence, a possibility
that apparently motivates Viscusi and others to oppose the idea of internalizing
the negative externalities of smoking through higher excise taxes.468
What those scholars seem to have overlooked, however, is that some forms
of ex post incentive-based regulation (namely, victim-initiated regimes) are less

464. The effect would not quite be that of double taxation, however, because the amount of the
implicit tax, averaged across all smokers, would be somewhat less than the explicit tax imposed by the
regulator. This is because the tax imposed by the regulator would include negative external costs not borne
by smokers (for example, ETS costs) as well as the costs they do bear, and the implicit tax fell by the
smoker would not (unless we were to assume, wildly unrealistically, that consumers for some reason fully
internalize all costs they impose on others).
465. See, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 49, at 19 (concluding that the current level of cigarette
taxes is adequate or even excessive); Viscusi, supra note 102, at 92 (same). The other main reason,
discussed earlier in the Article, is that economists working in this area have concluded that cigarettes, on
net, do not create negative externalities. See supra Subsection III.C. I .
466. See supra Section II.A (discussing Viscusi's argument that consumers are well-informed o f the
risks of smoking).
467. In the recent studies by economists of cigarette-caused negative externalities, the only policy
option that has seriously been considered is an excise tax. See MANNING ET AL., supm note 49, al app. F;
see also GRAVELLE & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 298, passim; VISCUS!, supru note 49, al 1 06-09; Viscusi,
supra note I 02, passim; Warner et al., supra note 28, passim. For a discussion of the historical development
of cigarette taxes, and a description of the changing magnitude of those taxes over time, see MANNINO llT
AL., supra note 49, at app. F. One can imagine a number of other plausible policy options, such as ( I ) a
complete ban on cigarette production and consumption; (2) a ban on cigarette smoking in public places:
(3) increased use of warnings and negative advertising; or (4) direct regulation by the FDA. Except in
connection with ETS (where limited smoking bans have been tried), the excise tax on cigarettes is the only
policy option that has been used or studied to any significant degree.
468. For example, when Viscusi addresses the topic of cigarette taxes, he describes such taxes us
substitutes for, or alternatives to, increasing consumers' perceptions of the risks of smoking. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Promoting Smokers' Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 554 ( 1 994); see
also Viscusi, supra note 1 02, at 54-57. Even those economists who have called for some increase in
tobacco taxes have done so only in situations where overdeterrence problems are not likely to be present
(such as with smoking among children), seemingly giving no consideration to the possibility of using other
incentive-based systems besides excise taxes as a means of internalizing the external costs of smoking. See,
e.g., Warner et al., supra note 28, at 385-86 (arguing that increased excise tax on cigarettes may be
appropriate as means of discouraging children from starting to smoke, but not mentioning the possibility
of using tort liability to the same effect).
If we allow for the possibility of imperfect information, the problem of overdeterrence under a tux
regime diminishes: If consumers do not perceive the risks of smoking, they will not add their implicit
premium to the price of cigarettes.
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susceptible to the problem of overdeterrence. Under an ideal ex post incentive
based regime, for example, smokers would internalize the costs of cigarettes
once when they purchased the cigarettes, as the nominal price of the cigarettes
would rise to reflect their full expected costs. Smokers would not, however,
count those costs fully a second time by adding to the nominal price of
cigarettes their own estimate of the expected monetary harm to themsel ves of
smoking, because they could expect to be compensated for that harm ex post
via tort damages.469
Even under such a regime, there could be some overdeterrence, depending
upon what damages are included in the ex post awards, but less overdeterrence
than with an excise tax. Overdeterrence under enterprise liability would occur
to the extent smokers themselves anticipate dying before having a chance to
collect their ex post awards. One cost of cigarette smoking that would, ideally,
be internalized to manufacturers and thereby into the price of cigarettes is
some willingness-to-pay measure of the value of the lost years of the smoker's
life. To the extent smokers fully appreciate the risks of smoking (including the
risk of a shortened life) and fully take those risks into account in deciding
whether and how much to smoke, however, adding a tort premium for the risk
of a shortened life could produce overdeterrence, since the smokers themselves
will not be around to enjoy that portion of the award.
There are a number of reasons, however, that this type of overdeterrence
would be relatively small compared to the overdeterrence associated with an
excise tax. The overdeterrence that stems from smokers' dying before receiving
their award would exist with the excise tax as well.�70 With respect to the
rest of the harms of smoking, however, enterprise liability would produce
significantly Jess overdeterrence. Smokers could expect to receive
reimbursement for at least some of those costs ex post in the form of a tort
judgment during their lifetimes. Such costs include the smoking-related
medical costs borne by smokers, all of the lost income to smokers due to
smoking-caused disability, and all of the pain and suffering experienced by
smokers during their lifetimes as a result of cigarette smoking. In contrast,
with an excise tax, no ex post reimbursement for those costs can be expected,
and thus all of those costs would contribute to overdeterrence.�71

469. We are assuming that consumers are aware of the .incl hab1h1y rule
470. Even overdeterrence stemmmg from the co•! to 1he Mnol.er of dymg early would be mlllgated
to some extent. Recall that we are currently a.•ummg pcrfoctly mfonncd •mol.ers Under an enterpme
liability regime, those kinds of •mokers could take •lep' to reduce the amount of O\ erdelerrcnce For
example, since they can expect to live •honer live•. the)' rmght decide to reduce !heir Je,cJ of .annp.
which would provide them with more money during their •rnol.mg hfeurn� to help off-.:1 the mc�d
price of cigarettes. Or they might be able to reduce their h fe 111.urJnce coverage >111<.:e 1he >hortfall would
be covered by the ton awards. Or perhap' long-term •mol.ers who could demon•lrate 1ha1 the) already had
a serious smoking-related illness might be able to borrow aga111,1 their future ton a" Jrd> Ahhough none
of those approaches would fully offset the overdetcrrence problem. 1hcy m1gh1 >1gnitican1ly reduce 11
47 1 . None of the costs that are borne by third panic> would produce overdetem:nce under either
regime, if smokers did not take them into account. Econom1•l> 1yp1call) a>.:>urne !hat al lea>t >0me of 1h�
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It bears reemphasizing that any concern with overdeterrence exists only
insofar as there are smokers who are informed and who make rational
decisions regarding the long-term effects of smoking on their life spans. As we
argued in Part II, there are many reasons to doubt that smokers, in making
decisions about whether to smoke the next pack, behave with such a degree of
foresight. In addition, if, for reasons of administrative cost or political
necessity, ex post incentive-based awards were limited to purely economic
losses, the overdeterrence problem would be reduced.

3.

The Prevention of Unraveling

An idealized enterprise liability regime (or some other idealized ex post
incentive-based regulatory mechanism) would, in theory, move us closer to
optimality with respect to cigarette-caused harms than the current and proposed
versions of a cigarette excise tax would. Under an idealized ex post regime,
manufacturers would have improved care level incentives because they would
benefit directly through increased sales from efficient reductions in the
expected costs (and hence the prices) of their own individual brands.472
Moreover, the activity level inefficiencies would be corrected as well,
inasmuch as the price of each pack of cigarettes would adjust to reflect that
pack's full expected cost.473 Thus, an idealized enterprise liability would be
a superior deterrent to a regime of excise taxes, even without considering
double-deterrence concerns.
E.

The Advantages of Victim-Initiated over State-Initiated
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation

Enterprise liability is one example of a victim-initiated ex post incentive
based system of product regulation. But what would a state-initiated ex post
system look like? Perhaps it would be a fine imposed ex post on cigarette
manufacturers for harms caused by past smoking; for example, a Pigouvian tax
whose amount was determined ex post rather than ex ante. Or perhaps it would

costs will be treated as internal to the smoker. We explained supra Subsection 111.C.2.a.i why that is a
highly questionable (and, in any event, largely undefended) assumption and that in the cigarette setting the
reverse assumption is usually more realistic.
472. Thus, manufacturers would effectively be bonded, creating an incentive to produce truly safer
cigarettes. See Croley & Hanson, Emerprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92; see also supra text
accompanying note 459.
473. The price of cigarettes would, under idealized enterprise liability, "inform" the consumer of the
risks posed by the brand of cigarette she was purchasing. See Hanson & Logue, The First-Party /11s1mmce
Extema/ity, supra note 40, at 175. More precbely, under such a regime, because consumers would be fully
compensated for the risks of smoking, they would not need to make their own individual assessments of
those risks. An excise tax, however, does not have the same effect. Because consumers will not be
compensated ex post, they must make assessments of risk ex ante and therefore, in addition to paying the
excise tax, may suffer from errors of omission and commission.
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be a lawsuit (much like the state attorneys general lawsuitst7� brought by the
government against manufacturers to recover for past cigareue-caused harms
imposed on the government. In any event, the key elements of a state-initiated
ex post system are (a) that the claims would be brought by the state; (b) that
they would be brought ex post; and (c) that the proceeds from the system
would not go directly back to smoking victims.
In Subsection IV.D.2 above, we described one of the advantages of victim
initiated, as compared to state-initiated, incentive-based systems. The idea is
that a victim-initiated regime would avoid overdeterrence of those smokers
who accurately estimate or overestimate the risks of smoking, as they could
expect to get some of the ex ante cigarette tax refunded to them when they
bring their claims. A state-initiated approach, on the other hand, could create
overdeterrence for such smokers, because they could not expect a "tax refund"
ex post-except only very indirectly through, for example, lower income tax
rates.
Another advantage of the victim-initiated approach is that the system itself
would generate information about the harms of smoking, and this information
could then be used to fine-tune further the regulatory system. Smokers would
have an incentive to bring claims whenever their cigareue-related illnesses
began to manifest themselves.475 Under a state-initiated approach, in contrast,
there would be no such incentive for victims to come forward. Thus, the
government's factual basis for its ex post claims/fines/taxes would have to
come from some other source-perhaps, for example, from epidemiological
studies of the effects of smoking on general populations. Such studies are
certainly valuable, but they could be made available to any regulatory regime,
including the victim-initiated regime.476
One concern that is sometimes raised about victim-initiated approaches is
that they can give victims the incentive to behave with "moral hazard." Thus,
the argument goes, if the promise of an ex post award motivates victims to
come forward with their claims (thus revealing all sorts of helpful

474. See cases cited supra note 68.
475. Some economists have argued that 111centl\ e-ba>ed n:gune> tend not to create mcentl\ c> tor
parties to volunteer relevant information. For c>.amplc. con>1dcr the following quotation from St1ghtl
Under both schemes [direct regulation and fine>] II 1> not m the mtcn:>t of a >tecl company to
announce how much pollution 11 i> creating. Nor 1> 11 111 the 1ntcn:>t> of any of the U>er> of >!eel
(to the extent that the marl.et is compcuuvc). >mcc an) line> unpo>Cd as a rc>ult of c�c�l\ c
pollution o r any expenditure o n polluuon-control de' ice> mandated b)· n:gulauon> an: \Imply
passed along to the user. And while 1t may be m the mtcrc>t> of consumer> collccu,dy to
monitor, if monitoring is CO>tly none will be willing to do 11. We ha\e a clas>ic pubhc-good
problem.
STJGLJTZ, supra note 425, at 229. Our pomt m th1> >ect1on 1> that one of the potcnttal bcnclil• of >·tellm ·
initiated ex post liability is that it helps to overcome th1> pubhc good problem
476. To the extent the state were to attempt Jo >tn:ngthen It> ca>.: for ex po>! Jinn, taxes. or award>.
by offering inducements to smokers to get them to come forward 1qth helpful mformauon. \\C would then
be moving along the continuum from a s1a1e-m1t1ated >)'>tern to a ' 1ct11n-1mttatcd >y>tcm Thal "ould be
another type of hybrid regulation.
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information), it can also give them an increased incentive to engage in the
behavior-or a decreased incentive to avoid the behavior-that created the
claims against the cigarette companies in the first place. Put simply, the
availability of an ex post award-such as a tort award-may make people
smoke too carelessly and too much.477
This worry about the moral hazard effect on smokers of the availability of
bringing an ex post claim, however, is largely unfounded. First, cigarettes do
not pose a substantial consumer care level issue. There is not much that
consumers can do, in care level terms, to reduce the costs of smoking. There
is no "safe" way to smoke a cigarette, at least not as cigarettes are currently
designed.478 Thus, it is difficult to conceive how the existence of a potential
ex post claim would induce smokers to smoke each cigarette "less carefully."
Second, even if smokers knew of, and could plausibly be expected to take,
some care level precautions, a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system
of regulation would not create a moral hazard problem inasmuch as the
compensation that it provided would only substitute for compensation that is
currently provided through public and private insurance mechanisms. That is
true because current compensation is not adjusted to take into consideration
smokers' care levels. A liability system, therefore, would merely replicate any
existing moral hazard problem.479 Finally, ex post liability would largely
eliminate activity level problems. As we have argued all along, if
manufacturers are forced ex post to bear the full costs that their products
cause, they will have to charge a price that reflects the full cost of cigarettes.
Therefore, overconsumption in the hope of being able to bring an ex post
claim against the industry is prevented by the requirement that smokers fund
that ex post award up front in the form of increased cigarette prices.480

477. Cf Cropper & Oates, s11pra note 38, at 692-93 (suggesting that a Pigouvian tax may be superior
to a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime as a means of internalizing the costs of polluters
because a Pigouvian tax does not involve behavior-distorting payments to the victim whereas ex post
liability does).
478. There may be ways in which smokers could reduce the risks of smoking. For instance, they might
try to inhale the smoke less deeply into their lungs. Or they might avoid covering the tiny holes around
the filters of some cigarettes that would otherwise allow some of the harmful constituents, including tars,
to escape into the air. The problem, however, is that consumers are unaware of those potential precautions
and, in any case, may not be consciously "deciding" how to smoke a cigarette. See supra notes 1 04- 1 07
and accompanying text. Indeed, those precautions may be available to consumers primarily because
consumers are unaware of their self-defeating characteristics and manufacturers seek to take advantage of
that fact. See supra notes 1 04- 1 07 and accompanying text; infra note 673.
479. It might well be true, as several readers of earlier drafts of this Article have noted, that smokers
could improve their long-term health-and, in essence, partially counteract the ill-health consequences of
smoking-by improving their diets or exercise habits. But that point can be made of smokers and
nonsmokers under the current regime. No compensation scheme of which we arc aware goes very far in
encouraging potential claimants to cat better or exercise more. In addition. we arc unaware of any studies
suggesting that diet and exercise have an especially significant effect on the health of smokers. Again, an
ex post liability system for smokers would not create a moral hazard problem.
480. Cf infra text accompanying notes 777-778 (responding to similar "personal responsibility"
concerns with ex post incentive-based regulation).
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Summary

In this part, we reviewed the arguments for different types of regulation.
Both command-and-control and performance-based regulation place huge
informational demands on regulators, demands worsened by the perverse
incentives under such regimes for manufacturers to conceal, or at least to fail
to seek out, better information. Without perfect information, regulators will set
prices too high or too low, and they will be unable to respond properly to
changes in the amount of harm a product does. Manufacturers will thus lack
incentives to make their products safer or charge prices that ensure efficient
activity levels. Ex post incentive-based regulation, by contrast, would harness
market forces and manufacturer information to avoid the inefficiencies of the
other regimes.
V. IMPLEMENTING A VICTIM-INITIATED EX POST
INCENTIVE-BASED S YSTEM

As we have shown in previous parts of this Article, a system of victim
initiated ex post incentive-based liability has significant advantages over other
forms of regulation in addressing the market failures associated with smoking.
In this part, we explore in greater depth the concept of a victim-initiated ex
post incentive-based regime. We begin by analyzing different alternatives to
such a regime. Throughout this Article, our model for ex post incentive-based
regulation has been enterprise liability. In this part, although we touch on
enterprise liability, we focus more on an alternative. administrative regime
based on the workers' compensation model.
A. Alternative Victim-Initiated Ex Post Incenril'e-Based Systems
So far, we have used an idealized version of enterprise liability to illustrate
the virtues of a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regime. Enterprise
liability, however, is only one form of such a regime-one that relies on courts
rather than agencies to do the relevant ex post damage determinations. In this
section, we describe an alternative ex post incentive-based regime: smokers'
compensation. Before doing so, however, we explore the idea of enterprise
liability further, relaxing some of the assumptions we have been making up to
now and addressing some anticipated objections. After discussing both
enterprise liability and smokers' compensation, we describe a technology-the
cigarette card-that could be used under either approach to allocate costs to
specific manufacturers (and to improve the efficacy of any regulatory
approach).
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Enterprise Liability

In this section, we relax some of the assumptions that were explicitly and
implicitly included in the notion of an "idealized" enterprise liability regime,
and we consider some of the common criticisms that are made of enterprise
liability as a system of deterrence. There are two types of criticisms that are
often levied against an enterprise liability regime: first, that it does a poor job
of measuring damages suffered by individuals481 and second, that it is an
extremely costly system to administer.482 In our view, those criticisms are
often overstated.
The tort system, especially to the extent juries are used, is generally
criticized for being an unreliable means of determining the amount of damages
to be paid by defendants to plaintiffs.483 Some argue, for example, that there
is a tendency for juries to award irrationally exorbitant damages, especially in
cases involving wealthy, out-of-state, corporate defendants and sympathetic,
local, individual plaintiffs.484 Such concerns, though perhaps valid in some
circumstances, are often vastly exaggerated.485 Indeed, in the cigarette
context specifically, juries have, if anything, been biased against individual
smokers and in favor of corporate defendants.486 Nevertheless, if runaway

48 1 . See infra notes 483-487 and accompanying text.
482. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 40-4 1 , 127-48
( 1 989); George L. Priest, The Currem Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort law, 96 YALE L.J. 1 5 2 1 , 1 560,
1 587-90 ( 1 987). Even the national tobacco settlement proposal seems to adopt the conclusion that the tort
system, as a means of regulating cigarette risks, involves unacceptably high administrative costs. See
Tobacco Settlemem, supra note 32, at 3 ("[C]ivil actions [against cigarette manufacturers] are complex,
slow-moving, expensive and burdensome, not only for the litigants but also for the nation's state nnd
federal judiciaries.").
There is a third type of criticism of enterprise liability, which is related to the mismensurement of
damages point, though the criticism is more of an insurance argument than a deterrence one. The claim is
that enterprise liability, because it typically includes damages for nonpecuniary harms (so-called pain-und
suffering damages), forces consumers to purchase insurance that they do not want and would not want,
even if perfectly informed. See Priest, supra, at 1 552-53. This type of criticism, to the extent it applies
anywhere, would certainly apply to the proposal set forth in this Article. The argument that consumers do
not demand this type of insurance coverage, however, has, in our view, been drastically overstuted. A
reasonably strong argument can be made that consumers do demand such insurance covemge and thlll
enterprise liability is an appropriate means of providing it. See Croley & Hanson, s11pra note 22, at 1 8571 9 14.
483. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 1 - 1 5
( 1 988) (describing :he alleged failure o f the tort system and attributing that failure, at least in part, to u
desire by jurors to be generous to tort victims at the expense of wealthy defendants).
484. See, e.g., id. at 1 1 - 1 2 ("If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant . . . , it will often
settle for a merely wealthy one."); JEFFREY O' CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES,
INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 23-32 ( 1 987) (describing numerous alleged biases in civil juries'
decisionmaking); Good Riddance to lotto Jury Awards, Bus. WK., June 3, 1 996, at 1 34 (extolling a
Supreme Court decision striking down a $2 million award to an Alabama doctor who sued BMW for 11
retouched paint job on his new sedan).
485. See Stephen Daniels, The Question ofJ11ry Competence cmd the Politics of Civil Justice Reform:
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1 989, at 269, 279- 8 1 , 2923 1 0; Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. I 093, I I 09- 1 2 ( 1 996).
486. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 3 1 , 1 39, 143-45.
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juries in tort cases remain a concern, there are reforms that would respond co
such concerns short of eliminating enterprise liabilicy as a policy opcion.m
Critics of enterprise liability also point to its supposedly high
administrative costs as a strong argument for choosing some alternacive system.
such as a fault-based tort regime or a no-fault first-party insurance regime.�ss
Those criticisms often misunderstand che full effect of an enterprise liabilicy
regime. For one thing, because enterprise liabilicy would do away with che
need for an expensive trial on the issue of faulc, it might accually be cheaper
to administer than, for example, a fault-based tort regime.�89 ln addicion, co
compare the administrative costs of a no-fault first-party insurance regime wich
an enterprise liability regime is co compare apples wich oranges. A no-faulc
first-party insurance regime is only that-an insurance regime. le focuses
exclusively on spreading the risks of product-caused harms, providing no
deterrence benefits to manufaccurers. Enterprise liabilicy, by contrast, provides
both product-risk insurance and product-accident deterrence. And ic is the
deterrence element-which includes a factfinding exercise to determine
causation-that adds costs (though not necessarily costs in excess of the
accompanying benefits)490 to the system.
2.

Smokers ' Compensation

Notwithstanding the arguments just made in defense of enterprise liability.
i f there remains substantial doubt that a jury can accurately calculace damages
and there remain concerns about the administrative cost of a tort-based regime.
then alternative victim-initiated ex post regimes should be considered. One
alternative to enterprise liability that may be more appropriate in che contexc
of tobacco-related injuries is smokers ' compensation, an administrative
compensation system. Under such a regime, instead of bringing a tort suit in
court, smoking victims (which could include smokers, their families, and
entities with subrogation claims, such as insurers)�91 would bring claims
487. For example. po>>ible solution> might mcludc refomung JUC) ..:lcc110n .:ntcna t pc:rha� c\en
placing some expens on jurie>). reforming JUry in•truc11on,. tal-.ing the damage> dcc1>1on from the JUry and
giving i t to judges. placing cap> on puni11ve damage• and nonccononuc damage>. and the hkc To be
absolutely clear, we do not recommend any of the": refonn' (e\ccpt. pc:rhap> . ...,, an .dtcmall•c to
eliminating ton law altogether).

488. See, e.g. • Prie>t. mpra note 482. at 1 560. 1 587-90 1cn11cmng cntcrpn..: hab1ht) on tho-.:
grounds).

489. See Croley & Hanson. IV/wt Lwb1/uv Cmt> '. mpra note -10. at 15· I 6 Which >) >tcm "' ould be

administratively cheaper would depend upon the rela11ve -izc of the CO•l·pc:r<� effect l "' luch "' ould make
a fault-based system relatively costly) and the quan111y-of<a>c> cffcc1 (\\h1ch \\ ould make an cntcrpn-.:
liability regime relatively costly).

See rd.

490. See id. at 1 6.
49 1 . We assume that victims of environmental tobacco >mol,.e ! ETS I \\OUld not be able to bnng a
smokers' compensa110n claim. For a d1>CU»1on of ho" a \ 1Ct1111-1m11atcd e� po>l inccnll\c·ba.cd n:g1mc
could be used to respond to pubhc ETS expo>ure. >ee

111/rn

Sub-cc11on V.C 3 A> \\e male dear below,

for a smokers' compen>ation sy>tem to ha\e a -igmficant ad\ antage O\Cf ahcma11 ' c t) pc:> of rcgula110n,
the administrative body would need to mal,.e ,e,crnl cau,,;il dctcn111na11on> 1ha1 may not currently be
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before an administrative tribunal. The tribunal would decide whether and how
much the claimant was entitled to recover, basing its decision on (a) whether
the claimant had a compensable claim; (b) to what extent cigarette smoking
caused the injury; (c) what the claimant's damage award should be; and (d)
how the compensable injury costs should be allocated among tobacco
companies. The administrative factfinders would bring expertise to the
adjudication of smoking-injury claims.492 Perhaps supported by a standing
science panel,493 the agency would bring to bear the most current evidence,
epidemiological and otherwise, regarding the effects of cigarette smoking.
Research could be not only borrowed from private researchers, but also funded
or conducted by the agency itself.
Causation-based administrative alternatives to tort law are not strangers to
the legal landscape. Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for
employees injured on the job in every state.494 And alternative compensation
systems have been used at the federal level on several occasions, including the
Black Lung Benefit Program for miners suffering from lung disease,495 the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for victims of illnesses
contracted from immunizations,496 and the Price-Anderson Act governing
liability in the event of a nuclear accident.497 Indeed, the notion of an
alternative compensation system specifically for smoking-related injuries is
itself not new. Over twenty years ago, Donald Gamer proposed a system in
which welfare agencies could exercise no-fault claims against cigarette
manufacturers to recover direct medical costs and related transfer payments,
such as social security disability payments.498 Gamer's system would involve
a special tribunal with expert factfinders to manage any complicated scientific
questions of causation.499 Claimants could invoke a rebuttable presumption

feasible with respect to ETS·related hanns.
492. Administrative alternatives are frequently proposed in situations that involve complex scientific
or medical detenninations, long latency periods, and large numbers of potential plaintiffs. See, e.g., Robert
L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compe11satio11 Scheme, 52 Mo.
L. REV. 95 1 , 952 ( 1 993). This description is usually applied to mass toxic exposures, but fits tobacco
equally well.
493. One model for a "Tobacco Disease Panel" is Ontario's Industrial Disease Standards Panel, which
assists the provincial Workers' Compensation Board. Its mandate is to investigate potential diseases, to
make findings about causal connections, to specify criteria for evaluation of claims, and to advise the Board
concerning appropriate eligibility rules. The Board refers specific questions to the panel, but the panel may
also investigate issues on its own accord. The panel may appoint specialist scientific subpanels on particular
subjects. The full panel integrates the scientific findings with policy considerations to make
recommendations to the Board. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00, at 335-37.
494. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1 994 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS at vii
( 1 994).
495. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 90 1 -945 ( 1 994); see also PETER S. BARTH , THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG:
FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ( 1 987).
496. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 0 to 300aa-34 ( 1 994); see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60.
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 22 1 0; see also Rabin, supra note 492, at 955-60.
498. See Gamer, supra note 48, at 3 1 4.
499. See id. at 3 1 9. He suggests the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office Board
of Appeals as possible models. See id. at 3 1 9 n.248.
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of causation based on how long the victim smoked,500 and liability would be
apportioned according to the approximate number of each manufacturer's
cigarettes that the victim smoked.501 A presumption that all cigarettes are
equally dangerous would be rebuttable by a manufacturer's showing that its
brand is safer than others' .502
Since Garner's article, legal scholars have continued to keep the notion of
an alternative compensation scheme for tobacco in play. Richard Ausness, for
example, recently proposed creating an administrative board with rulemaking
and adjudicative authority to process tobacco-injury claims.51n As under
Garner's system, Ausness's board would set presumptions of causation,
perhaps even irrebuttable for certam diseases, and damages would be limited
to economic losses.s04 Most recently, Paul LeBel advocated an administrative
system involving broad, categorical determinations of causation and damages
to minimize costs.sos The program would be open only to individuals with
particular diseases and smoking patterns.SOI> who could collect only out-of
pocket medical expenses.s07 LeBel would also allow a modest benefit to
families of smokers who die from smoking-related diseases, primarily for the
symbolic value.sos Both Ausness and LeBel would finance the payment of
damages through an excise tax.s09
Those earlier proposals were not designed to address all of the deterrence
and cost-internalization goals that, in our view, should be central.510 The
Ausness-LeBel excise tax, for instance, would impose costs on all
manufacturers, irrespective of their causal connection. As we emphasized
above, however, the goal of optimal deterrence requires that each man11fac111rer
bear that portion of the overall cigareue-caused hamz that is attribwable to
that manufacturer 's brand.511 Only then will market forces lead
manufacturers to design, produce, and market safer cigarettes. And only then

See id. at 3 1 5.
See id. at 3 1 6.
See id. at 3 1 6- 1 7.
See Ausness. Compe11sa1io11. supra note 48. at 1 1 24-25
See id. at 1 1 27-29.
See Paul A. I..cBel, Beginnmg the Endgame: The Search for an /11J11r..- Compe11so1w11 S)·stem
A/1ema1ive lo Ton Liabiliryfor Tobacco-Relared Han11s. 24 N. K Y . L. REV. 457. 474 ( 1 997)
506. See id. at 490.
507. See id. at 49 1 .
508. See id. at 492.
509. See Ausness, Compensarion. supra note 48. at 1 1 25; LeBcl. supra note 505. at 493.
500.
50 1 .
502.
503.
504.
505.

5 1 0. Alternative compensation systems generally ha,·e been propo-.:d 10 scne i nsurance. adnumstrauve
efficiency, and corrective justice goals. See, e.g . • Ausnes�. Compensatwn. supra note 48. at 1088, 1 1 25
n . 1 78; Rabin, supra note 492, at 95 1 . LeBel's and Gamer's propo�b arc based in part on a cost
intemalization goal, but both have other aim� that may pull in di fferent d1rcc11ons. Su Gamer. supra note
48, at 277 (advocating the removal of government �ub.id1c. of tobacco and encouraging �fety); LeBcl,
supra note 505, at 466 (aniculating as goab compen�uon. enhancement of �fety, adm1ms1rative
efficiency, and cost internalization).
5 1 1 . See supra notes 99- 1 0 I, 450-454, and accompanying text
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will each brand of cigarette fully reflect its expected costs, thus leading to
optimal activity levels.
None of the actual or proposed causation-based compensation systems
provides a perfect model for a smokers' compensation system. They do,
however, usefully highlight some of the major considerations and tradeoffs in
designing an ideal smokers' compensation system. In a forthcoming article, we
(with Michael Zamore) provide a more fully formed, but still incomplete,
model of the smokers' compensation idea.512 In this Article, we suggest only
a few of the major substantive issues that must be confronted in crafting such
a system.5 13
In an ideal smokers' compensation world, three conditions would hold.
First, all smoking-related injuries would be "signature diseases." They would,
in other words, be caused exclusively, or nearly so, by smoking. Second,
smokers would be steadfastly brand loyal, sticking to their preferred cigarette
as long as they smoke. Third, all smoking-caused damages would be tangible
and easily measured. Under these conditions, if a claimant had one of the
signature diseases, the system would unerringly place liability on the
manufacturer that caused the harm, for the appropriate amount.
In many cases, this ideal may not be so far from reality. Certain diseases,
most notably lung cancer and emphysema, are very rare among nonsmokers
and might accurately be considered signature diseases.514 There is also some
evidence that smokers are extraordinarily brand loyal.515 Moreover, a
substantial portion of the costs of cigarette smoking are economic and may be
easily and accurately measured.516 In many other cases, however, these
factors might be more variable. For instance, although smoking is known to
increase the risk of heart disease, there are many other common causes of heart
disease. Many smokers do switch brands. And many forms of damage are not
easily measured. As the real world begins to diverge from the ideal, it becomes
necessary to weigh the value of increased accuracy in tracing injury costs to
manufacturers and the administrative costs of achieving that accuracy. A
similar tradeoff exists with respect to calculating real-world damages.

5 1 2. See Hanson et al., s11pra note 40.
5 1 3. Procedural questions may loom large as well. For example, one threshold question is whether u
smokers' compensation system would partially or fully preempt tort law.
5 1 4. The portion of all lung cancer deaths caused by smoking in 1 985 was 87%. See Patrick
Remington, Presentation at the Conference on the So·Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications
for Public Health and Public Policy, University of Wiscon�in-Madison Law School (Oct. 1 6, 1997) (outline
of presentation on file with the Yale Law Jo11rnal).
5 1 5. See Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Adverrising and Co11s11mption: Evidence of a Ca11sal Relationship,
8 J. PUB. HEALTH Pot.'Y 492, 493 ( 1 987) ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of
any consumer product."); see also Philip H. Dougherty, A.M.A. s Assa11l1 on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1 2, 1 985, at D29 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes engender considerable brand loyalty.").
5 1 6. We describe losses as "economic" or "pecuniary" if they are conventionally characterized that
way. Many so called "economic" losses, however, are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily
measured. See Croley & Hanson, s11pra note 22. at 1 857-6 1 .

The Costs of Cigarettes

1 998]
a.

1 287

Causation
l.

General Causation

The first inquiry of a smokers' compensation board would be to determine
whether c igarette smoking could have caused the injury claimed. To lower
administrative costs, the system could be open only to certain claims. A
threshold definition of a compensable injury under smokers' compensation
might turn, for example, on the amount smoked and the type of disease.
Claims for certain diseases with known, constant latency periods might be
barred until a given period of time has passed. Finally, a determination that
smoking could have caused any compensable injury would not necessarily
imply that, in the given case, smoking did cause the injury.
Workers' compensation has long struggled with this problem in
occupational disease cases. It is often unclear, for example, whether a worker
who was exposed to toxic fumes developed cancer as a result of that exposure
rather than from genetics or environmental toxins. And, of course, long latency
periods complicate the inquiry. Workers ' compensation systems generally
consider a disease "occupational" if the victim was likely to have contracted
it due to the nature of her work.5 17 A disease that may be common may
nevertheless become occupational if the employment facilitates its
transmission.51 8 Moreover, the workplace need not be the sole or even
dominant cause of a worker's contracting a disease, so long as it contributes
to the disease·s development.519 Despite these apparently liberal standards,
the workers' compensation system does not always get high marks for
responding to occupational disease. The American Law Institute reporters '
study on enterprise liability, for example, called workers' compensation
"notably unsuccessful in delivering compensation" to occupational disease
victims.520
One option for addressing difficult questions of causation, often proposed
for mass toxic torts, would be probabilistic recovery.521 In such a system,
recovery would be discounted by the likelihood that smoking did not cause the
smokers' injury. If, say, smoking has a 90'K probability factor of causing lung
5 1 7. See I ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON°S WORKl:Jt�· CO\ll'E."SATIO" 7- 1 00 (de>I.. cd 1 976 & Supp
1 997). The work may be dis1inc1ive m 1he lypc oi ml.. 10 " luch ll expo..:> worl..cr.. le g . \\orlmg around
toxic chemicals) or in lhe degree 10 which worl..cr> mu>t face C\ cryda) ml..> le g . con1r.ictmg d1-.abhng
conditions from handling ice all day). See 1d. al 7- 1 1 2 10 - 1 1 4
5 1 8. In one case, for example, a lelephone operJlor who conlrJclcd 1obcrculo>1> quah licd for \\Ork.er.."
compensation because 11 was found 1ha1 1he clo>e-fimng mou1hp1ccc >he filed al \\Ori.. con1nbu1cd 10 her
contraction of the disease. See id. al 7- 1 07.
5 1 9. See id. at 7- 1 24.
520. I AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1 00. al 1 1 1
52 1 . For an extended early di>cussion of an ex po>l mccn11vc-b� n:g1mc along the hnc> dc..cnbcd
here, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Com11.-c1w11 111 MuH £tpomrt.' Cau:s A ""Public U.m ·· Vi$Wll of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 85 1 ( 1 984).
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cancer in smokers,522 one out of every ten smokers with lung cancer would
develop lung cancer without smoking. In theory, those individuals should not
be compensated, since smoking did not cause their injuries. The individual
attribution uncertainty of epidemiological evidence, however, makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify which ten claims should be
denied.523 Probabilistic recovery would address this problem by allowing all
claimants with lung cancer to collect damages-at 90% of their total. The
industry would thus pay the full costs of the injuries caused by its product,
albeit not to the exact victims.524
A smokers' compensation system could adopt another commonly
recommended tool for simplifying the causal determinations as well:
evidentiary presumptions.525 Garner, Ausness, and LeBel all propose
presumptions of causation for certain diseases depending on the claimant's
smoking history.526 Moreover, presumptions of causation figure prominently
in many of the administrative schemes set up by the current federal law,
including the Black Lung Benefits Program527 and the National Vaccine

522. Our hypothetical estimate may be reasonably accurate, as 87% of all lung cancer deaths in 1 985
were caused by smoking. Remington, supra note 5 14. Presumably, the percentage of smokers whose lung
cancer deaths were due to smoking would be well over 90% given that the rate of lung cancer among
smokers is approximately 20 times that of nonsmokers. Id.
523. Some might argue that making even the broad probabilistic determinations would be infeasible.
See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 492, at 962 (suggesting that the assumptions of scientific certainty underlying
probabilistic recovery are "problematic"). Some in the scientific community, however, are more optimistic.
Troyen Brennan and Robert Carter, for example, argue that probabilistic recovery comports with current
scientific thought. Science no longer looks for absolute, deductive explanations of occurrences, they write,
but allows for probabilities. See Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probllbility
of Cllusation of Cllncer and Other Environmental Disellse in Individuals, t o J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L.
33, 39 ( 1 985). Brennan and Carter acknowledge the difficulty of establishing a statistically precise
probability factor, but they believe that with epidemiological studies and expert testimony factfinders could
generally "arrive at some good estimate of the probability of causation in the individual case." Id. at 58.
524. David Rosenberg has argued that underdeterrence or overdetcrrence is the likely result in the
absence of a probabilistic recovery. The reliance on statistical evidence typical of mass toxic cases-and
smoking cases-means that a strong preponderance rule, requiring "'particularistic' proof' of causation us
to the individual, bars all mass exposure claims. Rosenberg, supru note 52 1 , at 857-58. A weak
preponderance rule, one that allows statistical proof of causation provided the risk at issue accounts for
more than 50% of the total risk, would have the same result in nearly all cases, since the toxic risk rarely
exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858. Rosenberg cites cigarette smoking us an exception to the rule
that the excess risk rarely exceeds the background risk. See id. at 858 n.40. But Rosenberg compares the
risk associated with smoking against a background risk of exposure to asbestos. See id. We expect that the
excess risk of certain common tobacco-related diseases (such as heart disease) from smoking over a general
background risk is likely to be less than 50%. In those cases in which the toxic risk is so great, "imposing
full liability is no more desirable than denying liability altogether: to hold a defendant firm accountable not
only for disease losses caused by its own tortious conduct, but also for those attributable to background
risk, might inflict a 'crushing liability."' Id. at 858-59.
525. Depending on the system, such presumptions could be rebuttable or irrcbuttable. Failure to satisfy
the conditions of the presumption could bar compensable claims from being brought, or it could simply
shift the burden of proving causation to the claimant.
526. See Ausness, Compensation, supru note 48, at 1 1 27-28; Gamer, supru note 48, at 3 1 5 ; LeBcl,
supra note 505, at 490. Rabin proposes the use of presumptions in some mass toxic tort cases. See Rabin,
supra note 492, at 960-6 I .
527. See 3 0 U.S.C. § 92 1 (c) ( 1 994).
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Injury Compensation Program.528 The use of presumptions would reduce the
costly obstacles facing claimants. It would also expedite the claims process by
avoiding redundant litigation of scientific evidence. Although these
administrative-cost savings would come at the expense of additional deterrence,
such a tradeoff may be desirable.
ii.

Specific Causation

If a claimant smoked only one brand of cigarette, establishing general
causation would be sufficient. When the smoking-related injuries must be
divided among multiple brands, however, a smokers' compensation system
would need to allocate liability. Ausness and LeBel do not address this
question; under each of their proposals, damages would be financed by excise
taxes.529 Liability, therefore, would effectively be determined by market
share. The Black Lung Benefits Program530 and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program531 are similarly funded by taxes, with liability
allocated according to market share rather than causal share. In this subsection,
we identify five possible methods of allocating liability among cigarette
manufacturers other than market-share liability. We begin with the least
accurate and (probably) least expensive and move toward the most accurate
and most expensive. In presenting these methods, we remain agnostic as to the
proper tradeoff between accuracy and administrative costs; our goal is simply
to highlight a few of the possible options.
First, responsibility could be divided equally among the manufacturers that
produced cigarettes smoked by the claimant. This method would be the easiest
to administer, as it would require only the knowledge of which brands were
smoked and some basic arithmetic.532 Moreover, it is at least one step better
than an allocation based solely on market share in that only those companies
that manufactured the particular smoker's cigarettes would pay for that
smokers' harms. If consumers are reasonably brand loyal, then manufacturers
of relatively safe cigarettes should thrive and competition for safety should
emerge. Nevertheless, the nexus between causation and payment of damages
would be fairly attenuated, reducing the beneficial incentive effects of the
system.

528. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 3 to - 1 4 ( 1 994).
529. See Ausness, Compensation, supra note 48. at 1 1 25; LcBc:l. supra note: 505. at -193
530. See 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (b)( I ) ( 1 994).
53 1 . See id. § 95 1 O(b).
532. Although we do not address the problem here, claimant' under a 'mokc:r's compc:ns,auon system
may, depending on the nature of the program, have: an mccnuve to over..tate the amount that thc:y smoked
and to lie about the brands of cigarettes that they 'moked. A 'moker"s compens,auon program should,
therefore, be designed with that possibility in mind. We take up 1hat issue: more fully m Hanson et al.,
supra note 40.
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Second, rather than dividing liability equally, a smokers' compensation
system could prorate liability according to the length of time a smoker
consumed each manufacturer's product. This method would require the
factfinder to establish additional information, and would thus add to the
administrative costs of the process. Pro rata liability, however, would represent
an improvement over the equal allocation method inasmuch as it would
allocate damages in a way that more closely approximated the harm done by
the respective manufacturers. This approach, too, may have problems. For
example, insofar as smokers systematically smoke disproportionately dangerous
cigarettes for disproportionately short durations, this equal-allocation-by-time
method would not create optimal ideal deterrence. To help address any such
problem, this allocation system could be combined with a rebuttable
presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous.533 Manufacturers of
demonstrably safer cigarettes would be permitted to rebut that presumption,
thereby reducing their shares of liability.534
A third allocation system would involve estimating the number of
cigarettes smoked of each brand. Doing so would further refine the allocation
process, but at much greater cost. It may be that a smoker smokes a half-pack
of Brand X every day for ten years. If that person moves on to Brand Y for
another ten years, while also increasing consumption to a pack per day, she has
smoked twice as many Brand Y cigarettes, though the time frame for each
brand was the same. Recognizing this problem, Garner suggests the per
number means of allocating liability, coupled with a rebuttable presumption
that cigarettes are equally dangerous.535
Fourth, it may be desirable to allocate the damages in some way other than
purely on a pro rata basis.536 The allocation could, for example, be structured
on a "winner-take-all" basis. Such a system could assume any number of
forms. For instance, the manufacturer who produced the most cigarettes

533. Similar presumptions might be employed with any of the options described in this subsection.
That is, any of the proposed rules could simply be rebuttable presumptions.
534. Although the administrative board may lack information to judge adequately the relative riskiness
of cigarettes, manufacturers probably do not. By placing the burden on manufacturers, therefore, the
presumption forces the well-informed manufacturer to inform the poorly informed regulator. Furthermore,
it does so in a way that pits manufacturers against manufacturers in contrast to the current regime in which
manufacturers have common incentives to maintain one simple story-that there is no proof that any brand
of cigarettes causes cancer and that smoking cigarettes is not addictive. A code of silence in response to
a presumption that all cigarettes are equally dangerous, however, is certainly not unimaginable given the
industry's history, and would partially undermine the primary motivational impact of ex post incentive
based regulation by sharply reducing care level considerations from manufacturing decisions. While this
behavior would not be in individual companies' best interests, oligopolistic decisionmaking might prompt
such action, particularly if the industry felt that the smokers' compensation system could be dismantled if
it failed to produce results. Even were it the case that manufacturers could not manage to cooperate in that
way, however, administrative regulators might not be sufficiently competent to sort out any informational
disputes and competing claims among manufacturers.
535. See Gamer, supra note 48. at 3 1 6- 1 7.
536. For example, if most long-term smokers tend to smoke the relatively safe brands of cigarettes,
then pro rata allocation would inefficiently penalize makers of the safe brands.
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smoked by the claimant could bear all liability. Such a method would reduce
the administrative costs associated with inter-manufacturer disputes. Or the
company producing the first brand smoked could bear a disproportionate share
of the liability. This "first-brand penalty" could be justified on the grounds that
first brands create the addiction and that their toxins linger in a smoker's body
for the greatest number of years. 537
The final general approach to dealing with brand-specific harm would be
to establish a danger quotient for each brand of cigarette. A science panel, for
example, could create a formula that incorporated output factors believed to
lead to disease and epidemiological regression analyses by brand. Based on
testing, each brand of cigarette would be assigned a quotient indicating its
danger. After allocating liability, the tribunal would adjust the amounts based
on the relative danger quotient of the relevant brands. To refine the system
further, the panel could establish various danger quotients for each brand with
respect to different diseases. This approach has obvious deterrence benefits
over the other approaches, but those benefits may be outweighed by the
additional administrative cost.
The information-forcing effect of ex post incentive-based liability would
refine any of the methods suggested above over time.m Though all of these
possibilities force tradeoffs between accurate causation measures and
administrative costs, any of them could feasibly be implemented, depending on
the resource constraints faced by adjudicators. Another factor in the choice
between the methods we have suggested is our initial estimates of how
individualized cigarette harms are: If we had good evidence that smoking
behavior was highly variable across smokers or that different brands varied
substantially in dangerousness, we would have good reason to invest more in
individualized causation determinations.
b.

The Cigarette Card

The list of five options for allocating liability discussed in the previous
subsection is hardly exhaustive. Moreover. each option has many strengths and
weaknesses that we are unable to discuss in this Article. Nevertheless. in this
subsection we suggest a possible means of overcoming, or at least reducing.
many of the likely problems that implementation of the above options would
create. In this subsection, like the last, our discussion is only cursory and
suggestive.

537. If it turned out that smoking co,ls were not linear. hab1hl) could '"'lead be \\e1gh1ctl according
to estimated marginal damage. If. for ell.ample. II tumc-d out that "nokmg for li'·e ) ear. "en: n:lau•dy

harmless, and that the cigareues smoked between years "x and ten wen: mon: de.trucll\e, l he 'Y'll=m might
put greater liability on the manufacturers of tho'c br.md' 'moked bet\\een )ears " " and ten CJ mpru note
442 (describing the typical assumption of econom1>l' that polluuon ha:. mcrca:.mg marginal c°'t'J

538. See supra notes 457. 475, and accompanying text
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One method of overcoming the difficult informational requirements of the
allocation models described above is by enacting a requirement that anyone
wanting to purchase cigarettes must first purchase a "cigarette card." The card,
which could be based on the same magnetic strip (or computer chip)
technology used for credit cards and ATM cards, would be issued to any legal
aged smoker who wanted to buy cigarettes and would have to be presented by
the smoker each time she purchased cigarettes. The card could keep track of
a variety of potentially relevant risk factors, such as the number of packs
purchased by the smoker, which brands the smoker purchased, and the
smoker's age at the time of purchase. If that smoker were later to bring a
claim against cigarette manufacturers, the smoker's cigarette card information
could be used to help resolve many of the potentially difficult causal questions.
Moreover, the new data could be used by epidemiologists and biostatisticians
to expand what is known about the effects of smoking, the effects of different
brands (or ingredient mixes within those brands), the effects of different
smoking patterns, and so on. Using advanced statistical techniques, we could
learn a great deal more about the effects of cigarettes; that learning, in turn,
could be used to hone further the agency's causal determinations and
ultimately affect manufacturer product design.
A drawback of the cigarette card is that it would create significant
administrative costs. But the costs of this proposal seem less significant in
comparison to the costs that would be imposed by the variety of regulatory
restrictions that the national tobacco settlement proposal envisages. For
example, the proposal would:
•
•
•
•

•

Mandate minimum federal standards for a retail licensin§ rrogram
that federal, state, and local authorities would enforce; 3
Impose penalties, both civil and criminal, for violations of the
licensure requirements;540
Impose licensing fees on sellers to cover administrative costs of
issuing licenses;541
Set a minimum age of eighteen to purchase tobacco and require
retailers to check the photo identification of anyone under twenty
seven;542
Ban all sales of tobacco products from vending machines; ban the
sale of tobacco products from opened packages; establish a
minimum package size of twenty cigarettes; ban the sampling of

539. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 1 2.
540. See id. app. II at 44. Selling tobacco products without a license, for example, would be a criminal
violation punishable at the federal level with a minimum penalty for individuals of $ 1 000 or imprisonment
for six months or both; and for corporations, with a maximum penalty of $50,000. State and local penalties
could be more severe than these. See id.
54 1 . See id. at 1 3.
542. See id. at 1 1 .
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tobacco products; and ban the distribution of certain tobacco
products through the mail.5�3
Such provisions pose restrictions similar to those entailed by a cigarette card
system. Issuing the cards and creating a system that would collect the data
from the cards would create significant administrative costs. to be sure. but
not, we suspect, overwhelming ones.
The case for the card system is even stronger when one considers its other
potential benefits. For example, the use of the card could assist in imposing
age requirements on the purchase of cigarettes. That is, cards would be issued
only to consumers who are otherwise legally allowed to buy cigarettes.� To
appreciate the potential ways in which a cigarette card might be helpful to a
cigarette seller, consider some of the "smart-card" technologies that institutions
concerned with correctly identifying people are beginning to employ. Some
companies are developing a card that is e.mbedded with a microchip containing
detailed personal information.�5 Representatives of the biometrics industry
report that still better means of identification verification are now available and
will soon be widely used.�6 Biometricians are deve:0ping better and cheaper
ways of using unique human characteristics, such as fingerprints, hand prints,
facial imaging, or retina patterns, to identify people.�' As the technologies
i mprove and costs decrease, the benefits of a "smart" cigarette card. measured
purely in terms of preventing underage smokers from buying cigarettes. could
well overwhelm the costs of the system.
There is a related potential benefit of a cigarette card. Any regulatory
regime that prohibits underage smokers from buying cigarettes, and that has
the effect of raising cigarette prices, will give rise to black market forces that

543. See id. at 1 1 - 1 2.
544. The idea of an identification card 10 as>1>! retai ler.. m avoiding ..:lhng 10 underage con>umer.. "
nothing new. British politicians are currently com1dcn n g whether na11onal 1den111y card> >hould be 1s..ucd
in order 10 "stem the soaring crime rate and prevent minor; buying c1garcllc> and alcohol •· Helen Arnold.
Mistaken Identity: Identity Cards, SUPER MARKETI1'G. Sept. 6. 1 996. al 20. MorcoH:r. 16 European
countries already have identity card policies. I 0 of which arc m an dato ry. See id. ll1e grcate>l advantage
of !he cards in those countries is that they provide credible photo 1den 11 fica1 1on of con>umer> Such earth
would represent less of an advance in the United Stale>. howe,cr. ma.much a> photo 1denutica11on "
widely held by consumers in the form of a dnvcr'> hcen..:.
545. See Stephen Lynch, Life 011 the Li11e: Ba11k111g 011 ATM Cards. OKA!>.G E Cot ''TY REG !Cal J. Feb
2, 1 997, at K8. A 256-byte memo!)' chip card " being u>ed. for e�amplc. m German)· '> health care .y>tcm
See Dr. Otfrid P. Schaefer, /11troductio11 of Clup Tecluwlog_v to Healrhrn� 111 Gemwrn I' 1.iled July 22.
1 997) <http://www.smartcard.co.uk/health.html>. The card comam> mform:mon >Uch a. the m>ured'> name.
address, date of birth, status, the name of the m .urJnce provider. and the exp1ra11on dale ol the m>urance
See id. For now, the primary goal of the chip card J> 10 lo\\er adm1m>tral l \ e cost>. but the technology "
also being developed to assi>! the heahh care >Y>lem m d1 agno>mg and 1rca11ng 1 1lne>> Su 1d
546. See Geoff Nairn, The Key to Your Jdem1rr Fallmg Cosrs Will Allow Fmgaprmr \'en/1carw11 To
Be Widely Used, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 1 5. 1 997. at 1 2 .
547. See id. ; see also Evan Perez. Changing rhe Face of Sernnn· S1·sre11u, CO\!. APPF.AL l�l emp h 1-.
..
Tenn.), Jan. 2 1 , 1 996, at 3C (describing a facial imaging >Y>lem that UM:> your face a> the key 10 accos
automated teller machines and office building>. or check the 1den111y of \\clfarc rcc1p1ent� and computer
network users").
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could undermine the goal of the regulation.548 The card could be used to
assist in preventing or reducing black market cigarette consumption and
production. It could, for instance, be utilized to limit the number of packs of
cigarettes that any one smoker would be permitted to purchase over a given
time period. If it were empirically determined that no individual smokes more
than three packs per day, for example, then that maximum could form the basis
of a buying cap for the month. To be sure, the adult might sell each of the
ninety packs per month, but the adult would not be able to sell more than that
amount. Moreover, the cigarettes would be purchased at the full, regulated
price. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how a profit could be made by reselling
those cigarettes, unless underage smokers not allowed to purchase cigarettes
legally were willing and able to pay more than the fully internalized price. But
such a possibility seems remote.549 On a more extreme level, anyone found
carrying cigarettes that could not be accounted for on their cigarette cards
could be subject to criminal penalties-analogous to the open-container laws
in many states.
The card could also assist individual smokers' efforts to quit smoking.
That is, a smoker could ask to have self-imposed limits on her card that would
prevent her from purchasing more than a specified number of cigarettes over
a specified time period. Thus, the card could serve as a personal hand-tying
technology for those smokers who want to cut down or ultimately to quit but,
absent such a tool, have great difficulty doing so.55° Finally, the card could
be used to help eliminate the alleged "positive externality" associated with
smoking. With the card as a measure of people's conduct, pension plans could
more easily charge less to smokers.
Although the potential advantages of a cigarette card may be enormous,
we have thus far ignored a difficult to quantify, but nevertheless real, cost. A
reaction of many readers may well be that our proposal gives too much
information to governmental agencies, therefore creating a "Big Brother"
problem. We sympathize with that concern, but we believe the problem is not
as significant as it may initially appear. First, it is not clear that the sort of
information that the cigarette card system would generate is any different from
the sort of information that the American public already routinely provides to
governmental and private agencies. In other words, it may be too late to worry
about the sort of privacy concerns that this proposal raises.551 Moreover, to

548. See infra Subsection V.B.2.
549. The cap, whether it be three packs a day or four or whatever, would be set at a high enough level
that the cap itself would not create a demand for black market cigarettes.
550. Cf supra text accompanying notes 1 90- 1 97 (describing smokers' common, but largely ineffective,
hand-tying strategies).
55 1 . As one writer put it recently, "Stored in computer databases around the country arc profiles
detailing what you buy at the grocery, where you spend your money, how much you paid for your home.
Your medical condition. Your credit card and Soci�l Security numbers. Almost every trait lhat makes you,
well, you." Sandy Smith, Instant Access, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 1 0, 1 996, at I F.
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the extent that the "Big Brother" problem associated with the cigarette card
system is viewed as extraordinary, the system could be tailored to reduce or
eliminate the concern. For example, the means of identification could be
selected so as to reduce the amount of information that would be kept
centrally, information that might otherwise be used or misused against the
consumers who use the cards.552 Further, Congress could create very strict
controls and limits on what can be done with the information that is obtained
through the program.
Despite such modifications, some might object to any regulatory system
that keeps track of who is buying cigarettes. To that very basic criticism, we
have two responses. First, we suspect that, for some, it is motivated in part by
a kind of status quo bias. Consider a different reference point-something
other than the regulation of a currently unregulated product, such as the
decriminalization of some currently illegal product (for example, heroin). If we
were to lift the ban on such a product, the idea of imposing heavy point-of-sale
regulation, including the collection of information regarding who is purchasing
how much of the product, might not seem so extraordinary. Indeed, such issues
would presumably be considered an essential part of any proposal to legalize
a currently illegal drug. Second, for those still opposed in principle to
mandatory regimes of this sort, we offer the possibility that the scheme could
be voluntary. Those who wanted to use the card without having data collected
regarding their purchases could do so. though at some cost. For instance, they
might not be able to enjoy any of the ex ante savings to which they might
otherwise be entitled through their pension plans. Similarly, they might be
disallowed from collecting damages from the system for any smoking-related
illness or injury that they experienced.
c.

Damages

Assuming a claimant proves causation, how much should that person
receive? There are two general sorts of losses that might be compensated,
economic losses and intangible losses. Taking deterrence as our only goal. an
ideal smokers' compensation scheme would, at least in an abstract world
resembling an economist's model, award full compensation for both economic
and noneconomic harms caused by cigarettes. In the real world, however, the
picture is clouded by a number of complicating political and administrative
considerations. In our forthcoming article (with Michael Zamore),551 we will
lay out some of those factors and their implications for the types of injuries
that should be compensable and the extent of compensation. For now, we
552. For instance, representatives of manufacturer.. de' eloping tcchnologu:' for accurate: lingc:rpnnt
verification claim that the data they collect cannot be nmu,c:d bccau� tingc:rpnnt> ca nnot be: gc:nc:ratc:d
from the stored data. See Nairn, supra note 546, at 1 2.
553. See Hanson et al., supra note 40.
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simply want to avoid any potential confusion by reemphasizing that the $7.00
per pack figure that we came up with in Part III does not represent an accurate
measure of the cost of cigarettes. Moreover, we do not take that figure to
represent an approximate measure of the damages that would be paid by
manufacturers under a smokers' compensation system.554

3.

Summary

In this section, we have explored two possible ex post incentive-based
regulatory systems. One uses the traditional court-based tort model as its
starting point; the other looks to workers' compensation as a model. Either
type of system may be able to avoid many of the problems with conventional
regulatory responses to market failures, particularly if the information gathering
necessary to make the system work were enabled by something like the
cigarette card. We now tum to a discussion of the effects of an ex post
incentive-based regime on the behavior of cigarette producers and consumers.
B.

What Might the Cigarette Market Look Like in a World with Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation ?
1.

Safer Cigarettes and Safer Smokers

If an ex post incentive-based approach-whether it be on the enterprise
liability or smokers' compensation model-were to be successfully
implemented, what might the cigarette market look like? There are many
possible outcomes, and we do not pretend to be able to predict with any
certainty which one would occur. Still, we can speculate about some of the
possibilities. For example, if we assume that cigarettes can indeed be made
substantially safer than they currently are, the cigarette market might look very
different from its current form.555 Manufacturers would have an incentive to
achieve the optimal mix of care levels (that is, investments in safer cigarette
designs) and activity levels, which would be regulated through the price
charged per pack. If the full costs of cigarettes were imposed on
manufacturers, they might discover that the best means of achieving optimal
product safety includes any of the following:
•

Substantially reducing nicotine levels in cigarettes so as to reduce
the lifetime amount of smoking by any given individual (that is,
to allow smokers to quit more easily) while also reducing

554. Cf. infra note 579 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate measure of damages that
cigarette manufacturers should pay).
555. For an illuminating recent attempt to imagine what may come of the emerging market in cigarette
substitutes, see Warner et al., supra note 1 06, at I 088-9 1 .
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somewhat the levels of carcinogens and other dangerous
substances found in cigarettes;
Alternatively, substantially i11creasi11g nicotine levels, and
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, to get the same result;556
Substantially reducing or eliminating the carcinogens and other
harmful ingredients while only moderately reducing (or
increasing) the level of nicotine;
Moderately reducing (or increasing) nicotine levels and
moderately reducing carcinogen levels, but marketing cigarettes
only to people over a particular age. Then, after a number of
years, offering to help those smokers stop smoking or switch to
some even less dangerous alternative "nicotine-delivery system";
or
Developing a nicotine-free tobacco product (which, because of its
lack of nicotine and relatively high price, consumers would use
only sparingly) and producing an alternative, nontobacco,
nicotine-delivery system that would be sold in high quantities and
at low prices.

Which variant of those approaches manufacturers would pursue depends on a
number of factors-such as the cost of developing technologies for removing
nicotine and carcinogens from tobacco, the cost of developing alternative
nicotine-delivery systems, and the effect on consumer demand of any change
in cigarette design. Under an ex post incentive-based approach, the parties with
the best information on all of those questions-the tobacco industry-would
be given the incentives to make the right choices.
In addition to giving manufacturers incentives to choose the optimally safe
cigarette design, an ex post incentive-based regime would give them incentives
to market cigarettes to those consumers who are less likely to suffer long-term
harm from smoking. For example, given that smokers who start at a very
young age are significantly more likely to suffer the Jong-term health effects
of smoking,557 manufacturers might well stop marketing their cigarettes to
younger consumers. Indeed, they may even make substantial investments in
preventing underage smoking.
If we combine both of these possibilities-safer cigarettes (whether they
be less carcinogenic or less addictive or both) and safer smokers-we can
imagine an ex post incentive-based regime dramatically reducing the costs
imposed on society by cigarette smoking. Another, less likely possibility is that
cigarettes simply cannot be made significantly safer and cannot be marketed
in a way that is significantly safer than they currently are. If that were the
case, even after the industry was forced to bear the full costs of smoking for
some time, then the final outcome of an ex post incentive-based approach
556. It might be that fewer cigareues overall would be >moked 1f each c1gan:uc provided more. ra1hcr
than less, of the nicotine smokers crave.
557. See SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. supra nolc 3. al 4-1, -15 fig.3
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might be either that all cigarettes would be incredibly expensive (and thus
consumed only by the wealthy, unless subsidized by the government) or that
cigarettes would be priced out of the "legal" market entirely. In either case, the
main remaining regulatory concern would be how best to deal with the black
market for low-priced cigarettes.

2.

Black Market Cigarettes

Some readers may be concerned that an ex post incentive-based regime
would create a large black market in unregulated cigarettes. When cigarette
prices rise once the full costs of smoking are imposed on manufacturers, there
will be strong market incentives for someone to produce and sell illegal
cigarettes that undercut those prices. For a number of reasons, we regard it as
unlikely that an ex post incentive-based system would substantially increase
black market concerns.
First of all, we should note that the potential for black market effects does
not distinguish ex post incentive-based regulation from any other type of
regulation. That is to say, any serious effort to regulate the market for
cigarettes through command-and-control regulation would suffer from black
market problems at least to the same extent as ex post incentive-based
regulation would. In addition, depending on what we mean by "black market"
cigarettes, an argument can be made that an ex post incentive-based system
would reduce rather than increase black market concerns as compared with the
status quo. For example, all underage smoking today arguably involves black
market transactions, given that there are laws against selling cigarettes to
underage smokers. If that is the relevant black market, we suspect that shifting
to an ex post incentive-based regime would substantially reduce rather than
increase the black market. Given that illegal cigarettes under our regime would
likely be more expensive than under the current system, there would likely be
far fewer underage smokers. Similarly, under an incentive-based regulatory
regime, manufacturers' incentives would change dramatically. Whereas
manufacturers under the current regime have many reasons to encourage, and
no reason to discourage, the sale of their cigarettes to underage smokers,558
manufacturers under an incentive-based regime would have a strong incentive
to ensure that purchasers of their cigarettes pay the full price so as to fund
potential future damages claims. They would, in other words, seek to
discourage black markets from emerging. Moreover, the threat of a black

558. Cf John Schwartz, '73 RJR Memo Sought Youth Market, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.). Oct.
4, 1 995, at A 1 (describing one manufacturer's considered strategy to attract young smokers). For similar
reasons, tobacco manufacturers have an incentive to sell their cigarettes on black markets in other countries.
See Raymond Bonner & Christopher Drew, Cigarelle Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in Smuggling, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1 997, at A5 ; Cigareue Smuggling Probe Eyeing Employees at RJR, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
23, 1 997, at A5.
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market would increase manufacturers' incentives to design and market safer
cigarettes with lower total costs. Such cigarettes could be sold at a lower price
and could therefore eliminate some of the profit that would otherwise sustain
a black market.
Perhaps the black market concern is not the effect on underage smoking
but instead the effect of black market cigarettes on the efficacy of the ex post
regulatory regime itself. On this view, the black market in question is the sale
of c igarettes by companies that somehow expect to be able to avoid ex post
liability for the harms caused by their cigarettes. If avoiding liability is
possible, companies who expect to avoid liability would be able to undercut
the prices charged by companies who participate in the system and who expect
to pay their share of costs. As a result, the black market of unregulated
cigarettes would grow and the legal, fully internalized market would shrink.
How would manufacturers go about avoiding liability for the costs of their
brands? For one thing, they might try to disguise the brand of cigarette they
are selling (for example, by arranging to sell their cigarettes under a "front"
brand name owned by a shell corporation of some sort, perhaps a foreign
subsidiary), making it difficult to be identified. S imilarly, they might engage
in a version of "hit and run"-that is, selling cigarettes for a number of years,
pocketing the profits, and then leaving the market before the health effects of
that brand begin to manifest themselves.
Those types of black market concerns may not pose an insurmountable
problem for ex post incentive-based regulation. First, both types of black
market concerns are limited by the fact that consumers tend to be quite brand
loyal559 and that entry into the cigarette market has long been notoriously
difficult.560 Manufactures may be unable to create significant demand for a
new brand of cigarette in time to profit from that cigarette before removing it
from the market. And insofar as there would remain a brand-disguising
problem, the obvious solution would be to monitor the major cigarette
manufacturers closely (perhaps even to audit them continuously) to keep track
of what brands they were selling and what revenues they were receiving from
those sales and then to impose stiff criminal penalties on companies (that is,
on management) for attempting to disguise brands.561 The hit-and-run

559. See supra note 5 1 5 and accompanying texL
560. See Howell et al.. supra note 254. at 9 (""The bamers con"'t pnmanl) of 1he m�'"e a<lvertmng
expenditures necessary to achieve some level of brand recogmuon and the huge capnal e'pendnures
necessary to achieve the production efficiency 'cale enjoyed b) lhe '1x major domesuc c1gan:tte
manufacturers.").
56 1 . In countries 01her than the Uni1ed Slate,, 1hc pnnc1pal blacl. market concern appears to be the
smuggling of i llegal cigarettes into 1he country. often from 1he United S1a1e,. Su Bonner & Dn:w. supra
note 558. Given the sheer size and markel dominance of 1hc U S. cigarette manufac1urers � compared w11h
foreign manufacturers, domesucally produced blacl. marl.el cigarette' .eem more h l..e ly 1han foreign-made
black market cigarettes. After 1he 1mpo"11on of a 'Incl ex po,1 mcenuve-� n:g1mc on domes11c
manufacturers, however, there would be an mcrc:i.ed mcen11vc for foreign manufac1urers 10 sell lhcir
cigarettes in the United States insofar a. 1ho'e compamc' m1gh1 expect 10 a'o1d hab1hl) for 1he harms
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concern, on the other hand, presents the issue of "judgment-proof'
manufacturers and retroactivity, issues that are discussed below.562 Basically,
to deter hit-and-run cigarette manufacturers, liability must somehow be
imposed on those companies, perhaps even on their shareholders, for the harms
their cigarettes have caused. Manufacturers could be required either to post a
bond or purchase full liability insurance coverage.563 In addition, it may be
possible to tie the amount of compensation that would be provided through the
smokers' compensation program to the number of legal cigarettes smoked by
each individual claimant.564 If so, then consumers themselves might be given
some incentive to eschew lower-priced black market alternatives. Such a
solution, although partial, would be responsive to all potential sources of black
markets.
Finally, note that the concern about black markets in cigarettes is in part
motivated by the memory of Prohibition. The Prohibition analogy, however,
is inapt. Cigarettes and alcohol are different in a number of important ways.
To give one example, the production of low-cost alcoholic beverages can be
accomplished on a reasonably small scale. Indeed, many people brew their own
beer today, long after Prohibition's end. It is quite difficult (for us anyway) to
imagine a substantial number of consumers being able to raise enough tobacco
and manufacture enough cigarettes to be able to sustain even their own one-,
two-, or three-pack-a-day smoking habits. Indeed, the work and money that
such an operation would require would make buying the legal and regulated
cigarettes (or just quitting smoking) attractive alternatives.565 In addition,
cigarettes do not provide the intoxicating effects that help to explain the
demand for alcohol and marijuana (even among those not addicted to them).
If policymakers are nevertheless concerned about the potential of
incentive-based regulation to create a black market, they could respond by
reducing the amount of the ex post fine imposed on the manufacturers. This
would, of course, come at the expense of some deterrence; such is the tradeoff
necessary to determine how much, if at all, to reduce the payments. Moreover,
so long as the relative costs imposed on each manufacturer varied according
to the relative social costs caused by that manufacturer's brand, some of the
care level and activity level deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based

caused by their cigarettes. That problem is no different from the general issue of how to impose domestic
product safety regulations (and products liability laws) on imported goods. Moreover, because under our
proposed regime the giant domestic manufacturers would be hurt competitively by the lower prices of
illegally smuggled cigarettes, they would have an incentive to assist in monitoring and preventing not only
illegal smuggling of foreign cigarettes, but also illegal home-grown cigarette production.
562. See infra Subsection V.C.2.
563. See infra text accompanying notes 595-600.
564. Such a program would be reasonably simple to implement, for example, if the cigarette card were
adopted. See supra Subsection V.A.2.b.
565. It might be argued that the widespread availability and use of marijuana is strong evidence that
a black market in cigarettes would emerge. Many people do grow and smoke their own marijuana. But a
marijuana smoker needs relatively little to satisfy her, unlike an addicted cigarette smoker.
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regulation would be retained, even i f the total amount o f damages imposed on
each manufacturer would be less than the total costs of that manufacturer's
brand.566
C. The Problem of Transition and the Case for S11ppleme11rary
Ex Ante Regulation
To this point, we have focused mostly on the disadvantages of command
and-control, performance-based, and ex ante incentive-based regulation and on
the advantages of ex post incentive-based regulation-with special emphasis
on the advantages of victim-initiated ex post approaches. Now we consider the
principal complaints about ex post regulation. The first is essentially a
transition question. The other three problems would present themselves even
after the transition had been made to the new regime. In the process of
discussing these potential problems, we identify the circumstances in which
such a regime might benefit from being supplemented with (though not
replaced by) command-and-control or performance-based regulations.

1.

Making the Transition to Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation:
The Retroactivity Question

Even if we decide to adopt some type of ex post incentive-based regulation
of cigarettes, how to make the transition to su1.h a regime will present
significant issues of implementation. The biggest transition question is to what
extent we should impose on cigarette makers the costs of past cigarette
smoking-that is, smoking that occurred before the adoption of the new
regime. Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, we summarize the issue briefly here.
One way of putting the question is this: To what extent should cigarette
companies be made retroactively liable today and in the future for the hanns of
past smoking? Surprisingly little has been written on the retroactivity questionS67
566. If the cigarette card were adopted, there would be add1t1onal means of m1mn11zmg black. manets.

See supra text accompanying notes 548-549.
567. Defining the concept of ""retroact1vity"' in th1' context involves an clement of arb1tranncs,; For
instance, retroactivity could mean applying the new regulatory regime to all c1garctte-causcd hanns that arc
manifested after the regime i' enacted, even if tho'e harm' were cau� by c1garcttcs that wen: purchased
and consumed before the new regime w� adoptL"d. That ver..1on of retroact1\'lt)' could =ult in payment•
being made by manufacturer.. for harm' who'e 'ymptom' become apparent many ye� after the exposurc
.
that gave rise to those harms. Alternatively. we could be 'omew hat ••Jes, . retroocuve by n:qumng that the
exposure have occurred within some 'ct period before the adoption of the new rcg1me Or we could go m
the opposite direction, even further back in time. and apply the new rcg1me to all harrru. ever caused by
cigarettes, even those harms that occurred and were manifested Jong before the regime w� adopted. but
for which the statute of limitations h� not yet run. Of cou=. e\en the choice of a urne lmlll for the •tatutc
of limitations is arbitrary. Finally. one could unagme a "completely" retroactive \·er..1on of ex post
incentive-based regulation that would apply to all harm' ever cau�d by c1garencs. e\en for c= m which
the statute of limitations has run and the victim j, Jong "nee dead. All of tho� option' nught reasonably
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in the specific context of cigarettes,568 although that may change as Congress
begins to focus more closely on the issue. One of the few scholars to have
written on the topic, Gary Schwartz, has argued that applying a rule of
absolute manufacturer liability retroactively in the cigarette context would have
no beneficial deterrence effects and would instead have the negative
consequence of bankrupting the tobacco industry. He acknowledges that
prospective absolute cigarette-manufacturer liability (that is, liability only for
harms caused by cigarettes produced after the adoption of the new rule) might
have some deterrence benefits.569 But, he argues, there would be no
additional deterrence benefits to applying the rule retroactively.570 Indeed, he
argues that applying absolute liability retroactively would only destroy the
cigarette industry, thus eliminating future cigarette sales as a potential source
of compensation for those harmed by smoking.571
We have two general responses to Schwartz's conclusions. First, he seems
to ignore the deterrence benefits of the precedent that would be set for other
industries. The precedent would be that in circumstances such as this-when
it is determined that a product causes an enormous level of externalized
harm-the manufacturers of that product will be forced to internalize those
costs, even if those costs occurred in the past. If the government could adopt
such a rule, and could credibly commit to apply it to all future situations that
fall within the scope of the rule, the effect would be to force manufacturers to
take into account the full social costs caused by their products.572
be called retroactive. Where one chooses to draw the retroactivity line will depend on issues of practicality.
We do not attempt to defend one of these versions of retroactivity over the others in this Article, though
we would probably agree that the practical problems associated with the most extreme versions of
retroactivity outweigh whatever benefits those approaches might provide.
568. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Ausness, Cigarel/e Company Liability, s11pra nole 48, al
950-52 (discussing the retroactive liability of the industry in the context of the failure-to-warn cause of
action).
569. See Schwartz, s11pra note 28, at 1 57.
570. See id.
57 1 . See id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, New Prod11cts, Old Prod11cts, Evolving Law, Retroactive u11v,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 825 ( 1 983) (arguing that applying strict products liability for harms caused by
products manufactured in the past has no deterrence benefits).
572. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 527-35
( 1 986). Kaplow was the first to provide a detailed argument for the proposition that, in all situations
involving legal transitions, there is a strong efficiency argument favoring full retroactivity. See id. at 6 1 51 6. One way of putting the argument is that uncertainty about future government policy is no different from
market risks of various sorts. Because we generally allow market risks to be allocated through private risk·
transfer and risk-sharing arrangements, we should do so as well with respect to government risk, unless
there is a good argument for doing otherwise. That would mean no special transition relief to protect parties
from the effects of changes in government policy. See id. at 550-66. Kaplow's analysis applies to all legal
transitions; shifts in common law tort rules are but one example that he discusses in particular. See icl. at
598-600.
As Kaplow points out, however. his thesis explicitly relies on a number of important assumptions.
See, e.g., id. at 520-2 1 (stating his assumptions that the transition policy was well-known in advance and
will be followed consistently in the future, that the reforms themselves arc desirable, and that substantive
policy decisions are not themselves affected by the choice of transition policy). In addition, throughout most
of his efficiency analysis, Kaplow assumes away a number of "institutional concerns" that could serve as
justifications for transition relief in some conlexts. See id. at 566-76 (relaxing some of those assumplions
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The principal incentive benefit of applying our proposed ex post incentive
based regime retroactively would not be the effects on the tobacco industry
itself, but the effects on nonrobacco industries that are watching the handling
of the tobacco situation by Congress and the courts. A decision in the tobacco
case to apply the new regime retroactively would send a message to
nontobacco product manufacturers. The message would be something like the
following: "If you manufacturer a product that is someday discovered to
produce anything like the external harm caused by cigarettes, this could happen
to you too."573 Given the existence of uncertainty regarding whether their
particular products might become subject to significant government regulation,
all product manufacturers would have a greater incentive to make optimal
investments in product safety and to charge the appropriate price for their
products.574
It may be, of course, that how the proposed incentive-based regime treats
the harms of past smoking will not be taken as a precedent for how other
industries will be treated. It may be, for example, that the circumstances in the
cigarette context are sufficiently unusual as to blunt any deterrent message for
nontobacco industries. On the other hand, it may be that, precisely because the
cigarette industry is involved-with all of its lobbying clout-the deterrent
message to other industries would be especially strong. Again, this is a very
complex issue, and we do not attempt to resolve it here. As a practical matter.
however, even if our handling of the transition issue in the cigarette context
were to provide some precedential effect, we would not advocate trying to
impose all of the past harms of cigarette smoking on cigarette
manufacturers.575 Nevertheless, it is of critical importance-for incentive
and suggesting that future analyses of legal 1ran>1t1on> 'hould focus on 'uch m>lltuuonal concern')

573. Cf id. at 599-600 (describing the mcenll\e benefit> of applymg e\O)\ lng ton law pnnc1pb
retroactively in the product coniext).

574. That these incentives would be effic1en1 a.sume>. of cour>e. that the regulatory >h1ft-1oward c\
post incentive-based regulation-is a move m the cflic1en1 d1recuon. If "e grant that a....u mp11on. Kaplow
would seem to reach the same conclusion a> we do-at lea.I regarding a >h1f1 from no rcgulauon to a
system of victim-initiated ex post incentive-ba>ed regulation >Uch as enterpn..: hab1h1y
Common law evolution of ton doctrine . . . 'eem' be't ..:rved by a uan>1l1on pohcy providing

no relief or mitigation for past inve>tmcnis and acuon' The cconon11c amily''' of mccnll\ c.

presented . . . suggests that such a pohcy would promote efficiency. and the addlllonal
consideration of market imperfecuons and '"'tllut1onal factor> doo not appear to " arrant a
contrary conclusion.

Id. at 602 (footnote omitted). I f, however. the anuc1pa1cd >h1f1 in regulatory regime. " thought 10

be

inefficient, the optimal transition rule would be " hate\ er mo'l mh1b11,, and min1m1z<:!> the effects of. the
shift.

See id. at 52 1 . Given, therefore. that the dc>1r.1b1hty of a retroacl l \ e tran>ll1on pohcy depend> on the

desirability of the proposed change. the 1mt1al dctenmnauon that the nc\\ rule " 'upcnor to the old rule
assumes added imponance.

575. See supra note 567 ('ugge,ting that we ,hould not adopt the mo't extreme. 1 e . m0>1 back.ward
looking, definition of retroactivity). To get a rough 'en'e of the 'taggenng >1ZC of the

ham1 .:au..:d by
rnpm Table I

smoking over the year>, the following thought cxpcmncnt might be helpful. We calculated

the full social cost of a pack of cigarette' at the current lcveb of production 10 be nearly S7 00
Approximately 24 billion pacb of cigarette' are 'old m the United Stale> each ) car Sa Tobacco
Settlement Hearings, supra note 442 ('tatemcni of Jeffrey Ham>) TI1a1 amount. to S l 68 b1lhon m cost.
per year. If we took just the past ten years of c1garene con,umpuon. then. and a....umcd that cigarette
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reasons-that we impose at least some of those costs on the manufacturers, in
addition to a substantial portion of future costs. That is, without an effort to
impose some of the past harms on cigarette companies, the promise to apply
such a transition policy on other, future cases loses credibility.576
Schwartz's second objection to holding cigarette companies retroactively
liable involves the likelihood of the industry's bankruptcy.577 At least from
a theoretical deterrence perspective, however, that possibility is not an obvious
problem. In fact, the eventual bankruptcy of the current cigarette companies
may be necessary in order to produce the sort of deterrence effect for other
industries that we just described. That is, if existing cigarette companies simply
do not have sufficient assets to cover the liability that is imposed on them by
the new ex post incentive-based regime, those companies should probably be
forced out of business. If the demand for cigarettes after the shift to an ex post
incentive-based regulatory regime is sufficient to maintain the market for
cigarettes notwithstanding the increase in prices, the bankruptcy of the current
companies would mean only a change in ownership of those companies. The
change in ownership might be from the current shareholders to the claimants
(that is, the smoking victims) themselves. Or it might be from the current
owners to some new group of investors. Either way, such a result would have
the beneficial effect of sending a message to stakeholders in other industries
that they run the risk of losing the entire value of their investment if their
product is found to have caused large-scale harm for many years.578
Whether the current bankruptcy laws are the most efficient way of dealing
with companies that become insolvent is a separate question on which we do
not here take a position. The relevant question instead is whether there should

production in the United States has remained roughly constant over that time, that would amount to $ 1 .68
trillion of costs. Trying to shift an amount that large from one set of parties in our economy (i.e., the
cigarette manufacturers, their shareholders and creditors, their insurers, and their employees) to another set
(i.e., smokers, families of smokers, first-party insurers of smokers, and the like) would present insuperable
judgment-proof problems as well as administrative problems. In any event, it seems clear that a /11//y
retroactive shift to ex post incentive-based regulation is simply not a politically practical possibility.
576. Interestingly, notwithstanding his arguments against holding cigarette makers liable retroactively,
Schwartz would not seem to have "fairness" qualms with doing so. For example, he observes both that the
evolution in tort law toward enterprise liability has been much more gradual than some commentators have
suggested (such that expansion of liability to include product manufacturers could hardly have caught
product manufacturers entirely by surprise), see Schwartz, supra note 57 1 , at 797-8 1 1 , and that judicial
decisions in tort cases have almost always been (and generally continue to be) applied retroactively, see
id. at 8 1 6- 1 7. Thus Schwartz certainly does not view retroactive application of products liability Jaw
generally as unfair. See id. at 8 I 9 ("[M]ost of the retroactivity implicit in product liability opinions is not
vulnerable to the charge of having subverted justified reliance.").
577. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 57 ("A rule of absolute liability, to the extent that it is applied
retroactively . . . would quickly wipe out all existing cigarette companies.").
578. It is conceivable that this possibility has already been taken into account ex ante by inveMors in
cigarette companies, in which case the relatively low prices that they paid for their shares (nnd the
relatively high returns they have enjoyed in the meantime) were compensation for the likelihood of the
outcome that we are recommending. One reason, however, that the market may not have capitalized this
risk into the price of cigarette shares is that investors may have been (and may still be) betting on the
extraordinary political clout of the cigarette industry. See supra note 1 1 .
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be some additional protection, besides the normal bankruptcy laws, for
companies whose largest liabilities happen to result from ex post inccntive
based damage payments (such as products liability claims). We sec no obvious
deterrence reason that such special protection would be warranted.
Of course, political reality may require that, for any new regulawry regime
to be adopted, some protection must be given to the existing cigarette
companies. If that is so, an ex post incentive-based regime could be adj usted
to accommodate that aim. For example, the damages assessed against
manufacturers could be reduced to the amount necessary to avoid the
companies' bankruptcy. One could ask how much the existing domestic
cigarette companies could afford to pay and still stay in busincss.n9 So long
as, within the appropriate annual cap, each manufacturer paid its relative share
(based not only on its market share but also on the relative harm caused by
that company 's brands), the deterrence benefits of ex post incentive-based
regulation could still be achieved.
Perhaps, however, the bankruptcy concern is that, if the tobacco industry
were put out of business, we would lose the principal source of revenues for

579. Some have suggested that 1he maximum amount "ould be: S7 6 billion per yc.ir. which
approximates

the

industry's current

annual

Manufacturers' Ability To Pay Damages:
292

profil,

Su

Jeffrey

E.

Ham,.

Amt'nw11

C.gur<'ll<'

01·en·1<'11' und t1 Rough Ct1lrnlu11011, 5 TOllACTO CO,lltOL 292.

( 1 996). As Professor Harris ha. observed. however. S7 .6 b1lhon drarnaucally undcr,1<110 " hal lhc

industry could afford. Moreover, he 'how' that. 10 am\c al an accurate C>llrnalc of the rndu>try's real
ability to pay. we must take into account lhc indu'tl)
liability.

See id.

\ ab1lny lo r.u-e 11.!> pnco in roporu.e 10 1h1• nc"

According lo Harri.\ rough calcul.it10n,, the ··monopoly profiHna"unmng pncc of

cigarettes i n the United States is currently about

S4 per pad. Al •uch a pnce. annual pre-tax prolih would

exceed $32 billion annually." Id. These calculauon' arc ba-ed on a»urnpuon' about the 'hape> of
consumers' demand curves for cigarettes and on the a.'ump11on that the CX1'llng domc,uc pro<luccn would
not face competition from new market entr.mt,. See 1d. at 293 If the new regime allowc:<l compeuuon by
new market entrants, competition would limit the ex1'ting compamo" ab1h1y 10 ra1-e 1hc1r pncc• lo fund
the ex post payments.
Even Professor Harris's calculation'. however. ma) m"' the point Fint. he ..,,umcs that the indu,try
will be allowed to engage in monopoly pricing. Ahhough we concede that perfect compc:u11on in th••

market is unlikely in any event, our hope still " to encourage compeuuon among c 1garcttc companies a,;
much as possible, along all dimension' including '3fcty Second. and perha� more 1mponant. "' he= 11
may be the case that $32 billion per year (or 'ome 'mailer amount a.>>uming cornpeuuon t> allowc:<l and

encouraged) roughly approximates the 111axi11111111 ummmr of T<'l'<'lll•<' that can

be: collected from the c1garcttc

industry via ex ante or ex post liability. the maximum pnce per pad, al which c1garcttcs could trade wnhoul
completely bankrupting the industry i> probably much higher than $4.00 (indeed. cigarette pncc• in .omc

countries have been reponed 10 be a. high a> $7 00 per pad.

m recent year. Su 111/ra note 58:!

) Pncc

higher than $4.00 per pack may nol maximize the cigarette rc"enue> available 10 be: u-ed lo compen"1lc
injured smokers or for whatever purpo>e. but 1ho-e pnce> n11gh1 more full)· reflect the c'pected c�b or
cigarettes. And that-internalizing tho>e cost>. or corning a> clo-e 10 doing >0 a> " " can-1• "' hat our
proposed ex post incentive-based regime is intended 10 do.

h

., nol intended lo max1m1Lc lax revenues from

cigarettes.

We do not mean 10 suggest that. under our propo-ed regime. c1garcne pnces "'ould necc."1nly me

higher than $4.00 per pack, ahhough that i• a po»1b1h1y. The cqu1hbnum pnce of c1garclto under our
proposal-if the only goal is 10 achieve a. much deterrence a. I> pracucally and pohucally p<>»tblc-would
be a function of a number of factors. such a. how re>pon>t\'e cigarette compame> arc 10 the inccnuvc 10
make safer cigarettes. At the very least. 1f maximally ach1e\able deterrence t> the only goal. 11 ., unclear
!ha! the ultimate equilibrium price of cigarette> would be: the pnce that rnaxumzc> re\ cnuc
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compensating claimants who smoked before the industry failed.580 Thus, if
the industry were rendered bankrupt by the claims of those whose injuries
were, at the time of the shift to the new regime, already manifest, there would
be no smoking revenues available to provide compensation for future
claimants, whose injuries were not yet manifest. (It should be noted that, under
our proposed regime, victims of smoking would not be able to recover from
companies who never sold them cigarettes-for example, new market
entrants.)581
Our response is twofold. First, a bankruptcy court could, in theory, protect
future cigarette claimants to some extent by setting aside a portion of the
bankrupt company's assets (including future income potential) to cover such
claims. Second, insofar as those assets are not sufficient to satisfy all of the
claims, the excess liability could be covered through some compensation
regime other than the ex post incentive-based system-for example, through
some type of private or public first-party insurance. Thus, any such excess
liability poses a question of choosing the optimal system of compensation
rather than the optimal system of deterrence, which has been our focus.
Schwartz's bankruptcy concern might be that the prospective effect of
absolute manufacturer liability would mean the end of the cigarette industry
altogether. If that is so, our reaction is again twofold. First, it seems extremely
unlikely. It is true that new entrants into the cigarette market (if we structure
the system to allow new entrants) would have to charge a price that would
include the full expected costs associated with their brand of cigarettes. At
least initially (before safer designs were developed), this would be a sizeable
amount. But even at that price, it is conceivable that there would continue to
be a legal market for cigarettes.582 Moreover, as manufacturers brought safer
designs to market, the price would drop commensurately. Alternatively, it
might be the case that after the adoption of the new regime and the

580. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1 56 (describing problems with liability-based compensation
schemes, including the problem of companies going out of business after the liability regime is
implemented).
5S I . It is worth emphasizing this point: The retroactive portion of the new ex post incentive-based
regime would, in theory, not be imposed on new entrants into the cigarette market. A new company would
nonetheless be affected by the new regime because liability would also be applied prospectively. Hence,
a new company-in making its decisions regarding what investments to make in producing safer cigarettes,
how much to charge for its cigarettes, and how to market them-would be induced by the new regime to
take into account all the expected harms that its products will cause.
5S2. See Harry Berkowitz, Jolt in Cigarette Price Eyed as Teen Cure: Senators Ready Bill 011
Immediate $1.50-Per-Pack Hike, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 1 997, at AS I (noting average prices of cigarettes in
various countries: Denmark, $5.07; United Kingdom, $4.40; Australia, $4.0S; France, $3.5 1 ; Canada, $3.34;
and Switzerland, $3. 1 6); R.C. Longworth & 1im Jones, If Tobacco Deal Becomes the u1w, Questions
Abmmd on Who Will Pay, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1 997, at C l I (noting that the average price of cigarette�
in Norway is $7.00); John Mintz. Prices of Tobacco Company Stocks Surge 011 Report of Negotiations:
Threat of lawsuits Had Depressed Shares of Cigarette Makers, WASH. POST, Apr. 1 7, 1 997, at AS (noting
that there is no lack of smokers even though the average price of cigarettes in Europe and some Third
World countries is $4.00 to $5.00 per pack); Susannah Vesey Rauscher, Tobacco Under Fire, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Sept. I , 1 996, at SD (noting that the Canadian price was $5.53 per pack in 1 99 1 ).
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development of new, safer cigareue designs, consumers would not be willing
to pay the price of cigarenes. Such a scenario would, indeed, spell the end of
the legal United States cigarene marker. That result, in and of itself, would be
fine. In fact, it would be precisely the desired outcome (given the
unwillingness of consumers to internalize the costs).m
2.

The Judgment-Proof Problem

Perhaps the most troublesome disadvantage of an ex pose incentive-based
regulatory system is the so-called judgment-proof problem. Whenever
manufacturers do not have sufficient assets (net of non-tort liabilities) to cover
all the p0tential harms caused by their products, those manufacturers are said
to be judgment proof. To the extent manufacturers are judgment proof, any ex
post incentive-based regime-such as enterprise liability or smokers '
compensation-could not have its full deterrent effecr.siµ Thus, enterprise
l iability or smokers' compensation can provide opcimal accident-pre vention
incentives only if manufacturers have assets at least equal in value co the
magnitude of the loss they can potentially cause. If the value of those
companies' assets is smaller than the magnitude of the threat of loss they pose,
then the companies' care level analyses would be skewed, their incentives to
invest optimally in accident prevention would be i mpeded, and activity levels
would be nonoptimal.
583. The real problem in such a scenano would be 1hc poH1blc m e of an illegal or unri=gula1ed
supra Sub,cciion V 8.2. howe\ er. 1hc adopuon of e\ pos1 mcenu •e

cigarecte market As we discussed

based regulation is more likely to cause a nonln\'lal pnce increa..e in c1 gan:1 1 cs• .omc ,;ifcl) inno• auon on
the part of cigarette companies, and some rcduc11on in over.ill c1garc11c consumpuon Then: m1 gh 1 be. under

such a system, some increase in certain kinds of illegal c1gan:11c �le:.; but 1hen: al.o m1 gh 1 be a
in orher types of illegal cigarettes-such � c1garcnc' being 'old 10 ch1ldn:n S.-.-

dccn:asc
rnpra not e 558 ""J

accompanying 1ex 1. That outcome seems quue plau.,blc:. and con>1derabl) > U pcn or 10 1he curren1 srare of
affairs. Moreover, some versions of el( ante. cornrnand·and-con1rol. or pcrformance·ba.>Cd regulauon could

>) 'tern to addre» 1he 1mmnce> of illeg al c1gan:11e ... 1c,
supra note 423. at 1 67-68 (Ob>en mg 1 ha1. \\hen m1un:n ca nn ot pay fu l ly for lhc
losses !hey cause, "[!]heir incenrive> 10 rake care m ay then:fore be inadequate. >mce the) \\ Ill rrea r loHe>
be used to supplement the ex po,1 mcenu\e-b;i,,cd
584.

See

SHAVELL,

that they cause and 1hat exceed their a.>cr. a. 1m po>mg hab1l111e:' only equ.il 10 1hc1r .i.>e1>'1 Allhough 1hc

basic idea of the judgment-proof problem had been undentood al >omc fc,el pnor lo Sha,c:ll"> " orl. 1u

Wittman , supra note 423, al 204; Comment. The Case of thr Dm1ppear111g D.-f.-11J11111 An Ewnonm·
A nalysis, 1 32 U. PA. L. REV. 145 ( 1 983). it w� Sha"ell \\ho formahu:d 1he argument and coined lhc lcrm
·�udgment proof problem," SHAVELL, supra nole 423. :11 1 67-70. 1 79-8:?. S !c • cn Sha•cll. fJ1e )11Ji:mm1
Proof Problem, 6 lNT'L REV. L & Ecol\. 45 ( 1 986). Many 01hcn ha\e dt>eu>>Cd lhc: problem "nee Sa.
e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakm an . Tmr nrd U11l11111r.-d Sl111r.-lwlda lwbilm for Corpornte fort1.
l 00 YALE L.J. I 879, 1 882-90 ( 1 99 1 ) (cxplam111g care lc'cl and a.:11\ tt) lc\el 1 ne frk 1cnrn:' a>.wc1.:i1ed " Hh
the judgment-proof problem cau,cd by lim 11ed >hareholder hab1hl) ) . K) le: D Logue:. 50/1 11111 th.- J111Ji:mm1·
Proof Problem. 72 TEX. L REV. 1 375, 1 375 & n.2 ( 1 994 1 (de.cnbmg 1he JUdgrnenr-proof problem and II>
relation to !he deterrence and m'urance goal, of tort la\\ ). L) nn M LoPud . 1 . Tlie Deurli af Liabtlm . 1 06
YALE L.J. I ( 1 996) [he rei nafler LoPucl.1, The Death of uabi/11\ I (dc:-c nb 111g numerou> >lr.11eg1c>. inc lud i n g
parent-subsidiary owner.hip >lructure. !hat firm> arc U> mg to render 1 hem >eh e> 1 utlgmc:n t proofJ. fame> J
White, Corporate Judgment Prooji11g: A Respo11se w l.11111 l0Pm l1 'J Tiu: Dca1h ol L1.ib1h1). 1 07 Y -'Lt
L.J. 1 363 ( 1 998) (providing evidence that LoPucl.1 dr.1>uc·all) O\ !!l">lale> !he e\lent of rhe 1udgmen1-proof
problem); Lynn M. LoPuck1, Virtual llldgmelll Pmo/mg A Rr;1m1J.-r, 1 07 YAU. L J 1 4 1 3 < 1 998)
(responding to White'' claim' poinr by pomt).
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If one were to get serious about applying the new regime retroactively in
the strongest possible sense (that is, holding cigarette manufacturers liable for
all of the past harms of smoking), those manufacturers would almost certainly
be judgment proof with respect to a large fraction of those costs. The sum of
the costs of all past smoking is almost beyond comprehension.585 And the
value of the assets of existing and past cigarette manufacturers would be tiny
in comparison, perhaps only the value of the companies' machinery and
equipment in the hands of the new entrants to the cigarette market, who, not
being saddled with the liabilities for past harms, would likely be the highest
bidders for those assets.586
But the judgment-proof problem does not arise only in the case of
retroactive liability. A significant judgment-proof problem could arise in
connection with the transition to an ex post incentive-based regime even if that
regime were applied only to harms arising from future cigarette consumption.
In that situation, there would be a strong incentive for new entrants in the
cigarette market not to maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover their future
regulatory liabilities. Since those liabilities would require payment (sometimes
far) in the future, the incentive would be to enter the market and sell relatively
cheap cigarettes-that is, cigarettes that do not include the premium for future
ex post damage payments-for a number of years and then, when the first
claims against the company under the ex post regime began to roll in, to
declare bankruptcy. A company following that strategy could price its
cigarettes at a substantial discount compared with the cigarettes of other
companies and could conceivably generate enormous profits before the jig was
up-before the first ex post claims were actually filed against it.587 For the
plan to work, the companies would have to pay out the extra earnings over the
years in the form of dividends to their shareholders. Protected by the doctrine
of limited shareholder liability, these shareholders would be able to pocket the
money without worrying about the company's impending future regulatory
liabilities.
This judgment-proofing strategy is not just a theoretical possibility. Indeed,
the existing tobacco companies-like some other industries-have, at least to
some extent, already exploited the corporate form to limit the extent of their
potential liability.588 Moreover, the temptation for existing cigarette
585. See s11pra note 575.
586. Thus, bankrupting the existing tobacco companies would provide more deterrence thun not
bankrupting them would, but it would provide less deterrence than if those companies had nssets surticicnt
to cover ull of their liabilities.
587. We discuss this possibility briefly s11pra text accompanying notes 56 1 -564.
588. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584, at 1 88 1 . Tobacco firms have publicly ucknowlcdgcd
that the purpose of organizing themselves as subsidiaries has been to evade tort liability. See id. at 1 8 8 1
n . 3 . It was reported that Phillip Morris, for ex.ample, created i t s holding company "to better i nsulate euch
business from obligations and liabilities incurred in unrelated activities." Id.; see crlso LoPucki, Tire Delllli
ofLiability, s11pra note 584, passim (describing numerous strategies, including parent-subsidiary ownership.
by which finns can, and according to the author do, render themselves judgment prool).
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companies to take steps to judgment proof themselves will increase as smoking
plaintiffs begin to have more success in courtrooms and as Congress begins
seriously to weigh alternative regulatory regimes.
It is sometimes argued that command-and-control regulation is less
susceptible to the judgment-proof problem than is ex post incentive-based
regulation.589 The justification for this view is straightforward: Command
and-control regulation can be enforced by means other than ex post liability or
fines. For example, a command-and-control regulator can impose care level
standards on a manufacturer ex ante and then enforce those requirements
through some type of ex ante fine or injunction. perhaps backed up with a
threat of criminal punishment None of these mechanisms is as susceptible to
the judgment-proof problem as are ex post damages.590
Before we describe the ways in which the judgment-proof problem might
be mitigated, we should first make one important. often-overlooked.
observation: Ex ante forms of regulation suffer from a judgment-proof problem
akin to the one associated with ex post regulation. I f. under a command-and
control or performance-based regime, the regulated manufacturer knows that
its assets are considerably less than any potential ex ante tine. the judgment
proof problem would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to abide by the
regulations. Insofar as the regulator has alternative, nonmonetary means of
punishing such a manufacturer (e.g .. shuuing the firm down or imposing
criminal sanctions), however, and insofar as the regulator can detect the
manufacturer's violations before injuries occur, the judgment-proof problem
will not be as significant for ex ante regulation as it is for ex post regulation.
In any event, there are a number of potential responses to the judgment
proof problem that, if successful, would strengthen the case for ex post
incentive-based regulation (and that, given the potential judgment-proof
problems associated with ex ante regulation, should be considered in any
case).591 One solution would be to eliminate or weaken the doctrine of
589. See. e.g. . SHAVELL. supra note 423. al 279-82. Sha\ ell, mpra note -12.l. "' 160-61 . .169 70
590. See SHAVELL. supra note 423. al 279-82. ShJ,elf. rnpra note -123. JI J6 1 -6.1 Sh,l\dl Jlw
demonstrates that, under cenarn a>>urnptlOn>. a n e' po>l comm;ind-Jnd-c:ontrol Jpprwd1-n.11ncl). J J.iu h 
based tort sy>tem--can po>e le>s of a judgment-proof prob lem than doc> a no-fault 1or cn tcrpn-c hJbthl} I
system.

See SHAVELL, supra note 423. at 28 1 -82.

59 1 . There is a possibility that >ome pon1 on of the 1obacco r nd u >l f) " po1cnl1.il hab1hl) \\Oufd be
covered under its propeny-ca>uahy rn>UrJnce pohc1e>. all hou gh there " contro\cr'y on lh h porn! Srr
Michael Prince, Louisiana Hopej /murers ' Def<•nsr Srmgl Big Tob11c co. Bt s J-.� . �!Jr 3 1 . 1 997 . .ii I .
see also Leslie Sci>m, Tobacco Negorwrors M11l Tn- Tu Tcirgrr lnrnrrn. W-'l.I. ST J . �IJ) 28. 1 997, JI
AJ (reporting that �late anomey> genernl have e>ta bh > hed a comnuncc 10 1m ouga1c the c\tcnl of propc n >· ·
casualty insurance coverage o f c1garene compantc:> · po1c:n11JI hJb1h11e>) Propcrt) -ca>u.illy m' urJncc
companies insist that the liability policte> they ha\ c >old to 1obJcco compame> o\cr the: p.t.>l 30 ) t'af\
contain exclusions that clearly preclude covernge for the hann> cau.cd 10 >mol..cf\ .ind 1hird PJrllt'' by
cigarene smoke. See Sci>m, supra. Moreover. ll ha> been >Uggc:> ted that the Co\ cragc "'°<' 111'1) be fc.,.
clear with respect 10 > U i b brought by >late" than " l lh rt'>pt'Cl 10 pcr..onJI inJUf) 'u 11 ' brought by
individuals. See Prince, supra, al I . In any event, few 1f any United Stale> tobacco c:olllPJOI<'' h;i\c yet
>ought product� liability coverJgc from their tn>UrJncc earner. Srr Sc:1>111. mpm Ac:c:ord mg lo wmc
insurance executives, however, the rea>on tobacco compame> ha' e not 1m oh ed 1 hc:1 r '"'urer.. m the r<:<:c nt
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limited shareholder liability. Cigarette claimants could then go after the assets
not only of the cigarette companies themselves but also of the tobacco
company shareholders. Such an approach would, of course, require a dramatic
change in current corporate law. Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, however, have made just such a proposal, advocating a form of pro
rata unlimited shareholder liability on efficiency grounds.592 Their proposal
would, among other things, reduce the incentive-dulling effects of the
judgment-proof problem in some contexts. Implementing such a regime,
however, would pose sizeable administrative difficulties, not the least of which
would be the problem of identifying which shareholders to go after (current
shareholders, past shareholders, or both) and then locating and securing
judgments against all of them. That problem would be especially acute given
that shares in publicly traded companies frequently change hands on the open
market.593 Whether or not the benefits of unlimited shareholder liability
would outweigh the costs as a general matter (a matter on which we do not
express an opinion), such a rule is, in our view, extremely unlikely to be
adopted.594 Therefore, we do not consider the option further here. Instead, we
consider briefly two other reasons that the judgment-proof problem, at least for
future cigarette-caused harms, may not be an insurmountable problem for the
transition to an ex post incentive-based regime.
First, the judgment-proof problem, at least for future harms, may not be
as large as we have been suggesting. Specifically, accountants and nonequity
creditors play an important role in monitoring companies and in preventing
potential judgment-proof problems.595 To the extent cigarette manufacturers
have to borrow money from banks (for example, to finance the purchase of
equipment or inventory), those manufacturers' abilities to judgment proof
themselves would be substantially limited. The lenders, whose interests are
more aligned with those of the smokers' compensation claimants than with the
interests of the tobacco equity holders, could protect themselves by insisting
on loan covenants allowing them to put pressure on the companies if their
liability-to-asset ratios rise too high. To enforce the covenants, the lenders

litigation is that doing so would require them to relinquish some control of the lawsuits, including decisions
regarding settlement, to the insurers. See id. Regardless, the stakes of this controversy are large.
592. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 584.
593. Hansmann and Kraakman are aware of these administrative-cost objections to their proposul. us
well as other objections. They suggest reasons that those objections arc overstated. See id. at 1 899-90 I .
594. J n fairness, Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal i s not entirely unrealistic i n the cigurettc contel\t,
if the rule of unlimited shareholder liability is, as they recommend, applied prospectively only. St:e id. ut
1 923. It is conceivable to imagine that, if Congress were to adopt a system of Cl\ post i ncentive-bused
regulation of cigarettes (especially a smokers' compensation regime in which damage� were limited uml
relatively certain), it would also adopt a rule that required all future �hareholders in cigarette companies
to be, in effect, excess insurers on a pro rata basis for the tobacco companies. There would �till be
administrative costs to keeping track of shareholders, but that problem may not be in�urmountublc.
595. See White, supra note 584, passim (giving reasons that Lyn n LoPucki's claim that corporations
are judgment proofing themselves on a large scale is overstated).
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could rely on periodic audils lo monilor lhose ralios.596 If lhose ratios were
to rise, the lenders at some point would insist that the companies retain more
of their earnings to fund the future smokers' compensation claims. If the
companies refused, the lenders would resort to lhe remedies in their loan
covenants. Ultimately, the cigarelle companies who try this "hit-and-run" or
judgment-proofing strategy may still go bankrupt, but, because of the presence
of the monitoring lenders, that bankruptcy would come much sooner than
otherwise, a fact that would reduce the overall profitability of the judgment
proofing strategy.597
To the extent a judgment-proof problem remains, there is a potential
regulatory response short of unlimited shareholder liability. All cigarette
companies wishing to sell cigarenes in this country could be required to show
proof of financial responsibility for the potential harms that their products
might cause.598 Financial responsibility could take the form of a bond posted
with some agency of the government to be invested and held in trust on behalf
of future victims of smoking-related illnesses. Or it could take the form of a
liability policy with a highly rated property-casualty insurance company, a
policy that would be required to include language specifically and fully
covering any ex post liability imposed on the cigarelle manufacturer.5'"1 Most
simply, financial responsibilily could require that a company wishing to sell
cigarettes show that it has sufficient capital to cover the expected costs
associated with ils product over time.600 If, in the end, despite all the
potential reform efforts, the judgment-proof problem persists, it may be

596. Under our proposed smoker.. ' compen>at1on regune . at lea>! 'ome pomon of the co mpa m""'
liabilities would be fairly predictable, based on the volume o( .ab and the a\ allJble Jata on the hnk
between smokmg and various 11lne"e'. Therefore. the lender.. >hould be able to detemune hab1ht) -�t
ratios, at least roughly.
597. Because cigarelle compame> gener.l!e >Uch enonnou' ca'h re\enuo. II m Jy be th.it tho.c
companies tend not to be heavy borrower... and therefore there nught be le" mon11onng b) lendc� th.in
occurs in other i ndustrie>.
598. Hansmann and Kraakman 'ugge>t th1> option as a 'upplement to !but not a 'ub>tllute fon
unlimited shareholder liab11ity. See Hammann & Kr.ial.man. rnpro note 58-1, at 1 927
599. I t could be argued that cigarene compame> \\ OUl d ha\e difficult) tindmg hab1ht) ' "'u re� " ho
would be willing to wnte >Uch pohc1e>. See supra note 591 1d1-cu"mg the fact that e�i>tmg h.ib1ht)
policies owned by cigarene compame> contain >pt.'C1 1ic exclu>1on' for 'uch claun,J One o( the reawn, that
insurers in the past may have in>i>ted on >uch an e�clu>1on. ho" e' e r. 1' the uncemunt) " 1th regard to the
"
overall size of the potential liability. Under a >mol.er..' compcn.at1on regune. the \Ile of the cornpamn
smoking-related liabilitie> would be more predictable than under the current regime; therefore. '"'ure� may
be more willing to write the coverage. It may be the case that legal uncenamty 1' not the reason for the
exclusions in previous and exi>ting liability poh c1e> . The reason for 'uch exclu,1on> might be the lad. o(
demand from cigarene companies, who expect u ltunately to be judgment proof. Su Sl!A\'ELl.. wpm note
423, at 240-42 (ob,erving that being judgment proof undercut' the rncent1\ e to pun:h:l.\C hab1hty 1n.orancc
and suggesting that mandatory liability in,ur.mce may be an appropnatc rc-pon>el
600. This son of capitalizatmn requirement I> not unu>ual Vin uall)· all corporation> in European
countries are subject to capitahzauon requirement,. See Clark D Sti th , Fed.-rulum 1111d Co111p<11n la» A
"Rad to the 80110111 " in the European Co11111111111t\. 19 GEO L.J 1 58 1 . 1 58-1 n 9 t 1 99 1 J I n the lJmtcd
States, in,urers are >Ubject to >1m1lar re>cn e requirement,. See S S Ill !:B'l:.R ET At . PROPLKn A'D
L!ABIUTY INSL"RANCE 607- 1 -l (3d ed. 1 982).
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appropriate to supplement ex post incentive-based regulation with some type
of ex ante regulation.
3.

Widely Dispersed Harm: Dealing with Public ETS Exposure

Another potential disadvantage of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based
regulation is the possibility that the harm caused by the product may be so
widely dispersed that no single victim would have an incentive to incur the
comparatively large costs of bringing a claim ex post.601 If that were the
case, the deterrence benefits of such a regime would not be realized. Perhaps
the clearest case of a widely dispersed harm problem would be air pollution.
The costs of air pollution resulting from automobile and other types of
emissions could not conceivably be internalized to polluters through a victim
initiated ex post regime. Who would have an incentive to bring such a claim?
And against whom exactly would they bring it? To deal with the external costs
associated with many types of pollution, therefore, some form of government
initiated ex ante regulation is necessary. The widely dispersed harm problem,
however, should not generally be a serious concern in the cigarette context, at
least with respect to the harms resulting from smokers' illnesses and deaths,
because the magnitude of the harm caused to smokers themselves and to their
family members would often exceed the costs of bringing the claims. In
addition, under the type of regime we are imagining-where causation and size
of damage are the only factual questions-the litigation costs for such claims
may be reduced.
Nevertheless, with respect to some of the harms associated with public
ETS exposure, such as the increased incidence of asthma, the dispersed harm
problem may be substantial. The standard way in which victim-initiated ex
post regimes respond to the dispersed harm problem is by the use of class
action lawsuits; the dispersed harm issue therefore becomes an issue of civil
procedure.602 To the extent that the dispersed harm problem cannot be
eliminated through the aggregation of claims, however, some state-initiated

60 1 . See Shavell, supra note 423, at 363, 370.
602. See Rosenberg, supra note 52 1 , passim (arguing that a class-based proportional liability rule
should be used to resolve mass exposure cases). One potential problem with the class action solution,
however, is that it may often pose a deterrence problem like that posed by excise taxes: Because the class
action mechanism would aggregate the claims of smoking victims (for example, victims of public ETS
exposure) and would also likely end up apportioning damages to the cigarette industry according to market
share, there would be the standard care level unraveling effect described above. See supra notes 450-454.
Although the industry in the aggregate would be forced to pay for those smoking-related harms,
manufacturers would have little or no incentive to invest in developing ways of reducing those costs
because the costs would be distributed pro rata across the industry (rather than according to brand-specific
causation). An alternative victim-initiated ex post approach in this setting would be to allow the claimants
to recover against either their employers (in the case of workplace ETS exposure) or the proprietor of the
public venue at which exposure took place (in the case of nonworkplace public ETS exposure).
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regulatory approach may be a useful supplement to a victim-initiated ex post
regime.603
There are other potential problems that arc peculiar to the case of public
ETS exposure. Indeed, the harms caused by ETS exposure in public
settings-such as the workplace, restaurants , bars , movie theaters. and the
like-are different in two important ways from the harms suffered by the
smokers themselves:604 First, with public ETS exposure, it is considerably
more difficult to determine brand-specific causation. A person exposed to ETS
in her workplace or in restaurants will have greater difficulty demonstrating
what portion of her overall ETS exposure was attributable to a given brand of
c igarettes than, for instance, a person exposed to ETS in the home. whose
exposure comes from one or two smokers and their brands. Thus brand
specific cost internal ization to manufacturers for public ETS exposure may be
ext1emely difficult.605 For this reason as well, therefore, there may be cause
to supplement ex post incentive-based regime with other regulatory approaches.
Second, in most public ETS exposure situations. there arc at least two, and
potentially more, "deterrable" parties-that is. parties who would be responsive
to having smoking-related costs imposed on them: ( 1 ) the manufacturer; and
(2) the owner of the relevant business (which would be the employer in the
case of workplace exposure or the proprietor in the case of non-workplace
public exposure, as in a restaurant). The presence of more than one detcrrablc
party with respect to those risks raises the question of which party should be
forced to bear those smoking-related costs. We might try to impose the public
ETS exposure costs directly on the cigarette industry. either through a
smokers' compensation or enterprise liability approach. Alternatively. we might
place the workplace ETS exposure costs on employers, and the non-workplace
ETS exposure costs on the relevant business proprietors, thereby giving
employers and proprietors the incentive to develop and introduce cost-effective
restrictions on smoking in "public" settings (i.e., those outside the home) or to

603. One pos,ible state-inuiated ex ante command-a nd -co n tro l altematJ\ e \\ould be go,emment·
mandated restriction' on 'moking in pubhc 'ettmg' That altemau'e might alw rc•pond 10 concern' that.
under a regime where the pubhc ETS cxpo,ure co'b arc un po>ed on employer-propnetor. m>tead or on
manufacturers, the employer. and proprietor. might be Judgment proo f. Whether >Uch emplo)er·propnelor
judgment proofing i> likely to be a problem would depend on the extent to " h1ch emp loyer' ha\ c an
incentive to provide an adequately funded (either through ou1;1de m>ur.ince or through internal. >elf·
insurance funds) health care plan for their c mpl o) �-C> and on the extent 10 \\ h1ch propnelor. ha\c an
incentive to carry adequate liability in,urance. Cf

supra te x t folio" mg note 590 (e >. pl .imm g th.it J udgment ·

proof problems may abo reduce the efficacy or command-and-control and perfomiance·ba.>cd rcgulanon>J.

604. When we u'e the tcmi ··workplace ETS expo>urc." \\c mean the cxpo>urc or emplo) CC> in the

workplace to the pas,ive 'mokc produced by other em pl o) ee' or b) patron> or the emplo)er When we >ay

"nonworkplace public ETS cxpo,ure:· we mean expo;urc or patro n• al rc•taur.int> and the hl.e 10 pa.>M \ e
smoke produced b y other patron' o r b y employee>.

605. Tub difficulty of dctemiming br.ind-,�-c1fic cau;.iuon m pubhc ETS expo•un: >llu.mon> may be
mpru Sub>CCuon V A 2 b. "'ere

somewhat reduced (though not eliminated) 1f the cigarette card. d1>eu>>Cd
introduced.
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provide a separate, well-ventilated space where all public smoking could take
place.
The choice of who should bear those costs depends upon who, as between
employer-proprietor and manufacturer, would be in a better position to develop
and implement cost-justified means of reducing public space ETS exposure.
The employer-proprietor might be in the better position. On the other hand, if
public ETS exposure costs were i mposed on manufacturers, they might have
the needed incentive to find a cost-effective means of removing all toxins in
cigarettes, including those that contaminate passive smoke.606 Adding the
public ETS exposure costs to the price of cigarettes through manufacturer
liability might also have enough of an activity level effect that additional
public-smoking restrictions would be unnecessary. Choosing between those two
general approaches is, needless to say, not an easy call.607 Either approach,
606. This manufacturer care level effect is possible even though the public ETS exposure costs
probably could not be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis. Although there might be
some unraveling effect (and hence we are unlikely to see the development of cigarenes that emit no ETS),
there could still be a beneficial manufacturer care level effect, given that all of the other cost� of smoking
would be internalized to manufacturers on a brand-specific basis.
607. Interestingly, to the extent that employers are already providing health, life, and disability
insurance coverage to their employees through group plans (and most employers do), it muy be the cru.c
that a large portion of workplace ETS exposure costs are already borne to some extent by employers. With
respect to workplace ETS exposure costs, employer-provided first-party health, life, und disability coveruge
approximates a form of voluntary (market-generated) ex post incentive-based regulation. The problem with
relying purely on the market, with no government intervention, however, is that, given the existence of the
market failures we described supra Parts II-III, we cannot be sure that voluntary employer-provided
insurance arrangements will fully internalize all of the costs of workplace ETS exposure. For example,
under the current system, employer-provided insurance generally fails to cover the nonpccuniary harms of
workplace ETS exposure, which means those costs arc not internalized to the employer at ull. Cf. supra
notes 292-295 and accompanying text (arguing that the market alone cannot be expected to internalize
workplace ETS exposure risk).
To the extent that employer plans currently operate as an ex post incentive-based form of regulating
workplace ETS exposure, it is understandable that some employers arc already voluntarily attempting to
restrict workplace smoking. Of course, as we indicated above, employers effectively bear many of the other
smoking-related costs, too. See supra notes 247, 270, and accompanying text. Thus, it may also be in part
to reduce those costs, and not just to reduce the workplace ETS exposure costs, that employers have
voluntarily introduced workplace smoking restrictions. With respect to tho�c other smoking-related costs,
however, it �eems clear that manufacturers, rather than employers or proprietors, arc the cheapest coM
avoiders. The main reason is that cigarene manufacturers, through care level and activity level adjustment�.
are in a position to minimize the costs of all smoking-related harms, not just the harms caused by smoking
on the job or in other public spaces.
With respect to non-workplace ETS exposure-such as the ETS exposure of patrons of restaurants
and bars-there is nothing approximating an ex post incentive-based approach to deterrence, either for
pecuniary or for nonpecuniary harms to patrons. Thus, if we wanted to impose those costs on proprietors,
we would need to adopt something along the lines of a "patrons' compensation sy�tcm" or "proprietor
liability regime." Again, we would not expect the market alone to internalize this sort of public ETS
exposure, for all the reasons discussed supra Part II and supra Section Ill.A. Moreover, even i f those
particular market failures did not exist, it might still make sense to regulate public ETS risks. It may be,
for example, that the loss of customers due to ETS is not large enough to make it worthwhile for many
proprietors to do anything about smoking. In a world in which there is smoking al lowed in mo�t business
establishments, firms will have an incentive not to become one of the few that impose smoking restrictions.
New nonsmoking customers might not bother to shift to the smoking-restrictive bu�incss even if they were
well-informed, because so many of the other public spaces they frequented would �till be full of passive
smoke. On the other hand, if a number of proprietors and employers could all agree to ban smoking, or
to confine it to certain places, the strategy might work. But collective action problem� may prevent that
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however, could have substantial benefits over the command-and-control
alternatives-such as banning smoking in all nonresidential buildings61Js_
because they both rely on parties with better cost-minimizing in formation than
regulators have.
D. Summary
This part considered two possible ex post incentive-based regimes and one
specific method for getting the information necessary for effectively
i mplementing any regulatory regime (but particularly an ex post incentive
based one). After briefly outlining the changes in manufacturer and consumer
behavior we would expect under our proposed system. we suggested some
ways to ease the transition to a new regime. cabining i f necessary the full
retroactive sweep of liability. We concluded that. to the extent there are factors
that can weaken ex post incenti ve-based regulation as a means of correcting
market failures, alternative approaches-such as command-and-control,
performance-based, or ex ante incentive-based approaches-may be useful
supplements. If, for example, we thought that judgment proofing might be a
problem for some c igarette manufacturers but not others, it might make sense
to supplement an enterprise liabil ity or smokers ' compensation regime with
some minimal ex ante command-and-control rules.WI If such a mixed system
were to be adopted, however, the key. in our view. would be: ( 1 ) adopting and
maintaining a strong ex post incentive-based system in order to get all of the
deterrence benefits described throughout this Article; and (2) coordinating that
incentive-based system with whatever other regulatory regi mes were in
operation so as to avoid underdeterrence or overdeterrence."w

from happening as well. ju,tifymg \Ome fonn of e\ ante regul;itwn

608. See, e.g., Smoke-Free Env1mm11ent Act of 1 993. H R 3-B.t. I O:ld Cong 1 1 99-l J
609. Another ;ituauon in which C\ po'! rnccntl \ e·ba,ed regul;iuon nia) be 1nlcnor 10 e\ ante
command-and-control regulation " when the nonnal a"umpllon thal m.1nufac1urer. an: beu.:r m fo nn ed 1h.1n
regulators about the costs of (and the markcb for) their pmduch Joe, not appl) Srr Sh;l\ ell. rnpm note
423, at 369. For example. a panicular product market nugh1 c·on'"t enurely of 'm.111. moni - .md - pop
operations that have neither the resources nor the C\p<!nl•C to tn\ e•t rn de te nm mng 1he long-run -afc:l) and
health effects of !heir produch or altcrnatl\ e de , 1gn' for their produch A regulator " ho 'pc:ctahte• tn the

regulation of such product> might ha\'e better mfon11.111on about 'uch l ht n g•. 111 \\ tu.:h ca..c: wme type: of
ex ante regulation might be a u,cful 'upplcment to e\ p<1'l h.1b1ltt)

Srr 1</

A lthough th1' '1luallon could

be imponant in other context>. it would 'c-em relatl \ cly tnapphcable tn the ca..c: of lhe tobacco 1ndu,1ry.

given the cigarette manufacturer,· enonnou' '17C and l.irgc re'e.1rd1 budget' It \\ould be rc lc \ .int 111 1he

case of public ETS C\po;urc. ho\\e\ cr. '1ncc the gO \ e rn ment nugh1 po>..:" better t n fonnall on .ibout
reducing risks as;ociated wnh 'uch C\p<J,urc than p<Jtent1al delcnd.m1' •Uch '" '111.111 emplo)er. or

restaurant proprietor... In any C\'Cnt. 'uch dire-ct rcgulatwn 'hould be u-cd a• a 'upplcmen t. not "' .1
replacement. for an ex po;t mcenuve-ba.,cd 'Y'tem

6 1 0. A number of ;cholar.. have argioed thal 1he op11m.1l .ipproach to c on trullt n g n,I.. . c'pc:c1.1l l) tn the
area of product safety. hkely entatb a mt\ture of rcgul .i toi;.· re,p<m-c,

Srr. r

� . ShaH :ll.

at 365 (arguing that a ··complete ,oJuuon to the problem of the con1rul of n,1,.

mprct

nolc -123.

,hould 1 n , u h c lite JO•nt

u;e of liability and regulation"') For an extended d1-cu"mn ol ho\\ Jn c\ p<J'l tn(Cllll\c-b.i.c:d ') 'tern .:ould
and ;hould respond to the ex1'tencc of

alternatl \ c ') 'tenh of detcm:ncc ('uch

J' .:omrnand-.ind-.:ontrul

regulation or ex ante incent1ve-ba;ed rcgulauon ) to J\'Otd under- Jnd O\ cr-delcm:ncc. \CC l l an,on

& Logue.
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VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
On the basis of the forgoing analysis, we believe a strong case can be
made for instituting a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system of
regulating cigarettes-whether that system be an enterprise liability regime or
a smokers' compensation regime of some sort. Thus far, however, our analysis
has been fairly abstract. In this part, in an effort to be more concrete and
responsive to current events, we apply the framework that we have developed
to the proposed national tobacco settlement.
Although ours is the first law review article to analyze the proposed
settlement, we enter the debate as relative latecomers. Because of the salience
and significance of the agreement, many academics, commentators, and
policymakers have already weighed in.61 1 As opinions have solidified on the
question of how, if at all, the proposed settlement should be amended, a
powerful consensus has emerged among opinion makers that the settlement
proposal, or a modified version of it, represents the best hope for providing
meaningful regulation of cigarettes. With some tinkering, these parties have
argued, the proposal should be adopted, even (or especially) if doing so would
significantly reduce any role of tort law.612 Our goal in this section is to

Tort Law in Context, supra note 40.
6 1 1 . See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7, 22; sources cited i11fra note 6 1 2.
6 1 2. While there is disagreement among President Clinton's advi,ers, for example, those advbo� have
relatively minor objections to the President's support of the pact. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Donna Shalala, rumored to be among the most skeptical of the Prc,ident'' advbcr,, nevertheless reportedly
sees the agreement "as an opportunity to get some things from the industry-a focus on nonsmoking that
goes beyond teenagers to all Americans, and substantial money for public health-that greatly exceeds whut
the administration would have achieved solely with its FDA regulations." Michael K. Frisby, Oppo11e/lfs
of Tobacco Pact Face Big Hurdle: Cli111011, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1 997, at A l 4; see also Laurie McGinlcy
et al., The Se11leme111: Foes Vow To Toughe11, Nor Trash, Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1 997, ut
B I ("[V]irtually no one who matters is vowmg to kill the deal. Even those who arc most critical of lhc
terms seem[] determined to amend them, rather than try to 'cuttle the entire package."); Jeffrey Taylor &
Hilary Stout, Cli111011 Pa11el likely To Bless Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1 997, at A3 (predicting
that a panel convened by the President would recommend that the Prc,ident embrace the basic den), with
some mi nor changes). Some key players who arc opposed to the deal in its current form also believe lhc
pact's shortcomings arc surmountable. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler, for example, arc critical of the limits placed on FDA authority in the
agreement, but suggest that they might support the agreement if it were modified. See John M. Broder,
White House Sees Adverse Effects i11 Tobacco Pla11, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1 997, at A I . More importantly,
none of the key critics was, until perhaps very recently, 'ignificantly concerned about the tort lnw
implications of the proposal or about the type of regulations that the settlement would rely upon. S1•e, e.g..
id. (stating that Dr. Koop thinks "that a broad settlement with large payments for public health prognnns
and strict limits on cigarette advertising and promotion could outweigh the costs of limiting the industry's
legal liability"); Jeffrey Taylor, Cli111011 Urged To Review Tobacco Papers, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1 997,
at A3 (explaining that Koop and Kes,lcr do not view industry immunity from punitive damages in civil
liability suits as a "deal breaker"). Indeed, 'ome of the advbcrs said things to suggest that they may prefer
a settlement that reduces the role of tort law. See, e.g. . Taylor, S11pra ("Dr. Kessler 'aid he doesn't oppose
proposals to compensate farmers for 'ettlcment-related lo,ses. 'I would much rather sec money going to
them than to lawyers' for smokers who have sued tobacco companies, he said."). As this Article goes to
press, however, antismoking groups and public health advocate,, including Dr. Koop, may be approaching
a consensus view in oppo,ition to tort immunity for the tobacco industry. See Alissa J. Rubin & Myron
J. Levin, Ami-S111oki11g Groups Appear To Close Ra11ks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at D3.
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destabilize that consensus view and to persuade readers that if any reform is
to improve upon the status quo, it would m:cd to look very different from the
reform envisaged in the settlement proposal. It would need to look more like
the tort system that the current proposal would. in essence, supplant.
B efore beginning our analysis. we should note that the proposed seulement
appears to be premised on the assumption that the cigareue market is subject
to many of the very same market failures that we identified in Parts II-III. For
instance, a variety of the proposal 's provisions, including enhanced warning
requirements,613 are intended to respond to the problem of imperfect
information. The agreement also reflects a concern about the sons of
externalities that we identified. For instance. one provision is directed at
reducing ETS in workplace settings61J-a noninsurancc externality. Insurance
externalities seem also to have played some role in the agreement. Indeed, the
very cases that Jed to the seulement-the cases brought by state auorneys
general to recover Medicaid
expenditures for smoking-related
injuries615-were themselves motiYated by the fact that public insurance
programs do not adjust tax rates according to each potential claimant's
smoking status.616 Moreover. several provisions regarding specific regulation
of cigarette designs and recipes appear to reflect a more general assumption
that the largely unregulated cigareue market fails to encourage safer
cigarettes.617 In short, the proposed regulations appear to be motivated by the
same sorts of concerns that we presented in Parts II-III.
Unfortunately, however. the regulatory instruments and devices that the
proposed resolution would employ are. roughly speaking, precisely the opposite
of what the basic lessons of Parts IV-V suggest. That is. the seulement would
rely almost entirely upon command-and-comrol regulations. to a lesser extent
upon performance-based regulations, and arguably not at all on ex post
incentive-based regulations. Rather than auempt an exhaustive analysis of the
agreement, we concentrate in this pan on key provisions that appear intended
to address the information and externality problems that we have identified.
We employ the framework and lessons of Part IV to categorize each provision
and to identify a sample of its predictable flaws. Also in this part, we examine
the proposed settlement in terms of how well it addresses the transition issues
that we described in Section V.C.

6 1 3.
6 1 4.
615.
6 1 6.

See Tobacco Serrlemelll. supra no1c 32.
See Tobacco St•rrlemelll. supra nolc 32.
See ca>.e' cited supra nole 68.
Cf Sugannan. '"P'" nole 277. al 1 6 1

a t I 0.

111/ra

Sub,ccllon VI B I

al 30- 3 1
( noung thJI 'oc1JI 111'UrJncc progrJn1' fJ1l 10 wrt b)

'moking 'tatu,). If 'ocial '"'ur.ince progr.im' dmrgcd lughcr prcnuum' or la\c' 10 ,molcf\, 1hc 'tJlc
attorney' gener.il would have been unable 10 ,Jio" dJmJgc'

6 1 7.

See, e.g.. Tobacco Serrlemelll. 'Uf""

nolc 32. JI

l -l - 1 6. 111/ra Sub...:c 11on \'I D I
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A. The Complete Rejection of Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the proposal from our perspective is
its nearly complete rejection of the ex post incentive-based approach. It rejects
this approach in two ways. First, it substantially weakens the threat of tort law
and, in any event, eli minates any beneficial deterrence effect that tort law
might have. Second, it does not adopt any alternative form of ex post
incentive-based regulation.
1.

The Proposal's Civil Liability Provisions

The preamble of the proposal promises that the legislation, if enacted,
would "reaffirm[] individuals' right of access to the courts, to civil trial by jury
and to full compensatory damages."61 8 The details of the proposal, however,
tell a different story. Among the most important effects of the agreement on
tort law would be the following:
•
•
•

•

Attorneys general actions, class actions, and all addiction-based
claims are settled;619
"[A]ll other personal injury claims are reserved";620
For cases regarding past conduct that are not settled by the
agreement, no punitive damages are allowed (such damages are
included as part of the settlement),621 only individual trials are
allowed (no class actions and no aggre�ation of claims
whatsoever without the defendant's consent), 22 and "protocol"
companies623 are to share liability costs, but will not be jointl_x
and severally liable for liability of nonprotocol manufacturers;6•4
A damage cap is imposed for judgments and settlements, equal to
33% of the annual industry base payment (that is, a damage cap
of $5 billion in most years), subject to the following conditions:
•

•

6 1 8.
619.
620.
62 1 .
622.
623.
as future
624.
625.
626.

If j udgments and settlements exceed that cap in a given year,
the excess does not have to be paid in that year and instead
rolls over to the following year;625
Any judgments or settlements run against defendants but give
rise to an 80% credit against the annual payment in the year
the money is paid to plaintiffs;626

Tobacco Set1/e111em. supra note 32, at 2.
See id. at 39.
Id.

See id.
See 1d.
Protocol companie� include the five tobacco companie� that were parties to the agreement, as well
industry entrants who opt into the protocol.
See Tobacco Set1/e111e11t, supra note 32, at 39-40.
See id. at 40-4 1 .
See id. at 4 1 .
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I f an individual judgment exceeds $ 1 million. then any
amount in excess of $ I mill ion will not be paid that year
unless every other judgment or settlement can be satisfied
within the annual aggregate cap. The excess would then roll
forward to the following year;02'
"In the event that the annual aggregate cap (of $5 billion ) is
not reached in any year. a Commission appointed by the
President will determine the appropriate allocation of the
amount representing the unused amount of the credit.""2�

These provisions, taken together. would quite clearly work an enormous
change in the status of tort cases, potential and actual. surrounding cigarettes.
2.

The Effect of Cii·il liability Pr<Jl'isions

To appreciate fully the effect of those provisions on cigarette lawsuib, it
is helpful to recall, briefly, the history of tobacco litigation. As many legal
analysts have observed, lawsuits against the industry were brought in two
"waves," both of which ultimately failed to overcome the industry's formidable
defenses.629 Among the factors thal combined lo provide near immunity for
the industry were the huge success of the assumption-of-risk and other
plaintiff-conduct defenses, the federal preemption of warning-based claims. the
difficulty faced by individual plaintiffs in proving specific causation. and the
relatively low potential compensatory damages that individual plaintiffs could
expect to receive even if they won."io
In recent years, however. a number of changes have 1 mpro\ ed the
prospects of tobacco plaintiffs. For instance. evidence has emerged from
previously undisclosed industry documents suggesting that manufol.:tun.:rs may
have known and manipulated the addictiveness of cigarettes. actively targeted
their advertising at underage consumers. and publicly denied evidence that they
had regarding the health consequences of smoking.6\1 That evidence has had
a variety of interrelated effects. First. it has improved plaintiffs ' prospects of
winning punitive damages. Second. in part because of the potential for
increased damage awards. the new evidence has also given rise 10 a number
of new substantive legal theories. many of which hold the promise of fi nally
defeating the industry's heretofore invincible plaintiff-conduct defenses.''''
In addition to the new substantive legal theories. there have been significant
627. See id.
628. Id.
629. See supra no1e 1 4 .
630. See Kelder & Daynard. supra no1c 3. a1 7 1 . Rabin & Sugannan. "'f'm nolc 28, .11 1 6, Sch\\anL.
supru no1e 28. at 145. 1 53.
63 1 . See rnpra nme' 144. 1 6 1 . 2 1 9. and acco111pan} 1ng: IC\I. ,,... u/10 KdJcr & O.i) n.ird. '"flm nolc
3, at 64, 72-74. 76-80: Schwanz. >t1pra nolc 28. at 1 45 . 1 5 .\
632. See Kelder & Daynard. supra no1c 3 . a 1 64. 12 · 7.t. 76, S0-85

1 320

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 1 07: 1 1 63

procedural innovations-such as the class action lawsuit-that permit plaintiffs
to cooperate and coordinate their efforts in a way that makes litigation against
the tobacco industry begin to look like a fair fight.633 Those developments
have given rise to what legal scholars call the third wave of tobacco litigation.
Indeed, it is primarily because of those evidentiary, substantive, and procedural
developments-and, more generally, the threat posed by the third wave-that
the tobacco industry was, for the first time in its history, willing to negotiate
a possible settlement.
The limits on civil liability contained in the proposal would essentially
return plaintiffs to the position that they were in five or ten years ago, at the
end of the second wave. First, the proposal would eliminate punitive damages
for past industry conduct.634 That one change alone would dramatically
reduce the chance that any individual smoking plaintiff would ever bring a
case against the industry. The compensatory damages in the typical case
involving an individual smoker are relatively low,635 and most lawyers would
be unwilling to mount a challenge against an industry notorious for its
overpowering and relentless litigation style without any prospect of punitive
damages.636 Moreover, without the potential claim of punitive damages, a
plaintiff's attorney has little ability, and even less incentive, to bring into
evidence many of the recently released (and yet to be released) documents
detailing the most deceptive and culpable conduct of the industry. Without
those documents, jury antipathy toward, or lack of sympathy for, smokers may
place plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage in the courtroom.637
633. See id. at 64.
634. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 39.
635. That is true simply because many smokers experience the worst or the i ll-health effect� or
cigarettes later in life, often after a smoker ha� retired and the smoker's children arc grown.
636. The roll-over caps on compensatory damages, see Tobacco Settleme11t, supra note 32, ut 40-4 1 .
may also discourage plaintiffs from initiating �uits. O n the other hand, the fact that liability would not
substantially increase a manufacturer's coM�-a point developed below, see infra note� 640-64 1 und
accompanying text-may remove or reduce manufacturers' incentives to defend aguin�t individuul claim\.
In other words, plaintiffs may be more likely to win a suit under the proposed �cttlement, ull ehe bcmg
equal, because manufacturers may be less averse to losing.
637. The elimination of punitive damages under the settlement seems to have been ju�tified on two
grounds. First, manufacturers thought that eliminating punitive damages would provide greater prcdictub1lity
in their liability payouts, since punitive damages arc alleged to be especially difficult to predict. See
generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes 011 Cog11itio11 am/ Vttlm1/w11
in !Aw), 1 07 YALE L.J. (forthcoming May 1 998) (discussing the reasons behind wide variation> in jury
verdicts for punitive damages). Second, us part or the settlement, the industry would be required to pay a
sizeable chunk of money that is understood by �ome to take the place or punitive damages. Sa 'J'obm·rn
Se/llement Hearings, supra note 442 (statement of Gale Norton), available i11 1 997 WL 1 4 1 5062 1 .
I f those are indeed the justifications for limiting punitive damages, however, there urc other means
of dealing with tho�e concerns that better serve deterrence goals. For example, the �ettlement might have
provided specifically that tobacco plaintiffs could 1101 recover punitive damages but that they could put on
evidence of past industry conduct. Such an approach would give the indu�try the predictability with re�pect
to punitive damages that it �eeh; the approach would also increase plaintiffs' chances or winning
meritorious cll!>es against the industry, however, by reducing the effectiveness or plaintiff-conduct defense�.
The settlement, as currently written, arguably would permit evidence of pu�t indu�try conduct on bsue�
other than punitive damages. After all, the agreement merely say� that, for pa!>t conduct cu�e�. no punitive
damages will be allowed. It says nothing about excluding evidence or past conduct for other purpo�es. See
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Even without the carrot of pun iti ve damages. plaintiffs might be will ing
to bring claims against manufacturers if they could continue to combine. and
thus lower the average cost of, thei r relatively small clai ms in the form of class
actions. But that option, too, is eliminated by the senlcmenl,61� and with it
many of the legal theories that were economical ly viable only in class action
form.639
Even i f smoking plainiiffs were somehow able to overcome the forgoing
obstacles to bring successful individual cases against cigarenc companies. those
suits would have virtually no deterrence value under the propo!>al because of
the way damage payments and defense costs would be al located. According to
the proposal, defense costs and 80CJc of l iabi lity costs would be d istributed
among the tobacco companies on the basis of market share.1H0 Any incenii ve,
therefore, to develop safer cigarenes would be substaniially reduced, because
of the unravel ing problem described above.(>.1 1 Moreover. most of those civil
l i ability costs would have been paid out by the industry even i f no member
were held civilly l iable. From each manufacturer's perspective, those costs arc
fixed and therefore have no effect on ex ante accident-prevcmion incentive!>.
If the proposal were adopted. tort law would hereafter have no beneficial
deterrence effect in the cigarene market.

Tobacco Seu/ement, supra note 32. at 39. (E' 1dence of pa , 1 conducl \\ uuld pn:,um.ibl) be .idn"'"bk lur
any theory of liability thal required a 'howmg of 'c1en1er on the p.in of mdu•tl) olli.:1.il>->ud1 ..., f raud
claims.) It is nevenhele" e3'y 10 unagmc the mdu'tl) · , la\\ ) ei> r.11>111g culur.ibk obJC:Cl1u11> 111 rn.in) .:a..n
when plaintiff' anempt 10 get 'uch evidence adm111ed Another .1pproad1 tu adll e \ mg 1hc ....me dclcm:n,·c
and predictability objective' would be to eh1111na1c or .:.ip pum m e d.1111age> . ..., 1hc: 111du>lr) \\ Jiii>. bu1
simultaneously to eliminate all p la1 11 11 ff-cund uc1 .md \\ Jm1ng-b.1.>ed deh:n>e> 10 mdu >ll) h.1b1hl)
Perhaps the argument 1ha1 really u nde rl ie > 1he propu,.iJ", 1n:aunent of pumll\e d.im.1gc> " 1h.11 1un
law punitive damages are. a' a gcnerJI pulic) mailer. unde'ir.ibk Jnd •huuld 1101 be rcqum:d ol .in)
industry. Although that argument ha' 'omc pl au,1 b1 hl) . \\ e u lu malc l ) find 11 unpcr>u.i"' " hr>I. lor 1 hc
re3'ons already mentioned. 1f puniuvc damage> arc c hn11 na1cd . other ch.1nge> •hould .il'o be m.idc to cn,ure
that plaintiffs will still have incentive' tu bnng clam1> Mon:O\er. from .in cffo:1enq pcr,pt.-.:11,e. 1111, m.i)
be a context in which punitive damage> arc c'pcc1.ill) appropn ;u c .ind >huuld. 1hcrclurc. not be cl un 111.1 1cd
The principal economic ju,tificauon fur pumuve dam.1ge> I> ba>ed on the d1fli.:uh) ul dcl c:c tm g .ind
attributing hann. Thu,, under thi' r.it1onalc. pum t 1\ C dam.1ge> (or d.image• 111 e\ce"' of the h.inm .:.1u-cd 1
are appropriate only in circum,t ancc > m wh ich tho'e ham1> Jn: unhkcl)· 10 be delc:<:led or .in: unM.cl) tu
be linked to the defendant who cau,ed them. 5,•., Wn.l.IA\t M LA'\t>l:.S &. RtCltAIUJ ,\ l'O\'\I K. Tiii.
EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 60-61 ( 1 987). A l\1 1 1.: hel l Puhn•I.) & Ste, en Slw,cll. l'wumr
Damages: An Eco1101111c A11alysis. 1 1 1 HAR\'. L. RE\' 869 ( 1 998) ll1u>e wn> u f dcl<Xl1un·.1\ u1dance
concerns would seem to be pre,ent m the c1gan:1 1e collle\t G1,en recent n:' da11un, abuu1 1he c1g.m:ne
companies' concerted effort, to 1.eep hidden mfunnallun .1buu1 1he hannfulne>> .1nd .iddic ll \ e nc" ul
cigarenes, the argument for a llow in g puniti ve dam age> lllJ) be e'pt.-.: 1.i l l ) >lrong " 11h rc,pc:cl 10 lhc p.i'I
hanns caused by cigarene,.
638. See Tobacco Setti<'ment. .111pra note 32. at 39 llie 'elllemelll .ign:ement oiler> no de.1.r rJllun.ilc
for thb provi,ion. A' far a' we can 1cl l . 11 n:pre,en1' an effort .imp!) tu reduce the ch.1n'e' 1lw1 1hc 1ub.icco
companies will ever lo,e a ton ca.,c.
639. See supra note 68 (di"u"mg cla" acllun' brought 111 " h u;h 1he .iggrcg.111on ol clJlllh .ind
lawyers' fee, would mal.c the c\pcn'c of ligh11ng the 1ob.1cco comp.ime' \\ urtlm lu lc 1
640. See Tobacco Settlemenl, .111pra note 32. al -1 1
64 1 . See supra Sub,eciion l V.C.2 (de,cnb111g the unr.i,chng problem .:n:aled b) e \ .inte t.i\"' ' · "'I""
notes 99- 1 0 1 and accompanying 1cxt (dc>cnb in g the unr.1,chng prob l em cn:alcd b) .i I re.: m.irlct \\ hen
consumers have only generic ri'I. mfonnauon); rnpra no1e 602 (de..:nbing 1he pu1e n1 1.il unr.i\ehng problem
in class actions).
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B . The Proposal's Attempt To Inform Consumers
In place of tort law, or some alternative form of ex post incentive-based
regulation, the proposed settlement would rely almost entirely on command
and-control and performance-based regulations to address the market failures.
For example, in response to the problem of imperfect information, the
agreement would implement the following: new warning requirements,642
new marketing restrictions,643 and a "look-back" provision designed to create
incentives to reduce underage smoking.644 In this section, we describe each
of these proposed regulations and argue that each of them is deeply flawed, at
least as compared to an ex post incentive-based regime of regulation. Their
central flaws relate to the insight of Part IV above: that command-and-control
regulation (and, to a slightly lesser degree, performance-based regulation) relies
heavily on regulators to recognize the pertinent tradeoffs and how best to make
them, whereas incentive-based regulation relies instead on the regulated entity,
which is usually better informed than regulators. In analyzing the various
provisions of the proposed settlement, we attempt to highlight a few of the
ways i n which that somewhat abstract drawback of command-and-control and
performance-based regulations would likely manifest itself in the proposed
regime.
1.

Warning Requirements
a.

Summary of Provision

The proposal's most obvious attempt to ensure that consumers are well
informed is its requirement that each of the following warnings be included on
cigarette packaging and advertising (on a rotating basis):
•
•
•
•
•
•

"WARNING:
"WARNING:
"WARNING:
"WARNING:
"WARNING:
"WARNING:

Cigarettes are addictive";
Tobacco smoke can harm your children";
Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease";
Cigarettes cause cancer";
Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease";
Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby";

642. See Tobacco Settlemellt, supra note 32. at 1 0- 1 1 .
643. See id. at 8-9.
644. See id. at 24-25. Categorizing these provbions poses a slight challenge. If tho•e regulatory
responses were fully successful, they would solve the underlying consumer-information market fai lure und
would meet all the information-related deterrence goals that we seek to obtain through victim-mitmted el\
post i ncentive-based regulation. Thus, those categories of provisions arguably ;hare the more ambitious goul
of incentive-based regulation: transforming a malfunctioning market into a well-functioning market. Decuu•e
the provisions take the form of command-and-control regulations, however, they constitute •Omewlmt of
a hybrid between command-and-control-style regulation and incentive-ba•ed regulation. However they arc
categorized, they contain all the drawbacb of pure command-and-control regulation•.
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"WARNING : Smoking can kill you " ;
"WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung d isease in non
smokers'·;
"WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks
to your health."645

Those warnings would appear in white lettering on a black background and
would occupy at least 25% of the front of a cigarette pack. near the top.(>.16
b.

Critique

Although the proposed warning requirements arc doubtlc�s an
improvement over the current ones.1..:7 that is not saying much. Like the
current warning requirements, the proposed warning requirements would be
largely i neffective as a means of overcoming the various sources of imperfect
consumer information.
For instance, most of the proposed warnings are phra�ed to influcncl!
general, not personal. beliefs (thus failing to overcome the third-pl!r�on
effect648). Those warnings directed al the indi\'idual smokl!r. ml!all\'-' hik.
leave room for considerable doubt (and may e\'en crl!ate doubb l rl!gardrng th!!
relative risks posed.649 Furthermore. the warnings do not specify qualitativdy
or quantitatively the actual risks posed by cigarettes in ll!rm� of l!ithcr
probabilities or magnitudes. In short, the proposed warnings appear unlikdy
to convey any health-risk information that most smokers do not alrl!ady havl!
(which is not to say that consumers are now adequately informed of th!! ri�"-� >.
S im ilarly, the problem of addiction is not addressed by the warning).. Only
one warning even mentions the addictiveness of cigarettes, noting simply that
645. Tobacco Se11/e111e111. supra note 32. at I 0.
646. See id. at I 0- 1 1 . In addition, the FDA " ould be req u ired under the propo'-11 to promu l gJte J rule
governing the dbclo,ure of tobacco smoke co n,t 1 tu en 1, . Srr ul at 1 1 . 1 9-20 :O. lan u l .u: tu n:r' " ould nc:i:d
to dbclose to the FDA all ingredient> added to their c1garene>- :O.loreo, er. the) \\ OulJ need to J1...: l<h<:
ingredient information to con,umer.. � food manufacturer.. no\\ mu,1 d 1 -.: lo..e food JJJ 1 t l \ e ' Su id
647. See infra note 649 (li,ttng the current warning req u i rement . I
648. See supra Sub,ection 11.B. I . (de,cnbtng the tlurd-pcr..on effect and 11' 1111plu:J1 101h 1
649. Cf. HILTS. supra note 1 2. a l 1 2- 1 3. 1 7 - 1 8 <dc1a1ltng the rndu,tr) » u ..e o f .1 111.1"1\e public
relations campaign addre,,ed bo1h to doctor.. and 10 ordrn.1� c i 1 1 1 en ' .inacl.rng the ...: 1 c111111o.: dJtJ Jnd lhc
scientisls behind it � a mean, of r.ii'1ng doubt aboul the haL.ard, of c1g.1renc•l
Previous warning' were 'UbJeCt to 1he ,ame cn t 1 <· 1 > 111 ' 111e ongtnal \\ am rn g 111.1nd.11c<l m 1 965 J1J
refer to the con,umer directly, bu1 w� qu11c une mphan c tn 11' me"age ··c.1 u 1 1on C1g.111:ne Smol.. t ng :0.1.i)
B e Hazardou' to Your Health."" Feder.ii C 1 g arene Labeling and Ad\C:nt'1ng A.:t of 1 965. Pub L �o 89·92.
§ 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (codified a, amended al 15 l' S C § 1 3 33 d 99-l 1 1 I n 1 98-1. the n:quin:ment " "''
expanded to four rotating wa rn i ng' : ( I ) ··smol.. i ng C.iu ":' Lung C.in•er. I le.irt D1...:J...e. Emph) ...:111.1. And
May Complicate Pregnancy'": ( 2 ) ··Q ui ll i ng Smol.. t ng !'o" G re.it l ) Redu.:e, Scnou' R1,1.. , 10 Your l leJ hh '".
(3) ..Smoking by Pregnant Women May Rc,uh in Fc1al lnJu�. Prema1ure Birth. And Lo" Birth Wc1g111··.
(4) ..Cigarette Smoke Contain, Carbon Mono'1de ·· Co m pn:hcn , l \ e Smol.. m t: Etlu•.111on Act of l lJ�. Pub
L. No. 98-474, § 4 , 98 Stat. 2200. 220 1 -03 ( 1 98-l ) (co<l1hcd at 1 5 l" S C � 1 3 3 3 1 Of the lour. onl) one
refers to the con,umer"' personal n,1.. Moreover. 11 " not ckar \\ hclher lhat \\Jm111g .1'1u.1ll) d1...:ouragc'
smoking. See supra no1e 1 57. One of the wa rn i n g' addre"c' 11.ell onl) to .1 group 1 pn:gnJlll \\ u111en1 111.11
exclude' mo,1 con,umers.
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"[c]igarettes are addictive."650 Acknowledging that cigarettes are addictive,
however, does little or nothing to respond specifically to the addiction
problems that we described in Subsection II.B.4: the problem of path
dependence, the problem of myopia, and the problem of multiple selves.65 1
Indeed, one of the warnings continues to emphasize that serious health risks
can be reduced by quitting. As we explained above,652 such a warning could
have the perverse effect of lowering the impact of all the other warnings.
Finally, the greater number and more prominent display of warnings could
encourage smoking, particularly among children, by enhancing cigarettes'
image as forbidden fruit.653 Cigarette manufacturers would continue,654 as
best they could, to promote that image through their marketing and would
otherwise attempt to downplay the risks of their products. For those sorts of
reasons, the proposed warning requirements are likely to be ineffective or,
worse, counterproductive.655
2.

Marketing Restrictions and Antismoking Advertising
a.

Summary of Provisions

The second general way in which the agreement seeks to address the
information problem would be to "drastically curtail[]" the "advertising and
marketing of tobacco products"656 and to require the industry to spend
millions annually on antismoking advertisements targeted at young consumers.
650. Tobacco Settlemellt, supra note 32, at J O.
65 1 . Moreover, the meaning of the word "addiction" may be unclear to some polential �moker�. Set•
supra note 256.
652. See supra note 1 57. A related problem may be created by the proposal'� empha�is on the
financing of smoking cessation programs. Lowering the perceived exit co�ts ha� two effects. Some people
will exit while the going is good. Others will smoke more because they will have greater confidence tlmt
they will be able to quit when they want.
653. There is growing evidence that warnings may actually give a product an enhanced glos� and
induce consumers, particularly young consumers, to purchase it. For example, seveml studies huvc
demonstmted a "forbidden fruit" effect of television parental advisory warnings for violent �hows. Set'. e.g.,
Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit Versus Tai11tecl Fruit: Effects of WC1ming u1bels 011
Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 207 ( 1 996). Similar �tudie� on the
labeling effects on alcoholic versus nonalcoholic drinks also support the theory that the warning it�elf may
serve to make the product appear more attractive. See, e.g., John M. Springer & Craig T. Nago�hi, Magirnl
Thinking ancl Alcohol labels, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 767 ( 1 99 1 ).
654. The forbidden fruit effect of warnings is probably not news to cigarette marketers. See, e.g., RJR
Memorandum, supra note 1 6 1 (concluding that "a new bmnd aimed at the young group should not in uny
way be promoted as a 'health' brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk" and stating that "the
warning label on the package may be a plus"').
655. The warning requirements would likely abo have a preemptive effect on civil liability cluims
inasmuch as they would produce de jure preemption of inadequate-warning claims and de facto prccmpllun
of other producis liabilily claim�. Cf Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 ( 1 992) (plurality
opinion) (finding failure-to-warn claims preempled by fedeml law); supra note 9 (de�cribing the irony of
the Cipollone decision in thi� regard). Manufacturers' assumption-of-risk defenses would be even more
robust, if that is possible, than they have been lo date. To the extent that tort law would have any beneficial
deterrence effect under the propo�ed regime that effect would be further attcnualed.
656. Tobacco Settleme/11, supra note 32, at 8.
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Among other things, the new regime would. consistent with the FDA's tobacco
regulations of 1 996:

•

•

"Restrict permissible tobacco product advertising to black text on
a white background except for advertising in adult-only facilities
and in adult publications";6�7
"Require cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertisements
to carry the FDA-mandated statement of intended use ( 'Nicotine
Delivery Device' )";658
"Ban all non-tobacco merchandise. including caps . jackets or bags
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco
brand";659
"Ban offers of non-tobacco items or gifts based on proof of
purchase of tobacco products";('°°
"Ban sponsorships. including concerts and sporting events. in the
name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand. 1.•.t. i
..

Going beyond current FDA regulations. the new regime would also:
•

•

0

"Ban the use of human images and cartoon characters-thereby
eliminating Joe Camei and the Marlboro Man-in all 1oba,co
advertising and on tobacco product packages·•;(><·�
"Ban all outdoor tobacco produce advertising";""'
"Prohibit tobacco product advertising on the Internee unless
designed to be inaccessible in or from the United Scates··;'".:
"Establish nationwide restrictions in non adult-only facilities on
point of sale advertising with a view toward minimizing 1he
impact of such advertising on minors";6M
"Ban direct and indirect payments for tobacco product placement
in movies, television programs and video games'';61.i.
"Prohibit direct and indirect paymems to 'glamorize· 1obacco use
in media appealing to minors. including recorded and live
performances of music";6<·7
"[R]equire that the use . . . of words currently employed as
product descriptors (e.g., 'light' or 'low tar ' ) be accompanied by
a mandatory disclaimer in advertiscmenls (e.g .. 'Brand X not
shown to be less hazardous than other cigarettes· ) . . . . •>M-\

662.

Id. at 8 (citing 2 1 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)-(bJ
Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(c J).
Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)).
Id. (citing 2 1 C.F.R. !I 897.34(b l )
Id. a t 9 (cuing 2 1 C.F.R. !I 897.34(c))
Id.

663.

Id.

664.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

657.
658.
659.
660.
66 1 .

665.
666.
667.
668.
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In addition to the limitations placed on advertising, the proposal would
require the industry to fund "a $500 million annual, national education-oriented
counter-advertising and tobacco control campaign seeking to discourage the
initiation of tobacco use by children and adolescents and to encourage current
tobacco product users to quit use of the products."669 As with most of the
advertising limitations, this provision evinces a special interest in discouraging
underage smoking.670
b.

Critique

The goal of the marketing restrictions is not to inform consumers but to
protect them from being misinformed by manufacturers. The command-and
control approach to the problem, however, contains all the predictable and
classic regulatory flaws. For instance, the restnct1ons may prevent
manufacturers from effectively marketing healthier cigarettes, thereby reducing
the companies' incentives to develop such cigarettes.671 In contrast, if
manufacturers were forced to internalize the costs that their products pose
through, for instance, an ex post incentive-based regulatory regime, then
advertising restrictions would be less necessary since manufacturers would
market their cigarettes in a way that minimizes the total injury costs of
cigarettes.672 So long as manufacturers bear the total costs associated with
669. Id. at 3; see also id. at 37-38 (describing the public education campaign in slightly more dctui lJ.
670. The preamble strongly implies that the primary goal of the settlement is to dbcournge undcrngc
tobacco use. See id. at I . Nowhere does it explain, however, why that goal should have priority over other
potential goals. One expert has slated that it is likely that the prioritization of underage �moking renccb
the history of the politics of smoking. Antismoking groups have long recognized lhal their �lrongcM
political playing card has been underage smoking. There were already laws against it, law� lhul were
largely unenforced. The fact that virtually all smokers pick up the habit when they arc minors and the fuct
that smoking is addictive and dangerous h� made the case against underage smoking e�peciully easy to
support. Interview with Richard Daynard, Chair of the Tobacco Product� Liability Projecl, Norlheu�lern
University School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (July 22, 1 997).
67 1 . Cf V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 47-48 (arguing that governmental advertbing reslrictions huve
discoumged safety i nnovations in cigarettes).
672. See Croley & Hanson, E111erprise Liability, supra note 40, at 786-92. Many commentators agree
that safer cigarette designs are viable. See, e.g., John Freeman, '60 Minutes' Stokes Cigarelle Co11trcll'ersy,
SA N DIEGO UNION-TRIS., Apr. I , 1 994, at E l 4 (describing u 60 Minutes episode lhal charged Philip Morri�
with hiding for years its capability to produce a cigarette that could have prevented thousand� of fire-re luted
deaths and injuries); cf George Rodrique, 'Safe ' Cigarelle Ignored, Researcher Says, D1\LLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 1 7, 1 997, at I H (quoting former Philip Morris researcher Victor DeNoble alleging thul for
decades tobacco companies have rejected plans to make cigarettes safer); John Schwartz, New Cigarelle
Clears the Smoke, bw the Heal Is Still 011, WASH. POST, May 27, 1 996, at A3 (quoting u former Brown
& Williamson research director alleging that tobacco companies have been rejecting de�igns for �ater
cigarettes due lo fear of legal liability). Critics of the tort system and defenders of the cigarette indu\lry
place blame for the fuel that those designs have yet to be marketed �uccessfully on existing products
liability laws. See, e.g., Norihiko Shirouzu, Low-Smoke Cigarelle Catches Fire in Japcm. WALL ST. J., Sept.
8, 1 997, at B I ("[l]f the liability issue gets settled, many expect the U.S. makers to devise new products
with safety features."). According to this argument, if manufacturers were to produce u �afer cigurcllc, then
that cigarette would be used as evidence against them to prove that their older de�ign was defective. Cf.
Freedman, supra note 1 6 1 (reporting the whistleblowing testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, in which he
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their products, they have a significantly reduced incentive to mislead
consumers with respect to the risk properties of cigarettes.673 Manufacturers
would have to pay for the costs that they understate. and. in that sense. their
claims would be bonded. Moreover. even if they understate the risks. cigarette
manufacturers would still have to charge a price that reflects true risks. The
price would, in effect, inform consumers and. at least potentially. counceract
false claims.
Similarly, though cigarette manufacturers would still seek to target
consumers, their motives in targeting consumers would be very different than
they are now. Under an incentive-based regime, manufacturers would direct
their marketing to low-risk smokers.674 There are a number of ways in which
consumers may be low-risk. For example, some consumers may be more
likely, other things being equal. to quit smoking before suffering many of the
ill-health effects of long-term smoking. There is some evidence. for example.
that quitting rates increase as education levels and age of initiation
increase.675 Different, identifiable groups may be more (or less ) likely to
suffer serious ill-health effects of smoking. For instance, the younger a person
is when he or she starts smoking, the greater will be that person's chances of
developing lung cancer, other things being equal.676 Thus, under an

described how he was told by the CEO of Bro\\ n & W1Iham,on. for whom Wigand w'" wort.. m g .it the
time, that ""there would be no funher d1"u"1on or cffon, on any "'uc' n:latc<l to a ..ifcr c 1gan:nc:·
because ""[a]ny re,earch on a ,afer c1garcne would clearly e:.. po-c every other product '" un..ife .ind.
therefore. present a liability i"ue m tenm of any type of h11gal10n°0). Whether or nol lhc argument " \'ahd
with respect to the current produci. liabiluy rcgnne. II " clear 1ha1 an cntcrpn-c hab1ht) n:g1mc. or wme
other ex post incentive-ba,ed regulatory mcchani,m . \\ould gn:all) cncourJge .afcr c1gan:ll<:<> The
manufacrnrer would be !table for all c1garcne-cau,cd hann,. regardlc" of the dc. i g n of the c1garene Thu'
manufacturers could lower their total co't' only by mal.. m g co,l -JU'l l fiablc: .afcl) nnpro, emcnl'
673. See supra Sub,eclion IV.D.3. The hi.loncal mart..c 11ng 'lr.ilcgy of ··10" tar c1gan:no." J<'<'
VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 37-4 1 . i' a perfect example of the problem' that ma) an-c \\hen manufacturer'
lack the incentive' to take co't' mlo their calcula11on,. See supra note' I 02· I 07 a nd accompany mg text
A' Hilts points out. the ··Jaw tar cigarcne·· did not \\orl.. '" a hcallh concc:pl. bc:cau-c ''(p)uffing I� or
differently on a high tar cigarene might well be more effoc11vc:," HILTS. rnpm note 1 2. al 6 1 . but 11 wa..
nonetheless manipulated by the indu,try for 11' innately appealing ··ad' c:m"ng concept," rd Thu" ·1110-c:
..
most concerned about genmg le" tar may not get le" tar. but they feel bc:nc:r about u Id
674. See supra Sec11on VB. I .
675. See Teen Smokers Find Halm Hard To Br!'a( S11td1 Sau. Pl!OE,I\ GAlJTTl. t An1 J . Feb 1 6.
1 996, at AS (quoting a 'tudy finding thal the quilling rJte \\.!' 4 4"< for people: \\ ho began 'mol.. m g before
age 14, 9.6% for people who 'taned between age' 14 and 1 6 . and 1 3 69< for tho...: \\ ho 'ianc:d Jftc:r .igc
1 6). Lloyd D. John,lon, the director of a ma1or ,1udy of lt'Cnagc: 'm ol.. m g. .ard that ''the )Ounger people:
·· Don Colburn. Rue 111 fan SmvJ.1111: I/tu
'tan smoking, the more likely their habit " to 1al.. e hold
Erperrs Vexed, WASH. Posr. Sept. I O. 1 996. at Z7. The Surgeon Gener.ii" Prog n:'' Rc:pon tracb qu1111ng
r.ite' between 1 966 and 1 985. See Sl"RGEO'-' GE�ERAL0S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpm nolc: 3 Tiic: 'ludy nolt:'
that quitting in 1 985 W3' h1ghe't among college gr.iduate' (6 1 I � > and much Jo\\cr among 1ho..c: \\ llh wme
college education (46.0%). high 'chool gr.iduale' wuhoul college: 140 59< l. and lho..c: " uhoul a high -chool
diploma (4 1 .3%). See td. at 287 tbl.9. The rcpon aJ,o noic' a ··mc:h efold d1ffc:n:nce rn 1he r.i1c: of decli n e:
in 'mol,.ing prevalence between the mo'l and lea'l educated group' rn our ">Crcl) ·· Id JI 2 7 1
676. See Sl!RGE0:-1 GE:-.ERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT. rnpra nolc: 3. J l 44 ("'Tht ml.. o f de,c:Joprng lung
cancer was greatest for tho'e who began 'mokmg al an earl) age: '"). Lur' G E\Cobc:do. Sporrs

Participation, Age at Smokmg /111111111<111. and rhr• Rtlk of Smol.mg Among U S l/1gh 5< lwol S1111frn1J. 269
JAMA 1 39 1 . 1 393-94 ( 1 993) (""It i' abo known 1ha1 lung cancer monaluy " h1ghe,1 among .iduli- " ho

began 'making before age 1 5 year..."" ).
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incentive-based regulatory system, manufacturers would not only lose some of
their incentive to target children, they would also have an incentive to
discourage children from smoking.
Without some type of incentive-based regulation, however, advertising
restrictions merely create incentives for manufacturers to find loopholes
through which they can continue to target underage smokers or otherwise
"disinform" consumers.677 Indeed, a common critique of the proposal is that
manufacturers would still be able to advertise effectively to kids.678 That
critique has significant empirical, as well as theoretical, underpinnings. In
countries that have previously adopted advertising restrictions equivalent to, or
greater than, those envisaged in the agreement, cigarette manufacturers
continue to target young smokers successfully.679 Similarly, although many
commentators appear to have a strong intuition that current industry marketing
practices have had an effect on the number of underage smokers, the evidence
supporting that intuition is, at best, spotty.680 Evidence regarding the effects
of antismoking advertisements or public service announcements of the sort that

677. See supra Subsection JV.D. I . Arguments have been made that the industry relic� heavily on its
underage consumer population. As one author expressed the point, "[l]f ii were true that the companies
steer clear of children, as they say, the entire industry would collapse within a �ingle generation." HILTS,
supra note 1 2, at 65. In fact, a look at past effort� of manufacturers 10 deter underage smoking indicate�
that many of the company-initiated programs were "useless and silly on their face. For example . . . 'Puck
notices. We will place a notice on all of our pack� and carton�: "Underage �ale� prohibited.""' Id. at 99.
To the extent that manufacturers would be prevented from advertising under the proposed regime, retailers
may be able to step in and fill that marketing void. Although there arc l icensing requirements in the
agreement that would appear 10 require sellers lo comply with the terms of the agreement, it is not clcur
whether conditioning a license on the licensee's consent lo give up FirM Amendment privileges b
constitutional. See Hearings on the Global Tobacco Settlement Before the Semite Judiciary Comm., I OSth
Cong. ( 1 997) (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe), available in 1 997 WL 1 1 234937 [hcreinartcr Tribe
Testimony]; Douglas J. Wood, Will Bans on Tobacco Ads Pass Muster?, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1 997, at B9.
678. Interview with Richard Daynard, supra note 670.
679. See. e.g., Brion J. Fox et al., Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of the United States Tobacco
Litigation 35 (Aug. 20, 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Jmmw/) (describing
common advertising practices in other countries with �ubstantial advertising restrictions and concluding thul
"(!]he advertising restrictions [in the settlement] are . . . unlikely to significantly reduce the pervasivcnes�
of tobacco imagery in society"); John R. Garrison, CEO, American Lung Ass'n, Statement at the News
Conference on Potential Tobacco Settlement (June 1 7, 1 997) (asserting that "(l]he ability of the tobucco
industry to reinvent itself and circumvent . . . restrictions" on targeting children is "remarkable"). In
reaction to the proposed settlement in this country, advertising finns arc said to be working already on new,
effective ways to advertise within the limits of the settlement. See Yumiko Ono, Firms Scramble for lVc1ys
To Sell Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1 997, at B l I .
680. According to some commentators, what little evidence there is suggests that the principal effect
of current marketing is on consumers' choice of which br.mds lo smoke rather than on whether or not lo
smoke. For example, Douglas Wood argues:
[N]o study has been conducted that prove� advertising motivates any child 10 take up smoking.
Studies that have been performed show that peer pre�surc and sibling and parental examples ure
primary reasons a child begins to smoke.
Nor, to date, is there any study �howing that advertising cau�es children who have cho�en
10 smoke 10 continue doing so. Although advertising may cau�e someone to switch brand�.
banning certain advertising methods 10 avoid brand switching, let alone the complete bun of
certain media proposed by the settlement, would probably not with�tand conslilulional muster.
Wood, supra note 677. For a summary of the evidence suggesting that advertbing does encourage underage
consumers to smoke, sec Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, al 65-66.
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would likely be implemented in the proposed regime is also mixed.M1
California enacted a counter-advertising campaign in 1 990, which served as a
model for the settlement proposal.6s: Teenage smoking rates in California,
however, have increased, not decreased. since 1 990.t.si As with warnings.
counter-advertising may even enhance underage demand for cigarelles insofar
as they bestow on cigarettes a forbidden fruit quali1y.t-..i As much as
proponents of the agreement might believe 1ha1 the advertising res1rictions will
substantially reduce underage smoking. 1here is li111e e\ idence to support 1ha1
belief.685 I ndeed, the evidence suggesls 1hat by far 1he be�I means of
lowering underage smoking is a price incrcase."M• which. of cour�e. is whal
an incentive-based system would yield.
We have a more fundamen1al concern aboul 1he child-cen1ric na1ure of 1he
marketing restrictions (and of the ''look-back" provisionM-). Even assuming
that the proposed strategies would be complc1ely cffective. it remains a
significant problem in our view that many of the underage consumers who
would have started smoking before the strategies were implemented might.
once the strategies were implemented . begin a few years later. Supporters and
opponents of the deal have argued that the trick to preventing people from ever
smoking is simply to make certain they do not begin smoking before they arc
eighteen, because under the current regime most smokers begin well before
they are eighteen.688 That argument. however. is based on an unproven and
68 1 . See John Schv.,anz. Officwl> St•t•J.. a P<11h fo Cut 11110 Ila:<' of fo11th SmoJ.111�, lh<" llo110111 l111<"
No One Knows \Vhm \Vorks. WASH, POST. Nov. 2. 1 997. al A l (""De,pne all of lhe Jlll1- 1obacco effort, 111
recent years, teenager..· altitude' tov. ard 'mol.. mg are gro\\ lng more l)()"t" e

See Adehon. s11pra note 1 63.
683. See id.
684. See id. ('"[S]ome expen' note

"

1

682.

that the more "nol.. i ng come' under Jltad. b) Jdult,, 1he more:

attractive or 'cooler" it become' to many teen-ager- "" >. >1tpra note 6)3 Jnd accornpan) mg tc:\t 1 d 1 -cu'" ng
the concept of "forbidden fruit"' in the context of the 'cnle ment \ \\am111g pro' "'""'

685. Similarly d1,couraging re'ult' have recent I) been reported " nh ropccl 10 1hc c:flort• 111

Massachusens to reduce underage 'mol.. m g by more 'tn ngcn l l ) enfotnng la\\ ' prol11b11111g �le. lo nuno�

See Nancy A. Rigoni et aL, The Effect of Enforrmg foba« o·Saln LJ.111 l "" .\do/"" <'lllJ ' ..\n <"H lo
Tobacco and Smoking Beha1wr, 337 NEW E�G- J MED 1 04-1 t 1 997 I trepomng 1he rc:,uli. of J mo·) eJr
study 3'Ses,ing 'ale' of cigarene, to m mor.. and ) Oung people", JCCe" to. and u..: of, c1gJ1c:1t.:. 111
•

Massachu,en' communit1e' and concl ud mg that \\ ell-enfon:ed JobJcco �1c, IJ" ' did not Jlter nuno�·
perceived acces' to cigarette' or their con,umpt1on Jc: , c l , I

686. See Schwanz. supra note 68 1 : > <' <' "'"' Richard Toml.. 1 11,, Afrn lh<' Smol..t' llm Clt'<JT<'d flt<'
Tobacco /nd11s1ry May Ha1·e Gor off Llglrtfl 111 /1> Pmpmc-d S<"lll<"m<'lll 11 11/r l " S Swrn. Ft' .\'Cl.\t Posr

(N.Y.), June 25, 1 997, at 8 (notmg that other countnc' ha'c found ljrge pnce mcrea.c' to be parttculJrl)
effective at reducing the demand for cigarette' among 1hc ) oung I

687. The look-back provi,1on, v. h1ch " ' umm arw:d and cnt 1q ucd 111/m Sub..:cuon \'I B 3. •late' tlwt
'"[a] central aim of thb leg"lauon '' to ach1c\'c drJm.1tic jnd 1111mc:d1J1e rcducuon' 111 1he number of

underage consumers of tobacco product>." Toba« o 5,,11/c-mc-111. >1111m note

688.

See. e.g

.•

31.

at

:!-I

Thoma' W. Mern l l . Financial Pcna h 1e ' for Youth S111ol..111g 3 1 1 997 1 < u npubll,hcd

manu,cript, on file with the

>tile law Jounw/)

(""We 1.. no" thJt fe" Jdulb •tJrt ,mol.. 111g Jfter the age of

2 1 . So if the tobacco companic' agree to a progrJm that " o ul d jC tua l l) reduce the 111c1dence of underage
'moking by 60%, thi' would put them on a path pounmg to\\ ard the C\ entual d.:.1ruction of 1hcir dome.lie
market."); Gerald J. Thain, The Fir..t Amendment and Re,tncuon' on Cummemal Speech m the "Tob.icco
Settlement": An Analy'i' 2 (Oct. 1 6, 1 997) ( un pub l"hed 111Jnu,cnpt. on tile \\llh the

fofr um Jmmw/J

('"There is overwhelming evidence [that] the con,u111pt1on of c1garenc' " 1 11 deeI me dr.unallcJll) 1f ,mol.. 111g

doe' not begin until the age when n " legaL")
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dubious premise. Evidence of when smokers start under the current regime
reveals nothing about when they would start under the proposed regime. If one
assumes, as many industry critics do, that marketing efforts have been partially
responsible for encouraging underage consumers to start smoking,689 and if
such marketing were successfully curtailed under the agreement, it seems likely
that manufacturers would begin targeting slightly older consumers. Advertising
and selling cigarettes to eighteen year-olds are perfectly acceptable activities
under the agreement. And if manufacturers can successfully target fourteen
year-olds, it seems plausible that they will be just as successful at targeting
eighteen year-olds.690 Indeed, the most recent Camel advertisements suggest
that that is precisely the strategy that R.J. Reynolds plans on adopting. The
animated Joe Camel campaign has been recently replaced with a variety of
other advertising campaigns, including explicitly sexual imagery.691
Finally, although we understand and agree that protecting children from the
dangers of smoking is felt to be an especially strong need, the information
problems that we described in Part II do not apply exclusively to children.
Although some of those information problems may be more significant with
respect to underage smokers (for example, the problem of myopia), none of the
problems is age-specific. Thus the proposal's tendency to draw a bright line
at the age of eighteen creates distinctions that are legalistic and irrelevant. One
benefit of an incentive-based approach, by contrast, is that no such arbitrary
lines appear. Any distinctions in advertising practices under such a regime
would be based on the total costs caused by the cigarettes as marketed to a
particular group.692

689. See, e.g., Kelder & Daynard, supra note 3, at 65-66; Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy und
Public Health, Final Report 5 ( 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Journal); suprtt
note 25 and accompanying text.
690. Under the current regime, there may be a sort of race to the bottom of the age groups of potcntiul
smokers. If a manufacturer can hook a young child, that manufacturer not only gains revenues of thul
smoker for the following three or four years, while the smoker is still a mi nor, but also for the years
following the time that the smoker reaches majority in which the smoker continues to smoke lhut
manufacturer's brands. Thus, the targeted marketing of manufacturers may nol be motivuled by an ultempt
to hook the only age group that is potentially hookable, but to hook the hookable people at the eurlie�t
possible moment. Assuming that the regulations succeed only in postponing the age at which many long
term smokers initiate their habits, those regulation� may still have u benefit. Speci fically, �moker� who Murt
at a later age may be, on average, le�s adversely affected by their habit. See suprtt nole 676 und
accompanying text.
69 1 . See Yumiko Ono & Bruce Inge�oll, RJR Retires Joe Camel, Adds Sexy Smokers, WALL ST. J.,
July 1 1 , 1 997, at B I . R.J. Reynolds decided to end the Joe Camel campaign six weeh after the FTC
brought an unfair-advertising complaint against the company. See id. Some antismoking advocates claim
that the decision was made in an effort to avoid turning over certain internal documents. See id.
692. See supra Subsection IV.D. l . To be clear, we do not neces�arily object lo a regulatory regime
that includes some command-and-control regulations and some performance-ba�ed regulations to help
prevent underage consumers from smoking. Instead, we object to a regulatory regime that relics exclusively
on �uch regulations as opposed to one in which they serve to supplement incenti ve-ba�ed, co�l-internalizing
regulation.
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The "Look-Back " Provision
a.

Sununary of Provision

To supplement the command-and-control regulation that we have thus far
described, the proposal includes a so-called "look-back" provision, which is a
form of performance-based regulation designed to reduce the level of underage
tobacco use.693 The performance targets are roughly as follows: Underage use
of cigarettes would have to decline by at least 30% by the fi fth year after the
proposal is enacted, 50% by the seventh year, and 60% by the tenth year.69-1
Those targets would be measured against the estimated underage smoking
levels that have prevailed over the last decade according to the University of
Michigan's Monitoring the Future study.695 If the targets are not met, the
proposal would authorize (and require) the FDA to impose a surcharge on the
tobacco industry in an amount that would approximate the "present value of
the profit the industry would earn over the lives of all underage users in excess
of the target," subject to an annual cap of $2 billion.696
b.

Critique

The look-back provision was designed to ensure that, even if the other
proposed regulations aimed at underage smokers (for example, the advertising
restrictions) do not have their intended effect, the industry would nevertheless
have a powerful incentive to reduce underage smoking to acceptable
levels.697 To use the taxonomy of this Article, the look-back provision can
be understood as a form of state-initiated ex post performance-based
regulation.698 The look-back provision-or perhaps a modified version of
693.
694.

See Tobacco Se11leme11t. supra
See id. at 52.

note 32. app. \' at 5 1

( >umman zmg

the ··1001.-bad.'' pro' 1'10n)

695. Although we focus. for simplicity. on c1garcnc>. >11111lar target> \\ould be unpo...:tl for •molclo.s
tobacco products. Based on an analy>is of the look-back pro' l>IOn in the propo>al an d of the �lonuonng
the Fucure study. Professor Hams estimate> the ''ba>e percentage" of underage d:ul) >molen l!he 1 986-

1 996 historical average) to be 1 5.2%.

See

Jeffrey E Ham>. Prepared Remans al the Amcm:an Cancer

Society's Press Conference on the Proposed Tobacco l ndu>t f) - W1 de Re>olu11on 2 (Jul) 24. 1 997 1 (tran...:n pt
on file with the

Yale Law Journal). Thu>.

for example. the fi \ C-) ear goal of a 30"C reducuon from the ba>c

percentage would mean a target rate of 1 0.6% underage >moken. That target. a> Ham ' points out. \\ould
amount to a 58% reduction from the current 1 996 le\ cl of underage >mokmg. \\)11ch

696.

Tobacco Se11le111e111, supra

I> 1 8 2'7< Sa 1d.

note 32. at 24. Under the agreement. the >urchargc \\ould be S80

million for each percentage point difference between the target percentage rcducuon of underage •mok.mg
and the actual percentage reduction.

697.

See id.

See 1d. app. V at 53.

at 24-25.

698. Presumably the provision is mouvated either by the >Ort> of con>umer-mformauon mark.ct fo1lun"
described

infra

Part

II or by a political or ph1lo>oph1cal dcc1>1on that people under the age of 1 8 •imply

should not smoke. We are by no means again>! rcg u l au on > motl\·ated by a de>1re to provide >pcc1al
protection 10 children. To serve that goal. we arc not a\ er>e to >upplcmenung e� po>! mccn U \ e · ba5Cd
systems of regulation with other types that are >pcc1fically directed at protccung duldrcn Jn many c=.
as i n this one. however. we believe that ex post mccnu vc-ba.cd rcgulauon> bener >en c that pamcu l ar goal
than do the alternatives.
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it-is considered by most policymakers and analysts to be the most promising
means of ensuring that underage smoking is curtailed.699 That makes some
sense, in light of the weaknesses that we have already highlighted with respect
to the command-and-control regulations intended to limit underage smoking.
Unfortunately, however, all of the sorts of flaws in the proposed command
and-control regulations afflict the performance-based look-back program as
well.
As we described in Section IV.B, performance standards may seem to
require less information on the part of the regulator than command-and-control
regulation does. When one considers the information necessary to choose the
standard in the first place, however, it becomes clear that fully efficient
performance-based regulations require all the same information that is required
of command-and-control regulations. To make this point clear, consider the
target reductions in underage smoking-30%, 50%, then finally 60%. Where
did those numbers come from? Why not target reductions of 1 00%, or 80%,
or 23%? As we indicated in Section IV.B, with performance-based regulation
the first necessary step is to justify the performance target. If the target
percentages in the proposal come from some political or philosophical
conclusion that a 60% eventual reduction in the level of underage smoking is
the best achievable end state, it would be helpful to have that spelled out along
with the arguments and the evidence behind those conclusions.700 In any
event, the look-back provision would provide absolutely no incentive to reduce
underage smoking rates by more than 60%, even if the costs to manufacturers
of encouraging further reductions were quite low.
If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the target levels of underage
smoking were well chosen, that does not imply that the proposed regulation
will generate the target outcomes. Indeed, a close examination of the look-back
provision reveals numerous reasons that it will almost certainly fail to achieve
the target goals. First, as some critics of the agreement have indicated, the
penalty imposed for failure to meet the targets is inadequate.701 The proposed
$80 million penalty for each percentage point by which the target is missed
represents an underestimate of what it is supposed to reflect, "the present value

699. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 688, at 2 (noting that the look-back program appears "to be the
crucial variable in deciding whether the global senlement is a tremendous breakthrough").
700. The fact that no one, as far as we know, has challenged those numbers is not nccessurily evidence
of the fact that they are optimal percentages. More likely, the lack of criticism reflects the fuel that no one
knows the optimal percentages, a fact that itself contributes to our case for an ex post incentive-bused
regulatory approach.
70 1 . See, e.g., Do11't Revise Pact, TtJbacco Firms Tell Cli11to11, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1 997, ut A20
(quoting Bruce Recd, President Clinton's top advber on tobacco is�ues: "We've made clear we wunt to
�trengthen the penalties . . . [since s]trict penalties for failing to meet reductions in �moking ure absolutely
essential"): Michael K. Frisby, Tobacco Ojjicwls Balk tit Cha11ges Proposed To Beef Up Settleme11t, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 1 5, 1 997, at B6 (summarizing a White Hou�e opinion that the surcharges were inudcquute):
Jeffrey Taylor, Task Force Asks for Stiffer Tobacco Pem1/ties, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1 997, ut A2
(summarizing a similar view of the Koop-Kc��lcr Comminec).
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of the profit the cigarette industry would earn over the life of underage
smokers in excess of the required reduction."70� The arbitrary $2 billion per
year maximum also renders inadequate the surcharge's bite.703 As some
analysts have observed, if the maximum surcharge were spread across all
cigarettes sold, the cost of noncompliance would be less than a dime per
pack.704
Even assuming that the amount of the surcharge reflects what it is
supposed to reflect, that surcharge would not eliminate manufacturers'
incentives to market to underage smokers. When faced with the question of
whether or not to target underage consumers. manufacturers would realize that
if they did market to children, they would enjoy at least 40C:'c (and, because of
the cap and the abatement scheme described above, probably more than 40%)
of the profits that they currently enjoy from selling to kids. Although the
incentive to attract underage smokers to their brands might not be as strong,
it would still be present.705 The problem stems from the fact that the target
is set below 1 00%.
But even if the target were set at I OO'K . the surcharge. properly measured,
would not create an incentive to discourage smoking. At best, it would make
manufacturers indifferent between selling to minors and not doing so.706 And
the problem is even more serious than just that. Even if the surcharges were
increased to provide some incentive for manufacturers to meet the targets, they
would possibly still be too low. It is not costless for the industry to prevent the
sale of cigarettes to people under the age of eighteen. To the extent there arc
any costs associated with that effort (whether they be advertising expenses or
702. Tobacco Seu/eme/l/, supra note 32. at 53; see also Su.an Page. C/1111011 Etpecte<I To Talk Tough
011 Tobacco Paci, Child Pro1ec1io11, USA TODAY. Sept 1 6. 1 997. at 6A ('The admtm>trauon analysts
shows that the proposed penalties would be largely off>el by the prolit> compame> "'ould male from a
higher level of cigarette >ales to teens."'); Carl T. Ro\\ an, Se11/e111m1 Co11111111es Tobacco's Dem.J1<11w11,
HOUSTON CHROl\., June 25, 1 997, at 22 ('Tho>c who dt>lrmt big tobacco . >.a)' 1 1 " 1 1 1 be more prolitable
for the industry to go on addicting teen-ager> 10 far more CO>ll) c1gare1te> and pay the line>
"')
703. See Merrill, supra note 688. at 9. Tim dt>CU»ton •> intended to 1llu>tratc the more general point
that designing a performance-based regula110n require> the .ame amount ol infonnauon ilS de>tgmng a
command-and-control regulation. See supra Scxuon IV B. In the ca>e of the lool-bacl. pro\ mon. the unuy
between the two types of regula11ons i> especially clear, becau>e the lool.-bacl. provt>ton contains a
command-and-control exception that could well swallo\\ the pcrfonnance-ba.>cd rule Under the proposal.
if the performance targets are not met and the surcharge t> 1mpo>Cd on the indu>tr). any manufacturer who
has paid its share of the surcharge can pelttion the FDA to have up to 75"C of the >Urcharge "abated.""
Tobacco Seu/ement, supra note 32. at 24. According to the abatement procedure>, the manufacturer tn such
a situation must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 11 t> ent11led to an abatement-\\ h1ch would
depend upon. among other things. the manufacturer >howing that 11 had "pur>ucd all rea.>onably •1'atlable
measures" to achieve the de>ired targets. Id. at 56. Thu>. for up 10 75� of the surcharge amount, the look
back provision is 1101 a performance-ba.>ed regime at all. but t> an e� po>l command-and-control regime
instead.
704. See, e.g., Fox et al.. supra note 679, al 14.
705. See Merrill, supra note 688, at 9- 1 0.
706. We are assuming here. a.> do the proponent> of the propo><:d ><:nlement, su. <' g • �lemll. mpra
note 688, at 3; Thain, supra note 688. at 2. that >mol.er> who do not begin before the> are 1 8 ) Car> old
will no! begin smoking at all. 8111 see s11pra note> 689-69 1 and accompanying te:1.t (qu�uomng that
assumption).
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forgone profits from older smokers discouraged from smoking by the effort),
the amount of the total surcharge must be greater than just the profit
attributable to the level of underage smoking in excess of the target level.
To take that point to its logical extreme, suppose that no plausible amount
of investment on the part of the industry in marketing and restricting youth
access would produce the target levels of underage smoking. In such
circumstances, the best way to achieve the targets (perhaps the only way) may
be through a price increase for all cigarettes.707 If that were the case, the
amount of the surcharge would need to be large enough such that the price of
cigarettes sold to all consumers would reach an equilibrium at which the
quantity of underage smoking would approximate the target level. According
to one economist, achieving that effect would require an enormous payment
by the industry, a payment not only many times larger than the maximum
amount under the surcharge, but also almost double the total payments
required under the entire settlement proposal.708
Perhaps the most profound problem with the look-back provision has
nothing to do with the total amount of the industry surcharge, but rather with
the manner in which it is apportioned across the industry. The surcharge, like
virtually all the payments required by the proposal, is allocated among
companies according solely to their shares of the cigarette market.7o<J To sec
707. This scenario assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that manufacturers cannot chc11ply price
discriminate among smokers and charge significantly higher prices to underage consumers.
708. Professor Harris estimates, based on an analysis of the overall settlement proposal (including the
look-back provision) and plausible assumptions about the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, thut the
sum of all the payments expected to be made by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over 25
years, see Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34-would result in an implicit (or "virtual") unit tux of
S0.62 per pack of cigarettes. See Jeffrey E. Harris, Comments on Proposed Reso/111io11 (last modified June
26, 1 997) <http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/ACScomments.html>, at 1 -3 & tbl.2; see also Harris, s111m1 note
695, at I . The implicit tax would be $0.4 1 per pack initially, and then rise to S0.62 per pack after the first
five years. See Harris, s11pra, at 1 -3 & tbl.2. Professor Harris has shown that the face value of all the
payments to be made by the industry, once the "volume adjustment" provision in the agreement is taken
into account, is $304.3 billion. See id. at 3. He further calculates the present discounted value of those
payments (assuming a 7% discount rate) to be S 1 94.5 billion. See id. at I . In arriving at these numbers,
Harris explicitly assumes that the marketing restrictions and the antismoking campaign directed toward
underage consumers would have no effect on the level of smoking. Instead, he assumes that the recent
historical trend of a 0.6% annual decline in overall smoking would continue. See id. at 3. He docs.
however, run a sensitivity analysis, assuming a I % annual decline in smoking. which produced total
industry payments of $289.3 billion, with a present discounted value of S 1 86.4 billion. See icl. According
to Harris's calculations, however, such an implicit tax would not be nearly enough to achieve the target
levels of underage smoking set forth in the look-back provi�ion. A tax of S 1 .50 per pack (indexed to keep
pace with inflation) would, by itself, reach those targets. The face value of the total industry payments that
would be necessary, under the current proposal, to produce such a unit tax on cigarettes would be $653.2
billion over 25 years. See Harris, s11pra note 695, at 2. He also determines that the surcharge would reach
the $2 billion cap. See id. at 3 n . 1 3 . Note that Harris's calculations regarding the optimal unit tux for
achieving the performance target ignore the potential effect of �afcr cigarette designs. If Harris hud tried
to take that possibility into account, and to imagine how alternative product designs would affect the
demand for cigarettes, his task would have been much more difficult. In fact, to do the analysis completely,
he would have required all the same information that would be needed to determine, on a commund-und
control basis, what the optimal cigarette design should be. This observation �hould serve to reemphasize
the benefits of an ex po�t. as compared with an ex ante, incentive-based approach.
709. See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 54.

1 998]

The Costs of Cigarelles

1 335

the problem with that system of allocating the costs. suppose the aggregate
amount of the surcharge accurately measures the profit at1ributable to underage
smokers in excess of the target and that, except for those forgone profits,
manufacturers can costlessly meet the target. Under those assumptions, the
surcharge would still not produce the incentives necessary to achieve the target
reductions, because of an unraveling problem of the son that we have already
encountered.710 Each company would bear all of the costs of an investment
in curtailing underage smoking of its cigaret1es. In contrast. the benefits of its
efforts would be shared by the entire industry; it would enjoy. at most. only
its market share of those benefits.7 1 1 Thus. even were it in the industry's
collective interest to lower underage consumption of cigarelles 10 target levels.
it may not be in each company's interest to reduce underage consumption of
its own cigarettes. Because all the companies face roughly the same incentives.
they would all end up selling to underage consumers. The industry as a whole
would end up bearing the maximum surcharge. Given this unraveling problem.
the performance targets would not be met unless the targets and surcharges
were tailored to specific companies.712 or unless the surcharge were
drastically increased.71 3

7 1 0.

See s11pra Subsection I V.C.2.

7 1 1 . The manufacturer may not enjoy even that much When: mdu>lr) cffon> lall >hon of 1hc 1argc1.
no company will get to enjoy any benefit> of 1i- mve>llllCnt> l11c ex po>l command·and-contrul e\ccpuon
may be i ntended to mitigate 1hat problem. See s11pra nole 703 In hght of th<: d1fficuh) 1hat lhe FDA would
likely have i n implementing that exception. however. 1 1 ma) cn:ale mon: problem> 1han 1 1 ,ol\ e, Where
the i ndustry overshoots the target, no company will enJO) 1he benefit> of 1he O\cnn, e-lment
7 1 2. The Koop-Kessler Commince apparently noticed the potenual unrJ\Chng problem and. JI lea..t
initially, called for a change in the propo>al >O 1ha1 the FDA would a>..:>> pcnalt1c' on a compan y -b y ·
company basis. See Taylor. s11pra no1c 70 1 . We have >een \ er) hnle recent mention of 1hc unra\ehng
problem with respect to any of the propo>al\ prov1>1on>.
7 1 3. The size of the ncces>ary incrca>c will depend on the number of manufacture� an the indu,1ry
and their market shares. The fewer the number of manufac1ure�. 01her lhtng> being equal. lhc lo"er \\ Ill

be the necessary increa>e in the surcharge . Cf Croley & Han.on. \l'har Llt1b1/m Cnm '.
at 1 02-03 (making an analogou> point with n:•pcct 10 1he >1 Le

"'I'• " no1e -10.

ol the tn>urance poo l ,)

Also wonh mentioning arc two potenual en forcement-related llaw > w 11h the lool.-bad. pro\1'1on l·o\
et al. have pointed out that the propo>ed >Clllement en' 1>agc> relying on da1a regarding 1hc pre' .1lcnce of

..daily smoking," despite the fact that there arc man) undc r.ige >mol.e� w ho do nol >mol..c d.111). bu1 ,mokc
See Fo\ el JI . mpra nolc 679. al 1-1 Con...:qucntl).

"frequently," and eventually become adult >moker..

reductions i n the daily smoking rJte> of underJge >mol.cr. would. under 1hc propo...:d regum:. alml>'>t
cenainly over.tale the actual reduction> m 1he number of youth> >11101.mg.

s.... 1J A ' 1hc) cApl.1in.

"II lhc

industry can keep frequent >moking rnte> n:la1 1 vcl) high w h1le dclJ) ing dail) >mol.. m g for JU•I " )Car or
two, they will evade the surcharge> completel) . with hnle change an the O\ Crall number of people \\ho
initiate smoking as youth and go on to become addicted •mokc� ·· Id JI 1 -1 - 1 5
Second, it >eem> likely that underJge >moker> will be affcc1cd by man) of 1hc 01hcr pro\ "'°n' i n the
propo>ed senlement intended to di.courage them from '11101.tng A' already md1c.11cJ. nc .ire duub1tul 1h.11
those effort' will succeed in >Ub>tant1ally altcnng underJgc .mol.mg behJ\lor :\c\ crthclc'>>. 1hey 1111gh1
influence the way underage 'urvey re>pondcni- dc>cnbc their beha\lor to ,un C) IJl.c� We can ca,11y
..
imagine, for example, that the potential ··forbidden frun dfec1 of 1hc planned .int1>mol.ing .1J,cm...: men1,
and warnings.

see s11pra note 653 and accompanying 1cx1. 1111gl11 ' 1 multaneou' I ) increa...: )Uulh ,mol.. i ng

and decrease the wilhngne» of youlh> to adm11 10 adult, that they are 'mol..c� For 'uch re.uun-. any
apparent reduction in underage >mokmg may. under 1he propu...:d regunc. O\ c�t:uc 1hc lruc n:ducuon CJ
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPORT.

mpra note 3. al 265-66

effect of the ···,ocial acceptab1h1y· bia. in >C lf- n:poncd data'").

(\UllllllanLmg C\ ldcncc regarding lhc
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Finally, even if the look-back prov1s10n were to work flawlessly, and
underage smoking rates were eventually to decline by 60%, it seems entirely
possible that smoking rates of legal-age consumers could increase to offset the
decline in underage smoking. As indicated above, we are quite skeptical of,
and concerned by, the widely held view that the current average age of
initiation is somehow predetermined by nature.714
As we detailed in Parts IV-V, under an ex post incentive-based approach,
in contrast to the look-back performance-based provision, most of these
problems would not emerge. There would be no need to decide ex ante upon
a target level of underage smoking or upon the appropriate level or allocation
of surcharges. Instead, the tobacco companies would be liable ex post for all
the harms caused by their products, and the market would do the rest.
4.

The Proposal's General Price Effects: The Excise Tax Model
a.

Summary of Provision

Most analysts estimate that the sum of all the payments expected to be
paid by the industry under the proposal-$368.5 billion over twenty-five
years7 1 5-would cause cigarette prices to rise by about $0.60 per pack.7 16
It is possible, therefore, that, as a de facto excise tax, the proposed settlement
would internalize some of the costs that consumers otherwise underestimate or
externalize.
b.

Critique

For a variety of reasons, the de facto excise tax will fail to internalize all
the costs to consumers and manufacturers. First, the amount of the payment
(and resulting price increase) is far too low. As we detailed in Part Ill, the
expected costs of cigarettes total, on average, approximately $7 .00 per
pack-at least ten times greater than the predicted price effects of the proposed
regime. Moreover, our $7.00 estimate, which we believe is conservative on its
own terms, completely ignores the past costs of smoking, some of which
cigarette manufacturers should be required to pay.717

See supra notes 687-69 1 and accompanying text.
See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 32, at 34. Jeffrey Harris has argued that the uctuul amount
paid will be significantly lower than that. See supra note 708.
7 1 6. See, e.g., Lauran Neergaard, Deal Seen To Gfre Big Profits for Tobacco: US Treasun· Does
Audit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1 7, 1 997, at A I (di\cu��ing a recent internal Trca�ury Dcparlmcnt uudil, which
placed the figure at S0.62 per pack); Harris, supra note 708, at 1 -3 & tbl.2 (e�timating 1hu1 cigurclte prices
7 1 4.
7 1 5.

would rise S0.62 per pack after the first five years).
7 1 7. The is�ue of whether the agreement doe� or �hould deal with past co�t� or only fulurc co�I�
presents all of the tran�ition bsues raised supra Sub�ection V.C. I . We dbcu�� the propo�ul in terms of
those transition i�sues in some detail below. See infra Sub�ection VI.E. I .
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According to Professor Harris·s calculations (applying a 7'/c tfocount rate,
.
taking into account the "inflation protection. provi�ion in the proposa1:1\ and
assuming Medicaid costs will grow by a nominal rate of 5'7c annually ), the
$368.5 billion over twenty-five years may be just enough to cover the states'
future cigarette-caused Medicaid expenses. m The proposal includes no
payments to cover any past smoking-related costs to the Medicaid system. Nor
does the proposal include any additional payments to cover the past and future
smoking-related costs borne by the Medicare system. which Harris believes
may exceed those borne by the Medicaid system."=0 In fact, viewed this way,
the agreement provides no cost-internalization payments for pa�l or future
smoking-related health care costs borne by private insurers or by 111div iduals.
no payments for ETS harms to third parties. and no payments for the
nonpecuniary harms suffered by smokers· famil ies and loved ones who must
see the smokers suffer smoking-related illnesses and bury the smokers before
their time.
Even if the average per pack price effect were of adequate size. there
would remain, in this context too. a significant unraveling problem. The annual
payments are fixed and allocated to manufacturers according to market share.
Because those costs do not vary according to the risks of each manufacturer's
cigarettes, those costs will create no incentive to design safer cigarettes. In
sum, although $368.5 billion is. by almost any measure. a lot of money. it
comes nowhere close to internalizing the full costs of cigarette smok111g.
C. The Proposal 's Attempt To Reduce No11i11s11ra11ce £tternalirie.1
The proposal makes one direct attempt to deal with nonin�urance
externalities. In a provision limiting smoking in public places. the proposal
provides an ex ante command-and-control response to the external costs of
public ETS exposure.n1 That proposed regulation would have the predictable
drawbacks of all command-and-control regulations. For in�tance. Il may
prohibit smoking in some workplaces where ETS costs are de minim1�. �uch
as those with especially good ventilation systems or tho�e where workers
themselves are widely dispersed. Less obviously. the command-and-control
7 1 8.
7 1 9.

See Tobacco Se11/e111en1. supra note 32. at 3-l
See Jeffrey E. Harn,. Wrinen Te,11mon) Before

the Senate Ju<l1c1JC)

C'onunmcc l kJnng, on the

"Proposed Global S en leme nt : Who Benefii-�·· I ( J ul ) 30. 1 997 1 1011 Iilc \\llh the

fofr Lm Joumull

A'

but a much smaller number (roughly $30-l.3 b1 l h on l once \ o lum e Jdj u,1 men 1' Jrc !Jken 11110 Jc c un1

Su

Harris shows, however, the real face value of the to tal p.l) OU! under the Jgrccmen1 " no! SJ6ll 5 bi l l i on .

.

supra note 708, at 3 .
720. See Harri,, supra note 7 1 9. a t 3. A"uming thJ! u n i ) 5"<

Harris,

o

of �lc<l1cJn: e \pcn<l11urc' J l c Jl!nbutJblc

to smoking (which he 'aY' " a con,en al l \ e e,111nate l. l !Jrn' .:JlculJh!> the J\ erage JllllUJI �lc<l l(Jlc

expenditure for cigareue-related il lne"e' (during 1 995- 1 9961 to be S9 J b 1 l h n ""PruJcclc<l o\er J 2 5 - ) eJr
period, the pre,ent d1'counted value of 'uch expcn<luun:> "Oul<l .: m c

o

of tho'e cost' b covered under the propo>al.
72 1 .

See Tobacco Sellft'm<'ll/, supra

note 3� . •u 30- 3 1

o

lo $ 1 92 _; billion ·· Id

J! -I :-;one
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prohibition may reallocate or even increase the ETS costs borne by
nonsmokers. For instance, a ban on smoking in public settings would likely
have the effect of increasing the level of smoking at home, which would have
ETS-related health consequences for smokers ' family members. The proposal
does nothing to respond directly to the problem of ETS exposure in the home
or to the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs borne by family and friends of
smokers on account of the smokers' ill health and premature death.722
One of the benefits of applying an ex post incentive-based approach to all
the costs of cigarettes (not just ETS costs) is that overall smoking levels,
public and private, would likely decrease dramatically (because of the price
effect) and cigarettes would likely become substantially safer, thereby reducing
the need for, as well as the cost of, command-and-control or performance
based responses to public and private ETS exposure. Alternatively,
policymakers might consider something along the lines of the employer
liability plan (for workplace exposure) and patrons' compensation plan (for
non-workplace ETS public exposure) described in Subsection V.C.3. Under
those systems, the employers and the proprietors of public spaces themselves
would be given incentives to seek the least-cost means of reducing public ETS
exposure. If, however, any of the problems for ex post incentive-based systems
were to be present-such as the judgment-proof problem or widely dispersed
harm723-something comparable to the proposal's public-smoking restrictions
may be warranted.
D. Specific Provisions Intended To Improve Manufacturer Care Levels
None of the provisions that we have examined thus far seems likely to
have a significant positive effect on encouraging manufacturers to design and
market safer cigarettes (that is, on manufacturer care levels). The proposed
settlement, however, contains a number of command-and-control and
performance-based provisions for regulating the design of cigarettes and the
manufacturing processes of cigarette manufacturers.
1.

Command-and-Control Regulations

On the command-and-control side, the FDA would be given the "authority
to mandate the introduction of 'less hazardous tobacco products' that are

722. For a rough and, we think, conservative e�timate of the current per pack co�ts associated with
all of the�e negative externalities, see supra Table I .
723. See supra Sub�ections V.C.2-3.
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technologically feasible.'·'14 This potential for command-and-control
regulations contains several drawbacks. at least when compared to an ex po-;t
incentive-based regulatory approach. For instance. it is not at all clear how the
FDA is supposed to recognize a safer, technologically feasible cigarette that
is currently unavailable. The suggested solution to that problem appears to be
that the FDA will rely on manufacturers to provide such designs. -z� At first
blush, that makes sense because manufacturers arc much better informed than
the FDA with respect to such options. Under closer inspection. howe\'cr. the
policy does not make sense because it assumes that manufacturers will disclose
information about potential designs and perhaps produce (or license !>Omeone
else to produce) cigarette substitutes that they otherwise would not.'!t.
Consequently, the policy could create a strong disincentive to produce such
cigarettes, to disclose information about such cigarettes:z7 or 10 create the
designs in the first place.
There are a number of factors that might explain a manufacturer's
unwillingness to design and produce viable cigarette substitutes under the
proposed regime. For instance, a manufacturer could. by offering an alternative
design, substantially destabilize the market for cigarettes. Cigarette substitute!>
woul d supplant traditional cigarettes and the market share of each manufacturer
woul d be threatened. Insofar as the tobacco industry is aptly charactenLed a!>
engaging in some form of tacit or express collusion.n� such a destabiliLing
act on the part of one manufacturer would be actively discouraged by other
industry members.719 Perhaps only new entrants into the market-or
724. Tobacco Serrleme/lf, mpra note 3'.!. at 14 lliat 1 ' true onl) ··aftc:r

.1 fonn .il

to the Administrative Procedures Act ( 'APA" ). wnh the righ t of JUd1ci.1l n:\ le\\

..

Id

rule:

m.il a ng ,UbJc.:t

n1e ptopo"1 1 \\OUld

also provide for greater FDA oversight over the manufactunng proce" to pn:' c:nt con 1 .1m 111.1 1 1on .ind en,urc
compliance with quality standard>.

See 1d. at 1 8

725. See id. at 1 4 ("The manufacturers " 1 11 be n:qu1n:d to nollf) FDA of an) tedmolog) th.it the)
develop or acquire and that reduce> the mk from tobacco product> and. for a comrn en:1.1ll ) re.bo n.ib lc
to cross l icense all >uch technology. but only to t ho>e

cornpame> al>o CO\ c:n:J b)

Ice.

the -.arne obhg.1t1on, ·· 1

726. The agreement provide> m pcnment pan:
[T]he Agency >hall have the authority to mandate that a manufactun:r >Ub)cct to tlm A.:1 " ho
owns such technology (at >uch manufacturer» elcc11on ) either introduce: >Ud1 produ.:i-. or .11
a commercially rea>onable market r.ue. hcen>e >Uch K-chnolog) 10 a rnanuf.icturcr " ho .igrcn
to bring the technology to market an a rca>onablc

lime l r.ime In the:

e\C:nt 1h.11 no m.inul .ic lurer

or licensee introduce> >Uch "le» ha1.ardou> tobacco product,:· " llhan a re.i wn .ib k tune l r.ime
set by [the] FDA. then the U.S. Public H eal t h Service ma) prod uce: either n-.cll. or through .i
licensing arrangement. any >Uch product.

ld. at 1 5.
727. With respect to past mdu,try mfom1at1on of tlm >on. the propo.al purport' to ··er1>urc th.it
previously non-public or confidential [document> from) the tile> of the tob.icco andu'tf) - andudmi,:

uncrn.il

[health research) document>-are d1>clo>ed to [the] FDA. pm ate ht1gan1>[. and the pubh .: ] ·· Id .it I S For

>CC rd. app. VIII. For a col lccuon of c n u q ue> of tho-.c .irr.in g emen t>. ""'
Hubcn Hu mphrc) I l l . Tc,um on) Befon: the Sen.ite Commerce
Committee (July 29. 1 997) (on file with the foh• Lan Jounwll. Al.in Momwn. Senou, Fl.i" ' 1 11 "lob.icco
Deal (July 23, 1 997) (unpubh>hed manu>cnpt. on ti le \\ Ith 1hc fo/r Li11 Jmmw/1
728. Cf Anthony Flint, Col/mum 011 Tobac co 111 6./ H1111rd R.-port Sa" Co111pw11n }0111.-d 111
Srraregies To Prorecr Documems. BOSTO' GLOBE. Oct I . 1 996. at A I
729. Cf DOL'GLAS F. GREER. hDLSTRIAL 0RGA,l/..ATI0' A'l> Pl Ill.IC Poun 27S 1 2J eJ 1 9S-1 1
(noting that ""it i > not >Urpn>ang that many cane!> attempt 1 0 ,tandard1Lc: their product. re,tnct .id,em > 1ng.
the detaib of tho>e arrangement>.

Tribe Testimony. supra note 677:
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relatively small players with little to lose-would be willing to take such a
chance. For reasons discussed below,730 however, the proposed regime
greatly discourages new entrants. In addition, there would be a disincentive to
produce safer cigarettes to the extent that tort claims remain viable and
evidence of safer cigarettes encourages courts and juries to find that the
manufacturers should be liable for harms caused by traditional cigarettes.731
Moreover, even if the FDA could somehow manage to identify a safer
cigarette design, that does not imply that it should require that design to be
manufactured and sold. Even if a "safer cigarette" is, other things being equal,
safer than a traditional cigarette, other things may not be equal. As the
experience with low-tar or "light" cigarettes amply demonstrates, a design
change can lead to numerous changes that are difficult to anticipate and
measure, particularly when the "safer" alternative is still in the design phase.
Smokers may switch to the "safer" substitute and smoke more cigarettes, take
more puffs per cigarette, or inhale more deeply the smoke of safer cigarettes
than they did of the traditional cigarettes.732 Nonsmokers may begin smoking
and smokers may be slower to quit smoking because of the "low-risk"
alternative. For those sorts of reasons, it is easy to imagine that the risks posed
by the seemingly "safer" alternative would be as great or greater than those of
traditional cigarettes. To put this point in economic terms, cigarette costs
depend not j ust on manufacturer care levels, but also on activity levels and, in
a way, consumer care levels. The forces of command-and-control regulation
would likely affect manufacturer care levels a_lone. Under an ex post incentive
based approach, however, the market would yield the optimal mix of care
levels and activity levels by internalizing the costs in the price of cigarettes
and creating a market for safer cigarettes.
2.

Peiformance-Based Regulations

The proposed settlement also provides that, so as to "insur[e] that the best
available, feasible safety technology becomes the industry standard, [the] FDA
will have the authority to promulgate Performance Standards . . . that require
the modification of tobacco products to reduce the harm caused by those
products."733 Although the goal is ambitious, a closer reading reveals just
how anemic the FDA authority would be. For a minimum of twelve years, the

and regulate technological change, for standardization and stagnation are mo�! conducive to coopcmtion").
730. See infra Subsection VI.E.2.
73 1 . One provision in the proposed agreement provide� that "(t]he development or 'reduced rbk'
tobacco products after the effective date or the Act is neither admbsible nor dbcovcmble." Tobm·,·u
Se11/eme111, supra note 32, at 40. In light or that provision, manufacturer�· liability-ba�cd dbinccntive muy
be reduced. To the extent that courts or jurie� are already aware or �arcr cigarettes, however, they muy on
their own dmw the inference that older de�ign� are unre�onably dangerou�.
732. See supra notes 1 02- 1 07 and accompanying text.
733. Tobacco Se11/eme111, supra note 32, at 1 5.
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FDA's ability to regulate nicotine would be limited by the following
conditions:
•
•

Nicotine yields may be reduced but not elimina1ed;"l.:
Traditional 1obacco produces may not be prohibi1ed;m
Tobacco products may be modified. bu1 only when 1he
modification ( I ) will resull in a signitican1 reduciion of 1he heallh
risks to smokers; (2) is 1echnologically feasible; and ( 3 ) will not
result in the creation of a significant black market;'\(,
The authority to require modification can be exercised only upon
a complex and multidimensional showing of ··subslantial
evidence. "737

Most critics of the proposal have emphasized 1ha1 this set of procedural
hurdles effectively weakens the FDA's currenl authority to regulate
nicotine.738 Indeed, that appears to be the primary objection of, among
others, President Clinton and the Koop-Kessler Committee.�w We suspect
that the problems with the performance-based rules will run deeper. Even if the
FDA could implement performance-based regulaiions on a whim. there is little
reason to believe that such regulalions would be efficient. Again. the FDA
simply does not have the information 1ha1 ii would need to design efficient
performance-based standards. Indeed. !he fact that the FDA has not. under its
current authority, implemented any form of signilicanl cigarette design
regulation can be seen as an implied acknowledgement on the par! of the FDA
of its own inability to regulate effeciively. ��0
See id. at 1 5.
See id.
736. See id. at 1 5- 1 6.
737. Id. at 1 6. A, the agreement explain, .

734.
735.

[A] shO\�ing of ··,ub•tanllal e\ ldencc[ ]"" [mu't be] ba,t-d upon .111 .1d1111111,1ratl \ c nxord
developed through a formal rule mal.mg ,ubject to the Adn11m,1r.1t1 \ e Procedure' Act. \\ llh the
right of judicial review. and any 'uch mod1lica11011 'hall be \UbJcct to the cuncnl J>roccdun::'
of the Regulatory Refom1 Act of 1 996 to pr0\ 1dc tune .ind .1 pron:" for Congn:" tc 1ntel'cne
should it •o choo•e. In the event a pany 'u b,eq ue nt l) JiJc, .1 pc1111on �l.111g Jll Jdm1111,trJll\c
review of whether a mod1 1icat1on ha., . 111 f.ict. rc,uJted 111 the crc.111011 of J '1gml1c .1111 Jern.1nd
for contr.iband or other tobacco produci- th.11 do not mt-ct the \Jlel) ,1.1nd.1rd .md [the! 1·0 -\
denies the petition, the petitioner 'hall ha' e the nght to •t:el. JUdic1.1I rc\ lc\\ ol the Jcm.11 ol the
petition.
Id. The proposal abo provide• for the creation of .1 ··sc1cn111ic AJ\ l,OI") Com111111.:c'" tu ,1ud) the c l l cch
of nicotine. Id. In addition, it provide' for the rcduc11on of 1.1r Jc, cl. m .ill c1g.1rc11c' to I� n11ll1granh. J\
currently measured by the FrC. See 11/. Although 'omc of the ,ub,tant l \ c and pru.:cdur.11 rnnd111u11' of
FDA regulation would be reduced after I'.! ) Cal"\. ><'<' rd . the rc'tnc11011> \\oulJ cont111uc 10 be qu11c
sub•tantial.
738. See, e.g., Freedman & Hwang. lllpra note 7. Lmne �kG111lc). fobm w Oral Jiii• ll111dle ""
FDA Role, WALL ST. J., June '.!6. 1 997. at A3: Diel. Pohnan . The Fme Pmrt uxmu li.m:r "'a S1110�111i:.
SAN DIEGO UNJON-TRtB., Sept. 7. 1 997. al G�
739. See Fri,by. rnpra note 701 ('umman11ng the Wl111e l lou-.c cn11quc1. BJl"T) �kier. Cl1111tm
Officially Rejects Limitl 011 F.D.A. 111 Toba« o Ple111. N Y Tl\U:.!>. Jul) 1 0 . 1 997 . .11 :\�O
740. Unfonunatcly. 11 " impo"1blc for u' to be more ,pct·1 1tc 111 our cm1c"m' ol thnc pro\ 1,1011'
bccau�e the propo•al ,ay• nothmg about the 'pcc1fic tcmh of the po»tblc pcrlonn.11Kc·ba...:d rcgul.111011'
that the FDA might try to implement.
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Transition Issues

The proposed settlement agreement raises a number of vexing transition
issues, along the lines of those discussed in Section V.C. What is distressing,
however, is that the proposal, in some places, appears to be completely
oblivious to the transition issues it raises. In other places, where transition
issues are at least recognized, the agreement appears terribly confused about
the appropriate response to those issues. In this section, we highlight a few
such examples.

I.

The Distinction Between Past and Future Harms:
$368.5 Billion for What?

Under the proposal, the industry would pay out a total of $368.5 billion
over twenty-five years741 (not taking into account the effect of the volume
adjustment provisions742). Although this is far more money than most of us
are accustomed to contemplating, it is impossible to determine whether or not
it is the right amount of money without first asking: What is that $368.5
billion supposed to cover? Is it a payment by the industry for the past harms
caused by cigarettes? Or is it a series of payments designed to correct the
market failures in the cigarette market on a purely prospective basis? Or is it
something in between? The answers to those questions are critical to resolving
the transition issues posed by the proposal. Unfortunately, such answers cannot
be found in the text of the agreement.
One approach, discussed above,743 would be to regard all of the
payments as being designed to cover thefuture smoking-related Medicaid costs
(that is, as a purely prospective correction of the Medicaid insurance
externality). A rationale for taking this view would be that the amount of the
payments does roughly approximate the amount necessary to achieve that
future deterrence objective, though all the other past and future costs of
smoking would be left unaddressed, at least by the payments required under
the proposal. B ut, of course, the coincidence of the amount of the payments
under the agreement and the amount necessary to cover future Medicaid costs
could be just that-pure coincidence. It could be that the payments are
supposed to be in part for past and future smoking-related Medicaid costs, in
part for past and future Medicare costs, in part for past and future private
insurance costs, and so on. Either way, there is no doubt that the $368.5 billion

741 . See Tobacco Set1/ement, supra note 32, at 34.
742. If the volume-adjustment provision is taken into account, a plausible c�timate of the total indu�try
payouts under the proposal would be roughly $304 billion. See supra note 708.
743. See supra text accompanying note� 7 1 8-7 1 9.
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is far less than the amount necessary even to internalize fully the past harms
alone caused by cigarettes. 744
Perhaps the uncertainty about where the $368.5 billion figure comes from
and what specific harms it is supposed to cover stems from a deeper confusion
that characterizes the agreement: the apparent failure to understand the
distinction between punishment for past harms and the regulation of risk of
future harms, a distinction that is essential to optimizing both general and
specific deterrence goals.745 As we noted earlier. political reality may require
that any new regime protect the existing manufacturers (or at least some of
them for some period of time) from bankruptcy.746 Therefore. full cost
internalization may be impractical. But $365 billion over twenty-five years is
plainly inadequate, even taking into account bankruptcy concerns.7�'
2.

Barriers to Emry

The proposal seems designed not only to protect the ex1stmg cigarette
manufacturers (at least the ones who were parties to the settlement agreement)
from bankruptcy, but also to protect them entirely from serious competition
from new market entrants. Although this portion of the proposal is especially
cryptic, the section dealing with "non-participating companies" would appear
to impose the following requirements on any cigarette manufacturer that is not
a party to the settlement agreement:
•

•

They would be subject to all the same "access restrictions" and
FDA "regulatory oversight" that would be imposed on
participating companies;m
A "user fee" would be applied to their products to cover their
portion of the payments required under the agreement to fund
public health programs and state enforcement of access
restrictions;749
To avoid constitutional challenges, they would not be subject to
the advertising and "corporate culture" provisions7� that would
be imposed on participating companies, which have consented to
such restrictions;751

744. Cf .111pra note 575 (C•timatmg roughly the co,t> of cigarette• O\cr JU>t the pa>t 10 yea� to be
considerably m exec" of S I trillion).
745. See sa1m1 S u b•cct i o n V.C. I .
746. See supra text accompanying note 579
747. See Harn,. mpra note 579, at 292 (•ugge•ttng that the tobacco mdu>try could afford to pay
roughly $32 billion per year, ba>ed on plau.ible a.•umpuon>J
748. Tobacco Se11/e111e111. supra note 32, at 29
749.
750.

See id.
Id. at 2 1 . The•e provi•t0n> c»enually rcqmrc thJt co mpa m c> co mpl y " nh the >ptnt

the letter of the •ettlemenl.
75 I . See id. at 28-29.
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They would receive none of the .grotections from tort suits
afforded to participating companies; 52
To ensure that these companies would not become j udgment
proof, each nonparticipating company would be required to "place
into an escrowed reserve fund each year an amount equal to
1 50% of its share of the annual payment required of participating
manufacturers," exclusive of that portion of the payment allocated
to public health programs and federal and state enforcement, and
the manufacturer would be allowed to reclaim unpaid funds, with
interest, thirty-five years Iater;753
"[T]he exemption from civil liability applicable to distributors and
retailers of the products of participating manufacturers will not
apply to distributors and retailers who handle tobacco products of
non-participating manufacturers."754

The effect of all these requirements is that any nonparticipating company,
presumably including any new market entrant, would have to pay one-and-a
half times the amount that participating manufacturers would be required to
pay, even though new market entrants may have had no responsibility for the
past harms of smoking.755 As if that were not enough, nonparticipating
manufacturers would effectively be prevented from selling their products
through existing distribution channels because any distributor or retailer who
carries their products would lose its immunity for tort suits provided under the
agreement. Thus, to compete with the participating manufacturers, a
nonparticipating company must be prepared to provide its own distribution
system. Both of those requirements obviously act as barriers to entry into the
cigarette market, thereby serving to protect the existing, "participating"
cigarette manufacturers from suffering the competitive consequences of failing
to take into account, ex ante, the possibility of a transition to an ex post
incentive-based regime of regulation.756 By creating barriers to market entry,
752. See id.
753. Id.
754. Id. at 29.
755. The justification given for the large escrow payments required of nonparticipating manufucturers
is to avoid a judgment-proof problem-that is, to ensure that funds will be available to cover whatever tort
liability those companies end up having ex post. That is certainly a desirable goal. See suprt1 Subsection
V.C.2. The problem with the provbion as written, however, is that while it prevents judgment-proof
companies from entering the market, the settlement overall lets exbting manufacturers off the hook for past
harms, sending the wrong general deterrence message to manufacturers in other industries.
756. Perhaps these provbion� help to explain the fact that the stock prices of the major participating
tobacco companies fell only briefly when the settlement agreement was announced. See James F. Peltz &
Myron Levin, The Tobacco Settlement: How Will Firms Fare?, L.A. TIMES, June 2 1 , 1 997, at D I . Indeed,
"(t)he consensus among tobacco equity analysts is that a settlement would �ignificantly boost tobacco stock
prices." Stuart Rossmiller, DMG Comments 011 Nabisco Holcli11gs Corp., Nov. 25, 1 997, available i11
Bloomberg, RJR Nabbco Holdings Corp. Current News File. Of course, without a sophbticatcd event
study, it is impossible to know with any confidence whether the proposed settlement agreement hus hud
any effect on tobacco stock prices. And even if we could identify a significant effect, it would not be clcur
what such an effect would mean about the market's interpretation of the settlement agreement. It would
depend on, among other things, what the market expects the eventual outcome of the tobacco litigation (und
threats of FDA regulation) to be. In any event, it seems fairly clear that the market does 1101 expect thut,
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a primary source of new ideas for developing safer cigarenes-the new, start
up tobacco companies-is eliminated.
F.

Assessing the Proposal from a Distance

We have focused thus far mostly on indi\'idual provisions of the
settlement. From that perspective. we ha\'e concluded that the proposal is
fundamentally flawed. The chief proponents of the proposal-particularly the
attorneys general who have endorsed it-ha\'e asserted that our vantage point
is inappropriate. They urge critics lo step back and view the proposal as a
whole package.757 They point out further that the selllemenl represents a
hard-fought negotiation against a savvy and wealthy industry that had yet to
pay a penny to anyone injured by cigarenes."K There arc. of course, some
imperfections in the agreement, they argue, but that 1s the nature of any give
and-take process. And when one looks at the proposal pragmatically and
realistically, they claim, it is evident that much more was gained in the
negotiations than was lost.759 In the conclusion. we will take up the question
of whether, in fact, the settlement is preferable to what has been the status quo.
For the remainder of Part VI, we want to respond to the claim that the
proposal is somehow more attractive from a distance than it is from up close.
When one reads the entire proposal without focusing on the details. it is
hard to deny that it reads as though the selllement would, if enacted. usher in
a new age in the cigarette industry. In addition to the specific examples that
we provided already regarding the bright promises of many of the sclllemcnt's
specific provisions, the agreement has big-picture language of the sort that
at the end of the day, the ex1>tmg tobacco compame' " il l be held full) hable for all th<: ham1' ca u..:d by
their cigarcnes in the pa't or that they will be left unprolcctc:d Jgam,1 unfonen:d com pc uuon from ne\\
market entranb if a >elllement 1> reached.
757. Christine Gregoire. Anomey GenerJI of Wa,hmg1on. 'aid 111 dden..: of the ..:nlement ·· 1t "n"t
perfect, but it\ the be'! anyone ha. put forward."" J.ime> Broo�e . Allomru Gr11rml Or/r11tl L.111tlmm{
Tobacco Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 25. 1 997. at 06 Grant \\'001h . Antona'> Anome) General . Jdmon"hcd
'"You' ve got to keep thi> thing in pcr-pcctl \ e
Thi> '' the b1gge>t public heJlth and corporate
settlement in the hi>tory of th1> country."" /ti. Tom Mil ler. Auome) Gener.ii from Jo\\a and ,upponer of
the senlement propo>al, conceded that there ma) be 'ome problem> \\ Ith ob1a1mng full d1..:lo,ure of
tobacco company document>, but urged cnu" nol to lei tho>e problem> '"d l \ en anenuon from th<: broader
settlement." Barry Meier, M11111esora Ojficwl /i11·m•s Ccmgrr>S1t111t1/ Sc rn11m of TulnIL' o /111/1urn Ftlr>. � Y
TIMES, July 28, 1 997, at A 1 0.
758. See, e.g. • Scon Har-hbarger. 11'/wr \\�· mm /11 Tobtt« o Orttl. BoSTO' Gt.0111:.. Jul) 5. 1 997. al
A 1 1 (arguing that ··congre»1onal crit1c1'm of our \\O� 1> >ome\\hat h�e a group of AWOL wld1er.
explaining how the wJr could have been won bener or fa>ter'" and concluding that "(1]h1> " an opponunll)
that we mu>! >eize with both hand>''). An unnamed tobacco repre>entall \ e reccntl) >Jld of the deJI "It'>
..
not perfect. but it'> far bener than \\ hat the ahematl\C:> Jre SJundrJ Toll). \1(1nwu1 A 111wur [)rim.
Tobacco A ides Defend $368 811/um S<'lllt•m•'lll. WASH PO�I. Jul) I S . 1 997. at A 1 0
759. It i> 1 lluminaung to con,1der. for '"'lance. 1hc 1m11al reac11<in' to . and cnuci,ni- of. th<: ..:lllcment
made by Dr-. Koop and Kc"ler before the Senalc C'onuncrcc C'omm111c:c: Koop and Ke,, J cr lir't Jrgued.
in effect, that the >ettlemcnt 'hould be 'cr.ippcd and thJI C'ongre" 1t-.c:lf >hould draft J belier ..:t of
regulation>. Supponer- of the agreement argued m re>pon>c that >uch propo>ah \\ ere '"npl) unreah,uc Jnd
that the agreement repre>ented a nece,,ary compronH>e. Su Sht:r) I GJ) Stolberg. Krulrr m1tl Koop l'ri:.
Co11gress To Do Awtt\" w11h the Tolwcco St•11/1•mt•111. N Y Tl\tl:.S. Jul) 30. 1 997. al B7
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suggests something fundamental is about to happen to the incentives and
mindset of the captains of the cigarette industry. For instance, the opening
paragraph of the preamble reads as follows:
This legislation would mandate a total reformation and restructuring
of how tobacco products are manufactured, marketed and distributed
in this country. The nation can thereby see real and swift progress in
preventing underage use of tobacco, addressing the adverse health
effects of tobacco use and changing the corporate culture of the
tobacco industry.760
S imilarly, Title I of the proposed settlement is named "Reformation of the
Tobacco Industry,"761 and Section G of Title I is called "Compliance and
Corporate Culture."762 In that section, the proposal begins by observing that
[a] key element in achieving the Act's goals will be forcing a
fundamental change in the way the tobacco industry does business.
Accordingly, the Act will provide for means to ensure that the
industry will not only comply with the letter of the law but will also
have powerful incentives to prevent underage usage of tobacco
products and to strive to develop and market less hazardous tobacco
products.763
The message in all of this seems to be that because of this agreement, the
industry can now be trusted. The culture of denial and deceit will be
fundamentally reformed.764 Manufacturers will want to comply not just with
the letter of the law, but also with the spirit of the law because the proposed
settlement, if enacted, will change their basic incentive structure.
The fairly close reading that we gave to some of the settlement details
suggests that claims regarding a change in corporate culture are grossly
exaggerated. B ut, as we have said, in this section we want to step back, if that
is possible, and take a more distant view of the settlement. If one imagines the
range of regulatory options that we have described in this Article as lying
along a continuum-with ex post incentive-based regulation at the left end,
command-and-control regulations at the right end, and performance-based
regulation somewhere in-between-and if one were to imagine stacking each
of the settlement's provisions on top of that continuum according to the
category of regulation that it represented, one could get an illuminating overall

Tobacco Set1/e111e111, supra note 32, at I .
Id. at 8.
762. Id. at 2 1 .
763. Id.
760.

76 1 .

9.

764. For gener.il accounts of the tobacco culture, �ee HILTS, supra note 1 2: and KLUGER, supra note
See a/lo supra notes 1 1 - 1 3 and accompanying Jext (describing the industry's ba�ic �trutegie� to avoid

meaningful regulation).
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picture of the proposed settlement. Because the vast majority of provisions are
command-and-control rules, the right side of the continuum would be stacked
high. The left side, in contrast, would be flat. In between. there would be one,
maybe two, examples of performance-based regulation, but even they would
be located well toward the right end of the continuum. That landscape, as we
have already stressed, is precisely the opposite of what would be ideal.
What makes this skewed landscape especially troubling, however. is that
it is probably no accident. It is, from the tobacco industry's perspective, ideal.
As we have emphasized throughout, command-and-control is the least effective
form of regulation. It requires the regulator to have an enormous amount of
information about the product, information that the regulator often must rely
on the industry to provide. Insofar as the industry is the source of the
regulator's information, it becomes relatively easy for the industry to
manipulate the process and to avoid really having to internalize the costs of
their actions.765 Furthermore, the regulations themselves are severely limited
by the inability of the regulator to anticipate every countermove that the
industry might make in its attempt to save the money that would otherwise
have to be spent in complying with the spirit of the regulation. As we have
argued in this part, those criticisms certainly apply to the settlement's
numerous command-and-control regulations. To be sure. the agreement also
contains some elements of performance-based regulations, which, in theory,
might pose somewhat of a regulatory threat to the cigarette industry. As we
have noted, however, the performance-based aspects of the settlement arc
rendered quite anemic by substantial ex ante and ex post loopholes and the
poorly calibrated and relatively minor surcharges for failing to meet
performance targets.766
Considering the big picture, therefore, we have no trouble rejecting the
suggestion that the proposed settlement would somehow substantially alter the
culture or incentives of the tobacco industry. To the contrary, the basic
incentives of manufacturers would remain. They would still seek to find and
to create loopholes in the regulations. They would still seek to misrepresent the
risks to consumers and regulators. Under the proposed regime, their options
may be fewer, but not by that much. And we sec nothing in the agreement
itself to indicate that there has been any sort of fundamental transformation in
the industry mindset. There was no public admission regarding the health risks
and addictiveness of cigarettes (except by the one manufacturer that was not
party to the agreement).767 There has been no apology for past conduct and
..
765. That phenomenon " known. generally. ;i,, the problem of capture:· See W.

Kii' V 1sn s1 1:.1 AL.

ECONOMICS OF REGL1LATION AND Al-mTRL•ST 38-39 (2d c:d. 1 995).
766.

See supra

Sub,ection VI.D.2.

char.ictenLc:tl "' a tobacco
c1gare11e� l.. 1 11 and arc
addictive (and that cigarette manufacture� in1enuonally targctL-d 1111no�). See John M B rod er. 2U Swte>
Ask the White House To Spare One Cigareue Mal.er, N.Y. TIMES. Aug 2 1 , 1997. at A l 9 Jn \ cry recent
767. Bennett LeBow, CEO of Liggett'' parenl company. " regularly

industry maverick for settling with the 'tate attorney' general and for conceding that
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no admission of wrongful conduct. Indeed, in the time since the proposed
settlement was made public, it has been business as usual for the industry:
Witness Camel's recent advertisements,768 the introduction and advertisement
of Winston's new additive-free cigarette,769 manufacturers' strong resistance
to any regulations requiring that they disclose additives and total nicotine
content,770 and their attack on Dr. Stanton Glantz.771
Our very strong sense at the end of the day is that the proposed tobacco
settlement would accomplish precisely what previous efforts to regulate the
cigarette industry have accomplished. Specifically, the proposal would create

depositions in Florida, two tobacco executives made headlines by admitting that cigarettes may pose a
health risk. Geoffrey Bible, chainnan and CEO of Philip Morris admitted that about 1 00,000 Amcric11ns
"might have" died from smoking-related diseases. Philip Morris Chief Says Smoking Deaths Mt1y Number
100,000, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1 997, at A4. The following day, Steven F. Goldstone, chainnan of the
company that owns the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, testified that he believed that smoking plays a
"part in causing lung cancer." Barry Meier, Chief ofR.J. Reynolds Says Smoking Ht1s Role in Ccmcer, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1 997, at A7. These recent admissions may have been intended to avoid outraging the
Florida jury by continuing to deny that cigarettes have ill-health effects in the face of, among other things,
LeBow's admissions to the contrary. See id.
As this Article went to press, there were reports that executive� of the leading tobacco companies,
including Geoffrey Bible, had admitted in testimony before the House of Representatives that nicotine is
addictive, "as the tenn is commonly understood." Barry Meier, Tobacco Executives \far Penitent Before
House Panel in Hopes of Preserving Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1 998, at A l 5. The executives 11lso
conceded, "in dramatic contrast to the testimony of tobacco officials four years ago," that smoking either
causes lung cancer or is a risk factor in the disease. Id. The executives' concessions were apparently
intended to "rally support for the embattled [settlement proposal]." Id.
768. See supm text accompanying note 69 1 .
769. R.J. Reynolds very recently introduced a refonnulated Winston cigarette, apparently i n response
to the growing public awareness of the nearly 600 additives-including licorice and ammonia-that
cigarette manufacturers commonly include in their cigarettes. See Sucin L. Hwang, Het1lth Grou11s
Challenge Winston Ad Clt1ims, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1 997, at B I . Public health groups have criticized the
ad campaign launching the new cigarette-a campaign that asks smokers, "What the heck have you been
smoking?"-as misleading and amounting to a health claim. Id. They view the campaign as "evidence th11t
the i ndustry is still doing business as usual." Id.
770. Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to require manufacturers to reveal additives,
including total nicotine content, in cigarettes sold in the state. According to Gregory Connolly, head of the
Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program of the state Department of Public Health, the industry is "playing
games" in an effort not to comply. Richard Saltus, Makers To Reveal Cigarette Additives; Mass11c/111setts
Order ls First in the Nation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1 997, at B I .
77 1 . I n July 1 997, the National Smokers Alliance, a new citizens group funded mostly by the tobacco
industry, filed a suit charging Dr. Stanton Glantz, a statbtician and professor of medicine at the University
of California San Francisco, with scientific misconduct in an influential �tudy concluding that smoking b11ns
in 1 5 communities produced no adverse economic impact on restaurants. Dr. Kenneth Warner, an economist
and public health expert at the University of Michigan and one of the original peer reviewers of Glantz's
study, made the following observation: 'This seems like a two-sided strategy by the tobacco induMry. . . .
They're playing good guys in the settlement negotiations with the government, and they're playing the
game harder than ever with Dr. Glantz." Bill Richards, Pro-Tobt1cco Groups Step Up A/lacks 011 Cl
Longtime Foe, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1 997, at B l ; cf. Suein L. Hwang, Fire Fight: Doctor Whose Swdy
Tied Joe Ct1mel to Kids Takes t1n Odd Journey, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2 1 , 1 997, at A l (describing R.J.
Reynold's aggressive and litigious reaction to Dr. Paul Fischer's famous study). Dr. Glantz's motion to
dismiss the complaint has been granted. See Tobacco litigation lit " Glantz: A lc1ws11it To Silence 1111
llldustry Anwgonist Is Thrown out of Court, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1 997, at A20. For a de�cription of
how the tobacco industry ha� financed a variety of "fake grassroots ('astroturf') organizations," sec Kelder
& Daynard, suprn note 3, at 70. For another example of how the industry is employing those organiz11tions
in an effort to push the settlement, �ee Tatiana S. Boncompagni & Jill Abramson, Tobacco-Funded Group
Gives Legislators Free Trips, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1 997, at A20.
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the i llusion of regulation (at least initially) while simultaneously protecting the
industry from having to internalize the costs of cigarettes.m In the words of
C. Everett Koop: "The tobacco industry has always been able to get around or
hurdle over measures we set up to try to stop them . . . to make victories of
steps we thought would set them back . . . . We don 't want that to happen
again here."773
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have attempted to offer a largely economic defense of
a number of claims. First, the cigarette market is characterized by severe
market failures-namely, information problems and negative externalities.
Consequently, immediate government intervention is required, especially given
the magnitude of the harms caused by cigarette smoking. Second, the best
regulatory response to those market failures is generally to rely as little as
possible on command-and-control regulation and to adopt some fom1 of victim
initiated ex post incentive-based regulation, such as enterprise liability or
smokers' compensation. Third, to the extent it is politically feasible. the
adoption of such a regime should be made retroactive so as to internalize not
only the harms caused by cigarettes in the future. but also the harms caused
by past smoking. Finally, the recently proposed tobacco settlement agreement
takes precisely the wrong approach in recommending the adoption of numerous
command-and-control, and limited performance-based, measures and by
eviscerating the only existing ex post incentive-based approach (tort law)
without proposing any alternative such regime.
B ased on the analysis contained in this Article, we recommend that
Congress reject the settlement proposal and start over from scratch, this time
beginning with the following question in mind: How can we design an
effective ex post incentive-based response co the cigarette problem? This
Article contains the framework for beginning that analysis, although much
work on the details obviously remains to be done.m
Those who are interested in the cigarette problem might also a!>k, however:
What if the apparent momentum in Washington to enact a comprehensive and
preemptive federal regulatory response to the cigarette problem should die, and
we should return to the status quo of a few months or a few years ago? Based
on the arguments in this Article, if product-accident deterrence is our
overriding goal, we would strongly prefer existing products liability doctrines
to the proposed settlement.

772. That was 1he effecl. for example. of the t\\o mo't '1gmlican1 pnor effon, 10 n:gulale c1gJrc1te
manufacturers. See supra note 9.
773. Taylor. supra note 6 1 2.
774. We take a ,tep toward filling in 'omc of thc,e dctJ1b 111 lfari.on et JI . >1111ru note -10
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In contrast to this view, much of the recent discussion about whether and
how to regulate cigarettes seems to be based on the assumption that products
liability law-or, for that matter, any form of victim-initiated ex post
incentive-based regime-should be dropped altogether. For example, to the
question of whether cigarette manufacturers should be liable to smokers
through one or another mechanism, a common response is that smokers should
not be permitted to foist the consequences of their own decisions onto others.
Richard Epstein, for instance, recently argued that cigarette manufacturers
should not have to pay a penny to anyone and that, instead, "smokers should
own up to . . . their actions."775 Robert Samuelson expresses a similar
sentiment: "I don't smoke and would fight my children if they start. But
otherwise, people have a right to choose. Punishing them for their choice
denies their freedom. Rewarding them for the ill effects of their choice denies
their responsibility."776
That sort of "take responsibility" rhetoric is powerful, particularly in the
United States, where we have long taken pride in our national ideal of rugged
individualism. (This is, after all, Marlboro country.) If the goal is to make all
parties "own up" to their decisions, however, several arguments can be made
that the appropriate policy response would be to adopt enterprise liability or
some other such victim-initiated ex post incentive-based regulatory system.
First, although the critics of products liability currently seem to exercise
exclusive rights to the "take responsibility" rhetoric, it is not at all clear why
that rhetoric could not be deployed at least as effectively by defenders of tort
law. For example, a strong argument can be made that, without products
liability or some other type of ex post incentive-based regulation of cigarettes,
tobacco manufacturers would be allowed to avoid responsibility for their
actions.777 Indeed, some analysts have calculated that the proposed settlement
would, if enacted, increase the industry's net profits.778 Second, even if we
are worried primarily about individual rather than corporate responsibility, the
only way to be sure that smokers take full responsibility for their actions
would be through the implementation of an ex post incentive-based regime of
775. Epstein,

supra note 22.

776. Samuelson, supra note 22; see also Chapman,

supra note 22 ("The war on the tobacco industry
is also a war on the right of individuals to make their own choices-and their obligation to take
responsibility for the consequences.").
777. See supra notes 1 2, 144, 1 6 1 , 2 1 9, and accompanying text (providing examples of the industry's
most culpable conduct); cf Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our C11lt11re of Irresponsibility, 3 1
WAKE FOREST L . REV. I 075 passim ( 1 996) (discussing several recent Supreme Court decisions o n products
liability and calling for the Court to reconsider doctrine that encourages irresponsible munufucturer
conduct).
778. See John M. Broder, Industry Windfall Seen in Tobacco Deal, GREENSBORO NllWS & REC.
(N.C.), Sept. 23, 1 997, at A l (describing an FfC study finding that "the tobacco companies could reap us
much as S 1 23 billion in additional profits in the next 25 years if the settlement plan is adopted as drafted");
see also Peter Passell, Tobacco Might Thrive with a $/.50·a-Pack Rise for Cigarettes, N.Y. TtMllS, Sept.
25, 1 997, at 02 (describing a study by a Stanford economist indicating that even if President Clinton's
proposed S 1 .50 per pack tax were adopted. the market value of tobacco stocks would increa�e).
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regulation and its effects on the price of cigareues. Otherwise, smokers would
continue to externalize substantial costs in the fonn of environmental tobacco
smoke, higher insurance rates, and the like.
Under a victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system, there is no doubt
that smokers would be responsible for their decisions. For starters, they would
have to pay when purchasing each pack of cigarelles, in the form of higher
product prices, for their right to make a claim when a smoking-caused illness
occurs. The arrangement is virtually identical to the arrangement that exists
between insureds and their first-party insurers. Thus, they would not be gelling
something for nothing and could not evade responsibility. Even to the extent
smokers or their families receive compensation for their harms. it is difficult
to say that the dead or seriously ill smoker would ever fully evade the ultimate
responsibility for her smoking decisions.
That is not the only misconception about the role of civil liability laws in
the cigarette context. Indeed, critics and supporters of the proposed seulement
share two flawed premises, which nevertheless seem to be dictating the terms
of the policy debate. First, both sides assume that the primary purpose of
products liability law in this context is not to serve public health goals, but
simply to compensate those injured by smoking. Second, both sides seem to
agree that civil liability laws have, to date, failed to serve that or any other
worthwhile goal. Consequently, most participants in the debate have indicated
in one way or another that the elimination of products liability law would be
no big loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The proponents of the proposed
settlement, for instance, point out that, even if $368.5 billion does not cover
all the harms caused by cigarelles, it is a lot more than nothing, which is what
manufacturers are often said to have paid in tort damages to individual
plaintiffs to date.779 Critics are typically less explicit. They make their views
known either by not mentioning the effect of the seulement on tort law or by
indicating that they would not challenge that effect if only the seulement could
be adj usted to serve public health goals beuer.780
Arguably, however, the principal goal of products liability law is, broadly
speaking, public health, not compensation. In the cigarelle context in particular,
the question then becomes whether the public health goal is beuer achieved
through products liability law or through the types of regulation envisaged in
the proposed settlement. Those who would sacrifice products liability law to
accept the settlement implicitly assume that the public health benefits of the
latter would outpace the public health benefits of the former. But, perhaps
because of the general anti-tort sentiment in this country, that presumption has
779. See, e.g., Benjamin Wie>er. Tobacco 's Trwls. \VASii PO�'T. Dec 8. 1996. § W !Magazine). at
ma! and none re-,ulted in

1 5 (stating that, of 800 >Uit> filed again>! tobacco compame>. only 1 2 weni to
the payment of damages to a plaintiff).
780.

See supra note 6 1 2 (de>cnbing the con>en>U>

proposal are of little >ignificance).
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been largely unexamined and is, for several reasons that we have already
noted, highly questionable.
Products liability law comes far closer, at least in theory, to providing an
ex post incentive-based type of regulation than any alternative form of
regulation now being considered (other than the smokers' compensation regime
we are proposing). Moreover, products liability law could have more than just
a theoretical impact. It is true that no substantial tort judgments have been won
against the tobacco industry. Nevertheless, products liability law is currently
in a state of flux or disequilibrium. In our view, the growing inevitability of
many large civil judgments against the industry helped push the manufacturers
to the negotiating table and thus made the $368.5 billion settlement offer
possible. In other words, to say that the settlement agreement would produce
$368.5 billion while tort law has produced nothing is to misunderstand what
motivated the agreement in the first place.
It would be more accurate to claim that command-and-control regulation,
not products liability law, has failed those who have been harmed by cigarette
smoking. The FDA has long declined to exercise its authority in this area,
presumably because of the political power of the cigarette industry781 and
because of the FDA's lack of expertise regarding how best to regulate.
Furthermore, it has been administrative regulation that has effectively derailed
otherwise viable tort claims against cigarette manufacturers.782 For example,
the FTC-promulgated warning labels have given rise to the preemption
defense783 and greatly strengthened the assumption-of-risk defense in tort
law. Those defenses have until very recently proved an insurmountable barrier
to tort recovery. Thus, in light of this past experience with administrative
regulation, it is not clear that we should have much confidence in the expanded
role for administrative regulation contemplated in the settlement proposal.
Indeed, the American public should be troubled (though not especially
surprised) by the fact that the settlement proposal, which the tobacco industry
fully supports, would adopt a mix of regulation (lots of command-and-control
provisions, some limited performance-based standards, and essentially zero ex
post incentive-based regulation) that is entirely consistent with the interests of
the tobacco industry.
Although we believe the case for ex post incentive-based regulation to be
quite strong, we would not be surprised to learn that our analysis has
overlooked some important considerations that may weaken the case.784
78 1 . See supra note 1 1 ; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
782. See supra note 9.
783. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-3 1 ( 1 992) (plumlity opinion); supra nole 9.
784. Some readers may find our arguments persuasive but nevertheless reject our policy
recommendation. The biggest source of that turnabout seems to be the classic slippery slope problem. If
we adopt this form of regulation for 1obacco, !he argument goes, why not for alcohol, chocolale, und fuuy
foods? One commentator has caplured Iha! argument as follows: "Plcnly of companies make money selling
goods and services Iha! carry serious ri�k�including 1 30-proof whbkey, trips up Mt. Everesl und cu� 1hu1
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Nevertheless, at the very least we hope that our argumenb have been
sufficiently provocative and developed to convince those in a po�ition to enact
policies to slow down and consider all the regulatory alternatives. Cigarettes
and their immense ill-health costs have been, and will likely continue to be,
with us for many years. Now is no time for legislative myopia.
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VISCUSl'S SURVEY DATA

In Part II, we attempted to rebut the commonsense notion that consumers arc well-informed of the
risks of smoking. In addition, we responded to the arguments and evidence presented by some cfficiency
minded legal scholars (principally W. Kip Viscusi) that purport to buttress that commonsense notion. At
the time, we postponed a more detailed critique of Viscusi's data and methodology. We take up that
critique now. In particular, we examine in some detail the Haws in the survey data on which Viscusi
primarily relies.

A.

A Questionable Reference Poi/If

In Section II.A, we described some of the findings of Viscusi 's survey research (and his analysis
of tobacco industry survey data) on the question of what consumers estimate the risks of smoking to be.
One of Viscusi's central findings was that, to the question "(a]mong 1 00 cigarette smokers, how many
of them do you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?".7"' the average answer from survey
respondents was 43%.786 This percentage is much larger than what Viscusi estimates to be the true
reference point (the actual risk of lung cancer to smokers), which he puts at 5% to 1 0% per year.787
Thus, he concludes, smokers may actually be overestimating, rather than underestimating, the risks posed
by cigarette smoking.788
Even if one were to accept Viscusi's summary of estimated risks as described in Part II, there is
reason to suspect that he significantly understates the actual risks that consumers believed they were
estimating. Viscusi calculates the reference point for assessing lung cancer risk by dividing the annual
smoking-caused lung cancer mortality figure in 1 982 (93,500) by the number of people who smoked in
1 985 (52.9 million).789 The average amuwl risk of lung cancer mortality, by that measure. i�
approximately .00177 per smoker. But the average annual risk figure is not a plausible true-risk reference
point. The survey respondents were asked how many of JOO "smokers" would get lung cancer because
they smoked. Although the survey respondents were not told what the survey question meant by the term
"smoker,"m it is unlikely that they would have had in mind the risks faced by an average smoker in

785.
786.
787.
788.
789.

V1scus1, supra note 49, at 1 55.
See id. at 68.
See id.
See id. at 1 45.
See id. at 68 & n . 1 9. Careful readers may have noticed that respondents in the national survey
were not asked about lung cancer mortality; they were asked only about lung cancer (fatal or not). See icl.

at 64. For this reason, Viscusi's true-risk reference point may be too low. Viscusi conducted two smaller
surveys in Durham, North Carolina. In one, he asked 53 respondents the same question as was asked in
the national survey. In the other, he asked 206 respondents about cleath from lung cancer. The average
response in the former survey was that 4 1 % of smokers would get lung cancer because they smoke; the
average response in the latter survey was that 38% of smokers would die from lung cancer because they
smoke. See id. at 76-77. The difference was not statistically significant, and Viscusi concludes "that the
assessed lung cancer fatality rate from smoking is very similar to the assessed lung cancer incidence rate."
Icl. at 77.
790. In describing one limitation of the underlying studies, Viscusi writes:
The character of the data requires the analysis to focus on static consumption decisions. What
are the individuals' risk perceptions and tastes, and how do these affect observed �moking
behavior? The nature of the data analyzed consequently docs not permit consider.ttion of
changes in smoking behavior, such as decisions to quit smoking.
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any single given year, inasmuch as the term implies a contmumg status and would 001 be hkcly t o c:hc1t
a one-year risk estimate.
Viscusi nowhere explicitly acknowledges 1his key dcfimt1onal problem w11h lhe survey daia. bul
he does implicitly acknowledge it in the following way: In hts calculations to obtam a range for the
true-risk reference point, Viscusi multiplies the average annual nsk figure (.00 1 77) by the total number
of years that a "smoker" might smoke. He chooses thirty years for the low end of the: range: ( 05). and
sixty years for the high end (. 1 0).791 It is this thirty- to s1xty-yc:ar nsk figure that he: compares wuh
respondents' risk perceptions. In other words. Viscus1 undc:rstands that. to compare the actual nsk of
"smoking" against the respondents' estimates. the annual nsk figure had to be mult1phc:d by a substantial
number to reflect the fact that survey respondents hkc:ly unagmc:d "smoker'' to rcfc:r to a long-tem1
smoker (i.e., someone who smokes for thirty to sixty yc:ars). V1scus1's solution to the: dc:linmonal
problem, however, is inadequate. If survey respondents did undc:rstand "smokc:rs" to mc:an "long-tem1
smokers," then it is necessary to do more than simply multiply the: avc:ragc: annual mk figure by some:
"long-term" number of years. Recall that the average annual nsk figure 1s calculatc:d wnh 11// smokers.
including short-term smokers, in the denominator. Short-tc:rm smokc:rs. howc:ver. face a much lower
annual risk of lung cancer than do long-term smokers.191 Conscquc:ntly. lhc: avc:ragc: annual mk figure
on which Viscusi relies significantly understates the nsk of smokmg to long-tc:nn 'mokers ,.,,
There is another reason to suspect that Viscu"'s rcfc:rcnce pomt understatc:s the mk 1hat sun·cy
respondents believed they were estimating. The survey qucsuon askc:d only about the: mk of /1111g mm·a
Many survey respondents might have, when answenng the: muluple-quc:st1on, fi,c: nunute ic:lc:phonc:
survey,.,.. estimated roral mortality risks (including. for example:. the nsk of hc:an disease)."' Vtscw.t

Id. at 87. Contrary to this statement. the studies rc:portc:d by ViscuM do not mc:murc: "obscrvc:d smokmg
behavior." Indeed, they do not even measure reported smoking behavior. thc:y mc:asurc: sclf-rc:portc:d slatll.'!I
as a "current smoker," a "never-smoker," or a "fonnc:r ctgarcne smokc:r." Id. at 1 55. Each respondent was
asked to characterize himself or herself, abstractly. in a way that he or she: possibly had nc:vc:r co�toll.'!lly
done. Complicating mailers further. both the risk-percc:ption and smoking "beha' tor" quc:suons were:
presented as if there were no difference, in tenns of risk or sclf-dc:tinnion. betwc:cn smolang a pack per
week or three packs per day, see id. , a variable that can have: a Mgniticant c:ffc:ct on a smokc:r's health. su
SURGEON GENERAL'S PROGRESS REPoRT, s11pra note: 3, at 43-44.
79 1 . See VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68. Our calculations. basc:d on ViSCll.'!lt 's numbers. md1ca1e that
the range is from .053 (30 years) to . I 06 (60 years).
792. See s11pra notes 1 39- 1 40 and accompanying texl (descnbing c:v1dc:ncc: !hat many smokc:rs do
manage to quit); supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing c:v1dc:ncc: that qunung rc, c:rsc:> man)· of ihe
ill-health effects of smoking).
793. Viscusi reports more recent evidence suggesting that 1 1 7.000 people dte yc:arly from 'mok.mg
induced lung cancer. See VISCUS!, supra note 49. at 84 n.20. Viscus1 opts not 10 � ht> reference poml
on that updated infonnation because "[i)mposing such a standard rctroacuvely ts an mappropnalc: standard
for judging the soundness of earlier decisions." Id. at 67. We: d1sagrc:c. In our \'IC\\, the: rc:lc:nml quc:suon
in this context is whether consumers are well-infonned of the: undc:rlymg mks of smoking If !hey arc not.
then the market will not lead to the efficient outcome and enterpm.c: hab1hty (or some other fonn of
incentive-based regulation) may help overcome that market failure:. Su supra Section II C lhmg 1hc
updated mortality figures, Viscusi calculates a lung cancer ml. r.inge of between .06 and 1 25 Sa VtSC'lSt.
supra note 49, at 68.
794. See VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 1 53.
795. This possibility seems especially likely given the: order and phrasmg of the sunc:y quc:suons
Immediately before the lung cancer question (Question 3). respondents were: askc:d quc:suons pertammg to
cigarenes' total risks. Question I read: "When 1 menuon c1garcnc:s. what comes 10 your nund"' PROBE:
Anything else?" And Question 2 asked if respondents had heard (even if !hey J1d nol agree) 1ha1 smok.mg
"will most likely shorten a person's life," "is dangerous to a person's hcahh," "is bad for a person·� health.
but not dangerous," and "is not bad for a person's health." Id. at 1 54-55. The fact 1hat Question 3 ask.c:d
only about lung cancer was a subtle change of orientation that mighl have gone: unnouced by the: telephone
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implicitly acknowledges that possibility (as well as the possibility that consumers are more l i kely to
underestimate the less salient risks of smoking).796 To correct for it, he calculates the "total smoking
707
mortality risk" to be a range between . 1 6 and .36-"roughly triple the lung cancer mortality risk."
Other scientists using different methodologies, however, have estimated that the mortality risks of
smoking are significantly higher. For instance, a 1 962 Royal College of Physicians study summarized
mortality studies indicating that approximately half of all adult smokers would die fro m a
smoking-related illness.798 A 1 992 study found that "in each 5-year age group from 45 to 74 the death
rates of the smokers are more than double those of non-smokers," suggesting again that roughly half of
all smokers die of smoking-related causes.799 Those figures suggest that Viscusi's subjects

underestimate the relevant risks, and may, in Viscusi's words, "necessitate a change in the nature of the
discussion."800 In sum, Viscusi's "true-risk reference point" is probably too low, and his claim
regarding consumer overestimation of smoking risks is l i kely overblown. Moreover, it is really not
possible to construct an accurate true-risk reference point absent much better information regarding whut
survey respondents thought they were estimating and regarding what the risks truly arc to the specific
group of "smokers" that survey respondents had in mind.801
respondents, in part because lung cancer is the most salient risk associated with cigarettes. For u summury
of why lung cancer risks are the most salient, see id. at 77.
The order and wording of the �urvey, furthermore, likely biased respondents' estimates upward by
reminding them of negative information about cigarettes and encouraging them to commit to u negative
evaluation early on, before hearing other questions (including the lung cancer question). See ge11erall_l"
HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATitTUDE SURVEYS:
EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT 23-77, 179-201 (rev. ed. 1 996) (discussing
the possible effects of survey wording and ordering on outcomes); id. at 203-30 (discussing "ugrceing
response bias" or "acquiescence").
Viscusi recognizes the potentially biasing effects of question order. See V1scus1, supra note 49, ut
88. Moreover, he emphasizes the "overwhelmingly adverse sentiment" that the first question elicited "even
among current product users." Id. For whatever reason, however, Viscusi nowhere considers the possible
biasing effect that those extremely negative answers might have had on subsequent answers. Cf infra note
824 (explaining that the absence of a "don't know" option may have had a biasing effect).
796. See V1scus1, supra note 49, at 69-70.
797. Id. at 70.
798. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, supra note 60, at 44.
799. R. Peto et al., Mortalityfrom Tobacco in Developed Cou111ries: lllclirect Estimation from Nt11io11al
Vital Statistics, 339 LANCET 1 268, 1 270 ( 1 992). The authors of that study explain further that "(i]f,
conservatively, it was assumed that 'only' two-thirds of the observed more-than-twofold mortality exce�s
is caused by tobacco then the [National Cancer Institute] study would still suggest that about 40% of ull
regular cigarette smokers would eventually be killed by their habit." lei.
800. VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68. Survey respondents might also have, for the same sort of reason,
been estimating total smoking-caused mortality and morbidity (including, for in�lance, emphy�ema), u
possibility that Viscusi does not consider. If �o. that probability would likely be substantially higher thun
50%. See Medical-Care Expendit11res Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United Swtes, 1993, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 469, 472 ( 1 994) (noting that indirect losses associated with
morbidity totaled $6.9 billion in 1 990); see also Jan J. Barendregt et al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking,
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 052, 1 053 tbl.2 ( 1 997) (concluding that smokers have a �ignificantly higher
chance than nonsmokers of contracting many serious dbeases).
80 1 . Viscusi acknowledges that "(h]ow one asks the risk-perception question can be of substantial
consequence," and that "whatevt:r risk perception question wording is chosen should be well wulerstood
by responde/1/s." V1scus1, supra note 49, at 74 (emphasis added). To determine whether results of the
national survey provided "a reliable index of smoking risk beliefs," Viscu�i conducted u number of
telephone surveys in the Durham, North Carolina area to explore "the sensitivity of the risk responses to
variations in the question formulation." Id. at 76. Based on his summary review of those studies, Viscusi
concludes that they were probably reliable. St•e id. at 82-83.
For a variety of reasons, however, we remain concerned that the wording of the question did indeed
affect the outcome and that Viscusi's sensitivity tests were inadequate. First, many of the other survey� thut
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Qualitative Versus Qua111iratfre Dara
There is a fair amount of survey data regarding con,umcn." mk pcrccpllon' of c1gan:nc' For

instance, Gallup conducts annual surveys that lrJck consumer awarenc'' of smoling

"'�- ....: V1...:u ,1.

however, downplays lhe significance of those survey' for lhc following n:"-'<>ns

The wording of the questions penaining to 1hc mi.. doc, not cl u: n a 'pec1hc probab1lny
judgment regarding the hazards of smoking. .

. The 'urvcy quc, uon ' �cnain " hcihcr

respondents believe that cigarenc smoking " "hannful " However. the ml-. 1hrc,hold "" 10
what constitutes harm may differ aero'' ind1v1duab 'o thal the unp h cau on' of dc"g n ati ng
any particular risk as harmful are not nccc"anly umfom1 aero" n:'pondent' In .idd111on.
even for any particular respondent we do not know whal n m ean' for a prod uct

10 be

"harmful."803

For those reasons, Viscusi concludes that "(a)cro"-person compan,on' of quahtall\c

"'" van.ibJc:,

may be invalid.""°' They "cannot re,o)vc the "'uc of whether the ab,olulc level of n'k pcrcc puo n,

Viscusi conducted did not vary the

1.-ordmg of the

quc,uon a. much a. tlic) "med lhc

•111ntw11 bcmg

asked. (We have not seen the actual 'urvcy,; we ha \ c 'L-Cll on l) V.-cu"" CU�I) dc...: npuon ol tlicm J

As far as we can tell, there were only 1wo survey' that reworded 1hc quc,uon a.led on 1hc n.iuon.il ,ur' e)
In one of them, respondents were a.kcd "how many among lhc 2 nulhon c1gan:ne 'mol..cr' m ll:orth
Carolina would gel lung cancer becau'e 1hey 'm okc," and 111 another 1hcy \\ere a.,ked "ho\\ 111.in) among
1 ,000 cigarette smokers would get lung cancer oc-cau'c lhcy "nuke

" lei. al 76

Vi,..;u ,1 doc' nol 1cll rc.tdcr'

what the numerical responses were to tho'e quc,uon,. ln,tead. he n:pon- onl) thal n:,pondcnl' !ended to
give their answers in percentage te nn ,. See

1d.

That fact, he md1cate" 'uggl!'>t' that the \\Ording of the

national survey is appropriate. Perhap' ,o, but, e'pec1 al l y given that n:•pondent' 1r.in,Jatcd thc11 """' er'
into the same tenn,, it would be intere ,u ng to !-.now \\hat their n:'pon� \\ere If 1hc rc>pon� \\crc
significantly lower than the an,wer. prov1dL'<l m the national 'urYcy. thal \\Ould lend to ca.>t doubt on
Viscusi's conclusions.

Moreover, Vi.cu"'' olher 'urvcy ' an a1 1011' ..:cm la.rgc l ) , 1( nol cn u rc ly,
.
unresponsive to the basic critique m 1h.- 'L-Cl 1 0 n-d1 at "· 1ha1 lhc \\Ord .,mol..cr" " "' no\\hcrc defined
802.
803.

See id. at 48.
Id. at 48 (footnole omincd).

Vi •cu" purport• lO offer "(a]n add1t1onal problem" " nh qu.ihtauvc

risk assessments-specifically. "that 1hc 'UbJCCll\'C ml.. cutoff, for l abeli ng an acll• ny n'I.. ) ' .ii) acr�,
individuals." Id. For example, college-educated worl..cr. dc,cnbcd )Ob, " 1th an an nu.ii lnJUI) r.ite of 06
as "dangerous." while worker. who had not gone to col lege labeled a J Ob " nh .in lllJUI) rate of
"dangerous."

See id. It is not clear to

u' that there

" a di ffe rence

the first problem that Vi'cu'i 1den11fic,-1hat 1" that '"the ml.. thre,hold a. 10 \\hat .:on,tnutn
differ across individuab."
"sub,tantial,'"

Id. In any event, although V1 "u"

id., it is arguably

09

bcm ccn lh1' "add111onal problc:rn" .ind

harm lllJ)

lind' 1h1> \ anauon a<:rfu' cduc.illon le•cl,

msub,1antial. The cndcncc 'uggc,l> a d1ffc:n:ncc of uni) three pcrcc:111.igc

points between college-educated worl..er. and worl..cr. who did no1 go to college " 1th rc,pc:cl 10 " hc:thcr

a workplace was con,idered dangerou,.
804.

Id. at 48. Despite h1' critici>m' of qua h t au vc •tud1c" V1...: u>1 argue' that the:) ne• enlicln' ··pro• 1de
Id at -19 lie: JU,11 1in th.ti d.urn

a mechanism for tracking the development of n>I.. perccp11on' o\cr tune: "

by assening that "compari,on over lime for relau vc l y 'table populauon group' >hould be mun: n:hJblc:" 1lun
"[a]cross-per.on compari,on' of qual11at1vc ml-. ' anablc'

·· Id.

al -18. If V1"u'1 •> corn:cl 1hat the quJhlJll•e

surveys are unreliable acros' per.on,, howe ver. then there " no rca>on to bche• e tha t tlicy arc n:hablc: o\·cr
time. Contrary to hi> a.'enion. n i> doubtful thal populauon group, ha•e been all that >t.tble . .it lc.1.>t m 1cm1>
of the variables that he >ugge,ts might

be

"gm fi can t aero-. md1\ 1du.1b. For m>tancc, a• cragc: educauon

levels. income levels. and age leveb have changL'<l "gmlicantl� •mcc: 1 95-1. \\hen V1"u'1·, co mpanw n

begins. In 1 960, 4 1 . 1 % of tho'e 25 and older had completed at lca>t four yc.ir. of high ...:hool Su
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TilE UNITED STAlCS. supra note 269, at 1 59 lb) 2-1 I Per capna d1'po>able
per.onal income wa. $8660 a. mC3'ured in con>tant J 992 do lla r., ><'<' 1</ al -1-18 tbl 692 . .ind the: med1.in age
of the resident population wa. 29.5. ue 1d. at 1-1 tbl. 1 3. B y 1 995. 8 1 7q, of tho>e 25 Jn older h.id cornplc:ted
high >chool, see id. at 1 59 tbl.2-1 1 . while di>po,ablc per.onal income: had n>en 10 S I S.757, ,..,. 1</ .it -1-18
t bl.692, and the median age of the re.idem popu lati o n had incn:a,ed to 3-1 3 . s...- ul .it 1 -1 tbl 1 3
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is sufficient. Perceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of u perception that smoking is
'harmful. ""'0s In contrast, according to Viscusi, the quantitative surveys on which he bases his
conclusions create "a meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric."'06
To that line of argument, we have several responses. First, there is considerable evidence from
previous surveys that is not qualitative, and, hence, is invulnerable to his criticisms. For instance, one
of Viscusi's own tables reveals that us of 1 98 1 (the lust year summarized). nearly one-third of all
cigareue smokers polled believed that smoking was not "one of the causes of lung cancer.""" In the
same year, over two-fifths of smokers believed that smoking was not one of the causes of heart diseuse
and two-thirds believed that smoking was not one of the causes of birth defects."°" One-fifth of
respondents did not think that cigarette smoking was even harmful.""' More recently, a 1 990 survey
in Canada put to respondents the following question: "To the best of your knowledge, what, if uny, are
the health hazards related to smoking?"810 Only 44% of the 1 030 respondents included lung cancer in
their answers, and only 20% included heart disease.'" Such survey results suggest that for a substantial
portion of the smoking population, underestimation of the risks of smoking is a significant problem. m
Second, although Viscusi claims that he has measured consumer risk assessments with u
quantitative, "meaningful, well-defined probabalistic metric,"813 the precision his datu appear to provide
is likely an illusion. To be sure, respondents' answers to the survey questions were numerical. In that
sense, Viscusi is correct to claim that the "wording of the questions pertaining to the risk[s) . . . elicit[s]
a specific probability judgment" from respondents.' 14 Those numerical responses, however, arc unlikely
to be any more precise-and may be less precise-than are respondents' judgments regarding whether
cigarettes are "harmful." Cognitive psychology suggests that most people do not typically assess risks

805. VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 48.
806. Id. at 49.
807. Id. at 49 tbl.3- 1 . Nearly one-third also believed that smoking was not one of the causes of throat
cancer. See id.
808. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2.
809. See id. at 50 tbl.3-2.
8 1 0. Environics Research Group Ltd., Awareness of Heahh Hazards Due to Smoking tbl.22C (Dec.
1 7, 1 990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale law Joumal).
8 1 1 . See id.
8 1 2. In anticipation of this sort of response, Viscusi offers the following reply:
The fact that some small segment of the population does not believe that smoking is harmful
docs not mean that they equate not being harmful with being risk-free. One can view each
respondent us having some threshold risk value, above which u product is classified ns hurmful.
The fact that cigarettes may not be above this threshold implies only that the respondents
believe the risk is not so great that it passes the harmful-risk cutoff.
V1scus1, supra note 49, at 50-5 1 . In our estimation, however, such a view is implausible. II strains the
English language to suggest, us Viscusi seem� to, that those respondent� who answered that smoking is not
harmful may well accurately estimate or even overestimate the risks of smoking. Viscusi's claim, recull,
is that "[p]erceptions may be biased in either direction irrespective of a perception that smoking is
'harmful."' Id. at 48.
The view �eems even less plausible when one considers the �ubstantial percentage of the sume group
of respondents who did not believe that cigarettes were one of the causes of lung cancer, throat cancer,
heart disease, or birth defects: Nearly one-third of smoking respondents did not consider smoking to be one
of the pos�ible causes of lung cancer-which "has long been the be�t documented and most highly
publicized risk of smoking." Id. at 5 1 . In any event, the view that re�pondents have some threshold below
which they classify a product as nonharmful does not alleviate the problem created by consumer oplimism.
If the risk does not clear a consumer's harmful-risk threshold, it seems doubtful that the risk will innuence
that consumer's consumption choices.
8 1 3. Id. at 49.
8 1 4. Id. at 48.
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i n precise probabilistic terms. For example. one re'earchcr 'ummar1zc, 1hc Jucr.uun: a. follows

Intuitively, we seem to unders1and only four degree' of probability for an cvcnl vcl) likcl).
somewhat likely (more likely to happen 1han not). 'omcwhal unlikely (more lil-ely nol 10
happen), and very unlikely. Inside 1ho sc four compartment' all ., gray No d1ffcrcnce make,
any difference. [For example. a) 6 percent probability appear. 10 u' already sufficiently .. ,.cl)
unlikely" that the significantly inferior probab1lil) of I percent . ,

JU'I "1hc .amc .....

Given that dynamic, it seems unlikely thal 'urvcy respondcni- truly con,1den:d the problem in prcc1">C
numeric terms. More likely, they simply attempted to lr.m,Jatc 1hc1r vague qualuau\ c ml- J.SSC ">'mcnl'
into numeric equivalents. Because thi' proce's of 1r.in,Ja11on would only have been rough n:spondcnl'
.
would have been likely to lranslate their estimate' into well-known. "focal" numbers If one ''ere 10
begin with the four-category hypothes1,, one might predict that anw•crs would be d1,proport1ona1cly
c lustered at focal numbers representing the edge' of the four quarters o f JOO ... For in't;incc. tho">C
who believed that smoking poses virtually no

nsl- nught have cho\Cn zero (or pcrhap' some other low

focal number such as 5% or 1 0%). Tho'e who believed that . rnol- ing po'Cs a n:lauvcly 'light
have translated their estimate to 25'i<. Tho'e who believed thal 'moking

ml- nught

P<J">C' a rned1u111-,1Lcd n,J- nught

have chosen 50%. And tho'e who believed th.u '1110king pn:">Cnh a vel)" '1gmlicant ml- nught ha\c
chosen 75% or even 1 00%.
With that sort of prediction in mind .

II I' 11 l uminaung 10 examine with 'omc .:arc \C\ cral notable

features of the survey evidence on which V1,cu'1 relie,. The lirst que,uon on 1he 'un e y w a. wh.it
Viscusi describes as "an open-ended memOI)' probe regarding 111d1v1dua1' · n:acuon' 10 cigarette' ..., •
To summarize the responses to that que,tion. Vi,cu'i d1v1dc' "reacuon •· into twenty-1wo categonc,, 'uch
as "causes lung cancer," "shorten' life, k1lb," and "tl)·inglhavc med to quu.''"' V1..cu'1 report' the
percentage of respondents who gave answers in each ca1egOI)' a.' well a. "the mean Jung cancer n'k
assessment . . . corresponding" to each category.'" A' V1.cu'1 'tre'\C'· 1he "adverse ">Cnurnent .igain't
the product" is "stunning." even "overwhclnung.''';,,' For our purpose,, 1hc mo't 11lu1111na1ing timhng
is that I .3% of respondents indicated that they did not believe. or at Jca.,l wen: skeptical of cl a i m, , that
cigarettes are hannful.'21 Among those nonbelievers and 'kepuc , , the average probabah,uc n'k
assessment was approximately 25%.'11 The fact that even lhose ind1' 1duab m·cn:,umatc the "true n,k"
of smoking by a factor of between two and live should give pause 10 anyone who would treat the
respondents' numeric assessmenL� as anything more than Joo,e prox1e' for qualitauvc Judgment' Thal
point becomes especially clear when one carefully con,1der; the d1,tnbuuon' o f

probabali • a 1c 'un·c>

responses. Viscusi summarizes those d bmbuuon ' a' follow'

8 1 5. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini.

Proba/11/rn· Blmdness · N.-11hu Rt11w11al nor Caprrt 1mu, BOSTO'-IA.

Mar./Apr. 1 99 1 , at 28, 32-33.
8 1 6. Cf THOMAS C. SCHELLl1'G, THE STRATEGY OF

CO,FUCT 1 1 1 - 1 3 ( 1 980 cd ) !d1..:u"ing focal-

point solutions).
8 1 7.

V1scus1, supra note 49. at 88.
Id. at 89.
8 1 9. Id. at 88.
820. Id.
82 I . See 1d. at 89.
822. See id. (The mean mk pcrcepuon
group estimated 23.5o/c. See 1d. )
8 1 8.

of 1ho'e re>pondcnt> " a> 26 6q.

Currcni >mol.cr.

w 11hm thal
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TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER RISK PERCEPTIONS
FOR CJGARETIE SMOKING82-'

FRACTION WITH RISK PERCEPTIONS
IN INTERVAL
DISTRIBUTION OF LUNG CANCER

FULL SAMPLE

CURRENT
SMOKERS

RISK PERCEPTION (RISK)
RISK < .05

.052

.092

.05 ::; RISK < . 1 0

.046

.05 1

. 1 0 ::; RISK < .20

. 1 17

. 1 30

.20 ::; RISK < .30

. 1 36

. 146

.30 ::; RISK < .40

.090

. 1 14

.40 ::; RISK < .50

.052

.050

.50 ::; RISK < .60

.239

.228

.60 ::; RISK < .70

.Q70

.056

.70 ::; RISK < .80

.084

.050

.80 ::; RISK < .90

.042

.027

.90 ::; RISK < 1 .0

.041

.028

RISK = 1 .0

.D30

.026

Mean RISK

.426

.368

(standard error of mean)

(.005)

(.009)

Sample size

3 1 19

779

Unfortunately, Viscusi's distributional categories do not permit us to determine the precise extent
to which estimates clustered around quartile cutoffs. Nevertheless the distributions do appear consistent
with the four-category prediction. Moreover, several points that Viscusi makes in his description of the
distribution indicate that, in fact, the distribution of survey responses is strikingly consistent with tlmt
four-category prediction. For instance, Viscusi concedes that there is "clustering of responses around
salient risk levels, such as .25 and .50."m Viscusi's only response to this clustering is thut "the

823. See id. at 69 tbl.4-2; see also id. at 1 24 tbl.6-3 (including numbers for respondents aged 1 6-2 1 ).
824. Id. at 68. Complicating matters further (and making Viscusi's data even less precise), the
clustering around 50% (approaching one-quarter of all responses) may partially reHect an attempt on the
part of some respondents to answer "I don't know." Cf. SCHUMAN & PRESSER, s11pra note 795, ut 1 1 4
(explaining that significant random or systematic errors may be created by respondents "who really have
no views on the issues under inquiry and simply Hip mental coins in order to satbfy the interviewer's
expectation of an answer").
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direction o f bias imparted b y such rounding 1 s unclear."•:.• Thus, Viscus1' s mterpretauon o f the
evidence seems to be that the respondents did have precise quanuues m mmd. quanuues that they merely
rounded off for purposes of the survey. Our cl:um. m contrast. 1s that the respondents did nol operate
with precise quantitative risk assessments. Instead. they had only foggy quahtauve assessments that they
forced into numeric tenns for purposes of the survey. Insofar as our version 1s accurate. the numenc
responses do not mean what they appear to mean.
Viscusi unwittingly endorses our interpretauon of the d1stnbuuonal data when he anempl.s to
explain "[a]n intriguing aspect of' the distnbu11ons-spec1fically. that a "reasonably large fracuon of
smokers . . . believe the risk level is 1 .0 yet continue to smoke:"=• V1scus1 explains "[A) contnbuung
factor [to this outcome] is that the assessed cases of lung cancer per 100 smokers lend 10 be clustered
at salient numbers. Respondents assessing a RISK of

1 .0

may beheve that lung cancer 1s highly hkely

but not necessarily a certain outcome."•27 Viscus1's pomt seems to be exactly ours. Respondents may
well have chosen numbers that reflect nothing more than a rough approxm1auon of their qualnauve nsk
assessments.
If, indeed, that was the tendency of survey respondents. then all of the problems that V1SCus1
identifies with qualitative surveys were present wnh hts "quant11a11ve" sur•ey One cannot detemune
whether a person who gave 25% as a response (because she beheved that c1garenes pose only a shght
risk of lung cancer) is pessimistic or optimistic. Par.iphr.tl>mg Viscus1. the nsk threshold as to what
constitutes "a slight risk" may differ across individuals. makmg the 1mphcauons of such Jes1gnauons
unclear and not necessarily uniform across respondents.
In light of the evidence regarding how individuals assess nsh. the ··qual11auve·· sur•eys that
Viscusi disparages may be superior to his favored ··quanrnauve" surveys, on at least two grounds. First.
such surveys better reflect the qualitative categones that many people use when asse�mg nsk. and they
do not create survey noise by forcing respondents to tr.inslate those categones mto a less fam1har
language. Second, they do not create the potentially dangerous illusion of havmg employed ··a
meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric:·m

825.

VISCUS!, supra note 49, at 68.

826. Id. at 1 24.
827. Id. at 1 24-25.
828. Id. at 49.

